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Abstract 
This dissertation concerns the development of market information 
technologies in the London Stock Exchange, c. 1945-1992. Based on 
archival research in London, Cambridge and Edinburgh, and 20 semi-
structured interviews with former technologists, brokers, and market-
makers, my dissertation identifies the social, technological and 
institutional factors that allowed dealings in bonds and equities to move 
off the trading floor of the Stock Exchange and onto competing 
electronic platforms. 
My dissertation utilises the history of market information 
technologies as an occasion for producing a multi-layered analysis of 
the material, social, and regulatory transformations f finance in the 
City of London between c. 1945 and the mid 1990s. In particular, my 
dissertation deals with the rise of the so-called ‘information age’ in 
relation to British finance.  
The analysis is carried out in three parts, each takling a specific 
‘myth’ on the role of information and communication technologies in 
contemporary finance. The first part (chapters 3-4)deals with the 
dematerialisation of finance, demonstrating the oftn ignored character 
of technologies, materialities and their associated expertise in the 
constitution of the market. The second part (chapter 5) deconstructs the 
concept of disintermediation by analysing the social history of broking 
and jobbing in post-war City of London. Specifically, this part argues 
that changes in financial practices amongst the membership of the Stock 
Exchange were neither determined by the adoption of computers nor 
defined by a pre-existing culture of gentlemanly capitalism. Rather, they 
derived from the adaptation of market participants to a changing 
economic and social environment. The third part of this thesis (chapter 
6) engages with deregulation. In particular, it provides an account of 
three broad patterns of financial regulation in Britain and the emergence 
of the current understanding of financial markets as m nageable entities. 
The dissertation finalises by exploring the role of ‘informational 
metaphors’ in mediating the practices, materialities and regulations of 
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Of the market 
 
Bargain: a transaction to buy or sell 
shares in the Stock Exchange. 
 
Bear market: a market characterised 
by a fall in the price of a single or 
several securities. 
 
Bid:  the price at which a jobber or 
market maker was willing to buy stock 
or shares in the market.  
 
Blue button: an unauthorised clerk, so 
called because of the blue badges they 
wore.  
 
Bond: a fixed-interest security issued 
by local authorities or corporations. 
 
Broker:  a member of the Stock 
Exchange who acted as the agent of 
investing clients on the floor of the 
Stock Exchange. 
 
Box: a small room adjacent to the 
floor of the Stock Exchange, used by 
the dealing staff of broking firms. 
 
Bull market: a market characterised 
by an increase in the price of a single 
or several securities. 
 
Gilt  also Gilt-edged: the term used to 
refer to British government-issued 
securities.  
 
House: The colloquial term used for 
the premises or trading floor of the 
Stock Exchange. 
 
Jobber: before 1986, a member of the 
Stock Exchange who acted as a market 
maker, buying and selling shares and 
stocks from brokers on his or her own 
account. 
 
Merchant bank:  a banking institution 
that engaged in project finance, 
investment management and planning 
securities issuance. Merchant banks 
were largely absorbed by investment 
banks and, eventually, consolidated 
with commercial banks. 
 
Offer:  the price at which a jobber or 
market maker was willing to sell stock 
or shares. 
 
Put through:  a broker who receives 
orders to buy and sell the same 
security from different clients is 
permitted to match one against the 
other after offering them to the market 
through a jobber. 
 
Quotation: a dealing price in the 
market or a mid price as registered in 
the Stock Exchange Official List. 
 
Share: a certificate representing one 
unit in the ownership of a corporation 
or mutual fund.   
 
Stock: a certificate representing one 
unit in the ownership of a corporation 
or mutual fund. In Britain, ‘stock’ 
could referred to debt before the 
1970s. 
 
Ticket:  a paper slip, prepared by the 
buying broker, to identify a purchase; 




Touch: the difference between the 
highest bid and the lowest offer in the 
market.  
 
Turn:  the spread between the bid and 
offered price quoted by a jobber or 
market maker.  
 
Unauthorised clerk: an employee of 
a member firm of the Stock Exchange 
admitted to the trading floor but that 
was not allowed to deal in securities.  
  
Waiter:  the name given to the 
uniformed attendants of the Stock 
Exchange before 1986.  
 
Of the organisation 
 
ASG: Advanced Systems Group (c. 
1982-1990); a group led by Peter 
Bennett, responsible for blue-sky 
innovation in the Stock Exchange. 
 
Committee for General Purposes: 
the organ of the Stock Exchange that, 
up to 1947, represented the members 
of the Stock Exchange. 
 
Committee of Trustees and 
Managers: the organ of the Stock 
Exchange that, up to 1947, represented 
the owners of the buildings of the 
Stock Exchange. 
 
DISS: Directorate of Information 
Systems and Settlement (); the 
division of the Stock Exchange led by 
George Hayter responsible for 
developing and maintaining the 
systems for the market.  
 
SSG: Special Systems Group (1977-
1984); a group led by Peter Bennett, 
responsible for developing Exchange 
Price Information by Computer. 
 
 
Of the technologies  
 
Argus: a series of industrial control 
computers developed by Ferranti 
(Manchester) between 1958 and 1976. 
The Argus 400 used by the Stock 
Exchange relied on silicon transistors, 
and was based on a 12-bit word length 
with 24-bit instructions.  
 
CHARM: CHecking, Accounting and 
Reporting for Member Firms; a 
bargain checking and reporting system 
introduced by the Stock Exchange in 
the mid 1970s, as part of the first 
phase of the settlement system, 
TALISMAN.  
 
CRS: Computer Readable Service; a 
system that allowed users (including 
member firms, banks and investment 
managers) to connect their proprietary 
information systems to the databases 
of EPIC. 
 
DEC: Digital Equipment Corporation; 
an American computer company and 
the vendor of PDP and VAX 
minicomputers throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s.  
 
EPIC:  Exchange Price Information by 
Computer; a price and company news 
information system developed and 
provided by the Stock Exchange 
starting in 1977. Unlike the Argus 
400, the computer at the heart of EPIC 
contained a database of prices and 
company news that was accessible 
through digital links. EPIC thus made 
possible distributing digital rather than 
analog content to users. 
 
IDN: Integrated Data Network; an 
unfulfilled plan conceived between 
1981 and 1984 to standardise the 
technological platforms of the Stock 
Exchange by creating a single system 
xix 
for market information, order routing 
and settlement.  
 
MANTIS:  MArket aND Trading 
Information System; a system planned 
by the Stock Exchange and ultimately 
replaced by SAEF that aimed to 
automate the execution of small 
trades. 
 
MPDS: Market Price Display Service; 
a black and white mid-price broadcast 
system developed by the Stock 
Exchange in conjunction with Ferranti 
in 1969. The system relied on a series 
of input terminals located on the floor 
of the Stock Exchange, where prices 
were entered into an Argus 400. The 
Argus 400 generated a digital feed that 
was then transformed into an analog 
signal by a video converter. The signal 
was broadcast via a closed circuit 
coaxial cable network throughout the 
City of London in 22 channels. 
 
PDP-11: a series of 16-bit 
minicomputers developed by DEC and 
designed for use in real-time 
applications. 
 
SAEF: SEAQ Automated Execution 
Facility; a small order automated 
execution system introduced by the 
Stock Exchange in 1988. 
 
SEAQ: Stock Exchange Automated 
Quotations; a quotation reporting 
system introduced by the Stock 
Exchange in Big Bang in 1986 that 
presented all the bids and offers for 
the most active shares in the market 
and allowed dealing to be conducted 
over the phone. 
 
TOPIC:  Teletext Output of Price 
Information by Computer; videotext 
service introduced in 1980 that offered 
price and company news information 
to subscribers throughout Britain and 
the world. Unlike its predecessor, 
MPDS, TOPIC was based on an 
asymmetrical communication channel 
(users were not limited to receiving a 
set broadcast but could request 
information to the computer). Data 
displayed on TOPIC came from EPIC 
and was distributed via conventional 
and dedicated phone lines to terminals 
across the world. 
 
TALISMAN:  Transfer Accounting 
and Lodgement for Investors, Stock 
MANagement for jobbers; an IBM-
based settlement system introduced by 
the Stock Exchange in order to 
streamline account and bargain 
matching, reducing the need of clerical 
workers in the settlement room and 
increasing the speed of bargain 
reporting. 
 
VAX:  a 32-bit minicomputer 














The world isn’t run by weapons anymore, or 
energy or money. It’s run by ones and zeroes, little 
bits of data. It’s all just electrons. […] There’s a 
war out there, old friend, a world war. And it’s not 
about who’s got the most bullets. It’s about who 
controls the information: what we see and hear, 
how we work, what we think. It’s all about the 
information. 
 
Cosmo (Ben Kingsley) in Sneakers (1992) 
 
 
I started research for this volume in late 2006, nearly twenty years to the day after the 
London Stock Exchange’s Big Bang. At the time of my initial investigation, the 
recent financial crisis was still in the making, nothing more than a faint possibility in 
a far away horizon. Indeed, if anything, the moment was one of celebration for 
British finance: after more than nine decades of American supremacy over the 
international financial system, the City of London could once again boast that it 
outranked New York as the largest capital of capital in the world (Timmons, 2006). 
Two decades of organisational reconfiguration, pervasive technological innovation, 
and carefully engineered governmental intervention tra sformed London into the 
brightest star in the constellation of global finance.  
 
Today, the record-breaking days of the FTSE are long-gone and all that seems 
to remain is the memory of a more prosperous past. That and the vast array of 
institutions, practices, materialities, connectivities and vocabularies built over 
centuries as the supports of finance. In seeking to understand the nature and character 
of these supports, this dissertation explores the design, adoption, diffusion, and 
apprehension of information and communication technologies within the London 
Stock Exchange between circa 1945 and 1995. Specifically, this volume utilises the 
history of market information technologies as an occasion for producing a multi-
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layered analysis of the material, social, and regulatory transformations that 
embedded the London Stock Exchange from the end of the Second World War to the 
mid 1990s. In doing so, the discussions presented i this volume serve as a basis for 
apprising both sociological accounts of the recent history of British finance as well as 
broader debates on the technological character of the marketplace.  
1.1 Caught in the information age 
The sociological literature on finance portrays Bigang as a fundamental 
discontinuity in the practices, structures and cultures of the City of London – the 
historical, geographic and figurative centre of the British securities industry. 
Paradigmatically, the work of Manuel Castells, widely deemed a foundational author 
for understanding the dynamics of the so-called information age, presents Big Bang 
as the ‘turning point’ in a process of global deregulation that set the grounds for a 
‘new financial freedom [allowing] capital from all sources to be mobilised from 
anywhere to be invested anywhere’ (Castells, 2000c, p. 104). Elsewhere, Big Bang is 
similarly rendered a watershed – both factual and symbolic – in the evolution of 
British finance: for some, it marked London’s début as a global city (Sassen, 1999); 
for others, it demonstrated the technologically-mediated end of geography in 
financial services (O'Brien, 1992); and yet for others, it exemplified the birth of a 
new global economic order (Strange, 1986). Big Bang was thus ‘liberalisation’, 
‘opening-up’, ‘deregulation’, ‘transformation’, ‘boom’, and ‘culmination’. In sum, it 
was the beginning of a new era, the exemplar of the uture of finance. 
 
The transformations of Big Bang, we are suggested by Castells, were defined 
by two specific processes. The first was strictly regulatory. Big Bang and the broader 
reordering of the British securities industry during the 1980s was framed by a 
calculated process of deregulation, whereby cross-brder transactions were 
‘liberalised’ and the ‘cartel’ of the Stock Exchange was disassembled. These two 
changes resulted in a flight of capital into London, leading to a reconfiguration of the 
securities industry and the subsequent consolidation of the City as one of the pillars 





The second process was overtly technological. Along with the regulatory 
overhaul of 1986, Big Bang entailed the introduction of a suite of novel platforms 
and services to the market. These included the scren-based market information 
services SEAQ and SEAQ-I (for Stock Exchange Automated Quotations, and Stock 
Exchange Automated Quotations International, respectively) that, in conjunction 
with the telephone, resulted in the demise of face-to-face dealing on the Stock 
Exchange’s trading floor. Big Bang thus signalled London’s transition towards a 
‘new informational economy’, incorporating its markets into a system in which  
all earnings from all activities and countries end up being traded. This global 
financial market works only partly according to market rules. It is shaped and 
moved by information turbulences of various origins, processed and 
transmitted almost instantly by tele-communicated, information systems, in 
the absence of the institutional regulation of globa  capital flows (Castells, 
2000b, p. 11) […] The outcome of […] financial globalisation may be that we 
have created an Automaton, at the core of our economies, decisively 
conditioning our lives. Humankind’s nightmare of seeing our machines 
taking control of our world seems on the edge of becoming reality – not in the 
form of robots that eliminate jobs or government computers that police our 
lives, but as an electronically based system of financial transactions (Castells, 
2000a, p. 56) 
As the world was tied together ‘in almost real time’ (Bell, 1977, p. 112), the 
technological reconfiguration of finance embodied the rise of a post-industrial epoch 
(see Bell, 1973). From Big Bang onwards, we are told, finance was increasingly a 
global technological affair. 
1.2 Three informatic myths 
Although the proliferation of information and communication technologies within 
financial spheres is an undeniable empirical fact of the twentieth century, the 
scholarship on the subject has so far tended to flatten the sociological facets of 
technological change. Effectively, the history of cntemporary finance is narrated as 
a triumphal saga of technological efficiency, a collusion of tales of bold innovation 
and stories of decreasing trading costs, wider corporate ownership and greater 
regulatory control. As a subsection of this literatu e, accounts on the digitalisation of 
finance are no exception. As demonstrated by extant analyses of Big Bang, the 
scholarship on the most recent wave of technological ch nge within finance 
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approaches the issue as a fundamental historical discontinuity. The late, though 
ultimately revolutionary, adoption of computers and telecommunications in the 
securities industry, for instance, is rendered the most important change in finance in 
the last century (Cortada, 2005). Likewise, the very st ucture of financial markets is 
deemed a pre-determined consequence of the rise and consolidation of the (digital) 
information age (Castells, 2000a). 
 
In presenting technology as a transformative force, however, authors have 
committed three important omissions. First, following the basic metaphors of the 
neoclassical theory of production, they present information technologies as ready-
made inputs that emerge from the black-box of the information age. Second, by 
rendering technologies as external inputs, they tend o present financial organisations 
as adopters rather than developers, clients rather than designers. The financial 
services industry, it would seem, only embraced innovations ‘once it made economic 
sense to do so’ (Cortada, 2005). Third, even in the rar  instances when innovation is 
the explicit object of analysis, it is portrayed as a linear process driven by the 
diverging forces of market demand and technological pull (for a discussion on these 
explanations, see MacKenzie & Wajcman, 2003; Williams & Edge, 1996).  
 
Examples of these omissions are numerous. Charles R. Geiss’ history of Wall 
Street, for instance, conspicuously leaves technological change unattended (Geiss, 
2004). Similarly, Ranald Michie’s meticulous history of the London Stock Exchange 
mentions the proliferation of technological systems in the market almost in passing, 
without reference to the trials and tribulations of their development.  
 
Engaging with the transformations of British finance that gave form and 
figure to Big Bang requires constructing a nuanced history of both deregulation and 
the adoption of information and communication technologies, avoiding the 
revolutionary – and ultimately sociologically opaque – rhetoric of the information 
age (e.g. Chandler & Cortada, 2000; Cortada, 2005). Such a study must start from the 
recognition that, however important in modern societies, digital technologies are no 
more central to the organisation of the marketplace than, say, specific valuation 
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techniques or particular cultures of accountancy. To imply that a circumscribed 
domain of the ‘digital’ imbricates a separate domain of the ‘social’ (Latham & 
Sassen, 2005) is to lose sight of the contingent and situated character of technology, 
knowledge and practice. Analyses of change in finance are not served by upholding 
dichotomies of digital/analog, technological/social, future/past, and 
revolution/tradition, all of which fail to capture the subtleties of the sociotechnical 
interactions that bound and structure market institutions.  
 
Much of the work performed in the following pages rconstructs the recent 
history of British finance by critically assessing a set of myths (see Barthes, 1993) 
that emerged from the rhetoric of the information age s applied to finance. In 
deconstructing these myths, the accounts here presented illustrate the uses, 
mobilisations, and reconfigurations of information a d communication technologies 
in the financial marketplace of the London Stock Exchange. Based on notions of 
information as the token of social and economic interaction, these myths are 
constituted by a series of teleological imaginaries that inflect the destiny of society 
and the market with the affordances of information and communication technologies. 
The future, in this mythology, is digital, a landscape populated by creatures bearing 
the prefixes of ‘i-’, ‘ e-’, ‘ cyber-’ and ‘info-’. Like comparable semiotic structures 
elsewhere, the mythology of the information age is thus an ambiguous meta-
language, distorting, deforming and naturalising the technological operation of the 
marketplace.  
 
The myths here dissected are three. The first is a d rect implication of 
accepting the information and communication technologies as entities that can 
capture, represent and process market interactions in their entirety. Insofar as finance 
is seen as the processing of information (e.g. Fama, 1970), it is deemed an arena that 
can be ‘dematerialised’, stripped of its awkward physicality and reduced to the 
virtual (and virtuous) purity of information flows. The possibility of 
dematerialisation is clear in the vocabularies of commentators of high modernity: 
today’s markets, it is said, exist ‘in a kind of [globalised] cyberspace in which money 
capital has reached its ultimate dematerialisation, as messages that pass 
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instantaneously from one nodal point to another across the former globe, the former 
material globe’ (Jameson, 1997, p. 260). While demat rialisation was originally 
confined to the technical vocabularies that described the possibility of computerising 
paper certificates to reduce settlement and clearing costs (Cerny, 1994; Hamilton, 
1986), the metaphor soon acquired greater ambitions, growing into an all-
encompassing term for extrapolating the hyper-mobile economies of the future (e.g. 
Colombo, 1988; Junne, Komen, & Tomei, 1989; Trainer, 2001; Kander, 2005). 
 
Compounded with the alleged ability of computers and telecommunications 
to capture the financial marketplace, finance is the subject of a second myth. Just as 
technology enabled the elimination of material dependencies, it also facilitated 
severing social connectivities. Technology, in particular, allowed investors to 
disintermediate their dealings, bypassing human brokers and market-makers with 
unhuman networks of computer code (Barber & Odean, 2001). For the myth of 
disintermediation, the deployment of alternative trading systems and electronic 
communication networks within the securities industry demonstrated technology’s 
ability to offer unmediated access to the informatic ebbs and flows of global finance 
(Ming, Stallaert, & Whinston, 2004; Allen, McAndrews, & Strahan, 2002). In the 
financial markets of the new economy, growth, efficien y, access, safety, risk and 
equality and were cast in informatic moulds (Atkinso , 2004; Castells, 2004; 
Claessens, Glaessner, & Klingebeil, 2002). 
 
Finally, contemporary finance was captured by a third myth. Technological 
innovations within the securities industry, we are told, flattened the world (O'Brien, 
1992), prompting an aggressive agenda of deregulation that aimed to contain the 
global flows of capital within the boundaries of nation-states. Through the economic 
incentives of deregulation, the space of flows is temporarily immobilised in a place 
of space. But deregulation was not merely a matter of liminating rules, of reducing 
intervention in the market and attracting flows to place. Deregulation involved 
delegating trust to technology, subordinating the regulator to the broader machinery 
of the market. Technology created an unprecedented ‘transparency’ (Nieto, 2001), 
solving the market’s fundamental problem of asymmetric information. Intervention 
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thus became a matter of objective undesirability: after all, constituted by 
technologically mediated information flows, efficient markets provide ‘the most 
potent protection possible for investors’ (Saari, 1977, p. 1076) 
1.3 Making finance in the London Stock Exchange 
This volume utilises the three myths briefly introduced above as a subtext for 
analysing the material, social, and regulatory transformations that embedded the 
London Stock Exchange in the years of the putative rise of the information age. Each 
of the following chapters, each critique of a myth, then, represents a different aspect 
in the career of the London Stock Exchange. In exploring these careers, each chapter 
provides a glimpse – perhaps fragmented, perhaps incomplete, but insightful 
nonetheless – of the changes that characterised late twentieth-century British finance. 
 
This volume does not pretend to be the first to approach the information age 
from a critical standpoint. Critical analyses of the information age (Webster, 2006; 
Sholle, 2003) and of some of the myths of the ‘new economy’ (in the case of 
disintermediation, see French & Leyshon, 2004; for regulation, see Vogel, 1996; for 
dematerialisation and ICTs, see Sassen, 2002) are plentiful elsewhere. The 
contribution of this study resides in supplying a historical demonstration of the co-
evolution of information and communication technologies, financial practices, social 
connectivities, and organisational regulations in the ongoing construction of the 
London Stock Exchange and its markets.  
 
The theoretical approach of this exploration is insp red in the traditions of 
science and technology studies (MacKenzie et al., 2003; Williams et al., 1996; Bijker 
& Law, 1992). And within the diverse collection of approaches within science and 
technology studies, this volume is particularly influenced by the performative theory 
of social institutions as forwarded by Barry Barnes, David Bloor and Martin Kusch 
(Bloor, 1997; Kusch, 2002; Barnes, 1983; Barnes, 1995). Based on the sociology of 
scientific knowledge as developed in Edinburgh during the 1970s, the performative 
theory of social institutions provides a subtle, though robust, theoretical scaffold for 
several parts of this project. In engaging with an overtly economic topic, this volume 
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also forms part of a larger body of social scientific l terature located at the 
intersection of several established disciplinary domains, from new economic 
sociology and the sociology of markets, to business studies and economic 
anthropology (Pinch & Swedberg, 2008; Callon, 1998; Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2005; 
MacKenzie, 2009; MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007).  
 
The discussions presented in this volume, furthermore, stand on a solid 
corpus of historical and sociological scholarship on the financial communities of the 
City of London. Prime amongst these is Ranald Michie’s exhaustive account of the 
history of the London Stock Exchange (Michie, 1999). I dare not compete with 
Michie’s historical proficiency: his narrative is meticulous and his descriptive 
breadth is bolstered by what seems to have been an u precedented access to the 
private records of the Stock Exchange. To Michie’s account, I offer a complementary 
narrative in the form of the testimony of technologists involved in building the 
platforms of the market between c. 1968 and 1992. While business history has tended 
to neglect the technical and bureaucratic underbelly of financial institutions – the 
engineers, secretaries, analysts, accountants, clerks, janitors, et al. that, through their 
everyday activities, produce organisation through time – here I seek to bring their 
contributions to the fore. Paraphrasing Bruno Latour’s renowned essay (Latour, 
1992), in at least two chapters of this volume, I search for the missing engineers.   
 
Alongside Michie’s work, the histories of David Kynaston, William Reader, 
and Michael Reed contextualise this study. While Kynaston’s oeuvre arguably offers 
some of the most detailed accounts of the City of London’s social life and the 
operation of its principal institutions, Reader and Reed presents – albeit in a 
sometimes celebratory and institutionally sanctioned mode – the history of some of 
Britain’s merchant banks and stockbroking firms. Operating with an altogether 
different rationale, Alex Preda’s recent Framing Finance (2009) prefaces the 
sociological discussions presented in this volume by offering a study of the 
emergence and consolidation of modern finance in the nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century, including debates on the meaning and use of information in the market.  
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1.4 Synopsis  
This volume is structured around three substantive themes, each dealing with one of 
the abovementioned myths of the information age. In deconstructing these myths, 
each theme engages with a specific aspect of the social and institutional life of the 
London Stock Exchange.   
 
The first theme of this volume is dematerialisation. This is approached by 
presenting an account of the adoption and diffusion of i formation and 
communication technologies in the Stock Exchange. Chapter 3 examines the early 
days of technological adoption, focusing on the development of the Stock 
Exchange’s first computer-based market information dissemination systems. The 
story presented in chapter 3 opens with the mutualisation of the Stock Exchange in 
1947 and closes with the introduction of the competing electronic trading platform 
ARIEL in the early 1970s.  
 
While chapter 3 deals with the early stages of technological development, 
chapter 4 describes the consolidation of the technological culture that surrounded the 
creation of market information dissemination systems within the Stock Exchange. In 
particular, this chapter explores the rise and expansion of the Special Systems Group 
– the department charged with developing most of the information systems for the 
marketplace. As this chapter explores, the Special Systems Group and its 
organisational correlates were instrumental in shaping and managing the 
technological trajectory of the Stock Exchange’s markets. Equally relevant, this 
chapter demonstrates that the digitalisation of the Stock Exchange was characterised 
by the proliferation of materialities, represented both by the novel technological 
platforms for the marketplace as by the organisation l infrastructures required for 
maintaining and supporting exchange. 
 
The second theme of this volume is disintermediation. This myth is analysed 
in chapter 5 through a reassessment of the social history of stockbroking and 
stockjobbing in the Stock Exchange. Weighing the history of the Stock Exchange’s 
membership in relation to innovations in technologies and investment techniques, 
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this chapter engages with the literature on so-called gentlemanly capitalism (see, 
paradigmatically, Cain & Hopkins, 1986a; Cain & Hopkins, 1986b). Following the 
insights of Eric Hobsbawm (2008), however, this chapter represents gentlemanly 
capitalism as an invented tradition and, in doing so, opens a space for understanding 
the different modes of technological adoption within the member firms of the Stock 
Exchange. As is shown, technological adoption within e market was associated to a 
re-intermediation of finance in London which included, among other things, the 
redefinition of the professional identities of brokers and jobbers vis-à-vis new modes 
of apprehending market information.  
 
Part three of this volume delves into the alleged dregulation of finance in the 
City of London. Deregulation is a critical theme, insofar as it is identified as the 
catalyst of financial globalisation and the consolidat on of the information age in 
international markets. Rather than being a removal f rules – as its etymological 
provenance would suggest – deregulation in the 1980s is here represented as a 
process deriving from the introduction of bureaucrati  imperatives into the 
organisation of the market. This was exemplified, for instance, in the adoption of 
economic techniques for assessing and surveying finance. As argued in chapter 6, the 
adoption of these techniques was itself catalysed by a series of internal and external 
crises of confidence and organisational readjustments that led both market 
participants and government to find novel solutions to a certain problem of authority. 
The exploration of chapter 6 consists of analysing the regulatory history of finance in 
and around the London Stock Exchange. By tracing the outlines of such history, this 
chapter highlights three broad transformations in the regulatory discourses of British 
finance.  
 
Chapter 7 approaches the themes discussed in this volume by analysing the 
mechanisms through which actors create markets with the use of metaphors. Chapter 
7, in particular, introduces the theoretical concept of a market-making regime as 
shorthand for representing the sociologically-relevant mechanisms that social actors 
utilise to orient their behaviours in constituting specific manifestations of the market. 
Recurring to the work of Barry Barnes and John Dupre (2008), and the insights of 
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George Lakoff (1992; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), this chapter draws a connection 
between metaphors and market-making regimes. In doing so, it presents an account 
of the use and mobilisation of the so-called informatic metaphor in constituting the 
markets of the London Stock Exchange. 
1.5 A brief note on terminology 
The discussions presented in this volume hinge on three interrelated, though 
empirically and theoretically distinct, concepts: those of myth, imaginary and 
metaphor. For the benefit of clarity, I will make explicit the differences in said 
concepts, thereby disentangling possible confusions that might arise. 
  
Myths – and the mythologies they create – are here und rstood in terms of 
Roland Barthes’ semiotic approach (Barthes, 1993). In particular, myths are 
considered second order signs that hinge on ‘ordinary’ (first order) signs but to which 
something, such as a certain ideological content, has been added. Following 
Ferdinand de Sausseur’s semiotics, Barthes presents the first order of communication 
as composed of signs in which the signifier and signified are associated according to 
a particular, though arbitrary, convention. In myths, owever, the sign is itself a 
signifier, or, in other words, stands for something. The meaning of myths, however, 
is not arbitrary: rather, it is purposefully attributed, carefully constructed. In this 
sense, myths are ideological. Within the discussions presented in this volume, 
dematerialization, disintermediation and deregulation operate in this sense: while 
they may refer to concrete things – for instance, in the case of dematerialisation, to 
the elimination of paper-based certificates – they also signify broader processes – for 
example, the hyper-mobility of global finance.  
 
Imaginaries, on the other hand, are complex symbolic systems shared by 
particular communities. Specifically, I rely on Charles Taylor’s definition of social 
imaginaries, which are understood as collectively shared systems of reference used 
by individuals to imagine their social existence, their obligations towards others, 
their expectations of behaviour, and the normative notions and images underlying 
these expectations (Taylor, 2004). Importantly, given that they are shared by large 
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social groups, social imaginaries are reservoirs that allow collectives to articulate a 
sense of legitimacy. Imaginaries are therefore different from myths: although they 
have an ideological dimension, they are constructed by collective accord and are less 
defined in their meaning.  
 
Finally, wherever references to metaphors are made, these follow the 
conceptual framework proposed by Lakoff & Johnson (2003). Metaphors, in 
particular, are understood as linguistic associations between different domains of 
experience and thought. For Lakoff and Johnson, such associations coordinate action 
across differing domains. As they note, ‘the concepts that govern our thought are not 
just matters of the intellect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the 
most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around 
the world, and how we relate to other people. […] The essence of metaphor [in this 
framework] is understanding and experiencing one kid of thing in terms of another’ 
(p. 3-5).  Hence, and unlike myths and imaginaries, metaphors are not purely 
symbolic; importantly, they are experiential modes of cognition that allow for 
comparisons and interpolations to be made.  
 
 Before I proceed to the details of this story, befor  I venture into the black 
boxes of finance in the twentieth century Stock Exchange, I shall offer some 








2 Studying Markets and their Machines 
Michel de Certeau once noted that writing history start  with the construction of a 
sentence, with the act of filling the blank surface of a page. To produce history in 
Certeau’s sense is to commence a new time, to distance our present from our past, 
vacillating between a reference to practices and the creation of a closed discourse 
(Certeau, 1988). Writing, categorising and reconstructing – all elements of producing 
history – are thus a creation of boundaries, acts that define what is within and what is 
without.  
 
Tracing boundaries is arguably an inescapable part of the creation of the 
historical text, a step that has to be taken to provide author and reader, manuscript 
and audience, the limits of their mediated interaction, an outline of the rules of the 
game. The rules of this game, the limits of this particular exploration, are the subject 
of this chapter. Showing these limits and the roads t ken to create this text, this 
chapter situates my study within the webs of sources, methodologies and theories 
used in its creation.  
2.1 Sources and resources 
The initial boundaries of this study are given by its theme. In its design, the 
discussions of this volume are constrained to the analysis of the technological 
infrastructures, financial practices, economic discourses and regulatory instruments 
deployed within and around the London Stock Exchange. Spatially and materially, 
this involves centring my account on a finite set of individuals, organisations and 
artefacts that were related to the financial community of the London Stock Exchange. 
Temporally, this thematic selection further implies focusing on events and processes 
that occurred during the second half of the twentieth c ntury – although on some 
occasions my narrative meanders into earlier periods. As such, this text is engineered 
in the form of extended narratives as opposed to punctual comparisons. Rather than 
contrasting the London Stock Exchange to some other venue, the objective of this 
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text is to account for changes in practices and institutions within a specific subset of 
British finance in relatively recent times.  
 
The spatial and temporal limits of this text derive in a second boundary, set 
by the selection of sources that inform the narrative herein contained. As any study 
informed by (and constitutive of) history, this project is prefigured by its sources, be 
they the archival records and interviews that empirically anchor the account, or the 
secondary narratives that provide links to the larger literature on British finance. 
Each source is unique, insofar as it is a specific manifestation of a past event, of a 
process, thought or interaction that was crystallised in physical form. To use a tactile 
metaphor, the threads used to weave this story have t us different lengths, strengths 
and consistencies, and it is through this diversity of materials that this story acquires 
its richness and form.  
2.1.1 Archives and documental sources 
The primary sources used in this study were obtained from a series of libraries and 
archives that are well-known to the historian of British finance. Without any doubt 
the most prominent among these, the archive of the Guildhall Library, London, 
houses the records of the London Stock Exchange as well as the collections of other 
City institutions. My use of the Guildhall Library, however, was somewhat limited 
by the scope of this project: while much of the automation of the Stock Exchange 
took place from the mid 1960s onwards, other than a couple of isolated instances, the 
corporate records of this organisation are only avail ble for dates prior to the mid 
1950s. A legal constraint made it impossible to access the minutes of the Council and 
Committees of the Stock Exchange – despite having sou ht permission in writing to 
the legal secretary of this organisation in late 2006. Similarly, whilst the archivist at 
the Guildhall Library kindly gave me a glimpse of two uncatalogued boxes of the 
records of the stockbroking firms Philips & Drew, most of the information therein 
found was already available elsewhere (Reader & Kynaston, 1998). Indeed, the 
archives of Philips & Drew at Guildhall contain discu sions between William Reader 
and some of the brokers formerly involved with this firm, as part of the exchanges 
that preceded the publication of his book. An important exception within the 
Guildhall Library was a series of corporate documents published by the Council of 
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the Stock Exchange describing, among other things, ts position vis-à-vis Big Bang 
and the role of technology in stockbroking in the 1980s. More than anything else, 
however, visits to the Guildhall Library – which I did almost ritualistically, in every 
opportunity I had when visiting London – provided me with a sense of the contents 
and vocabularies used by the Stock Exchange in its documents and, consequently, a 
small and admittedly partial sense of the everyday corporate culture of this 
organisation.  
 
Most of the sources used in this study were spread throughout a handful of 
libraries. The British Library, London, contained a considerable number of 
publications by the Stock Exchange, including its Rules and Regulations, the Code of 
Dealing, the Rules for Listings and Quotations, as well as diverse pamphlets and 
magazines. In addition to these documents (which were overtly oriented at the 
internal audience of the Stock Exchange), the catalogue of the British Library 
contained several volumes of the proceedings of a series of conferences titled 
Computers in the City which, organised by George Hayter, were a crucial forum for 
discussing the technological innovations of British finance. Insofar as they captured 
the technological developments and imaginaries of the City of London, this study 
utilised these volumes as primary sources. An equally notable source of data was 
found in the National Sound Archive, also located in the British Library, which 
contains transcripts and recordings of numerous oral histories of finance and banking 
forming part of the City Lives Project.  
 
In addition to the British Library, I consulted the collections of the National 
Library of Scotland, Edinburgh. There, I encountered a fundamentally important set 
of documents in the form of an (almost complete) colle tion of the Stock Exchange 
Journal. As a cultural object, the Journal provides a window into the everyday life of 
the Stock Exchange, the concerns of its membership, and the whims of the times. At 
a different level, the National Library of Scotland also housed several reports by the 
Office of Fair Trading, concerning the practices and regulations of the Stock 
Exchange in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These provided parts of the argument for 
chapter 6 and were the basis of a (failed) Freedom of Information Request that 
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sought to recover some of the consultations made at the time by the OFT with several 
financial institutions, in Britain and abroad. Unfortunately, such files were either 
discarded or destroyed, and apparently no records remain of the institutional 
discussions on the regulations of the Stock Exchange of the early 1990s within the 
archives of the OFT.  
 
In different ways, the Bank of England Archives, and the archives of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science and Ki g’s College, Cambridge, 
provided snippets that, however reduced, contributed to my narratives. The records 
of the Bank of England, for instance, showed instances of the use of operations 
research in a British financial institution, whilst the records of Peter Shore at the 
London School of Economics contained documents issued by the Stock Exchange in 
the 1970s in defence of their practices. The immaculately preserved records at King’s 
College, furthermore, provided data on John Maynard Keynes’ views of the Stock 
Exchange during the Second World War. 
 
Archival work was complemented with the opinions and temporalities 
portrayed and materialised in newspapers. The Financial Times was a particularly 
useful source of insights, as were The Guardian, The Times, The Independent, and 
the New York Times. While my initial explorations in these publications involved 
dealing with the physicality of microfilms, my work soon reached the realm of the 
digital archives of Factiva and Lexis Nexis – admittedly missing some of the context 
provided by a print newspaper. The accounts in newspapers and other periodical 
publications were utilised as indexes, in a sense, for the broader narratives, as 
elements that provided stubs on which to tie the story.   
2.1.2 Interviews and personal communications 
However detailed it may be, and however much it mayrepresent the logic of 
bureaucratic life, the print medium is inert. In a project that deals with a relatively 
recent set of practices and events, documents are almost inadequately partial, 
insufficiently rich, forms of data. Seeking to provide a thicker texture to the 
narrative, the bulk of the materials used in this volume come from interviews with 
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technologists and market participants that were associated, in some way or another, 
to the Stock Exchange between 1968 and 1992.  
 
The interviews forming part of this project were conducted between April 
2007 and May 2008 and took place in several locations across the United Kingdom. 
In total, this project made use of 20 interviews of which 8 were with technologists; 6 
with former brokers; 3 with former jobbers; one with a staff member of the Stock 
Exchange in charge of market supervision; one with an economist; and one with a 
former leading editor of the FT. In all of these cases, the interviews were in-depth, 
semi-structured, designed in the style of oral histor es, and tailored to the specific 
careers of the interviewees. Practically, the interviews were digitally recorded and 
subsequently transcribed in a simplified format – the objective of the transcripts, 
after all, was to provide a narrative of technology in British finance and not to delve 
into a deeper analysis of the interviewees’ discourses. The list of potential 
interviewees was compiled both by identifying important characters in the extant 
literature on British finance as through conventional snowballing techniques. The 
latter was particularly true of technologists, whose identities are often unaccounted 
for in the literature.  
 
As a representation of reality, an interview is patently false. The human mind 
is a particularly fallible recording instrument. Similarly, the conversational 
techniques used to explore individual memories are bound to the subjective states 
and retrospective interests of interviewees. These are two arguments typically 
adopted by opponents of oral history and other forms of interview as the basis for 
historical research (Roper, 1996). These arguments fail to recognise two points, 
however. The first, widely discussed in the literatu e on historical and sociological 
methodologies, is that oral histories and interviews are particularly well-suited for 
providing detailed accounts of the microcosm of everyday life, of personal relations, 
of organisational and familiar interactions, and, precisely due to their situated 
character, of subjective and personal meanings and lived experiences (however much 
ex post they may be). Arguably, oral histories have proven their worth in capturing 
the lives of people marginalised in physical (i.e. print) sources – from miners, and 
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labourers to soldiers, women and engineers (Perks & Thomson, 1998). The value of 
the interview does not reside in the ‘precise’ veracity of its claims. Interviews are 
worthy instruments of reconstruction owing to a second point, namely, their 
interactive features, the fact that they are the product of a moment in which 
researcher and interviewee jointly create specific h stories tailored to particular ends.  
 
The interview is a conversation with a purpose (Bingham & Moore, 1959), 
and in cases where the interview is an instrument of research, the purpose of the 
project is critically consequential to the narratives obtained. In my experience, telling 
the interviewee that the purpose of the conversation was to explore, say, the history 
of technologies in the Stock Exchange produced a response that was qualitatively 
different from occasions when the expressed purpose wa  to look into the sociology 
of information technologies in the City of London. I  the former case, interviewees 
tended to focus on the temporalisation of events, on presenting sequences of 
processes. In the latter, interviewees would refer to ‘anecdotes’ to illustrate the 
particular cultures of finance at different times and places, delegating temporalities to 
a second plane. Such reflexivity about the uses of their accounts, about the purpose 
of the conversation, was to be expected: several of the interviewees had practical 
familiarity with interviews that were used in historical, sociological and – quite 
notably – journalistic projects. As a researcher, I thus consciously represented this 
project with some latitude, thereby enticing specific types of responses (as opposed 
to specific contents).  
 
As an instrument for qualitative analysis, the apparently endemic inaccuracy 
of interviews must not be seen as a straightforward obstacle for historical and 
sociological reconstruction. Apparent errors in the recollections of interviewees are 
at times possible signposts of broader webs of meaning. In this study, this is 
exemplified by my interview with Peter Bennett, who in recalling his time as a 
student at City University, mentioned having seen ‘guest speakers, you know, from 
all over the world, top class speakers, Alan Turing, people like that’. Alan Turing, 
however, could not have been a speaker at City University whilst Bennett was there: 
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Bennett, born in 1944, was about a decade old when Turi g died in 19541. The 
mention of Turing, however, is consistent with Benntt’s broader interest in 
computing theory, artificial intelligence, chaos theory and other areas. As such, it 
signals his interests and lineages as much as it misrepresnts past events. 
 
The quality of the data obtained from interviews is further supported by the 
fact that these instruments of research are interactive not only within a specific 
instance but, more generally, across the entirety of a project. The interview needs not 
cease when the recorder is turned off. On the contrary, the conversation can continue 
through time, complementing the narratives produced during the initial exchange 
with twists, turns, and critical comments. An intervi w, in a sense, is not limited to 
the conversation or its transcript. An interview ‘here’ can provide the questions and 
cues for an interview ‘there’. Interviewees can communicate – albeit indirectly and 
through the mediation of the interviewer – across interviews, thus allowing them to 
judge, challenge and reinforce each other’s accounts. And the interviewer can discuss 
the narratives obtained from previous interviews with future interviewees, 
complementing them with an additional layer of input. Effectively, throughout this 
project, most of the interviews were utilised to dissect the conventional accounts of 
technological innovation within the Stock Exchange, utilising each conversation as 
an opportunity to examine the limits of the narrative as built up to that date and to 
discover possible new elements of the story. This process resulted in saturation, 
when the main narrative of technological innovation was no longer augmented or 
criticised by new interviews. In addition, interview es were provided with copies of 
the first drafts of some of these chapters. Their subsequent comments provided both 
corrections and nuances to some of the elements of the story. 
2.2 Accounting for the past, theorising for the future 
The documental sources, interviews and personal communications utilised in this 
study were intertwined to produce a multilayered account of different sociotechnical 
facets of the automation of the London Stock Exchange. As an instance of qualitative 
                                               




research, this study adopts an ‘interpretative approach’ concerned with 
‘understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena […] within their 
social worlds’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 3). In reconstructing and interpreting the 
sources, this study sought to triangulate as much as possible – that is, to compare the 
details, narratives, dates, names, and putative facts in multiple sources seeking a 
degree of convergence in data (Blaikie, 2000). Data was thus corroborated across 
sources and secondary accounts – including newspapers nd the extant literature on 
British finance – and elaborated by increasing, for instance, the depth and detail of 
documental material through interviews. 
 
While triangulation was the main method by which I sought to achieve 
convergence in the data, the ultimate objective of this study and its methodological 
foundations was to produce a compelling narrative on the role of technology in the 
financial practices of the twentieth century London Stock Exchange. The degree to 
which a narrative can be deemed compelling depends, of course, as much on the 
robustness of its sources, its stylistic characteristics and its narrative coherence as it 
does on its ability to engage with broader discussions n the literature. Stylistically, 
this volume is admittedly populated by many nooks and crannies. The narrative, 
furthermore, is frequently interspersed by long quotati ns from interviews or 
documents. This use of the sources, however, is part of  conscious effort to 
showcase and integrate the voices of the interviewees. This is clearer in the earlier 
chapters and become less patent as theoretical issues increase in prominence 
throughout the remainder of this volume. Nonetheless, it is in this display of 
empirical materials where I seek to engage the reader; it is here where I seek to 
reconstruct in words – perhaps even recover – some of the patterns of the past.  
 
But for it to be compelling, this study must be situated in relation to the 
purpose of its creation. The narratives here present d were engineered, in particular, 
as a form of intervention. Indeed, and arguably like other forms of history, the one 
here created is a modification of the present through a reconstruction of the past. This 
history does not constitute an account of reality as much as a ‘story of’ – whether a 
‘story of stability’, a ‘story of revolution’, a ‘story of conflict’ or a ‘story of 
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resolution’ – with a theoretical objective (Griffin, 1995). The objective of this 
volume, however, is not to offer a story of enlightenment between history and 
sociology – such attempts at a disciplinary synthesis have had mixed results (Abbott, 
1991). Neither is it to focus on the cultivation of a logic of explanation common to 
historical and sociological discourses (Abrams, 1980). This volume, rather, is an 
illustration of the scope, limits and explanatory possibilities of a gamut of theories 
(sociological, anthropological, historical and even economic) on markets, technology 
and social processes. Configured as a tool of exploration, this study therefore 
engages with a broad social-scientific literature, bolstering some theoretical notions 
while eroding others. In doing so, the ultimate objective of this study is to create a 
ground for future debate, to expand, create, reformulate and represent novel 




















3 Digitalising Finance: the History of 
Information Technology in the London 
Stock Exchange, 1945-1975 
For an observer sitting at the edge of the long nineteenth century, the City of London 
of 2010 must seem an alien space. In its financial practices, social dynamics, and 
embedding materialities, finance conducted on the globalised banks of the Thames 
stands in sharp contrast to the images of an insular gentlemanly past said to 
characterise Britain’s economic traditions.  
 
Located at the core of this emblematic space, the London Stock Exchange 
bears the distinguishable marks of time. Today a public company whose shares are 
traded within the electronic market that it itself provides, the London Stock 
Exchange has changed in almost every conceivable way from its origins in the late 
eighteenth century: it changed venues; it expanded its reach by merging with 
provincial exchanges and creating new markets; it altered its staff in numerous 
occasions; it changed its codes and structure of operation; and it shifted from a club-
like organisation that contained and regulated the market, provided centralised 
settlement services, acted as a trade association, nd controlled the listing of new 
companies to occupy its current role as but an additional, competing, and 
subordinated electronic hub for digital market transactions.  
 
In accounting for these transformations, information and communication 
technologies are often identified as catalysts of change. For authors across disciplines 
– from business history and organisation studies to law and sociology – twentieth-
century finance was driven not only by the utility-maximizing forces of the market; 
the outlines of finance, for them, were shaped – perhaps even determined – by the 
adoption of information and communication technologies within the securities 
industry and society at large. From the telegraph to t e telephone, from the computer 
to the internet, the invisible hand of economic rationality was given a modern 




Histories of contemporary finance that extol the functional role of 
information technologies in contemporary life conflate quite distinct events under a 
larger narrative of revolutionary change. We have be n told to believe, both by 
scholars as by commentators, that we live in a world markedly different from our 
industrial past (Chandler et al., 2000). We live in a society founded on and 
dominated by knowledge, information, and immaterial services. We live, in the 
words of Manuel Castells, in the network age, a time n which everyday experience 
becomes absorbed by a technological matrix built upon the continuous ebb and flow 
of information flows (Castells, 2000a). 
 
The intersection of the histories of finance, technology, and the information 
age is a foundry for numerous metaphors that mediat our understanding of where 
markets come from and where they might go. Acting at the level of myth, of second-
order representations of larger ideological structures, these metaphors reduce, restate 
and simplify the behaviour of the world; in their brevity, they become readily 
transportable; and in their definitional blurriness, they become widely applicable. 
The purpose of this and the following chapter is to reassess the historical contingency 
of dematerialisation, one such myth of the information age in finance. A term coined 
to describe the conversion of paper-based certificates into electronic computer 
entries, dematerialisation became a synonym of the digitalisation of haute finance 
towards the 1980s when the stocks, bonds, certificates nd myriad documents that 
populated the floors of stock exchanges and the offices of brokers, bankers and 
accountants became amenable to the computer; they became information; they 
became highly transportable, de-territorialized andstandardised bits.  
 
Indeed, like other tales of the adoption of information and communication 
technologies, the story of dematerialisation presents the recent evolution of finance 
as determined by the technological ability of investor  and intermediaries to 
transcend their material bonds. As certificates were digitalised, place was rendered 
irrelevant; information could flow freely across the world, unhindered by the 
awkward physicality of trading floors, dealing pitches, and geographic space. In the 
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imaginary of the brave new world, money is a ‘complete abstraction’ (Kintzele, 
1988), traders are massless entities who leave no footprints, ‘only the ghosts of 
electrons’ (Grundfest, 1988), markets are a continually evolving cybernetic 
epiphenomena of society (Mirowski, 2007), and the world is the ultimately a flat and 
interconnected marketplace.  
 
This and the following chapters analyse the dematerialisation of finance by 
presenting the history of the development of information and communication 
technologies within the London Stock Exchange. In particular, these chapters mount 
a critique to the myth of dematerialisation by stresing the regular and pervasive 
presence of materialities in the politics and practices of finance. In deconstructing the 
myth, these chapters perform three tasks that are relevant for gaining a deeper 
understanding the sociology of finance and its technological make-up. First, what 
follows shows that the development and adoption of i f rmation technologies within 
the London Stock Exchange was part of a longer institutional process that included 
significant, if often ignored, changes to the operational structure of the organisation. 
The automation of the back and front-offices, then, was not carried out simply to 
solve specific problems or to make certain processes more efficient; in a broader 
sense, mechanisation and automation were a reflection of larger and outwardly 
oriented organisational strategies adopted by the Sock Exchange over time2.  
 
Second, the technological history of the London Stock Exchange shows that 
automation was intrinsically embedded in the organis tional politics of British 
finance. It was not, in this sense, an instrumental response to the obvious possibilities 
of digital technologies. The benefits of automation were not at any point a given, and 
developing and incorporating technology required cultivating trust between 
                                               
2 The contributing role of technology to the structura ion of large organisations has been widely 
studied within the specialised literature. Jannis Kallinikos (2002, 2005), for instance, has argued that
the production and use of what Wanda Orlikowski (with Iacono, 2001) refers to as IT artefacts (which 
amount to an ontological mixture between the physical artefact and the social relations associated to 
its use and mobilisation) are central to the cognitive organisation of particular collectives – and, 
importantly, bureaucratic collectives such as large organisations. Indeed, as this and the following 
chapter will explore, the technologies developed by the Stock Exchange were not only cognitive 
instruments of market action but, importantly, led to the emergence of specific standards and 
institutional relations that had concrete effects on the evolution of the marketplace. 
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regulators, technologists, brokers, jobbers, and authorities of the Stock Exchange. 
The technological arrangements produced, furthermore, were in themselves political, 
acting as structuring platforms that brought into being specific formats of the market. 
The politics of the technological endeavour of the Stock Exchange were therefore 
concomitant to the definitional politics of the market.  
 
In what constitutes an important corollary to the above, a third and final task 
is performed throughout this chapter: namely, the following pages erode the myth of 
dematerialisation by demonstrating the role of materi lities in creating novel forms 
of market interaction and organisational expertises ( e Sassen, 2002). While much 
of the literature on the use of information technologies in finance assumes a definite 
distinction between technical and financial expertis  amounting to a deficit model of 
technical knowledge in the market, the history of the London Stock Exchange shows 
the co-evolution of different forms of relating to,and understanding of, the platforms 
of the marketplace. Through the development of technological systems for price 
dissemination and trading, technologists acquired expertise on the market; and 
through their adoption of information technologies, market participants acquired 
expertise on how technological systems worked. But this interaction was not merely 
an exchange. Out of it, new types of expertise emerged that substantially changed the 
character of finance. 
3.1 Snapshots from a club 
As other stories of contemporary societies, this tale starts at the end of the Second 
World War. Although tranquilizing, the end of hostilities in Europe in 1945 provided 
little practical relief to the equities market in London. Like much of the large 
financial institutions in Britain, the London Stock Exchange survived the war at great 
cost. The need to secure financial resources for the nation’s military efforts required 
strict controls over the economy that translated into a redistribution of powers within 
the City of London. Far behind lay the times of liberal internationalisation, when the 
London Stock Exchange was the hub of global finance and the motor of a constantly 
expanding financial machine. As the dust of the warsettled, it was clear that the 
Stock Exchange would share space with the two other national economic institutions, 
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the Treasury and the Bank of England. Effectively, in this brave new world, the 
Stock Exchange concentrated on enforcing market discipline between its members, 
‘so creating a climate of trust […] conductive to business’ (Michie, 1999, p. 336).  
 
Not all was stasis, though, and change that proved fun amental occurred in 
the form of a review of the mode of ownership of the Stock Exchange. Since its 
foundation as a subscription room in 1801, the Stock Exchange had reflected both 
the physicality of trade and the sociality of trust. In its activities, the Stock Exchange 
was driven by two committees, one representing the proprietors of the building that 
housed the market (the Committee of Trustees and Managers), and one representing 
the members, namely, the brokers and dealers that made the market (the Committee 
for General Purposes). For the proprietors, the building that enveloped the trading 
floor was an investment: they owned shares in the Sock Exchange and charged fees 
to those who used the marketplace, in return providing and maintaining the required 
infrastructure. Members, on the other hand, did not deal with the administration of 
their material surroundings (then referred to as ‘the House’), but were obliged to 
guarantee the behaviour of their peers by dictating both the conditions for joining the 
organisation and the sanctions that followed when someone deviated from the norm.  
 
The division between owners and users of the marketplace ended in 1947 
when under increased uncertainty regarding the future of the securities markets in 
Britain the Stock Exchange mutualised3. From then onwards, the Council of the 
Stock Exchange, representing the interests of all the members of the organisation, 
would ‘control the affairs and the transaction of business in the Stock Exchange, and 
manage and administer the property, moneys, funds a assets of the undertaking’ 
(Council of the Stock Exchange, 8 March 1948; Cited n Michie, 1999, p. 332). And 
as explored below, the effects of such modification were not constrained to the 
                                               
3 The members of the Stock Exchange were concerned particularly by the possibility of 
nationalization. As part of the government’s attempts to secure control over the country’s monetary 
policy, the Bank of England was nationalized in 1946. With nationalization, the Treasury was granted 
the power to give specific ‘directions’ to the Bank of England though, according to Philip Geddes, up 
to the mid 1980s this deterrent was never used. The cooperation between the Bank of England and the 
Treasury was based on informal relationships that depended on the personalities of the leadership of 
both organisations (Geddes, 1987).   
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administrative life of the Stock Exchange; rather, they percolated into British finance 
at large.  
 
The organisational effects of mutualisation were not immediate, absorbed by 
the bear market that followed the end of the war and the redefinition of the 
boundaries of authority amongst City institutions. I deed, in the opinion of historian 
Ranald Michie, constant struggles and negotiations between the Stock Exchange, the 
Treasury and Bank of England overshadowed the period between 1945 and 1965. 
Whilst the Stock Exchange sought to reduce or altogether eliminate competition from 
non-members upon which it had no regulatory control, he Treasury and Bank of 
England had as their priority stabilising the national economy. In this environment, 
sections of the Stock Exchange withdrew to conservative positions. Practices from 
the past, such as the use of options as instruments for managing risk, were abandoned 
temporarily since they conflicted with the type of markets forwarded by the 
government (options, in particular, were seen as merely speculative and as having no 
use in the marketplace). And, in broad terms, the quest to guarantee the centralisation 
of the equities market dominated the institutional life of the Stock Exchange.  
 
The concerns of the membership of the Stock Exchange re arding the 
centralisation of the market were not entirely unfounded. The floor of the House – as 
members referred to the trading floor of the old Stock Exchange building – was 
arguably the most important technological support of the securities market in 
London. The trading floor not only configured the market in spatial, cognitive and 
physical sense, but by the sheer presence brokers, jobbers and clerks it constituted 
the main centre of liquidity of the British equities and bonds market.  
 
To refer to the trading floor as a centre of liquidity should not conceal its 
patent materiality. On the contrary, liquidity was a consequence of the interaction 
between people and things. The trading floor of the lat  1940s and early 1950s was 
housed in a building erected in 1853 on the site of the first Stock Exchange. 
Historically, this space had grown in a fragmented manner, with particular areas 
devoted to trading in specific types of securities. To some extent, this geography of 
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the trading floor emerged as a matter of practicaliy: the proximity of dealers that 
specialised in similar shares implied walking less when searching for the best price in 
the market. This arrangement, however, also reflectd decades of economic growth, 
as the expansion and creation of companies and industrial sectors required space 
where to trade the securities associated to these ventures. At its origins in the late 
eighteenth century, the Stock Exchange specialised in trading government-issued 
debt (‘gilts’) and a reduced number of joint-stock shares. But as the foreign debts of 
budding Latin American nations became popular investm nts during the first decades 
of the nineteenth century, trading in these instruments was incorporated onto the 
floor. Railway shares followed a similar path in the mid 1800s, as did the mining and 
exploration shares that resulted from colonial expansion at the turn of the century. By 
the 1940s, the Stock Exchange had gone through two buildings (1802 and 1854) and 
a major refurbishment (between 1883 and 1885), resulting in a visually and 
architecturally heterogeneous space ‘dominated by [a] great echoing dome and 
broken through its length by rows of supporting columns’ (Attard, 2000, p. 9).  
 
The trading floor of the Stock Exchange was the veritable core of the market. 
Indeed, it was not merely a locale in which brokers and dealers casually engaged in 
exchange. This confined space guaranteed the possibility of exchange through the 
presence of the particularly tight-knit and knowledg able community that constituted 
the staff and membership of the Exchange4. The floor was, effectively, a device for 
the production and circulation of market knowledge. Orders to buy and sell shares 
and bonds were collected on the periphery of the floor, in small rooms operated by 
broking firms. Referred to as ‘boxes’, these rooms constituted a pied-à-terre of 
brokers within the market, ‘containing a number of telephones direct to the firm’s 
switchboard and to important clients, and in some cases telex machines or 
teleprinters for direct contact with provincial exchanges and other centres throughout 
                                               
4 The creation of liquidity in London was based upon a specific division of labor on the floor of the 
Stock Exchange, mentioned below, whereby market-makers (called jobbers) were obligated to provide 
two-way quotes on the shares they traded in. However, th  qualities of liquidity (e.g. the spread 
between bids and offers) were also influenced by the interpersonal knowledge of the tight-knit 
community of market participants. Thus, liquidity in the Stock Exchange was contingent both in a 
hard form of social structure (organisational) and  soft one (interpersonal, related to status groups and 
relations of trust between market participants). This is further discussed below. On the sociology of 
liquidity, see (Carruthers & Stinchcombe, 1999). 
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the world’ (Hamilton, 1968, p. 49). Staffed by both brokers and clerks, 
communicated to the main offices of the firms, and located on the edge of the 
market, the boxes served as convenient devices for interpreting and circulating data.  
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of jobbers on the trading floor of the London Stock Exchange c. 1968, as 
represented by (Hamilton, 1968) 
 
In effect, it was through these rooms that liquidity entered the floor as orders were 
collected and passed onto the market for their execution in the hands of specialised 
dealers. It was this combination that created liquidity on the floor of the Stock 
Exchange, thus transforming the House into the source of prices that, as the securities 
they indexed, represented a great resource that required even greater controls.  
 
Controlling the propagation of the prices generated on the floor of the House 
occurred through varying arrangements. The foremost wa  relatively simple and 
straightforward: access to the floor was granted only to members of the Stock 
Exchange, their clerks and the staff of a select group of newspaper and telegraph 
companies. Restrictions placed on the levels of physical access to the floor were 
supplemented by more overt regulations on the dissemination of prices. The Council 
of the Stock Exchange, for instance, introduced rules that obliged data providers to 
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delay the transmission of prices through telegraphs and prohibited member firms 
from distributing real-time quotes through the telephone. The strategic character of 
the floor and the prices therein generated was clear to both the Council and the 
membership of the Stock Exchange. Reporting in 1957 on the processing of company 
announcements on the floor, the Stock Exchange Journal noted that  
Accurate information is just as important in Stock Exchange practices as in 
any military operation. Without a flow of early comprehensive and authentic 
company news, jobbers are unable to assess values, brokers are unable 
properly to advise their clients, and investors are unable to form correct 
conclusions as to company prospects (F.S.G., 1957, p. 104). 
Echoing later notions of markets as efficient informatic devices, the Journal 
proceeded: 
There are […] three major requirements which have to be observed [in 
collecting and disseminating company news]: (1) Accuracy and authenticity – 
that is, all the information must be issued and spon ored by the company 
concerned or come from some other responsible and approved source; (2) 
Promptitude – that is, the news must be placed at the disposal of the House 
immediately, it is available; and (3) Impartiality – that is to say, it must be 
available to all members or at least to all interested members simultaneously 
(F.S.G., 1957, p. 104). 
 
Such interpretation of the trading floor vis-à-vis information persisted for 
some time, as made evident by subsequent political controversies that challenged the 
status of the Stock Exchange within the broader institutional arrangements of the 
City. In 1973, and reacting to claims made by a Working Group of the Labour Party 
Industrial Policy Sub-Committee, the Council presented a passionate argument for 
the floor as the natural and most effective niche of market information. Opposing the 
Working Group’s view that information often took ‘several days’ to reach investors 
hence allowing for insider trading and other practices deemed undesirable, the 
Council wrote: 
The Stock Exchange [acknowledges] the reality that t ere is no way in which 
news can be received by all individuals simultaneously throughout the 
country. By requiring all company news to be published first at The Stock 
Exchange it insures that all Brokers have the information and are therefore 
able at least to prevent their clients acting in ignorance of it. Because the 
jobbers are also instantly apprised of the information and if necessary adjust 
the market price it is by definition impossible forany operator, however slick, 
to gain an advantage over any other once the news is published in the Market. 
Once an item of news has been announced the price in th  Market at once 
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reflects that news. If of course by whatever means the operator can anticipate 
the news this may be at the Jobber’s expense and not at the small investor’s 
(The Council of The Stock Exchange, 1974)  
The purpose of the floor was thus to provide informatic equality to market 
participants through the proximity of jobbers, who made markets, and brokers, who 
acted as knowledgeable agents for investors. And being a confined space only 
accessible to members, the floor and its informatic contents were seen as controllable 
and manageable entities.  
 
The physicality of the floor and the restrictions imposed on members and data 
providers were not the only means for stalling the dissemination of prices and other 
pieces of critical information outwith the walls of the Stock Exchange, however. The 
prime control of the communication of market prices r ided in their genesis, which 
made immediate dissemination (and hence, the spatial byp ssing of the floor) 
socially and technically impractical5.  
 
The impracticality of transmitting real-time prices lay in a longstanding 
division of economic and epistemic labour on the floor of the Stock Exchange, 
reinforced by the production of prices primarily as verbal utterances with a finite 
                                               
5 The strategic importance of controlling the dissemination of prices is highlighted by Kenneth 
Arrow’s well-known observation on the economic properties attributed to information. As Arrow 
wrote (Arrow, 1959): 
In the absence of special legal protection, [an information vendor cannot] simply sell 
information in an open market. Any one purchaser can destroy his monopoly, since he can 
reproduce the information at little or no cost. […] With suitable legal measures, information 
may become an appropriable commodity. Then monopoly wer can indeed be exerted. 
However, no amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of 
something so intangible as information. The very use of information in any productive way is 
bound to reveal it at least in part. [T]here is a fundamental paradox in the determination of 
demand for information; its value for the purchaser i  not known until he knows the 
information, but then he has acquired it without cost (p. 9-10) 
Due to the nature of the market offered by the Stock Exchange, the prices of the most actively traded 
shares were, in a sense, the ‘best’ available prices in Britain. Hence their immediate dissemination 
outwith the walls of the Stock Exchange (and outwith the membership) would have made it possible 
to altogether bypass the trading floor without incurring in the markup costs of limited liquidity. 
Clearly, bypassing the floor of the Stock Exchange entailed not only reductions in income for this 
organisation (fewer members implies less annual fees); this would also reduce the quality of the prices 
by driving liquidity to other trading venues, endangering the relative position of the Stock Exchange 
in the securities industry. It is hence not surprising to discover that as early as 1896, printed market 
quotations were protected by copyright law (T.L.H., 1917). Further discussions on stock exchanges 
and information ownership can  be found in (Lee, 1999; Webb, 2003). A discussion of the emergence 
of news agencies and Arrow’s paradox can be found in (Bakker, 2006). 
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reach. To some extent, this division of labour traced back to the origins of the British 
equities market in the late eighteenth century, when two types of professionals 
emerged – stockbrokers and stockjobbers – specialising in distinct, yet interrelated, 
activities. Stockbrokers, on the one hand, served as intermediaries between investors 
and the market. Stockjobbers, on the other hand, dealt on their own account, buying 
and selling shares and profiting from the differentials between bids and offers. 
Although this division existed informally throughout most of the nineteenth century, 
the authorities of the Stock Exchange enforced it in 1909 when large jobbing firms 
threatened the livelihood of brokers and small jobbers by dealing directly with 
investors through the telephone.. Effectively, as explored below, single capacity 
shaped not only the operation of dealing but, as importantly, the infrastructure of the 
marketplace.  
 
A series of articles produced by former broker Donald Cobbett, who joined 
the Stock Exchange in 1933, provide a vivid picture of the physical and social 
environment that constituted life on the floor in the era of single capacity. In the 
early years of Cobbett’s career, the floor was organised as a sea of brokers and clerks 
(referred to as ‘blue buttons’ due to the distinguishing pin on their lapels) dotted by 
jobbers and their pitches. Despite the patterns of spatial organisation that 
characterised the floor of the House, up to the 1950s the pitches or stands of jobbers 
‘were ambiguously notional, and not […] physically structural’ (Cobbett, 1986). 
Similarly, lapel badges identifying members and dealers with their firms were only 
introduced in the 1960s. Indeed, the market was a maze in which jobbing firms  
[…] assembled close around the walls and surrounding the massive pillars 
dividing the floor space irregularly into sections, had seating facilities, space 
to erect a price board, and improvised shelves for dealing books and other 
paraphernalia of the business. But a large number of jobbers not conveniently 
disposed, particularly the small firms such as the on  I joined, were 
compelled to take their stand on the open floor, with the surging crowds of 
brokers and their clerks passing through and around them. (Cobbett, 1986, p. 
22) 
Forging interpersonal relations and keeping within e etiquette of face-to-face 
dealing on the floor was therefore a matter of critical import. Articulating a proper 
presentation was of such importance that expressive departures ‘as suede shoes or a 
checky suit on a relaxed Saturday morning would bring down the displeasure of the 
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market on the individualist’ (p. 30). Breaking the tacit conventionalities of the 
community, or simply not being entirely familiar with the identities of those on the 
floor, could prove to be a tremendous disadvantage when seeking to enter the market. 
‘The only information available to us in those days’, wrote Cobbett (1986, p. 32),  
was gleaned from a perfunctory tour of the floor by the senior waiter, a 
medal-bedecked personage who would marshal each batof new boys at the 
main door for a privileged insight into the layout, with the tacit expectation of 
a little something slipped into the receptive palm. 
Being unaware of the conventionalities of behaviour n the floor resulted in the real 
impediment of not finding a friendly counterparty and a reasonable price.   
3.2 Codes for the market  
Within this decidedly tacit and intensely interpersonal arrangement, the creation of a 
market involved the production of prices upon which deals were made. On the 
trading floor, the prices of shares and bonds acquired the form of uttered quotes, of 
pairs of numbers that indicated the values at which jobbers were willing to buy and 
sell a security. In normal dealing conditions, these utterances were formed on the 
request of brokers. Price-seeking brokers would approach jobbers and vocalize their 
requests, saying something of the sort ‘What are BP?’ That is, in the conventions of 
the floor, brokers would verbally ask jobbers to prvide a quote for shares in, say, 
British Petroleum. And under the Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange, the 
jobber was obliged to provide a quote. Upon a request, a jobber would reply with an 
utterance similar to ‘five hundred to five’ (‘500-5’), indicating that the price at which 
he was willing to buy ‘a reasonable’ number of shares was 500 pence (bid) whilst the 
price at which he was willing to sell was 505 pence (ask). To his answer, the broker 
could follow one of several paths: he could agree to buy at a volume pre-indicated by 
the client (that is, to execute the deal) for which he would have to respond something 
like ‘Take 500’ (sell) or ‘Take 505’ (buy); he could mention that he is only quoting 
(that is, he was merely asked by the firm or the client to find out the price of a 
particular share and did not have an order to deal); or he could walk away to another 
pitch, searching for a better price. Taking any of these paths required the broker and 
the jobber to possess an understanding of the conventions on the proper modes of 
holding a conversation on the floor. Specific socially greed codes on how one 
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should talk, built over years of institutional practice and standardisation, determined 
the existence of commitment, or lack thereof, betwen the parties involved. The 
operation of the Stock Exchange was thus close to the spirit of its motto: Dictum 
Meum Pactum, My Word is My Bond. Finance in London was, in effect, performed 
through conversational exchange6. 
 
The Code of Dealing of the Stock Exchange (The Stock Exchange, 1976) 
provides a window into the conversational and lingustic conventions that served to 
establish commitment on the floor of the Stock Exchange in the days of face-to-face 
dealing. In it, we can observe, for instance, that o avoid committing to a deal, a 
broker needed only to utter specific words in a particular way (adapted from The 
Stock Exchange, 1976, p. 13-15): 
‘What are XYZ?’ Answer: ‘125-8’ 
Broker: ‘I am only quoting. What is the size of the market? 
Jobber: ‘I will make that (i.e. 125-8) in 2,000’  
By saying ‘I am only quoting,’ the broker insulated himself from dealing and showed 
that his intention was getting a sense of the state of the market. But the conversation 
could have gone elsewhere: 
‘What are XYZ? Answer: ‘125-8’ 
Broker:  ‘Is there any way in 250?’ [or, can you make a closer price one way 
for 250 shares] 
Jobber: ‘I’ll make you 126-8’ 
Here, a different path was taken, showing the desire to either buy or sell 250 shares. 
Had the broker accepted an exchange of ownership, and consequently generated a 
register of the movement of legal documents of different kinds, this sequence of 
utterances created, in effect, a market price for that particular lot of shares and its 
associated volume (‘250’) and time (the moment in which the broker inquired for a 
‘way’ in 250). Yet this did not mean that more extend d forms of communication 
could not take place. If the broker had an order to t ade limited as to price and was 
not authorised to ask for the ‘way’, the standard phrases could be as follows: 
‘What are XYZ?’ Answer: ‘125-8’ 
                                               
6 On a discussion of conversational exchanges and their relation to the temporalization and structuring 
of finance, see (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002). 
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Broker: ‘I am limited. I’m ½p out in 250’ 
Jobber: ‘I could deal one way’ [i.e. he could make either 125½-8 or 125-7½] 
Broker [hoping for the one which will suit him]: ‘Very well, you may open 
me’ 
Jobber: ‘Give you ½p’ [i.e. 125½]  
Broker: ‘Sorry, I’m a buyer at 127½’ 
In this instance, the quote faded into nothingness along with the words that 
comprised it. And with the end of the quote, with the broker leaving the pitch of the 
jobber, the price was not performed into existence; th re was no market price to be 
found7. 
 
Such dependencies on the spatiality of voice reinforced the generation of 
quotes as an interpersonally mediated activity. Quotes were created in the context of 
a face-to-face interaction requiring careful calculations of the counterpart’s social 
character. Quotes were not only ‘bound to the circumstances and the situation, [to] 
how many shares you were long or short on the book, [t ] how the rest of the firm 
[was] positioned’ (Steen interview); they were also connected to a ‘knowledge of 
people’, hierarchies of trust, and the social ecology f the marketplace. And as a 
closed organisation, the Stock Exchange facilitated such social calculations: the club 
was, in a sense, built purposefully as a self-regulated status group. Variations existed 
amongst the membership, nevertheless, with some individuals and firms considered 
more trustworthy than others. All things equal, quotes generated on the floor would 
not be necessarily the same for different people from different firms. Partial evidence 
of the tailored character of quotes is visible in numerous anecdotes and recollections, 
as well as within the reference literature on finance in Britain. For example, in his 
frequently cited manual to the Stock Exchange, H. Berman insisted on trust as a 
prerequisite for jobber/broker interactions when he wrote that ‘[in] order to be able to 
                                               
7 This point is particularly important for the sociology of prices. A price is a market price only insofar 
a deal was struck at that particular price. Quotes produced in a conversation that does not result in a 
deal are consequently not market prices. On the floor of the London Stock Exchange, however, 
numerous jobbers would deal in the same share simultaneously, opening the possibility for several 
market prices to exist simultaneously. Furthermore, as discussed below, prices were inherently bound 
to the identities of the interlocutors in the conversational exchange: the spread in prices would be 
larger the lesser the jobber trusted the broker. Hence, the prices generated on the Stock Exchange 
reflected not only knowledge of a putative state of the market but, as importantly, knowledge of the 
precise circumstances of a conversational exchange. 
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deal well a broker must be known, trusted and liked by the jobbers and to acquire 
their trust he must play fair’ (Berman, 1963, p. 19). If this metaphor of face-to-face 
dealings were pushed to an extreme, one could argue that the market prices produced 
by successful deals were, in a very tangible sense, i commensurable bits associated 
to interpersonal forms of knowledge.   
 
Voice was not the only method for communicating prices within the floor of 
the Stock Exchange. Due to the calculative intensity of life in the House (during busy 
times jobbers had to produce prices constantly while brokers had to procure them 
continuously either for dealing or for relaying them to their offices), non-vocal props 
were incorporated to the market. The distributed forms of cognition (Hutchins, 1995) 
that developed around these props grew to involve both particular types of 
vocalisations as well as a range of inscription devices. Up to the early 1950s, these 
devices consisted primarily of ‘printed price display boards [located in jobber’s 
pitches] which required regular (almost daily) replacement’ (Cobbett, 1986, p. 32). 
Cobbett speculates that wartime rationing, along with increased costs of printing, led 
firms to introduce Perspex boards on which the security titles were ‘permanently 
printed or separately enslotted’. On these boards, jobbers and their clerks would enter 
overnight closing prices in black and use chinagraph pencils to record the succeeding 
movements of prices in blue (for increasing prices) or red (for decreasing ones) 
throughout the day.  
 
For the brokers and jobbers who constituted the market, whiteboards became 
more than mere proxies of uttered prices; they were a sort of coordinative device for 
the market, exposing quotes and prices that would have otherwise been invisible for 
members located in other parts of the floor. Such use of the whiteboards is illustrated 
by the recollections of a jobber who worked with the firm Wedd Durlacher before 
Big Bang (Stuchfield interview). If someone approached the pitch and asked for a 
price in BP, 
obviously, you had to think what BP are now. And, you know, two minutes 
ago I was thinking they were 500 to 5. But actually, I can see someone on the 
pitch opposite in different companies, mining stocks or something like that, a 
different sector completely. They just put a little blue up on the board, and 
something else has happened, and actually, now I think ey’re 500 to 7 
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It was by means of this visuality, of guaranteeing that prices could exist beyond the 




Figure 3.2 Trading floor of the Stock Exchange c. 1968.  
© Henry Grant Collection/Museum of London 
 
Two further examples demonstrate the point. The first concerns cases in 
which a ‘big’ order arrived at the market. Given that jobbers worked with the spread 
between bids and offers, holding large inventories could be a problem. In order to 
‘unwind their positions’ (for instance, to get rid of an excess of shares without 
affecting market prices in too big a fashion), it would not be uncommon for jobbers 
to be a ‘bit reluctant to change their board prices, it may be that they've done a deal 
and don't want to broadcast [it] to the world’ (Attard interviews). The second 
example relates to the careful ‘manipulation’ of the specific representations of the 
market by means of controlling the prices displayed on whiteboards. In order to 
conceal the nature of his transactions from his peers, a jobber noted that  
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[one] might change the price [on the board], but it needn't necessarily be 
correct.  Say, for example, you sold some shares at a £1, a lot of shares; well, 
in order to be clever you would mark the shares down to 19s 9d or something 
like that, you see, so that the other jobbers would think you probably bought 
the shares. So this was all part of the skilful back nd forth play in the art of 
jobbing. (Attard interviews). 
 
This strategic production of prices extended beyond the visual cues deployed 
amongst jobbers. Whiteboards also served as instruments for promoting and driving 
up the quotes of shares, as exemplified by an episode recalled by Nic Stuchfield. 
During the early 1980s, and while on vacation as a student at the University of 
Oxford, Stuchfield joined the team of one of London’s leading jobbing firms to train 
on the floor of the Stock Exchange. Stuchfield was as igned to work on the 
Australian mining book, which consisted of a list of mining shares selected and 
managed by a senior partner. As part of his research, the senior partner travelled to 
Australia to inspect facilities, talk with managers and engineers, visit brokers in 
Sydney and Melbourne, and buy shares for the firm’s inventory. On an occasion 
during which Stuchfield was on the pitch, the partner had returned from Australia, 
carrying shares of a newly found company. The market, as Stuchfield remembers, 
was ‘a bit frothy’, but generally the price of gold was ‘really going through the roof’. 
Before the market opened at 9:30, the senior partner introduced his new finding to 
those in the pitch: ‘Alright. I’ve got this company called GEM Exploration, which 
I’ve bought 250,000 shares of […] and I’ve bought them for the equivalent price of 
3p. [We’ll] see what we can do with them’. He wrote ‘GEM’ on the whiteboard and 
next to it he wrote ‘5’ as the opening price for the share. Because it was written 
rather than printed on the board, it was clear for everyone in the market that this was 
a new share. And so, the first brokers were drawn to it. The first one to enquire about 
this strange new entry said ‘I see… What’s this GEM you’ve got up there? They look 
interesting. Tell me about that’. As the one responible for managing Australian 
mining shares, the senior partner replied: ‘Well, I went to Australia. I saw this 
company’ and after explaining the business of the company, he mentioned he thought 
they were ‘a real prospect in the current market conditions’. Intrigued, the broker 
asked for a quote. ‘They’re 4 6’ replied the senior pa tner. ‘What sized you’d like 
that?’ asked the broker. ‘25,000’ answered the jobber. ‘OK, well, thanks very much. 
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I’ll go away and have a think about that one’ said the broker, walking away from the 
pitch. Regardless of the fact that he had not closed a deal, the senior partner changed 
the number on the board, writing in blue the number 6. The next broker approached 
the pitch, seeing GEM Exploration on the board. 
‘What are they this morning?’ ‘Ah, well they’re 5 7’. ‘What’s the size?’ ‘Ah, 
well they’re at bid for 25, offered in 10’. Which sowed that I’m a buyer, 
obviously. And he said ‘Oh, OK, well, I’ll buy ten’. The next guy comes 
along and literally, within half an hour, the things are trading at 25p. By the 
end of the day, they’re trading at 40p, and we’ve turned over 2.5 million and 
we are we are long 350,000 shares instead of 250,000 shares (Stuchfield 
interview). 
In closing what was doubtlessly a successful day, the senior partner asked Stuchfield 
‘You know what, Nic? What does blue make?’ to which Stuchfield answered, ‘Blue 
makes buyers’. 
 
As this vignette shows, despite their strategic role, whiteboards were 
ultimately subordinated to the utterances of senior jobbers and the logic of 
interpersonal knowledge on the trading floor. This subordination was evident in 
cases where whiteboards unintentionally contradicte th  will of those managing the 
book. As a jobber reminiscing about his days as a clerk mentioned, updating prices 
on the whiteboard required time  
because as you were doing that so you were keeping an ear open for what 
your partner was doing if he was dealing. [Y]ou wanted to know what was 
going on, because quite clearly if he was doing a big deal there was going to 
be a change in price or what have you.  One of these [brokers] would come 
up and say to you, ‘What’s the price of Welcome Gold’, and you know, you’d 
suddenly shoot out a slightly old price and your partner might have heard and 
told you, ‘No, they're not that at all, the price has changed’ (Attard 
interviews) 
In effect, whiteboards did not command the market. The prices displayed on 
them were by no means a pact with brokers on the floor. Dictum meum pactum 
extended only to utterances, not to their representatio s. And in a sense, whiteboards 
and other means of price visualisation did not occupy the same representational role 
as modern trading screens; they were not the same type of technologies. These were 
instruments, carefully woven into, but ultimately controlled by, the verbally-centred 
social practices of the floor. 
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3.3 Tying loose ends 
As such, the materiality of market transactions relied on the verbality of finance. 
Such materiality, however, was not confined to the floor, overflowing the market 
beyond the granite walls, marble pillars, wooden floorboards, and plastic 
whiteboards of the Stock Exchange. Because shares are ultimately tied to the 
ownership of companies and debt, their exchange in the years before 
‘dematerialisation’ required the production, modification and mobilisation of 
countless pieces of paper: certificates that stood as the legal instruments of 
ownership, registrars that informed firms about their equity structure, lists that 
allowed identifying whom to pay dividends and interest to, ledgers representing the 
inventory of shares and the portfolios of clients i jobbing and broking firms, notes 
confirming that particular securities were bought or s ld from a specific jobber at a 
particular time and date, orders to buy shares at certain prices, and the different 
forms of tender used to cover a deal.  
 
The management of these pieces of papers, so critical due to their economic 
and legal implications, was a gargantuan task. Each tr nsaction on the floor produced 
a record (called a ‘ticket’), and each of these reco ds was verified manually for name, 
price and volume. At the end of the trading day, stockbroking clerks met to 
reconstruct the flow of market orders and to produce an image of how certificates 
and money should be re-distributed. Clerks in broking f rms calculated the 
commissions and taxes associated with each trade in order to bill their customers. 
And with each transaction, companies updated their reg strar, indicating who owned 
how many shares in the firm. Indeed, armies of couriers, clerks, accountants, and 
lawyers working to guarantee that the investors whobought and sold shares received 
their end of the bargain constantly rushed about the City of London. Settlement was 
the name of this game, and its end objective was to make effective the pacts created 
between jobbers and brokers, on behalf of investors, on the floor of the Stock 
Exchange.  
 
Settlement of the most active shares in the market was located within the 
organisational and physical confines of the Stock Exchange. A Settlement Room was 
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originally provided for in the basement of the House in 1872 (Michie, 1999, p. 77), 
shortly after which a Settlement Department was formally added to the Stock 
Exchange’s structure. The history of settlement, however, was not a smooth and 
continuous one. The department was closed for eightyears as a result of the First 
World War, losing the ‘skilled personnel that such operation required’ (Michie, 
1999, p. 291). With the outbreak of the Second World War, the suspension of 
fortnightly accounting periods and the introduction of cash bargains8, work in the 
Settlement Department was once again suspended. It was not until January of 1947 
that activities resumed at full pace, after gaining authorisation from the Treasury to 
reinstate account trading and after training a new g neration of recruits on the 
intricacies of matching bargains.  
 
In the post-war years, settlement became a critical fa tor in the development 
of the Stock Exchange as an institution. In particular, as mutualisation entered into 
force in 1947, the Stock Exchange came to provide a growing range of services, with 
settlement occupying a central role. With mutualisation, the complex ecology of the 
membership made almost tangible the politics of the organisation. Pressure grew 
from members to receive a higher degree of services at lower charges. But the views 
on how to achieve this varied. In the bear market that followed the war, settlement 
became a particularly controversial issue that exemplified the divergent views within 
the Stock Exchange. Large broking firms, equipped with greater numbers of skilled 
personnel and deeper pockets, could process their own bargains. Smaller firms, less 
equipped and more vulnerable to the sways of the market, could not. In the end, the 
Council of the Stock Exchange opted to subsidize the Settlement Department, used 
‘largely by the smaller member firms from the fees paid by all’ (Michie, 1999, p. 
334).  
 
                                               
8 The settlement of trades was bound to specific accounting periods. In the early twentieth century, 
these were fortnightly. All the trades that occurred within these periods had to be settled by a certain 
date. It was possible to carry on certain bargains into the next settlement period, thought this would 
not be the case for most of the trades. The purpose of this system was to guarantee the delivery of the 
certificates and cash that had exchanged hands by prox on the trading floor. The introduction of the 
cash bargain during the Second World War, however, changed this system. A cash bargain involves 
the transfer of shares and certificates on the day following the trade. Extensive descriptions of the 
settlement process can be found in (Berman, 1963; Hamilton, 1968). 
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Despite the conflicts that emerged from the expansion of services following 
mutualisation, the reorganisation of the Stock Exchange illuminated the role of 
secondary services as competitive products vis-à-vis non-regulated inter-office 
markets9. An example of such services was a centralised system for the delivery and 
payment of registered shares, which became operational in August 1948, reducing 
the need of messengers carrying certificates between offices. The provision of these 
services required a careful political calculation. The Council could not alienate the 
membership by drastically increasing annual fees, yt it needed to expand its 
repertoire of services in order to avoid the potential fragmentation of the market. One 
solution found was to implement labour-reducing measures. In 1939, for instance, 
there were an estimated 13,646 people working in the City of London directly 
involved with the Stock Exchange, of which 726 were clerks in the Settlement 
Room. The number of workers indirectly involved with settlement was greater, 
however, for many others provided auxiliary functions in jobbing and broking firms 
as messengers, typists, account clerks and an increasing group of ‘calculating-
machine operators’ (Michie, 1999, p. 298). In an attempt to control the costs 
associated to rising wages particularly amongst skilled workers, the Stock Exchange 
mechanised its back-office by acquiring a Hollerith punched-card machine in 1949.  
 
The addition of punched-card equipment to the back-office was by no means 
limited to the Stock Exchange. During the 1950s, such systems became ubiquitous in 
both industry and government. In the City of London, however, trends in 
mechanisation were bound to the basic divisions of labour prevailing in the market. 
For stockbrokers, mechanisation followed from the installation of ‘accounting 
typewriters—machines which combine the calculator and the typewriter, generally 
operating from one keyboard’ (Day, 1956, p. 13). Although expensive (in 1956 they 
were estimated to cost up to £1,500, roughly £27,000 in 2008 prices), these machines 
offered an important advantage over existing forms of typing, allowing relatively 
junior staff to prepare a variety of records with cross castings and totals in one 
                                               
9 For instance, the emergence of institutional investors along with the decreasing cost of telephone 
communication threatened the role of the Stock Exchange, as they meant that large orders could be 
negotiated over the phone without passing through the minimum-commission system that was 
imposed on all the trades that took place on the floor.  
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operation. Stockjobbers, on the other hand, tended to a opt punched-card systems 
through which  
details of bargains are, as in the past, written in the Dealer’s Book; 
calculations of amounts are made in the normal way; n mes of Companies 
and Brokers, &c., are translated into a figure code. Thereafter a routine 
operator with a desk keyboard instrument taps out the various figures and 
perforates a card; this is checked by passing through another desk instrument 
[…] The cards accumulate up to some desired point in the operations and are 
then passed to the next operation. From this point onwards the machine takes 
charge (Day, 1956, p. 13). 
Jobbers with such systems would obtain printed records covering most of their firm’s 
requirements, accurately, legibly and in a fraction of the time otherwise needed.  
 
The future, however, lay elsewhere. The possibility of performing complex 
calculations that previously required many staffed hours was seen as an obvious 
niche of office mechanisation. ‘Calculations can to-day be done electronically’, 
wrote Mark Day in the Stock Exchange Journal in 1956  
and as cogs and cams give place to transisters [sic.], magnetic cores and 
vacuum tubes, and electrical impulses become the ord r f the day, the 
question of the applicability of the Electronic Computor [sic.] to the Stock 
Exchange work is coming up for discussion and quite serious consideration. 
Promissory images of mechanisation populated the minds of many in the Stock 
Exchange. Changing finance became a matter of changing its practices, of embracing 
automation and the distinct materialities that it implied. 
If only jobbers could be persuaded to report bargains into [a centralised 
machine] as they were carried out it would clear all stocks automatically and, 
not only that, it would give a running record of the dealing prices in every 
broker’s office, reducing the staff required in boxes and order rooms and the 
House itself. […] We might even reduce the costs to uch an extent that small 
orders became profitable and the ideal of the Cloth Cap Investor at last 
became a reality (Bennett, 1959). 
Automation, it was preached, would not only usher an era of increased efficiency in 
back-office operations. Through the reduction of clearing costs and the streamlining 
of trade and settlement, it would also deliver, so argued its supporters, the long-held 
aspiration of a market in which even the orders from small, ‘cloth cap’, working 
class investors were profitable. It would transform the Stock Exchange into a 




In the early 1960s, mechanisation gathered pace. Inv stments in automated 
systems occurred both in the offices of member firms as in the buildings of the Stock 
Exchange. Between 1959 and 1961, the Stock Exchange furth red the mechanisation 
of settlement by leasing and installing an International Computers and Tabulators 
punched-card unit that could handle the automatic clearing of 140 stocks (Abacus, 
1962) and up to 150,000 bargains in an account. In the same year, an article in the 
Stock Exchange Journal pondered about the possibility of introducing systems that 
would comprehensively cover the market. ‘Some sort of computer installation in the 
Stock Exchange itself’, read the article, ‘could handle part, if not all, of the accounts 
and records at present kept in the offices of Members’ (Anonymous, 1960b). The 
possibility of such a broad system of management led o an attempt by the Council of 
the Stock Exchange to index the market. The market was no longer the ocean of 
faces and relationships encountered by Daniel Cobbett in the 1930s. With a view to 
installing systems that could handle both accounting operations and valuation 
statistics, the Stock Exchange undertook a ‘revision of the members’ number code to 
bring it into line with the alphabetical order of firms and the devising of a Securities’ 
Code’ (Daedalus, 1960)10.  
 
The history of the introduction of computers to theSettlement Room of the 
Stock Exchange is not entirely clear. While a small number of member firms 
ventured into the realm of computing as early as the mid-1950s (the history of the 
mechanisation of broking and jobbing firms is explored in Chapter 5), the Stock 
Exchange was a notably slower adopter. Ranald Michie’s comprehensive history of 
the Stock Exchange locates the purchase of the first computer, an IBM  360, in 1964 
(Michie, 1999, p. 365). The new computer reduced a processing task to a tenth of the 
original 876 person-hours. Although the Stock Exchange Journal makes no allusion 
to this system, and although the records of IBM  place the first purchase of one of their 
                                               
10 This development was similar to the re-formatting of the market that occurred in the American 
securities industry with the introduction of the stock ticker (see Preda, 2008). In London, however, the 
degree to which linguistic conventions changed as a result of items such as securities’ codes was 
tangibly different from similar developments in Wall Street. The difference may well reside in the fact
that these codes were primarily for the use in the back-office, rather than the marketplace, where 
linguistic conventions went largely unmodified.  
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systems (a Model 158) in 1973 (Grimm, 1977), computerisation was clearly well 
under way by the 1960s.   
 
In March 1966, the Stock Exchange officially reported he installation of its 
first computer – an ICT 1903 – in the Settlement Office at 26 Austin Friars. An 
intriguing article accompanied the news of this acquisition. ‘The bloodless 
technocrats’, wrote Geraldine Keen, ‘have found their way into this bastion of 
civilisation. The dustbins of Throgmorton Street will be loaded with quill pens and 
thousands of lines a minute will be clacking from the asteful buff coloured 
peripherals of an ICT 1903’ (Keen, 1966). The demise of a seemingly Dickensian past 
was not the only image marshalled by the new computer. Keen speculated that a 
central computer, perhaps more powerful than the ICT 1903 and backed-up by a 
standby copy, could eventually take over ‘inter-memb r accounting, a large slice of 
client accounting, run an efficient up-to-the-minute prices and general information 
service, and possibly take over centrally the registration of all quoted stocks’ (Keen, 
1966). In the minds of some technophiles, a computer could thus become the locale 
of the market, perhaps the market itself. But such promise could only be achieved 
through a real-time, on-line, multi-programming system, which the ICT 1903 was not. 
The Stock Exchange’s new computer, formally inaugurated by the Chairman on 1 
November 1966, was limited to the settlement of the most actively traded shares, an 
activity that had been carried out with previous punch-card equipments. When the 
computer was initialized, reality proved to be modest in comparison to Keen’s 
speculations. The first account fed into and entirely handled by the system was 
completed on November 15th. The processing of 170 stock  took a mere 12 minutes;  
the computer then took approximately an hour to sort the pieced bargains into 
order for printing and 25 minutes to print out the result. Under punched card 
methods, this work would have taken the Department, plus part time staff, 
approximately 12 hours on an Account of this size (Anonymous, 1966) 
An incremental increase in efficiency, the new system was but a single step in a 
larger process of mechanisation that continued for ecades to come.  
 
49 
3.4 A House for the future 
The introduction of computers and punched-card equipment to the Settlement Room 
of the Stock Exchange was by no means the only type of innovation affecting the 
market’s infrastructure. A series of seemingly pedestrian modifications of the 
agencements11 (Callon, 1998) of the Stock Exchange took place along with the 
mechanisation of back-office operations. Such was the case of the patchwork-like 
building that housed the market in the years following 1945. Although many deemed 
fully adequate to the needs of a membership considerably larger than it was in the 
1950s (Anonymous, 1955b), the ongoing reconstruction of the City of London 
inspired some to contemplate the erection of a ‘really modern House, worthy of the 
great part we play in the affairs of the nation, and offering better accommodation and 
facilities to a larger number of our members’ (Anonymous, 1955b) 
 
The prospect of rebuilding the Stock Exchange had indeed surfaced as early 
as 1943. It was then that G. J. Buckingham, acting as Surveyor, produced the plans 
for a new house for the market. The realisation of these plans, however, proved 
problematic: after extended scrutiny by the Stock Exchange’s Buildings Sub-
Committee and the City of London Reconstruction Advisory Council, Buckingham’s 
project was submitted to the City Corporation in 1948 from which he obtained 
conditional permission for development in 1949. Nevertheless, a ‘number of 
difficulties and limitations’ had to be surmounted before the first speck of concrete 
touched the ground. Constraints on the vertical height and surface coverage of the 
building made it of difficult design. But more importantly, any project of 
reconstruction would have to meet two qualifications imposed by the Sub-
Committee: first, that the scheme should be economic, such that ‘net income from 
tenants alone would suffice to service the cost of the entire rebuilding’; and second, 
that the business should continue to occur on the floor of the House during 
rebuilding. Although the former was an important obstacle to Buckingham’s project 
(estimated to have cost between £3½ million and £4 million at a time when income 
                                               
11 The term agencement, which is used elsewhere in this volume, refers to the ‘assemblages or 
arrangements—which are simultaneously human and nonhuman, social and technical, textual and 
material—from which action springs’ (MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007, p. 15). 
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from the fees paid by members amounted to roughly £210,000 per year), it was the 
latter condition which ultimately delayed rebuilding the Stock Exchange. After 
calling in G. A. Coombe for a second opinion and failing to identify an alternative 
venue for the market within the City of London (distance between offices of member 
firms and the floor of the Stock Exchange was, after all, a critical matter), the 
Committee indefinitely shelved its plan for the reconstruction of the House 
(Anonymous, 1955b). 
 
It was only in the 1960s that rebuilding the Stock Exchange became, once 
again, a topic of serious consideration. In the years following mutualisation, the 
Stock Exchange expanded its sources of revenue – most i portantly, through the 
introduction of quotation charges – closing the gapbetween income and expenditure. 
The relative financial stability provided by such charges allowed the Council to 
revive the long held ambition to rebuild, or at thevery least refurbish, the House. In 
1961, the decision to rebuild was announced to the members of the Stock Exchange. 
The cost of the new building was put at £4.9 million (£78.5 million in today’s 
prices), although the plan included office space which could generate an income of 
£284,000 per annum (Michie, 1999, p. 450). As had been the case more than ten 
years earlier, the Stock Exchange set the condition that ‘if it were to be practicable, 
[rebuilding] must take place on the existing site while the Market should also remain 
on that site’ (Lord Ritchie of Dundee, 1963).  
 
Fuelled by the affluence of the day, the Stock Exchange resolved the issue of 
the temporary floor by acquiring additional space through the freehold of the North 
British and Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd. A similar st ategy was followed with the 
offices of Messrs. Blydenstein and the Threadneedle Str et Post Office.  ‘Our 
decision,’ wrote then Chairman Lord Ritchie of Dundee, ‘has been that we must pull 
down our existing home around our ears and build it up again while we stand, dusty 
but triumphant, amid the rubble. Things will not, of c urse, be as bad as that, thanks 
to the ingenuity of the architects, engineers and the contractors’ (Lord Ritchie of 
Dundee, 1963). After arranging a complicated relocati n of the Post Office and 




The project proceeded at a steady pace, as reported by Colin Mansfield in 
1967 (Mansfield, 1967). Demolition of the old building started in 1966. The plaster, 
timber and copper of the dome were stripped. The supporting steelwork was cut into 
pieces. The brick and masonry columns were brought down by explosives. And by 
January of the following year, the site was clear of the up to 17 feet thick concrete 
foundations dating from the nineteenth century. While a temporary trading floor 
remained on site, the contractors Trollope & Colls Ltd had to deal with the additional 
complication of the proximity of the London Underground tunnels that ran beneath 
Old Broad Street, from Bank to Liverpool Street. Concrete beams were laid along the 
site and next to the tunnels as a mechanism for stabili ing the clay and avoiding 
unwanted movements. The use of a giant Archimedean screw to bore the 102 feet 
deep holes for the concrete beams proved to be invariably noisy. ‘To claim that this 
is a quiet method’ wrote Mansfield ‘would provoke sharp protestations from those 
who have to work in the immediate environment’. Yet d spite the noise, the crowds 
that filled the viewing gallery on Threadneedle Stree , and numerous technical 
complications construction continued apace. Soon enugh, a massive steel-reinforced 
concrete platform emerged on site, extending 40 feet b low street level. Upon it, a 
core was built that supported the cantilevered floors, accommodated lifts, heating, 
and water ducts as well as other ‘services’. And the walls, consisting of structural 
precast concrete units, provided the building with its face to the world. The new 
building, designed by Lord Llewelyn-Davies, eventually became a recognisable 
feature of the City’s skyline. An ease on building restriction (which up to the 1950s 
had included that no building in central London could exceed 100 feet in height) and 
the control over a large area of the block, allowed for the vaulted structure that once 
stood on Threadneedle Street to be replaced by a 26 storey tower reflecting future 
visions of the nature of organisations. As Lord Llewelyn-Davies mentioned in the 
Stock Exchange Journal,  
Coupled with a controlled and consistent scheme of interior decoration and 
choice of furniture, the office worker today enjoys greatly superior conditions 
than in the past. 
Today there is a trend to much more mechanisation in ffice work, with the 
use of computers, punch card systems, pneumatic tubes and so on, and an 
increasing need for adaptability if organisations are to maintain their 
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efficiency. There [are] also increasing standards for the general amenity and 
welfare of office workers and new office buildings answer these requirements 
in a way which old city buildings, however cleverly adapted, cannot hope to 
do. 
And thus, in 1972, the House became the Tower, erected upon the imagined 
requirements of a modernised era. Hexagonal trading posts, equipped with 
telephones and television screens for the future, replaced the notional pitches of the 
old trading floor. The cavernous structure of the House gave way to a lighter, almost 
monochrome, space.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Traders on the floor, as seen from the visitors gallery c. 1980.  
© Henry Grant Collection/Museum of London 
 
The Tower represented a broader consolidation of the operations of the Stock 
Exchange. After all, it was a standardised, purpose-built venue for an increasingly 
far-reaching, institutional and mechanised marketplace. The consolidation also 
extended to the communications networks used by the members of the Stock 
Exchange. An important element of the rebuilding was the creation of a new Branch 
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Post Office and the room that would house the Private Automatic Branch Exchange, 
PABX (Mansfield, 1967). While the Post Office (that at he time controlled telephone 
communications in the United Kingdom) would serve as the link outwith the Stock 
Exchange, PABX would be the backbone of internal communications for brokers and 
jobbers.  
 
The reconfigured communication system was conceived as the result of a 
comprehensive study on the past patterns of use and projected needs of the members 
of the Stock Exchange, an assessment that reflected the expanded offer of services 
provided to market participants. Rather than framing the 350 member firms as 
requiring individual facilities, the study concluded that it was necessary to treat the 
Exchange as a single community with a density of 14,000 telephones. The 
standardised system had to offer not only intercommunication between the offices, 
boxes and pitches of member firms, but also access to public exchanges, an internal 
telephone service for the staff of the Stock Exchange, and a speedy personnel 
location system (S.R.G, 1965). A manual system requi ing 40 to 50 operators to keep 
the itemised accounting of calls would have cost some £60,000 per annum, in 
addition to the costs of equipment and accommodation. It was thus decided that an 
automatic installation with a central switch system was a better solution, not only 
because it provided the type and degree of interconnectivity desired by the Stock 
Exchange, but also because it represented substantial sav ngs. A facility would 
provide both internal and external calls through single telephones. But while internal 
calls would be routed by the private automatic exchange, outside calls would take 
place through external exchanges managed in the switchboards of individual member 
firms. Overall, the PABX was planned to a capacity of up to 1,200 simultaneous calls 
to be connected. And the operating positions needed to handle the system could be 
reduced from 40 to a mere three, avoiding an administrat ve cost of some £56,000 
per annum.  
 
In addition to PABX, the Stock Exchange conducted studies on the feasibility 
of a personnel paging system. Plans were devised for a system specified to a 
transmission capacity of 600 location-calls every half-minute, in 2,000 different 
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channels corresponding to individual pocket receivers, and built with a call 
forwarding system for unmanned boxes. Supplementing the pocket pagers, a lamp 
indication system, based on a three digit code system, was also intended for 
installation (S.R.G, 1965). Although three manufacturers tendered for the provision 
of the paging system by 1965, the decision as to which system to implement was 
delayed by several years. It was not until February 1970 that a paging system 
developed by Modern Telephones Ltd., and boasted as ‘the fastest and one of the 
largest at present in use in the world’, was introduced to the Stock Exchange. In 
effect, the paging system was but one in a series of important changes: at the same 
time, brokers and jobbers were involved in a complicated move to a temporary 
trading floor in the Tower, and were dealing with the newly installed inter-dialing 
telephone service, re-branded STX (Anonymous, 1970a).   
 
 
Figure 3.4 The STX Strowger-based PABX 1974, courtesy of John Scannell 
3.5 The market on a screen 
Throughout these reconfigurations, the commitment to face-to-face dealing remained 
constant in the Stock Exchange. Despite the mechanisation of back-office operations, 
investments in telephony, the possibilities offered by computerisation, and the 
modernization of the trading venue, the trading floor and the division given by single 
capacity were at no point challenged by either the authorities or the membership of 
the Stock Exchange. These were, in a very concrete sense, the core of the dominant 




Nevertheless, some of the broader technological developments of the post-
war period ushered the possibility of automating one f the most critical aspects of 
dealing, that is, the communication and disseminatio  of quotes. In particular, 
reductions in both the costs and the technical challenges associated to the 
transmission of video signals implied that images of the whiteboards on the floor of 
the House could be taken to the offices of member firms. Effectively, as early as 
1956, a small number of firms transmitted prices off the floor of the Exchange to 
television sets linked by a closed-circuit network12. The entirely analog system 
inherited some of the quirks of life on the floor of the House: prices were collected 
on an ad hoc basis, the clerks responsible for inputting quotes wrote these on a 
surface that was then scanned by a camera making them at times difficult to read; 
consequently, the images received in the offices of member firms were often of an 
inconsistent quality.  
 
In the mid 1960s, the transmission of prices drew the attention of the Council 
as an area in which the Stock Exchange could intervene to become a central provider 
of information for the City of London’s bonds and equities markets. After all, if 
price-display services were owned and operated by the S ock Exchange, the currency 
of the information displayed in them could be managed to disincentive the 
development of outside markets – mutualisation and the reorientation of the Stock 
Exchange towards the provision of multiple services w re once again shaping the 
technological constitution of the market. It was in this spirit that the Council of the 
Stock Exchange pursued the development of an electroni  mechanism for price and 
information communication. By early 1969, the Stock Exchange Journal nnounced 
that such system, named Market Price Display Servic (MPDS), would be available by 
July of the same year. From the outset, MPDS was presented as being open to both 
member and non-member subscribers. And as such, it would not display real-time 
quotes. Rather, it was proposed as a display for the ‘current middle prices of 
approximately 650 stocks on […] 16 main channels’ (Anonymous, 1969b). 
Following the usage of the whiteboards located on the floor, the system was designed 
                                               
12 See, for instance, the images of the system displayed in the Stock Exchange Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1.  
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to show the closing price from the previous trading session and up to five changes in 
the mid-price for each stock. The blue and red chinagraph pencils from the floor, 
however, were not represented since MPDS worked on conventional black and white 
television sets. Two further channels were proposed featuring the prices of new 
issues, special stocks, currencies and commodities. And a remaining pair of channels 
would be used to broadcast company announcements and relevant pieces of 
information. 
 
The initial deadline for MPDS was not met. In May 1969, the Stock Exchange 
Journal reported a new timeline for the introduction of the service, without 
committing specific dates. The completion of numerous tasks was required before 
the service went live. Television receivers had to be distributed amongst member 
firms; the General Post Office had to complete the installation of the coaxial cable 
distribution network within the City of London; the c ntral control and processing 
equipment had to be delivered, programmed, and tested; input keyboards on the floor 
of the Stock Exchange had to be fitted; and a new type of clerk – the green-buttoned 
price collectors – had to be hired and trained (Anonymous, 1969a).  
 
The ensuing development of MPDS occurred in a planned and careful fashion. 
Initially, the service operated on a restricted number of channels (16, solely for 
prices) and during a restricted period in the day (from 9:30 to 15:30). As testing and 
debugging continued, and as the suggestions from the users were compiled and 
analysed, both the number of channels and the time of operation of MPDS expanded. 
By the time the trading floor moved to the temporary space in the Tower in early 
1970, nearly 1,000 MPDS television receivers were operating in 220 offices of 
member firms, the result of 70,000 hours of work by 250 external engineers 
(Anonymous, 1970a). In October of the same year, the service reached 145 member 
firms and 22 institutions, including press agencies, in urance companies, an arbitrage 
house and merchant banks, who were reportedly ‘very satisfied’ with the operation of 




Allegedly, MPDS was the first system in the world to use a digital computer to 
feed information into slightly modified analog television receivers (Anonymous, 
1970a)13. It was, quite probably, ‘one of the first stock exchange display systems 
anywhere in the world’ (Bennett interview) and one of the ‘first cable networks’ in 
Britain (McLelland, personal communication). Contested as these statements may be, 
MPDS was undoubtedly the first standardised computer-based price dissemination 
system available to the securities industry in the City of London. A Ferranti Argus 
400, interfaced with an analog rotating video drum, produced the signal for MPDS. 
This particular design resulted from the cooperation between the computer 
manufacturer Ferranti and the Stock Exchange’s Computer Services Group 
(Anonymous, 1970c). Ferranti had originally developd the Argus 400 in 1958 for 
the operation of the Bloodhound Missile MkII, but it became clear that the same 
system was useful in non-military applications requiring real-time control and 
communication.  
 
The price information compiled by the Argus came from eight different 
terminals. Each of these dummy terminals consisted of a mechanical keyboard 
attached to a 12-inch monochrome Prowest monitor (Ca ey, personal 
communication). The price-input terminals were located on the periphery of the floor 
and their successful operation hinged on the work of a series of price collectors 
responsible for updating the system throughout the rading day. As was the case with 
jobbers, price collectors specialised in particular industrial sectors in order to make 
more efficient their traversing through a normally bustling and noisy trading floor. 
Each collector carried a slip of paper containing the names of 18 to 24 shares, next to 
which he or she could write their respective quotes at different times during the day. 
Slip in hand, a price collector would walk around the floor, obtaining the quotes 
necessary for completing the list from the main jobbers that made markets in those 
particular shares. Carrying the updated slip, the price collector would then go to the 
                                               
13 The television receivers installed in the offices of ubscribers were VC100 television chasses 
supplied by Standard Telephone and Cables Ltd which had had the sound circuitry removed (Tony 
Carey, personal communication). However, it was perfectly feasible to connect any standard 
television receiver to MPDS. In fact, Peter Bennett suggests that one of the advantages of using a 
standard television receiver was that brokers could tune into cricket when the floor was closed 
(Bennett interview).  
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edge of the floor to enter the prices into the Argus 400 via one of the eight terminals, 
returning afterwards to the market for a new batch of prices. This cycle, which 
normally took between ten and fifteen minutes, was repeated throughout the day, 
hence making the prices on MPDS ‘as fresh as possible’ a guidance (McLelland 
interview). A system of safeguards, furthermore, guaranteed the accuracy of prices. 
When a collector inputted data into the system, the terminals displayed the new price 
underneath the old one. When she was sure that there was no mistake in the entered 
price, the collector pressed a switch that updated th  information in the Argus, hence 
changing the price throughout MPDS. But if the change with respect to the previous 
price was too small or too great, the system requird the collector an additional 
confirmation. And at all time, the supervisor of the price collectors could change the 
information on the system through her terminal (Anonymous, 1970c). A data entry 
terminal is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Data entry terminal for MPDS. Courtesy of John Scannell © 
 
MPDS was quickly embraced after its formal introduction n 1970. The 
television receivers displaying prices of the most active shares in the market 
expanded throughout the offices of firms in the City of London. Jobbers on the floor 
 
59 
quickly developed ‘pretty good’ relationships with price collectors, to such an extent 
that ‘they’d walk to them and almost as they were walking up they would quote them 
a price’ (McLelland interview). By relieving the blue-buttons from some of their 
work, MPDS left them ‘free to gather more specialised information. The new system 
has not rendered the old one obsolete but it has enbl d it to be put to better use’ 
(Anonymous, 1970c). And as Margaret Hughes reported in the Stock Exchange 
Journal, ‘[in] little over a year the City’s brokers [became] a group of push button 
devotees’ (Hughes, 1971). These adaptations occurred despite the fact that the prices 
transmitted within the walls of the City were merely indicative; in all practical 
senses, they were not the stuff with which brokers traded, lacking both the requisite 
depth and the diversity of prices produced on the floor of the Stock Exchange. Users, 
however, were overall satisfied. Their comments on the service ranged from ‘rather 
good’ through to ‘very valuable and useful as an immediate indication of price 
movements’ (Hughes, 1971).  
 
Although it did not affect the primary method of dealing – which remained 
limited to face-to-face encounters on the floor of the newly built Tower – the 
introduction of MPDS signified a quiet yet significant organisational metamorphosis. 
Having been partially funded with the income streams engineered after 
mutualisation, MPDS became itself a financial resource for the Stock Exchange. At 
the time of its introduction, every subscription to the service represented an annual 
fee of £500 for members and £1,000 for non-members (Hughes, 1971). Additional 
television receivers were charged at £50 each per annum, and as the marginal costs 
of installation were ‘next to nothing’ due to the relative simple technologies upon 
which MPDS was built (Bennett interview), every screen added to the system 
represented a profit – the cost of the equipment, after ll, was covered by the 
subscribers. MPDS emerged from the outset as a business in its own right. And as 
such, the Stock Exchange considered that it was crucial for qualified in-house 
personnel to deal with the maintenance and further development of such a strategic 
asset. It was then that a new generation of technicians entered the ranks of the Stock 




3.6 Systems programming 
If one were taken to select a moment that signalled th  above-mentioned 
transformation, this could well be the hiring of Peter Bennett into the Stock 
Exchange. Arbitrary as this selection may seem, Bennett’s career in the City of 
London reflected some of the general patterns that c racterised not only the 
computerisation of British finance in the late 1960s and early 1970s but also the 
mobility of knowledge and expertise within the economic and technical communities 
of the City of London. 
 
Peter Bennett’s technical origins were broadly located within the complex 
institutional machinery forged in Britain as a result of the Second World War. In 
particular, Bennett (b. 1944) trained as a telecommunications engineer within Plessey 
Telecom Research (‘an R&D establishment for the military’) where he spent some 
time as a student apprentice. His formative years as an engineer also involved a five 
year sandwich course at the City University, London (f rmerly, the Northampton 
Institute; on the nature of these courses, see Teague, 1980), where he became 
acquainted with the use of computers. But as he mentioned, his formation there was 
not ‘merely’ academic.  
City itself was a very practical university. I had  wind tunnel. I had laser 
labs. All sorts of stuff. So I came out a bit of a boffin. But it was a wonderful 
environment. […] We had guest speakers from all over th  world, top class 
speakers, Alan Turing, people like that. And, we had all sorts of clubs. We 
had something called the Math Lab which was an old wooden building which 
used to be used by the gardeners actually. It was an old gardening hut which 
had been refurbished, and in that was our computer. I had to go in this 
building and actually had to put on a white suit. And only very special people 
were allowed in.  And there was an ICL mainframe, one of the first ICL 
mainframes. 
Bennett was not the only one with such an institutional provenance. At the time, City 
University presented itself as ‘a meeting place of financial and industrial minds’, 
emphasising that its students were in close touch with computer science as with 
recognised techniques ‘such [as] operational research or managerial economics’ 




Bennett joined the Stock Exchange in 1971, attracted not so much by a pre-
existing affinity to finance but rather by the fact that the position to which he applied 
for offered an attractive salary of £5,000 per annum, almost twice as much as what 
he was earning at the time. After several rounds of interviews, and receiving a bad 
report because of the flowery tie he wore (he would not ‘fit in’, read his personnel 
record), Bennett was hired. Although he could see that the Stock Exchange was 
interested in the possibilities offered by computing, Bennett remembers his arrival as 
one into an organisation that knew little of how to harness computers for use in data 
processing and dissemination. The ICL mainframe recently bought by the Exchange 
‘was doing nothing, just standing in the computer room’. 
The people who had been charged with [automating some of the back-office 
work] were the Property and Maintenance people, so [they] were […] 
actually in charge of lifts and escalators, and the plumbing and all that sort of 
stuff, and knew nothing about computers. And to cut a long story short, they 
spent a lot of money on this machine, and conveyor belts and stuff like that. 
[It was as if the system had been designed] by someone who’d worked at 
Ford Dagenham, because their idea of automation was to shift the paper from 
one end of the building to the other on a conveyor belt. And this mainframe, 
all it did was basically, sort of very basic process control (Bennett interview) 
Bennett was the ‘data bloke’ brought in to ‘sort all this out’. And indeed, he became 
an entrepreneur, carving a niche distinct from the existing computer and 
telecommunications groups at the Stock Exchange.  
 
The project where Bennett initiated his career in the Stock Exchange was not 
directly related to the development of price information systems, although he was 
apparently involved in MPDS at an early stage of his career. When Bennett was hired
by the Stock Exchange, settlement was once again under review. Between 1969 and 
1970, the Stock Exchange sought to update its systems hrough the introduction of 
Bargain Accounting14. If bargains checking were automated through the introduction 
                                               
14 As reported in the Stock Exchange Journal, plans to modernize settlement were considered as arly 
as 1960 when a City committee analysed the problems of the existing methods as well as the 
possibilities available to the Stock Exchange, including the creation of a nominee company. In 1966, 
after the passing of the 1963 Stock Transfer Act, a Stock Exchange sub-committee examined the 
opportunities offered by the use of a centralised computer system that avoided the production of 
tickets. By the late 1960s, the problems associated with settlement, and the possible advantages of 
using computers to streamline the process were clear: the London Stock Exchange had followed 
closely the problems faced by the so-called ‘paper-work jam’ of Wall Street in 1968 (Vice, 1968; 
Wells, 2000). This proposal of the sub-committee was hence taken seriously, ultimately informing the 
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of computers and with the addition of terminals installed in the offices of member 
firms, the number of errors could be reduced substantially along with the overall 
costs of the complete trade cycle. This required improved telecommunications 
between the floor, the offices of member firms, andthe settlement room, an area in 
which Bennett’s expertise could prove fruitful15.  
 
Initially, the existing staff of the Stock Exchange managed the expansion of 
electro-mechanical and computer systems for settlement. However, by the early 
1970s, Stock Exchange leadership realised the need for xternal expertise if the 
project were to materialise. Michael Jenkins, a management consultant who had 
experience in the development of reservation systems for the British Overseas 
Airways Corporation, was hired in 1971 as a technical director to analyse the 
development of the new system. And in hiring Jenkins, the Stock Exchange created a 
new organisational branch, the Directorate of Information Systems and Settlement, 
which would take care of the computerisation of settlement in the following years 
(Jenkins, 1974) (Jenkins eventually became technical d rector of DISS). Soon 
enough, Jenkins realised that Bargain Accounting as proposed would prove costly 
and ineffective – the ‘fairly grandiose computer scheme’ would become a disaster. 
He recommended the Stock Exchange to stop investing in the project. But, since a 
change in settlement was needed due to increased trading volumes, the project was 
re-structured. The team headed by Jenkins proposed a n w settlement system based 
on the findings of a report published in 1970 by a City Working Party on Securities 
Handling. Named TALISMAN , for Transfer Accounting and Lodgement for Investor , 
Stock MANagement for jobbers, the settlement system would make unnecessary the 
use of tickets to settle bargains, effectively reducing the paperwork associated to 
matching deals, clearing securities, and updating company registrars. But as the 
complete elimination of tickets was too ambitious a project to be carried out in a 
                                                                                                                          
deliberations of the City Working Party on Securities Handling, chaired by the Chief Accountant of 
the Bank of England, R E Heasman (Jenkins, 1974). The report of this committee, as is described in 
the following paragraphs, set the guidelines for the computerisation of settlement in the London Stock 
Exchange. 
15 The development of settlement systems and of the hardware and software upon which they relied 




single step, an intermediate system was designed that relied on the existing method. 
Named CHARM for CHecking, Accounting and Reporting for Member Firms, the
intermediate system was introduced in the first half of 1970 and formed part of a 
larger, multi-phased project for the automation of p st-trade accounting, settlement 
and clearing.  
 
CHARM itself consisted of two phases. The trade magazine DataSystems 
reported the first, a checking system, as superseding ‘the traditional method of 
checking bargains whereby Brokers and Jobbers, having dealt on the Floor of The 
Stock Exchange, prepared lists of bargains to be checked manually the next day at 
Blossoms Inn’. 
[E]very day about 300 staff went down to the Checking Room and called 
over the bargains dealt the previous day. In many wa s the Checking room 
was like a second trading floor – on average 20% of the bargains did not 
match exactly and staff had to agree changes on the spot. […] Many 
alterations […] are made in the Checking Room but there is a small residue 
of bargains that cannot be agreed on the spot. These have more serious errors 
and must be referred back to the dealers and then checked over the phone. 
[…] A checked bargain is the starting point for thesettlement process and to 
ensure accuracy the Council decided that this matching of bargains should be 
done by computer (Anonymous, 1974).  
Unlike the prevailing arrangement, where data-entry was physically centralised and 
required the work of numerous clerks, the checking system that part of CHARM 
allowed each firm to report bargain details directly into a central computer. Larger 
firms possessing computerised management systems of their own could enter the 
information of the bargains made throughout the day by sending their magnetic tapes 
and punch cards directly to the Stock Exchange Computer Centre on Wilson Street. 
But there remained many firms that could not invest in computing. For these, Bennett 
thought, the equivalent of a banking terminal could be installed in their offices and 
connected directly to the Stock Exchange’s dedicated IBM  370/145 (it seems that the 
first computer used for matching bargains was an ICL mainframe; Bennett interview). 
Bennett deemed such terminals the basis of a larger remote data entry system, 
providing both input and output facilities that could handle the daily capture of deals 




The choice of terminals became the entry point for other technologists. At the 
time of the development of CHARM, Olivetti was expanding into the market for 
terminals and minicomputers, both of which were being adopted within banking and 
finance. Olivetti, for instance, was involved in the installation of an electronic check 
clearing mechanism at Barclay’s Bank. Holding great similarities to the settlement of 
deals in the Stock Exchange, check clearing was a very manual activity. 
If you wrote a check, it would go to the banking office and a girl would key 
in the details into a machine which would a punch card and that would be 
loaded on the IBM  system, because that’s all they had in those days (Scannell 
interview). 
The introduction of magnetic ink character recognitio  in United States banking 
during the mid 1960s made possible automating most of these processes. Indeed, the 
Inter-Bank Computer Bureau, formed by a series of British commercial banks, 
implemented character recognition as a standard in 1970 (Inter-Bank Computer 
Bureau, Bank of England, C156/1).  
 
Automated check clearing, however, was not entirely fault-proof. There 
would always be checks on which the E13B number was damaged to the point of 
making them illegible to the machines, thus requiring ‘about 40 girls who were in an 
office with these punching machines taking the checks that wouldn’t go into the 
scanner, keying it all in into the punch card, [and] loading the punch card into the 
IBM . Horrendous process’ (Scannell interview). The soluti n implemented for this 
arrangement consisted in adopting minicomputers. The system installed by Olivetti 
in Barclay’s Clearing Department in 1971 connected dumb banking terminals to 
minicomputers. 
A girl was to get the check. [She] would key the details into the banking 
terminal. [That] would simply write it on to a tape, and the tape would be 
taken off the minicomputer [and] loaded straight into the IBM . So we it cut the 
number of staff required significantly. And that was successful (Scannell 
interview). 
 
News of Olivetti’s terminals and minicomputers eventually reached the 
London Stock Exchange. The Olivetti TE 339 terminal, in particular, was seen as a 
solution for the technical specifications of CHARM. John Scannell (b. 1944), who 
joined Olivetti in 1964 as a field engineer and was a section manager by 1970,  
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ended up doing a presentation to Peter [Bennett] and a few people of the 
Stock Exchange when I was working [for] Olivetti to [explain] how we 
would support [the terminals], because I was running the support operation 
for it, and I immediately got on quite well with Peter (Scannell interview). 
The purchase of 150 Olivetti terminals for CHARM created a relationship between 
Scannell and the technical teams of the Stock Exchange. When Olivetti closed its 
branch in the City of London, making Scannell redundant, he sought refuge at the 
Stock Exchange. ‘Within a couple of weeks I ended up working for Peter […], 
because they’d bought the Olivetti banking terminals’ (Scannell interview). 
 
CHARM symbolised an important element of the computing and engineering 
cultures of the Stock Exchange. From the outset, Bennett formed the team that 
implemented the communications network of the new sttlement system around 
systems programming, with design preferences biased towards developing 
applications and systems from scratch as opposed to purchasing and installing ready-
made solutions. This was visible in the design choies made by Bennett’s team 
around the validation of bargains. Before passing bar ains to the IBM  370/145 for 
checking, the data required a filter to detect input errors. Minicomputers could 
handle this step of the process. And Olivetti, with w om Bennett had developed a 
relationship through Scannell, provided such minicomputers. Nevertheless, ‘[t]hey 
didn’t buy the minicomputer. They bought a [PDP-11/40] minicomputer instead 
because […] they wanted to write the application on that themselves’ (Scannell 
interview).  
 
As Bennett’s team grew, similar views became increasingly frequent. 
Computing systems such as those provided by IBM  were deemed ‘too hierarchical’ in 
comparison to the more ‘flexible’, more ‘open’ alternatives given by vendors such as 
Ferranti, developers of the Argus 400 on which MPDS relied, and Digital Equipment 
Corporation, developers of the PDP-11s on which the data validation mechanism of 
CHARM was based (Newman, personal communication). The prominence of systems 
programmers subsisted even beyond the transformations of the 1980s. Simon Peter 
Buck, who joined the Stock Exchange in 1979 after completing a degree in computer 
science at Imperial College, London, recalls 
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In those days there was this big sort of distinction between systems 
programmers and application programmers. And it was like the distinction 
between us and [settlement] guys. The [settlement] guys were applications 
programmers. Application programmers wrote COBOL programmes and didn’t 
really understand computers. They just strung a few instructions together, put 
some numbers in at the front and they came out at the end and that was it. 
And the fact that it was running on a computer was largely irrelevant. 
Whereas systems programmers had to actually understand how the computer 
worked because you were working at the level where you were fundamentally 
using the structure of the computer to do things. […] That was very much a 
sort of system programming sort of approach to things. […] Although 
obviously we were writing applications it was very much more bound into the 
system (Buck interview). 
The rift between Bennett and the settlement team emerged, as Buck suggests, from a 
difference in computing cultures. Even at the time of its creation, Bennett considered 
the design of the central settlement system arcane.  
Why not go for a real-time settlement? You know, why go through this stupid 
batch processing? They did it because they had an ICL mainframe which was 
going to spare. And, you know, at the time, there weren’t that many 
computers that could not only check, but that could actually [offer] real time 
checking and real time reporting. But that was too far for these guys at this 
stage. So I just basically stayed back and did my bit on the telecom front. 
From this point onward, settlement and telecommunications would follow different 
paths. They remained disconnected and showed, each in its own way, the tensions 
between the complex and at times divergent interests of the member firms of the 
Stock Exchange and the distinct technical cultures of its employees16.  
                                               
16 Unlike the dissemination of prices, settlement presented numerous legal complications to the 
securities industry in Britain. The development of TALISMAN, for instance, required changing the 
law of ownerships of shares as to allow for the creation of a transfer intermediary known as the Stock 
Exchange Pool Nominee, SEPON introduced ). SEPON effectively held the stock between accounting 
periods (which at the time were fortnightly), allowing their free transfer between brokers and jobbers. 
The system devised for TALISMAN proved to be tremendously effective. It was not until the late 
1980s that the Stock Exchange embarked on the developm nt of a replacement for TALISMAN which 
came to be known as TAURUS (Transfer and Automated Registration of Uncertified Stock). Part of the 
rationale behind TAURUS was the reduction of the account period from two weeks to three days. 
Likewise, it was seen as an opportunity to ‘demateri lise’ shares (namely, to altogether eliminate 
paper certificates). TAURUS, however, became a project fraught with political and technical 
complications. The project was halted in 1992, after expenses for £100 million, and led the Bank of 
England to intervene. The Bank of England eventually introduced its own system, CREST, in 1994. 
Incidentally, the design for CREST originated from the gilt-settlement system introduced in the Stock 
Exchange in the 1980s, which was developed by a team of which Bennett was part. The general 
history of settlement in the Stock Exchange is captured by (Michie, 1999) while the case of TAURUS is 
analysed in (Drummond, 1996). 
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3.7 MPDS goes to the country 
In 1973, the structure of the securities industry was altered, testing the technical 
infrastructure of the London Stock Exchange. It wasin this year that the stock 
exchanges of the British Isles amalgamated to create a unified institution, the Stock 
Exchange of Great Britain and Ireland.  
 
The idea of a single organisation covering all brokers and jobbers in Britain 
had existed in numerous forms since the early twentieth century. However, it was 
entertained with particular force in 1962, when a London-based committee 
investigated the possibility of creating a national stock exchange for the whole of 
Great Britain. As a result of the committee’s delibrations, the Federation of Stock 
Exchanges in Great Britain and Ireland was established in 1965. The Council of the 
London Stock Exchange saw membership of the Federation s but a single step in a 
larger process of unification.  
 
The London Stock Exchange expected to use the Federation to eliminate 
dealings in dual capacity in other stock exchanges in the United Kingdom thereby 
taking the principles of their organisational strucure to every corner of Britain. The 
Federation, nevertheless, was not a trivial battlefield and became the site of a critical 
defeat. While it did not outlaw dual capacity amongst provincial jobbers, the 
Federation restricted London brokers from accessing regional securities markets 
(Michie, 1999). Full unification became the only means to deal with the 
fragmentation of the market and the competition from non-member brokers, 
especially as reduced costs in telecommunications made matching bargains over 
distance increasingly affordable. With the political support of its largest broking and 
jobbing member firms, the Council of the London Stock Exchange pursued 
unification throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. The threat of competition from 
foreign securities houses that dealt in domestic shares, however, catalysed the 




The merger of the London Stock Exchange with the provincial exchanges17 
transformed London into the undeniable pole of influence of the securities market. 
But it also presented the organisation with a serie of technical challenges. In 
particular, amalgamation implied guaranteeing equal access to the services provided 
in London to peers in the provinces. For settlement, this entailed extending the 
remote data entry system devised for CHARM and TALISMAN  to the offices of 
provincial brokers and jobbers; and for market servic s, it meant taking the signals 
from MPDS had to the regional centres across the United Kingdom (Newman 
interview).  
 
MPDS posed a particularly important technical challenge. The original design 
of the service relied on a coaxial distribution network, and the London Stock 
Exchange could not just link the regional centres by plugging them to the existing 
infrastructure (Newman interview). The cost of installing hundreds of kilometres of 
coaxial cable between the City of London and the regional centres (located as far as 
Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool, Dublin and Belfast) was prohibitive.  
 
The solution devised by the Stock Exchange made use of the same type of 
technologies introduced for CHARM. The system created for the new unified 
institutional arrangement received the name of Country Market Price Display 
Service, cMPDS. Relying on the existing infrastructure of MPDS in London, cMPDS 
involved installing a PDP 11/40 in each of the regional centres across the United 
Kingdom. Each of these PDP 11/40s received a digital feed produced by the Ferranti 
Argus 400 at the London Stock Exchange (McLelland interview) through a dedicated 
telephone line. At the end of the network, the PDP11/40s created simulated 
televisions by requesting information to the computer in London. Thus, the service 
delivered to the country was digital in constitution but provided the same visual 
representation of the market as the analog television receivers in London  
                                               
17 Although dominant, London was not the only financil entre in Britain. Since 1836, it had shared 
the market for British securities with exchanges in Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Cardiff, 
Bristol and Glasgow among others. Provincial stock exchanges, however, tended to specialize in 
raising capital for, and trading shares in, regional companies. On this, see Thomas (1973).  
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So [you had] a sort of hybrid. In the centres, [you had] the television cable 
we’d done, but people weren’t actually all living in the centres, so they got 
the slower version which [was] purely digital. [We] made [..] it look back to 
being analog television whereas it wasn’t. This wasin order to create a so-
called fairness with everybody seeing the same thing (Newman interview). 
 
Country MPDS proved a milestone in the technological history of the London 
Stock Exchange. At one level, cMPDS signalled an organisational change in the 
production of new computing and telecommunication systems. Up to the introduction 
of cMPDS in 1974/75, technological developments within the Stock Exchange were 
produced through outsourcing. Indeed, while MPDS emerged from collaboration with 
Ferranti, cMPDS involved the information technology provider Logica (McLelland 
interview), which was behind the messaging system of the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication, SWIFT.  
 
But cMPDS would be the last major project to be outsourced. Rather than 
leaving the job to external vendors and service providers, the technical staff of the 
Stock Exchange started to expand rapidly, hiring and retaining individuals whose 
expertise were deemed particularly valuable. Such was the case of Ian McLelland, an 
electrical engineer trained at Swansea University who joined Logica in 1973. Some 
years after having worked for Logica on the development of cMPDS, the Stock 
Exchange took McLelland up for the development of other projects (McLelland 
interview). The debugging of cMPDS provided itself an entry point for increasing 
numbers of qualified personnel and the growth of the Stock Exchange’s technical 
teams. Country MPDS was not free of problems. Michael Newman, who eventually 
became a key figure of the Stock Exchange’s information systems team, joined 
precisely to manage what had become a messy arrangeme t. 
When I joined, [the cMPDS project] was in a mess. [The] number of errors and 
faults had risen faster than our ability to solve th m. So every time we 
thought we’d solved three problems and put a new releas  out, another seven 
would appear. So one of my first projects was to get control of […] Country 
MPDS and bring some discipline to solving the problems (Newman interview).  
A consequence of this growth, born out of the necessity to expand and maintain the 
Stock Exchange’s systems, was to bolster the position of Peter Bennett within the 
organisation. In effect, both Newman and McLelland became close collaborators of 
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Bennett, whose ideas were increasingly influential in the technological decisions 
taken by the Exchange.    
 
At a different level, the introduction on cMPDS unveiled the potentialities of 
digitalisation and, in particular, of digital transmission feeds. Contrary to the service 
provided in London, cMPDS was digital at its core – it was precisely this digital 
character that allowed relaying data from the London fl or across the country. 
Although it preserved the visual formatting of its analog predecessor, cMPDS showed 
that digital technologies could accomplish more with less: they could expand 
throughout the United Kingdom, perhaps even abroad; they could provide the same 
quality of information, if not better; and they could be adapted to the needs of 
individual users with relative ease.  
3.8 The dangers of digital 
The consolidation of the Stock Exchange’s systems, represented by the developments 
in both settlement and price communication, could not have come at a better time. 
After all, the technologies upon which the Stock Exchange built its many services 
were increasingly available in the market. Any institution willing to invest adequate 
sums and to pursue the creation of systems catering to the needs of the securities 
industry could become a direct competitor of the Stock Exchange. It was only a 
matter of time before someone used digital technologies to tackle the monopolistic 
position of the increasingly digital Stock Exchange of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
Competition came in 1971. On that year, institutional i vestors mounted a 
unified front against the Stock Exchange, whose fixd-commissions system they 
considered uncompetitive18. The Accepting Houses Committee, a select group of 
                                               
18 Strongly capitalised and increasingly diversified, merchant banks in the 1970s did not have access 
to the floor of the Stock Exchange. They could neither own broking firms nor become members of the 
Exchange. During the late 1960s, early 1970s, the merchant banks sought to negotiate a deal with the 
Stock Exchange through which they would receive discounts on commissions, bypassing the retail 
market on the floor. The merchant banks, along withother large institutional investors heavily 
involved in the market,  
did not see the need for the broker’s research, since they had their own staff of fund 
managers and analysts. And as, increasingly, they wanted to buy large parcels of stock, they, 
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merchant banks, struck the first blow. In May of 1972, the Issuing Houses 
Association (formed by members of the Accepting Houses) announced that a group 
of merchant banks would embark on the creation of a computerised dealing system 
named Automated Real-time Investments Exchange, ARIEL, providing ‘an 
inexpensive efficient trading market which will transcend National boundaries’ 
(Kynaston, 2002). The seventeen merchant banks that initi lly subscribed to ARIEL 
found inspiration in the United States. In particular, the model for ARIEL was the 
block-trading system pioneered by Instinet in 1968/ (Littlewood, 1998). As such, 
ARIEL departed from the methods of dealing long held in the London market. ARIEL 
guaranteed complete anonymity, breaking with a face-to-face dealing tradition that 
spanned more than a century. ARIEL was open to all institutions, departing from the 
club-like character of the Stock Exchange. ARIEL disintermediated trades, eliminating 
the division between market-makers and brokers hence challenging the system of 
single-capacity that defined the structure and operation of the Stock Exchange. And 
even in terms of technological cultures, ARIEL was a patented system, whereas the 
services developed at the Stock Exchange were not (as Peter Buck mentioned in 
interview referring to the patenting of the Stock Exchange’s systems, ‘people just 
didn’t think like that. You just got on and did things’). The system, set for 
introduction in 1974, was planned to secure 10% of the institutional business, 
equivalent to 4% of the total equity market (Littlewood, 1998). 
 
The Stock Exchange was quick to perceive the threat posed by ARIEL. Its first 
reaction was regulatory, prohibiting its members from joining the system. A 
statement of the Council issued in 1973 captured th rationale behind the decision. 
ARIEL, said the council, was ‘incompatible with the established methods of dealing in 
securities in this country’ (Council of the Stock Exchange, 1973). By ignoring the 
separation of functions that defined securities dealings in London, they argued, ARIEL 
would jeopardize the fairness of the market. The fragmentation entailed by the 
                                                                                                                          
or rather their brokers, found the jobbers hard-pressed to find it from their own books and 
even less willing to take a big risk with the price (Chapman, 1988a; p. 43).  
As noted by Kynaston (2002), what drove the merchant b ks to develop ARIEL was not so much the 
Stock Exchange’s fixed-commissions but rather they w re not granted a privileged exception, a 
possibility that was out of the question for the Council of the Stock Exchange.  
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system, furthermore, would ‘reduce the effective establishment of fair prices’. And 
finally yet importantly, ARIEL posed potentially grave problems of supervision:  
[what] ‘ARIEL’ seeks is direct access to the jobbing market withou  accepting 
the disciplines which are imposed on the members of the Stock Exchange in 
the interests of the whole securities industry.  
The Council of the Stock Exchange also leaned on the most prominent financial 
information provider at the time, Exchange Telegraph Co. (Extel), to guarantee that 
up-to-date prices from the floor would not be available to the competing system. 
They organised fact-finding missions to the United States, where they assessed the 
operation of the three existing computer-based system  (e.g. Instinet, Autex and 
NASDAQ
19). And, critically, they pressed for the development of instruments that 
would obtain  
the maximum advantage in the distribution of dealing information to 
institutions [by introducing] a system which instantly recorded prices at 
which deals took place and a further communication system through which 
brokers could inform institutions of their interest in lines of stock (Hamilton, 
1986, p. 5).  
To an extent, ARIEL catalysed technological innovation within the Exchange. 
Specifically, it created an organisational rationale for the creation of the systems that 
would become central to the Stock Exchange’s approach towards Big Bang more 
than a decade later.  
 
The risk posed by the new system faded away rapidly, however. After its 
launch in 1974, ARIEL underperformed its original expectations, capturing o ly one 
per cent of the jobber’s total share and two per cent of the institutional business 
(Davis, 1979). The explanations for the demise of ARIEL are numerous. The year of 
ARIEL’s introduction saw a steep fall in the market, reducing overall stockbroking 
activity (Littlewood, 1998). Although the Bank of England never openly opposed 
ARIEL, it did not allow the inclusion of gilts (a tradable UK government debt) in the 
                                               
19 Such missions were important in presenting existing technological possibilities to the Council and 
membership of the Stock Exchange. At a later point in time, for instance, the Stock Exchange assessed 
the possibility of developing a system similar to the one provided by Instinet for in-house dealing. The 
Paris Bourse, which was also on the route of the computerisation of trade, was seen as a possible 
partner in this venture .(Michie, 1999) (p. 505). Yet perhaps more importantly, these fact-finding 
missions gave the Stock Exchange an opportunity to nvestigate the National Association of Securities 
Dealers’ Automated Quotations system (NASDAQ) which, as is shown below, became a crucial 
template for the City of London in the 1980s. 
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system (Kynaston, 2002). With no access to current prices or to the market-making 
jobbers of the Stock Exchange, ARIEL lost some of its appeal. And, as Barry Riley, 
former editor of the Financial Times noted, the cynical view had it that ‘a computer 
can’t buy you lunch, whereas a broker can, and would’ (Riley interview).  
 
ARIEL was too much, too soon, an example of the contingent character of 
technological success in the marketplace. For a technology to have effect on social 
structures, observes the economic sociologist Niel Fl gstein, there needs to exist a 
form of social organisation that makes technologies relevant in the first place 
(Fligstein, 2001). The face-to-face environment of the floor and its associated 
institutional arrangements were still central to the securities industry. Screens and 
automated bloc trading did not suit the historically rooted practices of the makers of 
the equities market in London, configuring ARIEL as an unsuccessful venture. This 
episode, nevertheless, left one thing clear: the days of the Stock Exchange’s 
monopoly were counted. Great competition lay ahead, an  in the brave new world, 




 Table 1. Chronology of market information systems at the London Stock Exchange, 1968 – 1992 
 1969/70 1974/75 1979/80 1985/6 - 1992 
Systems     
 Market Price Display Service (MPDS), 1969 – c.1980  
  Country MPDS (cMPDS), 1974 – c.1980  
   Exchange Price Information Computer, 1977 – c. 1992 
   Teletext Output by Price Information Computer 
(TOPIC), 1980 – c. 1992 
    Stock Exchange 
Automated Quotations 
(SEAQ), 1986 – 1990s 
Technologies Ferranti/Olivetti/DEC   
   Digital Equipment Corporation (Information services) + IBM 
(Settlement) 
Departments     
 Computer Services Group, 
c. 1966 – 1971 
   
 Directorate of Information Services and Settlement 
(DISS), 1971 – c. 1979 
  
   Special Systems Group (SSG), c. 1977 – c. 1984  
   Technical Services Department, 1979 – c. 1990 
People     
 Peter Bennett 
 John Scannell 
 Michael Newman 
 Ian McLelland 
 George Hayter 
 Peter Cox 
 Peter Buck 
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4 An EPIC Marketplace: the 
(Re)Materialisation of the London Stock 
Exchange, 1975-1995 
 
During the three decades following the Second World War, the London Stock 
Exchange experienced numerous transformations. The old House built in the 
nineteenth-century was a memory from a seemingly distant past, replaced by a 
Tower with a trading floor populated by electronic hexagonal pitches. The coaxial 
network of MPDS extended throughout the City of London and its vicinities, 
disseminating mid-prices to thousands of users. The digital signals of Country MPDS 
reached the most prominent financial centres of the United Kingdom, guaranteeing 
access to the same images observed by the Londoners. Moreover, the machinery of 
CHARM was becoming a run-of-the-mill element of the overall operation of the 
British securities industry, bringing settlement a step closer to a paperless (what 
some would later call dematerialised) state. Yet despit  these transformations, the 
market retained a strong connection to the past. Single capacity was now more than 
ever the norm. Fixed-commissions persisted for all tr des. And the London Stock 
Exchange continued to be a veritable club-like organisation.  
 
ARIEL, the electronic block trading system developed by merchant banks in 
the early 1970s, presented the Stock Exchange with an important lesson. However 
strong the ties between its members may be, however much it continued to present 
itself as a national institution built upon reinvent d historical grandness, the position 
of the Stock Exchange was not set in stone. The decreasing cost and increasing 
flexibility of computing and telecommunication technologies mounted a challenge to 
the Stock Exchange by materialising the possibility of alternative dealing systems 
that circumvented the trading floor. Indeed, the prsence of a thriving market in 
Eurobonds was proof that face-to-face dealing was but one in a number of possible 
sociotechnical market configurations. The Stock Exchange was well aware of this. 
Their missions to the United States and their closene s with the exchanges of 
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Continental Europe showed them just how diverse the architectures of the market 
could be. And in learning this diversity, the Stock Exchange deliberated on the future 
shape of the securities market in Britain.  
 
Of all the possible routes to follow, there was an increased recognition that 
computer and communication technologies were bedrock to the markets of the 
future. As early as 1973, the Council had concluded that the ‘world-wide provision 
and reception of market information through visual display screens will in future 
become a vital aspect of the business of the Stock Ex hange and its member firms’ 
(Council of the Stock Exchange, quoted in Michie, 1999). In particular, the data 
streaming through the cables and computers that were commonplace in international 
finance had suffered a notable transformation. It was no longer a mere appendix to 
the market, a by-product of jobbers and their interactions with brokers. It was no 
longer ten lines of edited company announcements published on a television screen 
or printed on a sheet of paper. Information mutated into an asset, and within the 
realm of information, ‘fresh’ and ‘fair’ prices wer the most coveted resource of all.  
 
The learning curve towards this realisation was steep, nevertheless. 
Notwithstanding the recognition of information as central to its operations, the 
attitudes of the Stock Exchange towards information systems fluctuated considerably 
over time. In 1974, for example, the Stock Exchange toy d with the idea of selling 
MPDS to Reuters, a growing influence in international mrkets, who then possessed 
an infrastructure capable of delivering London prices to Tokyo within four seconds. 
It took the intervention of Dundas Hamilton, a broker who served as Deputy 
Chairman of the Exchange, to remind the Council that by doing so they would 
renounce to the control over their own price information, opening the possibility for 
Reuters to develop a competing screen-based trading service (Michie, 1999, p. 508). 
The Stock Exchange hence withdrew from Reuters, zealously safeguarding its prices. 
Even the relationship with Extel, a longstanding partner, changed due to of the peril 
of uncontrolled information. From 1975 onwards, Exchange Telegraph, Extel, would 
no longer be able to collect prices off the trading floor, becoming instead a paying 
subscriber to the information services provided by the Exchange. With the 
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consolidation of information services as a central activity of the finance, the Stock 
Exchange set the stage for a transformation of MPDS.   
 
The initial change took the form of an update. While the members of the 
Stock Exchange considered MPDS a valuable service, there was room for 
improvement in terms of the accuracy and quality of the mid-prices it reported. In 
particular, prior to 1975, the prices displayed by MPDS coexisted with those provided 
by at least two other services, Extel and the Financial Times. Three different teams 
of price collectors ran between pitches, acquiring quotes from different jobbers, at 
different times, and submitting them to different systems with different standards. 
The prices presented on MPDS were thus not unique representations of the market: 
there were ‘three different teams and what you could easily get at the end of the day 
were three different versions of the price of a stock like Shell or ICI’ (Newman 
interview). When Extel was denied direct access to the floor, their price collectors 
were absorbed by the Stock Exchange (Newman interview).  
 
The amalgamation of price collection implied that there was now only one 
official price for each share. It was thus imperative to assure quality of the prices by 
introducing faster and more reliable methods of colle tion and dissemination. The 
processing capacity of the Argus 400 computer was, nevertheless, a bottleneck for 
further increases in the rate at which prices could be fed into MPDS. The proposed 
solution derived from the technical experience gained in the development of CHARM. 
As occurred with CHARM, a PDP 11/70 from Digital Equipment Corporation was 
added to the system to serve as an input/output process r. This minicomputer 
received its price input from a set of upgraded Westinghouse dumb terminals located 
on the floor of the Exchange, which replaced the original Ferranti terminals installed 
in 1970 and fed data into the Argus 400 through a digital link. By supplying 
preformatted messages, the PDP 11/70 reduced the ‘number crunching requirement’ 
of the Argus, hence increasing the rate at which prices could be changed (Carey, 




A reconfigured MPDS allowed the Stock Exchange to enter an altogether 
different club. In some ways, this slight modification of the price dissemination 
service was a foray into the markets for data provisi n. Due to its monopolistic 
position and tightened regulation on the information it produced, the Stock Exchange 
arrived at a position where it was able to capture, format and sell prices to specialised 
data vendors, even individual users. Reuters and Extel were two examples, 
distributing the prices of the Stock Exchange through their networks across Britain 
and the world. The new version of MPDS, however, made space increasingly 
compressible, allowing for the identification of new interlocutors in business. In 
particular, it showed that space was no impediment for data transmission, and that 
wherever there was a customer there could be a market for information. The concrete 
manifestation of this new vision came in the form of a link with Telekurs, a financial 
information provider founded in Zurich in 1930 as Ticker AG. ‘We had the first ever 
computer link to display data. As far as I know, it was the first ever in Europe. It was 
[certainly] the first in Britain’, recalled Michael Newman, responsible for managing 
the project. Space was showing its technologically mediated flexibility and, in the 
eyes of the engineers of the Stock Exchange, the globe was mutating into an 
electronically interconnected marketplace.  
4.1 The (cybernetic) road to EPIC 
The attitudes towards the expanded role of technology in the operation of the Stock 
Exchange and its concomitant relation to information were never entirely 
homogeneous across the membership. In the early 1970s, brokers and jobbers 
remained quite wary of the possible demise of the floor due to the emergence of an 
alternative computer-based dealing system. Yet, as mentioned above, towards the 
mid 1970s a certain degree of consensus emerged on the role of technology in the 
future of the Stock Exchange. Just as New York managed to keep its specialist 
system by giving the floor access to faster means of communication and novel 
mechanisms of visualisation (see Keith, and Grody, 1988), London could keep its 
longstanding practices and institutional structures. The apparent contradiction 
between face-to-face dealing and the computer becam a fallacy, domesticating 
information technologies as a routine element of the culture of finance in Britain. If 
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anything, new technologies – in particular, those of the type represented by MPDS – 
transformed the floor into more than a marketplace. The floor, usually described to 
the public in terms of a wholesale produce market, moved into the light of a different 
metaphor. The Stock Exchange was also a factory, a place where prices were forged 
by jobbers out of the specialist knowledge of brokes, to then be digitally shipped 
through telephone and coaxial cables across the world.  
 
This specific attitude towards information technologies was partly the result 
of a consolidated ‘informatic’ culture within the engineering and computing 
community of the Stock Exchange. This was visible in Peter Bennett’s group, which 
by the mid 1970s had carved a space of its own within the organisation. The 
milestone that marked this new culture was set in 1976 when the Stock Exchange 
hired George Hayter to direct its technical services. The decision to hire Hayter, 
recommended by consultants, derived from the realisation that ‘this technology thing 
was something that was eventually going to take over in a big way’ (Scannell 
interview).  
 
The convergence between Hayter and Bennett was a fertile ground for the 
expansion of information systems within the Stock Exchange. To some extent, this 
convergence derived from Hayter’s multifaceted background. Originally trained in 
natural sciences at Queen’s College, Cambridge, George Hayter (b. 1938) read 
numerous subjects – including empirical psychology, philosophy and logic – before 
becoming an electronics engineer designing military ai craft control systems. It was 
‘a lot of fun’ recalls Hayter, ‘sort of grown-up Meccano, really, and actually making 
things that work […] was great’. Hayter’s association with computers resulted from 
working with Elliot Automation, a British computing company taken over by 
International Computers and Tabulators, ICT, in 1968. There, Hayter was involved in 
a project validating analog computing results through digital calculations. It was 
‘very slow and cumbersome, but thought to be very rliable and more sort of kosher, 
in some way or other’. While the experience with Elliot Automation got Hayter 
‘interested in what computers could do’, it was during his subsequent time at LEO 
Computers where he uncovered ‘all sorts of new interes ing applications’ in 
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commerce. This realisation led Hayter to join the British Overseas Airways 
Corporation, a predecessor of British Airways, where he was put in charge of 
managing the development of a computerised reservation system. Named BOADICEA, 
the system was the first such development outside of the United States, where IBM  
had launched SABRE in 19641. Altogether, BOADICEA was a feat for BOAC, both in a 
technical and an organisational sense. The system, in particular, exemplified the 
adoption of advanced control techniques (e.g. operations research) and computing 
systems within British industry (see Littlewood, 2005). For Hayter, participating of 
the development of BOADICEA resulted in a specific – and, as time would prove, quite 
critical – set of organisational skills. The development of the reservations system 
required managing with a complex bureaucracy and coordinating tasks across several 
technically distinct groups.  
There was passenger checking, passenger ticketing, passenger fare 
construction, weight and balance calculations, route optimisation, all this sort 
of stuff was being done online. And that was thrilling because it was really 
leading edge, real-time computing, you know, for the first time for me. That 
was in 1968, and I was there until 1976. I was in charge of real time system 
development. A team of about 120 system designers and programmers, 
documenters, testers and so forth. And we also sold that package of software, 
which amounted to about 500 man years of work, to other airlines around the 
world. So I had little teams of people dotted about the place. I got to work on 
a sort of global canvas which turned out to be important later on (Hayter 
interview). 
 
The confluence between Hayter with Bennett came in the form of a shared 
metaphor of the market that resounded with the technological direction taken by the 
Stock Exchange. For Hayter, in particular, it was clear that digital technology 
‘needed to be introduced in order to broaden the scope of the information systems’ 
Because I could see that trading securities, is pretty much a hundred per cent 
information flow. There isn’t much else, really. I mean, there’s paper, but the 
paper represents information and there were ways in wh ch I could see that 
the paper could be immobilised so that the whole process could be 
represented as information flow. Starting with market information to the 
broker and his client, generating an order. It doesn’t have to be written on a 
                                               
1 SABRE originated as a civilian spin-off of SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), a large-
scale computerised command, control and communications system built in the United States in the 
1950s for providing continental air defense against the possibility of a nuclear strike. For a history f 
the development of SAGE see Campbell-Kelly & Aspray (1996) and Edwards (1996).   
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piece of paper as it was then. It can flow straight nto the market, it can be 
executed against a jobber or market-maker’s quotation, he resulting trade can 
then be generated and recorded and then passed on to settlement and generate 
the necessary trade contractual exchange of ownership, and exchange for 
money. And money is information as well, with the depositary which 
[electronically] keeps track of the ownership of shares in the United Kingdom 
and the banking system for transferring money. The w ole blazing thing is 
actually information flow, from start to finish (Hayter interview). 
Permeating the design of systems, an informatic metaphor was adopted by the 
technological communities of the Stock Exchange, prsenting the market as a series 
of information flows, feedback loops and technologically mediated reflexes. For both 
Hayter and Bennett, the market could not be reduced to ither an inherent 
equilibrium derived from individual rationality or to the whims and worries of 
speculators and informed investors. For them, the complexity of the market 
necessitated an informatic interpretation, modelled on the quasi-cybernetic systems 
underlying computers and automated avionic control mechanisms.  
 
Bearing a common metaphorical heritage and similar experiences in college 
and industry, Hayter and Bennett cultivated a unique engineering culture within the 
Stock Exchange. For George Hayter, the successful development of BOADICEA 
proved the commercial feasibility of large-scale real-time computer systems in an 
essentially international business. Indeed, the growing scope of real-time computing 
applications in business confirmed its technological and organisational viability. For 
those building the information systems of the London Stock Exchange, real-time 
computing became the primary path to follow when designing technologies for the 
marketplace. After all, information cannot flow in a world of mainframe-based 
batch-processing. The rift that originally distanced Bennett from the technical 
activities of settlement was now the source of an alliance with Hayter. Although 
Bennett ended up reporting to Hayter, ‘the pair of them made a good combination’ 
(Scannell interview): while Hayter ‘had kind of a political mind, [knowing] the right 
way to go about things’, Bennett was the technological entrepreneur guiding ‘a sort 
of forward-looking outfit, crazy techies, who were fantastic, some of them were real 




The systems of the Stock Exchange, however, were a long way from the real-
time computing and communication networks that exist d elsewhere. Between the 
flow of information and the transformation of the trading floor into a factory of 
actionable prices, there was a fundamental architectural roadblock. In a sense, the 
prices displayed on MPDS were not the type of signs that moved the market, th y
were not triggers of action. The system was ‘extremely crude’, recalled Scott Dobbie, 
formerly a broker with Phillips & Drew (Dobbie interview). The real price ‘was 
always on the floor’, the place one had to access to execute an order or discover the 
best bids and offers for particular shares2. To an extent, the temporalities created 
through MPDS, within finance on the floor, and the practices in the offices of brokers 
and jobbers had yet to converge (Miyazaki, 2003). To be used and interpreted as 
actionable signs by the community of brokers and jobbers in London, the prices on 
MPDS required a series of mutations. Above all, it was necessary to impose upon 
them a certain standard, a form of authority and centralisation that gives digital bits 
their apparent universality. Such standard came in the form of a unique price 
collection mechanism within the Stock Exchange. Restricting access to trading floor 
of the Tower made the Stock Exchange’s information systems a point of obligatory 
passage (Callon, 1986) for those wishing to observe and interact with London’s 
market. This primacy in finance was guaranteed not o ly by controlling the 
dissemination of prices and their consequent transformation into scarce commodities, 
but also through the standardisation of their production.  
 
Electronic mid-prices were therefore made valuable things; they became 
commodities. But for these valuables to flow, for them to be utilised across time and 
space, two further changes were required. The first, guaranteeing real-time access to 
all the quotes in the market and aligning the temporalities of floor and screen, was 
for now too large a shift in the practices of the Stock Exchange. The second, 
however, was more socially permissible. Prices had to be malleable; they had to be 
flexible and usable. Owing to their analog nature, th  signals and screens of MPDS 
                                               
2 This was, in fact, a sociologically relevant difference between the stock exchanges of London and 
New York. Unlike New York, where the stock ticker became the dominant mode of visualising and 
interacting with the market (Preda, 2008), MPDS and the systems that followed in London did not lead 
to an erosion of face-to-face dealings. Conversation l turns predominated in London until the end of 
1986 as the only legitimate means of accessing the market of the Stock Exchange.  
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allowed no modification to or further electronic processing of their contents. The 
prices fed into the Ferranti Argus ‘were only used on that system. They could not be 
put to any other use’ (McLelland interview). 
4.2 A digital heart for the EPIC marketplace 
The need to create flexible and malleable data-feeds provided an incentive for the 
Stock Exchange to replace the computational core of MPDS. In practical terms, the 
architecture of the Argus 400 was an obstacle to the expansion of digital services for 
the market. However relevant, the link with Telekurs could not be taken to more 
users, and MPDS itself could not be reconfigured to handle more shares without 
affecting the quality of the output.  
 
The solution conceived was to replace the Argus 400 with a PDP 11/70, 
allowing for a critical innovation, namely, the construction of an electronic database 
for market prices. The project, initially labelled Exchange Price Input Computer, 
EPIC, was a joint financial venture between the Stock Exchange and Exchange 
Telegraph. As Michael Newman recalls, the use of the word ‘exchange’ ‘was 
deliberate, because [Extel was] Exchange Telegraph and we were the Stock 
Exchange, so the common word was ‘Exchange’, so that [EPIC] could mean [both] 
Exchange Telegraph Price [Input Computer] and the Sock Exchange [Price Input 
Computer]’ (Newman interview). The financial backing of Extel was based on a 
clear rationale, as it had a vested interest in the development of reliable data 
dissemination systems. Facing increased competition from vendors such as Reuters 
and Datastream, Extel considered the development of a system for distributing prices 
‘as a digital feed to everyone’ (Scannell interview) a profitable and necessary 
venture. In any case, the digital distribution mechanisms of EPIC could facilitate 
Extel’s main business of providing financial information to British newspapers 
(Buck interview). The ultimate design of EPIC, however, remained in the hands of 
Bennett’s team. Hence, the organisational template for the system came from the 
tried and tested collection protocol of MPDS: the current prices of shares were entered 
from the market via price input terminals located on the edge of the floor. The 
difference was that these prices were sent to a database ‘which held information 
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about every stock traded on the floor (identified by its 4 character EPIC code) such as 




Figure 4.1 Engineer testing EPIC, c. 1977. Courtesy of John Scannell 
 
As the project evolved, other types of information were added to the service, 
leading to is renaming as Exchange Price Information C mputer. EPIC incorporated 
such elements as market-related news items and headlines, and specialised programs 
that managed official publications requiring accurate nd up-to-date data. 
Particularly important was the Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL), produced 
every night by the Stock Exchange, containing the official prices of all the securities 
listed in the market. SEDOL was not merely an element of routine documentation. All 
tax, probate and portfolio valuations carried out in the United Kingdom referred to 
the prices in the Official List. Maintaining the list was a laborious task. While th re 
were only about 2,500 regularly traded stocks that needed an EPIC code there were 
about 10,000 listed stocks that each had a SEDOL code (Buck, 2008). Along with a 
program that facilitated the production of SEDOL, EPIC also dealt with the creation of 
the Weekly Official Intelligence, WOI, a collection of company announcements and 




EPIC went online in 1977 amid little pomp. For the users of the Stock 
Exchange, the introduction of the system was surreptitious: EPIC did not transform 
the screens of MPDS nor the quality of the documents published on a daily and 
weekly basis by the Stock Exchange. Everything seemed to be the same. At the level 
of infrastructure, however, EPIC embodied a change in the role of information 
technologies in the organisation of finance. In particular, EPIC demonstrated that a 
computational system – none other than a database – could become the core of the 
financial marketplace. EPIC was able to gather within a single unit the different inputs 
from the floor, moulding them into data-feeds that challenged geography by reaching 
distant corners of the British Isles through cMPDS and overseas countries through the 
distribution networks of Extel.  
 
These feeds, furthermore, were malleable. Unlike the information produced 
with the previous incarnation of MPDS, EPIC allowed Extel to gather the information 
from the market and tailor its presentation according to the specifications of the 
numerous newspapers it serviced.  
The Glasgow Herald, for example, would have its list of stocks and its 
defined output. [They] might, for example, cover 900 stocks in its paper and 
it might [have] wanted a 12 character name or something and the price 
[immediately after] that. So the extraction [program] worked out who the 
customer was and what he wanted his layout to look like. Because each 
newspaper has a different layout, [length] in characters as well, so that the 
new computer system would [extract it] and then send it electronically to the 
newspapers (Newman interview). 
The social appropriation of information feeds – that is, their incorporation to the 
practices of particular groups – was not instantaneous. Some, in fact, considered the 
automation brought by data-feeds as a threat to established relations. Newspapers 
illustrated the defiant reception given by some to the digital flows of EPIC. Michael 
Newman recalls with bewilderment how some of the newspapers that bought data-
feeds from Extel ‘still printed out [the formatted layout] and typed it back in again 
because the union operators had jobs for life as the typists. So amazingly this thing 
was still getting the computer printing it out exactly as they wanted it and they would 




Initial opposition notwithstanding, the community of brokers and jobbers in 
London as well as some non-member users embraced the malleability of the feeds 
from EPIC; ‘it was clear that people started to want real time feeds’ (Buck interview). 
With the expansion of computing within the financial community of the City of 
London, it was now possible for individual users to connect directly to EPIC in order 
to receive the most up-to-date information possible without accessing the floor. This 
resulted in the creation of a separate service, the Computer Readable Services, which 
offered a portfolio of data feeds for various subscribers and replaced the earlier 
custom feeds such as the news agencies and tapes (Buck, 2008). A new materially 
mediated modality of finance was emerging within the City of London. 
 
At the level of metaphor, EPIC was a departure from previous 
conceptualisations of the market. Specifically, EPIC was an expression of the 
feasibility of ‘dematerialising’ finance through a cybernetic transformation. The 
routines once performed by individuals working in con ert towards a single 
calculative end translated into self-contained processes running on a PDP 11/70. The 
organisation of the market, in a sense, was reduced to one of its computational 
representations, with humans becoming sources of input for the system. The 
DataBase Handler (DBH), which ran as a process called DBHD80, mimicked the clerks 
that once stood on the pitches of jobbers updating Perspex whiteboards in the House. 
Both the price input program and the company announcement program signalled DBH 
when data was entered into the terminals, validating the contents and assuring the 
integrity of the digital repository. A display program formatted the data for its 
transmission to the screens of MPDS, updating the contents upon receiving an 
instruction from DBH. An output process created a log for every transaction, 
recording it on a magnetic tape. And a response program, coupled to a watchdog 
timer, served as an indicator of the failure of the system by regularly polling EPIC and 
sounding an alarm if a response was not received. Although it did not bear a one-to-
one correspondence with the organisational arrangement of the market, the division 
of labour between the processes running on EPIC emulated the operation of a bygone 




The successful operation of EPIC hinged on a series of transformations of its 
social surroundings. In particular, the market, understood as a collection of brokers, 
jobbers, clerks, prices, securities, devices and practices, was cast in a language 
amenable to EPIC and its organisational appendages. People and things, i  particular, 
were parameterised. Just as EPIC led to the characterisation of the clients of Extel in 
terms of a number of pre-set instructions, it also introduced a new conventionality for 
the shares in the market. On the one hand, the EPIC codes introduced by the Exchange 
set a unique standard for the identification of companies and shares. On the other 
hand, shares were differentiated through their locati n within categories built upon 
perceived price behaviours.  
We expanded the database to about two and a half thousand [shares] on it, 
and we basically put them in three tiers. The active stocks, which sort of then 
became the FTSE 100. [These were the] top 100 or so stocks. The pric  
reporters were told they must keep them up to date at all times. [T]hey were 
70 per cent of the trading going into those stocks. Then there was the next 
[band?] somewhere in the middle […] and then the last stocks were [those] 
we only needed to make sure [were] updated once a day. So the middle band 
would be a few hundred, and the rest were in the ‘make sure you’ve got once 
a day’ (Newman interview).  
This, in a sense, entailed a double modification. While the world was fixed to the 
demands of EPIC, the parameters of the system were made significant only through 
the carrying out of particular practices. Price collectors had to adapt their behaviours 
to the new categorisation of the market in order to guarantee the stability of the three 
tiers of shares. Failing to adopt particular behaviours (e.g. failing to update the prices 
of the most active shares) led to a breakdown of the system. The (incidentally long) 
survival of the EPIC codes, as well as of the three levels of prices, hnce depended on 
a co-modification of social and technological arrangements, on the development of 
new conventionalities that allowed the EPIC marketplace to function, in short, on new 
set of organisational routines centred around the market/machine. 
 
The centrality acquired by EPIC should not lead us to put too much weight on 
either the dematerialisation of the market or the mechanisation of economic relations 
in the Stock Exchange. On the latter, the parameterisation of shares still relied on a 
highly interpersonal, almost tacit, form of knowledg . The tiers, for instance, were 
not ‘fully defined […] People knew what the stocks [were]’ (Newman interview). 
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Indeed, EPIC formed part of the broader social mesh of the market, where face-to-face 
interactions, conversational exchanges, and interpersonal forms of knowledge 
continued to base economic relations and the calculative efforts of agents in the 
marketplace. On the former, EPIC was quite a material enterprise. Although elements 
of the market were represented by processes running o  the PDP 11/70, a large 
infrastructure remained. As the Argus 400 that preced d it, the PDP 11/70 was a 
tangible entity associated to tangible organisationl routines. The most visible 
material consequence of EPIC, however, was not to be found in the copper wires 
sending signals from London across the world or in the circuits that comprised the 
PDP 11/70, but rather in the rapid expansion of the siz and remit of the technical 
services team of the Stock Exchange. What started as a h ndful people grew by 
orders of magnitude in the following years. The ‘dematerialisation’ of the market 
was proving to be a tricky endeavour requiring an army of experts responsible for 
building and managing the (materially present, though increasingly invisible) 
agencements of the marketplace. 
4.3 The birth of SSG 
The organisational correlate of EPIC was the creation of a specialised section within 
the Stock Exchange charged with developing information and communication 
technologies for the market. The group, which bore the title of Special Systems 
Group (SSG), centralised the projects on market technologies, most of which were 
then headed by Peter Bennett, within a single unit (McLelland interview). Under the 
supervision of George Hayter, the SSG was responsible for guiding the technological 
trajectory followed by the Stock Exchange in the years leading up to Big Bang in 
1986. Special Systems ‘was sort of like being in a research department in a 
university. Everyone was a graduate [,] smart people’ recalled Peter Buck, who 
joined SSG in 1979. It was, nevertheless, a research department in the City of 
London, embedded in an organisation that sustained a ‘yes sir, no sir’ attitude 
towards superiors (Sheridan interview), and surrounded by a financial culture that 
mixed gentlemanly ideals with masculine bravado (themes dissected in closer detail 
in the following chapter).  
 
89 
It sounds cliché now, but [..] the culture was very much work hard play hard. 
So it would not be unusual to see people still there at eight or nine o’clock at 
night, because they were working on a project. And, you know, we needed to 
get it done and projects tended to be very short term, three month[s] or 
whatever. So people would work very hard to get things done. And then, you 
know, Friday night or whatever, you’d go out and get absolutely plastered 
because, again, it was the City and that was the culture in the City (Buck 
interview). 
 
The work hard/play hard culture of the technical tem combined with the pre-
existing attitudes towards the design of information systems (e.g. systems 
programming and a bias towards real-time computing a d communication). In effect, 
the SSG was the locale of technological innovation within the Stock Exchange. Their 
approach towards the development of systems was part of their strength: ‘I learnt 
some powerful skills from Bennett and Newman’, recall d Ian McLelland.  
Keep development teams small and effective – more than six people? – 
rethink the structure […] Prototyping – better to show the product than 
produce mountains of documentation (the Achilles heel of settlement 
development). This was against the traditional development cycle at the time, 
but was hugely successful in getting the requirements right up front and proof 
of concept […] Work Breakdown Structure – Similar to small teams, keep the 
work packages small and deliver often. Can’t develop weekly? – break it 
down further. (McLelland, personal communication). 
Much like the popular image of the dot-com firms of the 1990s, the SSG was initially 
small (in the recollections of Buck, around 23 out f 800 employees of the Stock 
Exchange) and composed of relatively young engineers and programmers. The head 
of the SSG was a by then experienced Bennett. In his words, the success of previous 
endeavours (not so incidentally coupled to his political abilities) implied that, in the 
eyes of the Council and the membership, he could ‘do no wrong. I mean, they gave 
me more or less a carte blanche to automate everything inside’ (Bennett interview).  
 
Bennett’s technical achievements contributed to the wid  support given to the 
projects and continuity of the SSG, not to mention its ever-expanding budgets. Even 
so, a critical form of endorsement to technology and the work of the SSG came from 
the close collaboration between George Hayter and Ptrick Mitford-Slade. Mitford-
Slade was the direct liaison between the Council and the technologists working for 
the Stock Exchange. A partner of the highly reputed stockbroker Cazenove since 
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1972, Mitford-Slade had first-hand knowledge of the various activities involved in 
the operation of the Stock Exchange. After twelve years in the army where he served 
as signals officer and achieved the rank of captain, M tford-Slade joined Cazenove in 
1968. His first six months at Cazenove were spent as a clerk in the contract and 
settlement departments, which constituted a sort of ‘basic training’ on stockbroking. 
The partners then realised ‘that they were wasting my time and theirs, and they put 
me into the New Issue department for the next 18 months’, completing his two years 
of basic training. At New Issues, Mitford-Slade and his three colleagues did 
‘everything in dealing with the Stock Exchange for listings of securities and that sort 
of things’ (Mitford-Slade interview) giving him a particularly close understanding of 
organisational procedures. He was then seconded to the board of the Takeover Panel, 
created in 1968, and after two years, returned to Cazenove to head the money 
broking side of the business. During this time, Mitford-Slade accompanied the visit 
of then Deputy Chairman David Roy-Lewis to Washington and New York, which, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, was a response to the threat of the automated 
trading system ARIEL. The visit to America gave Mitford-Slade a closer look of the 
state ‘of international regulation at this stage’. Equally importantly, it got him 
interested in electronic technologies. As he mentioned, 
When I was out in New York and Washington on this expedition we saw the 
first word processors, and we were astounded the secr taries could actually 
manipulate all this on a screen. And we were thrilled by that. And I got quite 
interested on that side of things (Mitford-Slade interview). 
In 1976, Mitford-Slade was elected to the Council of the Stock Exchange, where he 
became ‘quite a valued member’. Particularly relevant, however, was his 
appointment as the Chairman of the Information and Communications Committee, 
the organ that had overseen the development market systems since the initial days of 
MPDS. Reflecting its wider remit, the Information and Communications Committee 
changed its name in 1979 to Technical Services Committee. ‘People got a bit 
confused with the name “information and communications”’, said Mitford-Slade. 




4.4 The limits of analog 
With the introduction of EPIC in 1977, the Stock Exchange was preparing to enter the 
technological playing field of an increasingly global and electronic financial system. 
Changes in the structure of the domestic and interna io al securities industry – such 
as the liberalisation of exchange rates in 1972, the development of electronic dealing 
systems in North America, the growth of institutional investors and the consolidation 
of foreign investment firms in London – led the Information and Communications 
Committee of the Stock Exchange to pursue a next stp in data provision. For 
Mitford-Slade, Chairman of the Committee, ‘MPDS was marvellous, as far as it went. 
It only had 22 pages of information, and it was really just listing the shares on those 
22 pages with an up-to-date market price on it’ (Mitford-Slade interview). Whatever 
the solution implemented, the system replacing MPDS needed to be both 
commercially viable and able to handle ‘an unlimited amount of information’ 
(Mitford-Slade interview).  
 
The Special Systems Group was particularly aware of the technical 
limitations of MPDS and had considered, as early as 1975, ‘moving the system 
forward’ (Scannell interview). The roadblocks for scaling up MPDS were clear to 
them: to increase the number of channels was simply prohibitive due to the required 
bandwidth. The expansion of MPDS had reached a point where the 22 channels 
‘squeezed every available bandwidth […], so much so that the gap between [them] 
started to get almost blurred’ (Newman interview). The system was ‘absolutely at its 
limits’, as Michael Newman recalled. The pressure to xpand, furthermore, only 
increased with time: as new instruments entered the market, users demanded 
additions to the service, such as when traded options were re-introduced to the floor, 
forcing the SSG to implement a time-sharing system on the channels i  MPDS. The 
data displayed on the screens would switch every ten seconds between market 
sectors, allowing for the visualisation of the prices of traded options while keeping 
the system at 22 channels. However, ‘people really didn’t like it, because if you were 
trading you didn’t want the bloody thing to switch on to the other page when you 




The issue was not merely one of the quality of visuali ation. Problems in 
maintenance and the general reliability of MPDS also suggested that a different 
approach was necessary. The modified television screens MPDS required considerable 
work. The engineering teams of the Stock Exchange would ‘go round and service 
these damn things. And sometimes, after sort of five years, the screen would be very 
fuzzy and you could barely make out the […] characters’ (Scannell interview). The 
core hardware on which MPDS ran also had its peculiarities. For example, the digital-
to-analog video converter that allowed sending images via coaxial cables relied on a 
crystal that operated at a set frequency. The effici ncy of the crystal varied greatly 
according to the environmental temperature.  
[If] it was a warm day and it was a bit warm in thecomputer room, [the 
crystal] would [lose its original resonance frequency], which would make the 
characters on the screen to start to tear, because it wasn’t in synch. [What] we 
had to do [was] to open the door of the Ferranti Argus about 2 inches to cool 
it down and that would allow the frequency of the crystal to go back to where 
it was originally set (Scannell interview). 
The technological mashup of digital computers, video converters, signal amplifiers, 
television emulators, and miles of coaxial and telephone cables rendered the 
materialities of MPDS an awkward solution for future expansion.  
4.5 TOPIC for the market 
The replacement of MPDS came through a serendipitous confluence of technological 
innovations. In the late 1970s, real-time computing was an established technological 
design/practice, both within computer engineering ad in broader commercial 
applications. Financiers in Britain had a decade of xperience as ‘push-button 
devotees’, making electronic information systems socially acceptable. And a new 
communication system had been developed which could potentially solve the 
bandwidth and modularity issues of MPDS.  
 
The system in question was known commercially as Pre tel and belonged to a 
broader set of data-dissemination technologies called Viewdata. Developed by the 
British Post Office, Prestel was a ‘marriage of industries, technologies, processes and 
skills’ in ‘telecommunications, the telephone, the computer, and publishing’ (Fedida 
& Malik, 1979, p. 2). Prestel was an information publishing service whereby a 
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computer sent data to modified colour televisions set  using conventional telephone 
lines. Users of Prestel were provided with either a dial-up modem or an acoustic 
coupler and a keypad with which they could connect their television sets to navigate 
through the numerous indexed pages of the service. Each page consisted of 80 
columns by 40 lines of characters. By pressing specific buttons on the keypad, the 
user could request to download a particular page. Unlike its predecessors, such as 
Ceefax (offered by the BBC to send information as Teletext), Prestel was an 
interactive videotex system as opposed to a unidirectional broadcast. In other words, 
Prestel allowed for communication between the user and the computer. Prestel made 
use of a technology that is widely known today, namely, an asymmetric 
communication channel: users only had to send short requests to the computer in 
order to receive the selected page (the initial upload/download speeds were in the 
order of 75/1200 bytes per second). Indeed, many hailed Viewdata technologies as a 
basis for the interactive data communication system of the future, ‘if some method 
of breaking into the mass market could be found’ (Fedida et al., 1979, p. 7). 
Electronic diaries, electronic mail, on-line video games and even a home movie-by-
wire delivery service were the potential applications envisioned for Viewdata, most 
of which are captured by a currently pervasive asymmetric communication 
technology, the internet.  
 
For techies like Bennett and Scannell, Prestel ‘looked quite good’ as a 
replacement for MPDS (Scannell interview). Not only did it preserve theestablished 
economies of conventional television sets (‘people had got very used to TVs and the 
cheapness of them blended in well with the concept of having a TV terminal’, said 
Bennett), but it also relied on the existing network f telephone lines and re-
introduced colour into the visualisation of the market. The system thus devised by 
Bennett, named TOPIC for Teletext Output of Price Information by Computer, used 
Prestel as a technological blueprint.  
 
The development of TOPIC implied some important technical departures from 
Prestel. While EPIC was sturdy enough to serve as the repository of the price and 
company data displayed by TOPIC, the mechanism for updating the pages on Prestel 
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was an important hurdle. As a price visualisation system, TOPIC could not be slower 
than MPDS. The users of MPDS were used to the quasi-instantaneous updating of 
prices: Due of the previous experience of MPDS, ‘there was a requirement to have 
something on [the] screen pretty rapid[ly]’ (Scannell interview); to change from one 
channel to another in MPDS took as much time as it did in a conventional analog 
television set, roughly the time it took an electron beam to scan the screen. Yet in a 
standard Prestel system, users had to request the screen to update without knowing if 
new information had been fed to the computer, therefore exerting a higher load on 
the communication channel and forcing users to keep th  keypad constantly within 
reach.  
 
To deal with the real-time requirements of the users, Bennett designed a 
‘super Prestel’ (Newman interview) that took the original interactive Viewdata 
technology and made it ‘formal and reliable’ (Bennett interview). In TOPIC, the 
television sets were given ‘some extra logic’ allowing them to render the teletext 
signals that came from the terminal. The terminals, developed by BARCO, the Belgian 
electronics manufacturer, were boxed in a metal casing to endure life on the floor and 
in the office. Groups of up to twelve terminals were connected to purpose-built 
multiplexers that linked to a switch, itself linked to a high performance process 
control machine. In effect, these process control machines gave TOPIC both its 
modularity and its speed. Built by Modular Computer Systems Inc, these control 
machines (MODCOMs) were originally designed for uses in aerospace and industrial 
applications. (Bennett remembers, with some pleasure, that NASA used these 
computers. Although expensive at £220,000 each, he thought that if TOPIC was going 
to work ‘that’s the only way it’s going to work’; Scannell interview).  
 
The MODCOMs provided a reliable link to the databases of EPIC, being able to 
have ‘have a thousand test points connected [to] either a rocket engine or an army 
211 [Rolls Royce] engine’ or, in this case and by proxy, the market floor (Scannell 
interview). With 128 ports potentially connected to 12 terminals each, one MODCOM 
could service more than 1500 users. With this arrangement, the number of pages 
available to the market was only restricted by the storage capacity of EPIC. Soon 
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enough, the 22 channels on MPDS became several hundred pages on TOPIC. The 16 
channels of prices moved to a ‘magazine’ of 100 pages; the 4 channels for company 
news and announcements also reached a magazine of more than 100 pages; and 
pages for indices, currencies and traded options proliferated throughout the new 
system (McLelland interview). TOPIC was ‘ahead of anything that Reuters was 
running at the time’ (Bennett interview) and provided, in a sense, a completely novel 
informatic life-form for the market.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 System-testing TOPIC, c. 1980. Courtesy of John Scannell 
 
The driving force behind the development and subsequent introduction of 
TOPIC resided in the expanding armies of technicians working around the market 
floor. For Patrick Mitford-Slade the process was ‘definitely bottom up’, with ideas 
coming from people who ‘knew what technology was avail ble’, particularly, the 
Peter Bennett’s and George Hayter’s of the world. The ‘technocrats’ ‘had to sell 
[their ideas] to me and I had to sell them to a lot of people who didn’t understand 
technology whatsoever’ (Mitford-Slade interview). TOPIC was particularly illustrative 
of the organisational dynamics supporting the development of market information 
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systems at the Stock Exchange. Although some were aware that MPDS needed a 
replacement (particularly, the SSG and the Information and Communications 
Committee), for many members and users of the market the system was a solution in 
search for a problem. The initial reaction of the Stock Exchange to TOPIC largely 
reflected both this perception as well as the system’  technical origin. ‘Many 
members of the Committees didn’t believe TOPIC would be a success’, recalled 
Newman. ‘They thought people liked MPDS and had learned to live with it’.  
I remember going to one brokerage house […] when I went around to find 
out what people wanted. [And a broker there told me] ‘colour will come into 
this trading room over my dead body’, he said, ‘it’s a complete gimmick, we 
don’t want it’ (Newman interview). 
For the Council, the project ‘was quite an investment to launch into [requiring] quite 
a lot of persuasion’, recalled the then Chair of the Information and Communications 
Committee, Mitford-Slade. To sell the new system to his peers, Mitford-Slade found 
inspiration paraphrasing a well-known slogan for Heineken by assuring that ‘TOPIC 
reaches parts MPDS cannot reach’. Years of trust backed the concerted negotiations 
between the technologists, their supporters among the membership and the Council, 
leading to the ultimate approval, development and introduction of TOPIC in 1979. ‘In 
fairness to them’, recalled John Scannell about the Council, ‘we’d got the proper 
documentation. They were quite confident we knew what we were doing. Their own 
firms were suffering because they’d really needed this equipment for their business, 
so it was very interesting times’ (Scannell interviw).  
 
Once online, TOPIC gained credibility rapidly, not least because the new 
system allowed member firms to visualise data through colour, text, and graphics and 
share information within closed user groups (Newman interview). (In fact, the 
number of pages associated to closed user groups quickly surpassed the number of 
pages for prices). Within two years of its introduction, the number of TOPIC terminals 
rose from the 400 initially authorised by the Council to several thousand. The 
purchasing of hardware to extend the system became much easier. As Scannell 
mentioned, when ‘you’ve got 2000 orders outstanding’ 
you could not spend enough money. It was virtually impossible. And you had 
people screaming at you because the place is absolutely booming, you know? 
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There’s people ringing up, ‘can you install one of these next week, I’ll give 
you, personally, I’ll give you X to sort of install it.’ 
Even those who had once considered colour a gimmick were a few months later 
‘complaining to the Council that his firm [didn’t have the terminals that they 
wanted]’ (Newman interview). Numerous additions followed the expansion of TOPIC. 
Without much resistance from the authorities of the Exchange, the number of 
MODCOMs increased; to facilitate access to highly used information, the SSG set up a 
cache of the most requested pages; and to ensure overall lower response times, the 
technical teams installed a Winchester disk that provided higher speeds and increased 
reliability.  
4.6 The ripples of ARIEL 
According to George Hayter, by the early 1980s the service provided by TOPIC and 
EPIC had been widely recognised as a ‘great success’. TOPIC was the new Aston 
Martin of the City of London, with a two-year waiting list for delivery and a long 
queue of firms anxious for their terminals to arrive. It cost about a tenth of similar 
developments in Reuters, and had ‘a superb way of [using] colour [instead of] black 
and white, a superb performance, very fast response [rates] by some very clever 
programming, and a proprietary network which was very high performance’ (Bennett 
interview).  
 
The development of TOPIC, however, occurred in an environment of mounting 
political pressure against the Stock Exchange. Although it seemed that the Exchange 
was progressing smoothly into the 1980s through the provision of better services and 
a greater centralisation of the British equities market, this was but a façade. In effect, 
pressure had built up for almost a decade. The structure and mode of operation of the 
Stock Exchange was becoming increasingly untenable for the large institutional 
investors that dominated the post-war market. International competition was afoot, 
thriving under the shadow of the Stock Exchange. And the meaning of technology 




The almost imperceptible uncertainty surrounding the Stock Exchange in the 
late 1970s originated, one could say, from the introduction of the electronic dealing 
system ARIEL. Not only did ARIEL open the possibility of finance conducted through 
electronic and automated means, but it also led large investors and financial 
institutions to question the raison d'être of the Stock Exchange within the larger order 
of the market. However much a national institution it may have once been, the Stock 
Exchange was anything but a fact of nature, an inherent and immutable feature of the 
British securities industry. The political efforts a sociated to this newfound 
opposition, most of which focused on the fixed-commissions structure that 
dominated finance in London and that gave ARIEL its original appeal, led the Board 
of Trade to require the Stock Exchange to register ts rules and regulations with the 
Office of Fair Trading in 1974. For some, the national institution was transmuting 
into a monopolistic and anticompetitive cartel, and s David Kynaston (2002) wrote, 
a long slow fuse had been lit.  
 
The referral of the Stock Exchange to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) was 
initially a mute issue. The existing Restrictive Practices Act 1973 had been ‘drafted 
by a Conservative administration’ and was ‘not intend d to impinge on the 
operations of self-regulatory bodies such as The Stock Exchange’ (Hamilton, 1986, 
p. 10). The passing of a revised Act in 1976, however, was less sympathetic to 
capital markets, making their so-called restrictive practices illegal. Upon registering 
its Rules and Regulations along with its Code of Dealing, permanent notices, and 
other Council directives, the Stock Exchange received a letter from the OFT in June 
1978 indicating that seventeen restrictions were identified. Of these, the two most 
pressing concerned fixed commissions (which were deemed as limiting the freedom 
of brokers in supplying services to their clients) and single capacity (relating to the 
operation of the market). The notice marked the beginning of a defining legal battle 
between the Stock Exchange and the OFT, generating disquiet amongst the 
government and the City that the ‘future operation of a national undertaking […] was 




Planning for the court case continued apace within the Stock Exchange. 
During the course of legal preparations, the Exchange was successful at stressing the 
role of single capacity as a means for preventing conflicts of interest within a self-
regulated environment. Neither the government nor the financial institutions of the 
City of London desired an end to the division between brokers and jobbers, 
considering it a stabilising factor in the market (serving as a crucial element in their 
policy for improving investor protection; see Michie, 1999; see chapter 6 for a 
discussion on investor protection). The Stock Exchange reaped the tacit acceptance 
of single capacity, building a so-called ‘link’ argument (Mitford-Slade interview), 
that maintained that fixed commissions and single capa ity were co-integral parts of 
the system: if the court eliminated the former, the reduced profits of competing 
brokers would lead them to act as principals in order to avoid the costs implied by 
the jobber’s spread; jobbers, on the other hand, would have to act as agents since 
they would be at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis brokers. The OFT was not 
entertained by the idea. They were only willing to accept a ‘total surrender, which 
was doing away the minimum commissions, and doing away with membership rules, 
doing away single capacity’ (Mitford-Slade interview).  
 
The election of a Conservative government in 1979 seemed to provide an 
opportunity for getting the case dismissed. Many within the Stock Exchange 
assumed that a Tory government would be friendly to the activities of a long 
established (and largely establishment) City. Nevertheless, the incoming government, 
headed by Margaret Thatcher, was a ‘very radical conservative government’ that 
‘didn’t like clubs and […] didn’t like monopolies’ (Riley interview). The case thus 
persisted, despite the political efforts of the Council of the Stock Exchange and its 
Chairman, the broker Sir Nicholas Goodison. The impending court case set for 
October 1983, and the possibility that the Stock Exchange might have lost its legal 
battle hence paralysing the British securities industry, motivated the identification of 
alternatives. Following the general election of 1983, which the Conservatives won, 
Sir Nicholas Goodison met with Cecil Parkinson, Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry. By then, the government was sympathetic to the predicament faced by the 
Stock Exchange. The meeting proved critical. In July 1983, an agreement was 
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reached with the authorities whereby the OFT dismissed its case if the Stock 
Exchange 
[dismantled], by stages and with no unreasonable delay, all the rules which at 
present prescribe minimum scales of Commissions, and to complete this 
dismantling by 31 December 1986. (Goodison quoted in Michie, 1999) 
 
In the broader history of British finance, this pact between Parkinson and 
Goodison stands as the narrative climax marking the red finition of the Stock 
Exchange. However, the court case was but one (undoubtedly prominent) among a 
great number of factors leading to the transformation of finance in the United 
Kingdom in the 1980s. Technology, regulation, changing patterns within the 
industry, and broader transformations of financial and social life contributed to re-
configuring the market. Change had been deemed necessary as early as the days of 
the fact-finding missions to North America in the yars surrounding ARIEL’s 
introduction. From there on, a sense emerged that  
London had rather had the blinkers on for a number of years. [The 
membership] sort of regarded the London Stock Exchange as the premier one 
of the world, and that there is only one way of doing things and that is 
London’s way (Hayter interview). 
The Parkinson/Goodison agreement merely catalysed institutional transformation, 
freeing the Stock Exchange from the constraints of the court case, forcing its 
membership to re-evaluate their remit. In effect, the case had ‘made us look at our 
rules and principles’, as Peter Wills remarked (Wills quoted in Michie, 1999, p. 552). 
Soon after Sir Nicholas Goodison announced the deal to the membership, it became 
clear to most that, as the ‘link’ argument suggested, dismantling fixed commissions 
entailed the de facto end of single capacity. A bicentenary tradition, a longstanding 
market structure, was coming to an end.  
4.7 (Re)creating the market 
The Parkinson/Goodison agreement, however, did not specify the mechanics of 
change. Aside from the deadline, the Stock Exchange was left free to decide how it 
would proceed with reform. The future of the Stock Exchange, ‘the way we 




From the outset, it was clear that the market in overseas securities was a 
prudent area for the introduction of negotiated commissions – as explored below, this 
area was arguably feeling the most pressure for change nd, in the view of the 
Council and market participants, was easier to isolate from the UK securities market. 
The market in domestic securities, nonetheless, preent d thornier issues. The 
membership considered three possibilities for impleenting changes. The first, 
‘class-by-class’, entailed removing the minimum scale of commissions successively 
across different sectors of the market. The second, ‘top-slicing’, approach implied a 
progressive reduction in rates, culminating in the complete elimination of fixed-
commissions. The third involved the introduction of negotiated commissions in a 
single step, an approach that was consequently termed ‘Big Bang’. According to 
Michie (1999), it was clear by February 1984 that both the ‘class-by-class’ and ‘top-
slicing’ approaches were impractical for they presented scenarios in which the rate of 
change became uncontrollable due to the competitive pressures from institutional 
investors. Above all, the Council wished to monitor and control change. The idea of 
a single moment of market restructuring, a single Big Bang, was thus chosen.  
 
Recognising the inevitable end of single capacity and having embraced Big 
Bang as their approach to reform, the Stock Exchange still faced the issue of 
choosing the market structure for the future. It was clear that Big Bang implied much 
more than the elimination of fixed commissions, as explored in an April 1984 
discussion paper issued by the Council. There, it was recognised that  
[the] dealing system must change and that any new system must be available 
by the time minimum commissions are dismantled. In co sequence, the 
present membership and entry rules will also need to change […] and the 
structure and constitution of The Stock Exchange must be adapted as far as is 
necessary to accommodate these changes. [Outside] houses will in due course 
be admitted to Stock Exchange membership in some form, in order to prevent 
fragmentation of the market [as endorsed by the Bank of England] (Council 
of the Stock Exchange, 1984). 
Whichever market structure was eventually adopted, the Exchange deemed three 
objectives as guiding its final choice. First, the new market should provide an 
optimum degree of liquidity given by continuous dealings that encourage the highest 
possible exposure of orders to each other. Second, the new system must preserve, in 
some form, adequate investor protection by minimising conflicts of interest and 
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ensuring that bargains are made at fair market prices. Third, the post-Big Bang 
market should reflect the ‘natural evolution’ of the global securities industry yet be 
flexible enough to allow for local contingencies. As the Council noted, the transition 
had to reflect the particular circumstances of British finance. ‘Market participants of 
the type found in other financial centres cannot be conjured into being at the stroke 
of one pen’, wrote the Council. 
It would be unrealistic that, simply by writing the appropriate rules, The 
Stock Exchange can create a dozen auction/specialist Firms in the US mode, 
accepting complex market functions and capable of making a respectable 
return on capital. Nor can new competing market-makers be created by edict. 
Different types of Firm may evolve, but the market framework itself cannot 
immediately create them (Council of the Stock Exchange, 1984). 
The Exchange surveyed the world to identify the structure that would best suit 
London’s history. Through a new fact-finding mission t  North America, the Council 
identified two broad possibilities: a market based on the principle of broker-to-broker 
auctions, with specialists serving to assist the market process, and a market based on 
competing market-makers, whose obligation was to provide continuous two-way 
prices. 
 
Of the different configurations available to the Stock Exchange, there seems 
to have been an initial, almost nostalgic, appeal for a market driven by specialists. 
After all, this was the model followed by the New York Stock Exchange, the largest 
such organisation in the world since the 1920s. ‘In Lo don’, remarked Hayter, ‘we 
intuitively felt that New York and London were of similar importance, and therefore 
that we ought to look quite closely at what they’d done. [If you looked] at the 
domination of the New York Stock Exchange, it was self evidently true that this was 
the way to go’. Indeed, the Council contemplated ‘adopting different trading systems 
for different categories of securities’ allowing specialists to handle the most active 
shares in the market (Council of the Stock Exchange, 1984). Alas, by July 1984, the 
Stock Exchange had recognised that New York specialists were losing their 
importance. The conclusion was clear: ‘[to] introduce a specialist system with all its 
faults, on a largely unwilling membership would be to impose the second best at a 
time when the opportunity to make the right choice existed’ (Council of the Stock 
Exchange, quoted in Michie, 1999). Another American system emerged as the 
 
103 
pattern for London’s future. NASDAQ, the automated quotation service of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers and a direct competitor of the New York Stock 
Exchange, became the source of inspiration. ‘NASDAQ was intriguing’, remembered 
Hayter, ‘because [their] market-makers looked a bit like [our] jobbers, except that 
they were dual capacity, they were able to trade on the one side with their clients and 
on the other side for themselves’.  
 
With the decision to adopt a competing market-makers system, the contours 
of Big Bang were settled. It was clear, by then, that changes to the terms of 
membership would accompany the introduction of negotiated commissions and the 
end of single capacity. And, to a certain extent, it was also clear that the brave new 
world would be dominated by larger, better capitalised member firms. ‘New dealing 
systems’, wrote the Council in its April 1984 paper, ‘will give rise to the need for 
increased capital in member firms […] The stipulation that a non-member must not 
own an interest greater than 5% in a Member firm when it already owns 29.9% of 
another firm [will] be relaxed’ (Council of the Stock Exchange, 1984). The Council 
had opened the floodgate for mergers, allowing broke s and jobbers, merchant and 
investment banks, British and foreign to mingle. And i  preparation for Big Bang, set 
to take place on 27 October 1986, both domestic and international firms entered a 
period of courtship, seeking to arrange the corporate marriages for the market of the 
future.  
4.8 The gears of change 
The competing market-maker system adopted by the Council involved a shift in the 
architecture of the market. The Stock Exchange would now have to provide a two-
way system for the communication of quotes between brokers and market-makers. 
As such, the path taken towards Big Bang entailed re-structuring the existing 
technological platform.  
 
With hindsight, it is tempting to interpret the decision to emulate NASDAQ as 
the origin of the technological choices taken by the Stock Exchange in the years 
leading up to Big Bang. However, closer inspection of the events surrounding the 
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activities of the Exchange in the early 1980s reveals that, by the time the Big Bang 
approach was announced in 1984, the Technical Services department had already 
drafted an ambitious plan of technological reform that would serve as the partial 
blueprint for 1986. The plan was no doubt inspired by NASDAQ, but only as much as 
it was inspired by the broader developments in the international securities industry as 
well as the changing technical horizons of computing a d telecommunications. The 
primary rationale behind the system proposed by Technical Services derived mostly 
from local perceptions on the need to standardise the existing computer and 
communications services offered by the Exchange. In ffect, the plan presented by 
George Hayter’s department envisioned reassembling the heterogeneous network of 
market information and settlement systems under a single technological umbrella, 
creating a general-purpose network to replace those in place. 
 
The blueprint for the so-called Integrated Data Network, IDN, originated 
during the years of uncertainty surrounding the Restrictive Practices Court case and, 
as most of the efforts of computerisation within the Stock Exchange, came from 
problems in settlement. As early as 1979, a Joint Committee on Gilt-Edged 
Settlements (where gilt-edged refers to the governmnt debt issued by the Bank of 
England and traded in the London Stock Exchange) recommended the development 
of a ‘long term computerised book-entry system for Gilt-Edged settlements’ owing to 
the ‘risks currently incurred by Member Firms when settling high value bargains on a 
next day basis by the movement of physical transfers, certificates and cheques’ (Joint 
Study Group on Computerised Gilt Settlement, 1980). In a system still dominated by 
paper-based securities, the transfer and settlement of deals presented several risks 
and difficulties associated to the materiality of dcuments: from time to time, gilts 
were lost by the couriers or damaged in transit and, overall, the transfer of checks, 
cash and paper was a costly part of the transaction, requiring the physical movement 
of documents across offices in different locations. The system proposed for gilt-
edged securities allowed transferring stock ownership and payment for stock 
‘without need for any paper movement’, immobilising paper-based gilts by creating a 
digital proxy of the market in a computer. The system, based on the concept of Book-
Entry Transfer, BET, required the creation of a Central Gilts Office, CGO, that would 
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maintain uncertified holdings for all principals (for instance, jobbers, money brokers 
and clients). Terminals would be used to transfer stock and money between 
principals via their brokers. And all would be linked by a central computer that kept 
track of the exchange of certificates and money.  
 
From the outset, TALISMAN , the existing Stock Exchange settlement service 
for company shares, was seen as inadequate for its use in gilt-edged settlement. The 
central nominee system upon which TALISMAN  relied obliged firms to surrender 
registrations of their shares to the Stock Exchange Pool Nominee, SEPON. This, 
nevertheless, implied a central liability of payment, deemed ‘unacceptable to all 
parties in view of the values inherent in gilt settlement’ (Joint Study Group on 
Computerised Gilt Settlement, 1980). Although TALISMAN  was not adopted as a 
model, its proven success provided a sound foundation for the CGO, at the least in 
terms of the trust attached to the Technical Servics department of the Stock 
Exchange. Indeed, Technical Services was given the task of evaluating the proposals 
of the Joint Committee and was chosen, soon enough, to lead the creation of the 
system. For Bennett, in particular, this became an opportunity to take real-time 
computing into settlement. It was, as he mentioned, the moment when he ‘got them 
to think in terms of real-time’ (Bennett interview).  
 
By May 1982, the Council of the Stock Exchange had embraced a data 
network strategy that called for an integrated system for the entire securities industry. 
A year later, in 1983, the idea of the integrated data network took BET/CGO a step 
further. In fact, the gilt-edged securities settlement system became but the first stage 
in the more ambitious development of an Integrated Data Network. As George 
Hayter announced in 1983, IDN was set to have ‘a widespread impact on the working 
of the Securities Industry over many years’. Based on the growing communications 
method of packet switching, IDN was a direct response to the ‘proliferation of 
networks’ within the Stock Exchange which, in the vi ws of the Technical Services 
department, had led to ‘high cost, inflexibility and i convenience to service users’. 
Offering a unique communication platform, IDN would permit the interoperability of 
the existing systems at the Stock Exchange while providing ‘faster, easier and 
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cheaper communications’ for the UK securities industry ‘by setting up a common data 
network operating to a set of recognised internatiol standards’ (this paragraph is 
based on Hayter, 1983).  
 
The packet switching method chosen for IDN resonated with the real-time 
computing and communications design principles of the Technical Services 
department of the Stock Exchange. Pioneered in military applications in the United 
States of America in the early 1960s, packet switching provided a technical basis for 
engineering large computer and communication systems. With its forward-looking 
design and its overtly strategic intent, IDN became the flagship project of the Stock 
Exchange, acknowledging the importance of owning and controlling ‘the principal 
communications facilities used for [business] in order to facilitate [the Stock 
Exchange’s] regulatory control over the market and its Member Firms’ (Hayter, 
1983). Standardisation meant not only a more fluid an efficient arrangement for the 
marketplace and the clients of the Stock Exchange; it symbolised control over the 
market and its participants.  
 
IDN would have been a tremendous technological achievem nt for the Stock 
Exchange, had it come to fruition. The system, designed by Bennett and his team, 
and heralded by Hayter, would have made a cost-efficient use of the most 
sophisticated systems available at the time. It would have integrated the ‘IBM  
personal computer, or one of its look-alikes [as] the basis for [a new] terminal 
system’. Brokers, market-makers and clients of all types would have been able to 
‘use a single terminal, or a limited range of terminals, for a multiplicity of functions’. 
And through its development and management at the Stock Exchange, IDN would 
have freed the user from ‘the cost and time involved in building and maintaining his 
own communications networks’ (Hayter, 1983). Indeed, the system was visionary: in 
design, IDN would introduce the modern multi-purpose trading screen to London at a 
scale not seen before. It ws the veritable foundation for what the Technical Services 
department saw as the standardised information flows constituting the blood of the 
market. The financial press clearly identified the strategy of the Stock Exchange. 
‘Ideally’, wrote Alan Cane of the Financial Times, ‘the Exchange would have liked 
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to have created a totally new market information and trading system’. But times were 
difficult, and the deadline of Big Bang loomed above everyone’s head. IDN in its 
complete incarnation would have to wait, if not be completely forgotten. Eventually, 
only the initial stages of IDN materialised, in the form of a BET/CGO settlement 
service, based on fault-tolerant, non-stop Tandem co puters3 (Cox interview).  
4.9 SEAQ and conquer 
IDN did not disappear entirely from the scene. Although the project of a single 
communications network was sent to the backburners, it remained deeply ingrained 
in the attitudes of many technologists within the Exchange. Such was the case of 
Peter Bennett. By late 1984, Bennett had left the Sp cial Systems Group (largely 
absorbed by the Technical Services department) to sart the Advanced Systems 
Group, a ‘directorate [with] a very small team of [hand-picked] people’ (Buck 
interview). In December 1984, and with most in the Exchange acknowledging the 
unfeasibility of IDN given the deadline of October 1986, Bennett present d his vision 
of the market of the future. In a document directed at the authorities and members of 
the Stock Exchange, Bennett warned of the ‘danger that the information systems 
required to maintain and to grow the position of the UK Securities market as a world 
leader will be developed on an ad hoc and piecemeal basis, leading to fragmentation 
and low return on investment’ (Bennett, 1984). Rather an investing in an entirely 
new system, however, Bennett saw in the TOPIC/EPIC combination a foundation for 
the information and trading supports systems of the new marketplace. TOPIC, in 
particular, could be  
developed extensively to handle the anticipated increased flow of information 
available from the restructured market, to broaden and add depth to the 
information available, and to improve ease and use of accessibility to the 
information banks. The TOPIC system will continue to be marketed to the 
investment community at large (Bennett, 1984). 
                                               
3 Arguably, the choice of Tandem computers over DEC’s systems evidenced the different engineering 
cultures within the Stock Exchange. While settlement r lied on batch processing systems and, 
physically, on IBM and Tandem computers, market information services were built on DEC 
computers that, in their recollections, allowed systems programmers to deal with the technical 
minutiae of real-time computing. 
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In proposing the existing TOPIC and EPIC systems as a technological solution, Bennett 
sought inspiration abroad. For him and others in the City of London, there were clear 
indications that the UK securities industry was ‘poised to make a massive in stment 
in information technology, particularly in areas of front office automation’ (Bennett, 
1984). The signals from North America were notable. There, Bennett identified 
markets based on computer networks as a ‘significant tre d’. The Computer Assisted 
Trading System of the Toronto Stock Exchange, along with the National Association 
Securities Dealers’ Automatic Quotation System and the order-matching network of 
Instinet were among some of the ‘significant ripples on the establishment pond 
which cannot be ignored’, wrote Bennett. These system , however, posed what was 
then considered a particularly grave risk for the Stock Exchange. ‘As the physical 
floor gives way to screen based and networked markets it is important that [the focal 
point once occupied by the floor] is not lost, as is happening in the USA, resulting in a 
fragmentation of the market4’ (Bennett, 1984). The flaw of the American system, 
argued Bennett, resided in that the main exchanges across the Atlantic 
have not taken a lead in the development of networked markets, but have 
instead largely abrogated the responsibility for networking and have handed 
the business to third party operators. In contrast, the U.K. Stock Exchange 
has invested, and continues to invest, heavily in information and 
communications systems and it has built up a considerable systems 
development and operations skills in these areas (Bennett, 1984). 
With this, Bennett established a justification for the growing body of technologists 
within the organisation: the future of the Stock Exchange was not to be found only in 
the marketplace and its regulatory structure. Rather, it resided in the discussions 
taking place in the offices of the Technical Services department. The future of the 
market was rendered technological. 
 
In Bennett’s vision, the core of the ideal market, IDN, was partly a 
continuation of the service provided through TOPIC, partly the introduction of packet 
switching in financial services. As an ‘open system’ (insofar as third parties could 
add value to it through feeds such as TOPICLINE and the Computer Readable Service), 
                                               
4 Here, Bennett was referring to a perceived fragmentation of the American securities market brought 
about by the emergence of NASDAQ (which operated over-the-counter) and the American Stock 




TOPIC was extremely successful. Hence, the move to a general-purpose IDN could be 
carried out in a modular, step-wise fashion using existing systems and services. In 
effect, Bennett presented IDN as a ‘set of standardised and versatile networking and 
information systems building bricks which will be used by the Stock Exchange to 
build its new generation of networked systems’ (Bennett, 1984). The Stock 
Exchange, wrote Bennett, ‘is getting into LEGO business’.   
 
What Technical Services envisioned was the creation of a market 
infrastructure based on a standardised instruction delivery system, in which personal 
computers sitting in offices across the world would transform London into a global 
marketplace. ‘Globalisation of the UK securities market’, read the December 1984 
report, ‘could be achieved by linking the UK messaging and packet switched network 
to other securities and Finance Industry networks’ (Bennett, 1984).  Full automation 
on a global scale by means of the creation of a globally accessible order book – a 
concept never before imagined in London– was the ultimate outcome of IDN. 
 
As a stepping-stone, and notwithstanding its supporters, TOPIC was limited. 
‘Whilst providing a strong foundation, [TOPIC] would not be a complete solution to 
all the networking requirements of the securities industry’ (Bennett, 1984). The 
technical limitations of TOPIC were clear:  
[the] network was optimised for the outflow of rapidly changing market 
information, but it was not an ideal basis on which to build high volume data 
collection, transaction processing and teleprocessing applications which 
require two way communications (Bennett, 1984).  
TOPIC terminals, furthermore, were inadequate. They did not ‘meet the needs of 
transaction processing applications [or] the market needs for high performance 
information distribution and display’ (Bennett, 1984). Above all, the network 
composed of TOPIC and EPIC lacked a critical feature for a dual-capacity market, that 
is, a system for disseminating two way quotations generated by market-makers to the 
membership at large.  
 
On account of time, the efforts of the Stock Exchange shifted to pragmatics. 
Big Bang was less than two years away, and implementing an integrated data 
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network in such short time was, at the very least, risky. For Hayter, there was ‘a wide 
river to be crossed and time only to build a Bailey bridge initially’. The Bailey bridge 
to which Hayter referred was an interesting metaphorical choice for the strategy 
adopted by the Technical Services department. Developed during the Second World 
War by Sir Donald Bailey, a ‘Bailey’ bridge is a portable, ready-made, standardised, 
and interchangeable structure that a few ‘unskilled’ soldiers can erect rapidly across 
a river or depression during a military operation. Bailey bridges were instrumental 
innovations during the war, and remain widely used in both civilian and military 
applications. Yet an important characteristic of these structures is that they are 
temporary tools for getting things done. For Hayter and others in the technical teams, 
time was scarce for blue-sky innovation. What they n eded was a system delivered 
on 27 October 1986 for the new marketplace. And it was clear that, however elegant, 
IDN was not the Bailey bridge to cross the turbulent waters of a market in constant 
reform.  
 
With hindsight, and paraphrasing Jean-Paul Sartre, the technological bet at 
the Exchange was placed years before Big Bang with the selection and design of 
TOPIC and EPIC. The systems had become locked-in (David, 1985). After almost 
fifteen years of in-house innovation, the Stock Exchange had deployed a vast and 
heterogeneous array of systems, standards and networks. The very meaning of 
compatibility and incompatibility had been congealed in the platforms of British 
finance: not only were the capital investments in the existing systems considerable; 
member firms, in particular, had built their own systems around the standards of 
TOPIC, EPIC, and CRS, creating economic, cognitive and organisational expectations 
that were anchored to the materialities of the Stock Exchange’s information and 
settlement services. Changing the systems for a completely new network, however 
efficient it may have been, was both financially and socially prohibitive5. And so, 
when the time came to develop a new platform for market exchange, the technical 
                                               
5 The considerable social, cognitive and economic costs associated to the replacement of the Stock 
Exchange’s systems (and thus, their de facto lock-in) is an important illustration of the organisational 
centrality of information technologies: the systems of the Stock Exchange were not merely 
instrumental mechanisms of data communication; theywere central elements of inter-firm relations 
and a critical part of intra-firm practices. Similar claims have been made elsewhere in the literature. 
See, notably, Kallinikos (2002), Kallinikos (2004) and Orlikowski and Iacono (2001). 
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and organisational conventions of the past were the prime source of inspiration. In 
late 1984, as Bennett drew plans for a completely automated financial world (he later 
recalled that ‘everything in [his 1984] report was developed but [in] a very 
expensive, pedestrian way’; Bennett interview), Hayter presented London’s newest 
bridge. Initially code-named SEMANTIC (for Stock Exchange Market ANd Trade 
Information Computer) and later known as SEAQ (for Stock Exchange Automated 
Quotations), the solution implied a modification of TOPIC and EPIC that allowed 
bidirectional distribution of quotations from either the trading floor or the offices of 
member firms and their subsequent visualisation in TOPIC6. Trades under this system 
were conducted over the phone or face-to-face, then entered into the SEAQ terminals. 
The system was ‘not exactly rocket science’, recalld Buck. All SEAQ was, said 
Bennett in interview, ‘was TOPIC, really. It was it was just TOPIC and EPIC brought 
together. [The system was] two legacy systems [put] together essentially, which was 
actually quite a safe route’. Indeed, As Hayter explained in December 1984, in 
arriving at this choice of design, the Technical Servic s department 
had to face up to a number of practical problems. Fir tly, we have a short 
time scale in computer developments [which] will not allow us to build 
radically new services from scratch with any degree of confidence that they 
will work effectively and reliably under high volumes of loading from the 
first day of the new market. Secondly we have a fundamental uncertainty 
about the real requirements of the system. […] Finally we have little idea 
about the absolute level of trading which is likely to take place and the 
consequent level of system activity (Hayter, 1984). 
SEAQ responded to the constraints faced by the Stock Exhange. It relied on ‘solid 
and reliable systems’, tried and tested for several ye rs, and presented a ‘low-risk 
implementation plan’. For technologists like Hayer, Big Bang became a series of 
‘scarcely discernible pops’ (Pagano, 1985). 
                                               
6 Ian McLelland recalls that initially there were three system proposals codenamed ‘red’, ‘amber’ and 
‘green’. Upon refinement, these derived into two releases of SEAQ, one ‘focused on functionality (a 
single machine configuration), the second on failover and recovery (a dual or multiple machine 
configuration)’ (McLelland, personal communication).  
 
112 
4.10 The material expansion of a dematerialised market 
The effectiveness of SEAQ was tied to the reliability and speed of the TOPIC/EPIC 
network. Under the old market structure, ‘if you’re lagging by a few milliseconds or 
whatever’, noted Buck,  
it’s really not a big deal, whereas [in SEAQ], they [were] actually dealing off 
[the system] and so it was really important that [users had] up to date 
information. [Ideally,] you want [quotes] coming in not from someone just 
sitting typing stuff in. You want a better capture system (Buck interview).  
SEAQ thence entailed changes to the architecture of the networks of the Stock 
Exchange that would guarantee technical reliability in the marketplace. These 
changes came in many forms. Some involved upgrading the computers on which the 
existing network operated. This was carried out by substituting the PDP 11-70 by a 
VAX , also from Digital Equipment Corporation (with whom the technical teams 
‘worked very closely […] particularly on the technology changes’ [McLelland 
interview]). Others involved a re-standardisation of the means of communication 
between the systems operated by firms and those ownd by the Stock Exchange, 
following some of the logic of IDN.  
We specified a protocol for the quotes to come in from the computer and the 
same with the trades. And [we] went around and convinced the members, 
who at this point were all busy basically either stabbing one another in the 
back if not actually sleeping with each other to try and make big 
conglomerations, what they needed was a dealing system of their own that 
managed their portfolios, that managed their quotes and their trades, and 
communicated with us. [Some] of them had started to go along think along 
those lines anyway. [But] those were just the big companies (Buck 
interview). 
Restructuring the technological marketplace involved n gotiating an alignment of the 
interests of a heterogeneous group of users within the firms. Analysts, hired by the 
Stock Exchange, bridged the communication channel between the technologists and 
the potentially thousands of users in the City of Lndon, identifying requirements 
that became specifications for the systems introduce  on Big Bang.  
 
Yet a different type of changes revolved around the design of EPIC’s 
databases. The design principle of real-time computing was reaching a clear 
expression in the Stock Exchange. The strain exerted on EPIC by the constant influx 
of quotes and trades submitted through SEAQ meant that the database had to deal with 
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a larger-than-average number of transactions. The initial proposal was to develop a 
relational database (much like the ones that live at the core of most of the current 
information applications). As Buck recalled,  
[The] important thing for us was to have a very fast database. And we looked 
around all the commercial databases that were available and we’d worked out 
that we wanted a database that could handle between 5 and 9 transactions a 
second, ideally more to give us [leeway]. So we talked to [to several 
vendors], and the new version of Oracle [was] coming out [soon] and they 
could guarantee on a VAX  80-600 […] an average of a transaction a second, 
on a good day, with a  trailing wind. […] One transction a second was where 
it was at (Buck interview).  
Peter Buck, who by then was Developer Manager for SEAQ, circumvented the 
problem by choosing a memory-resident database as the core of the system,  
which was feasible because we didn’t actually need that big a database. 
[There] were 1500 stock that were actually traded, an  as far as SEAQ was 
concerned, the important thing was the quotes that were coming in, the trades 
that were coming in, just sequences of numbers. […] So we decided to build 
this, and I did some benchmark tests on it, and I got her going at 1000 
transactions a second. It is a little bit more than Oracle. I was very pleased. 
(Buck interview). 
 
Indeed, the development of the infrastructure for Big ang depended on the 
systems programming approach that had defined the engin ering cultures of the 
technical teams of the Stock Exchange since the 1970s. SEAQ involved spending ‘a 
lot of time looking at the heart of the VAX  operating system to work out how we 
could do it in a way that would work’ (Buck interview). A similar view was 
expressed by Ian McLelland:  
We had to write our own drivers, so you had a programmer who was 
basically writing a device driver, so he had to know how a device worked, 
[and would have to] work more closely with engineers. It wasn’t like doing a 
client’s requirement [and] saying ‘well, you know, this is the function that I 
want’, [and] writing it. It was actually getting that in and making that work 
with, say, our database. So to call them application programmers wasn’t quite 
right. 
With their understanding of computing and communications at the level of both 
programming and engineering, along with the trust cltivated with the Council, the 
technologists of the Stock Exchange were in a unique position to influence the shape 
of the market. Their high technical and organisational standing is illustrated by two 
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cases: the introduction of the first real-time ticker and first real-time index of the 
Stock Exchange.  
 
Both developments derived from one of the fact-finding missions carried out 
by the Stock Exchange in the years leading up to Big Bang. In one of these missions, 
Michael Newman and Daniel Sheridan (who was in charge of market rules and 
supervision) had the opportunity to visit Wall Street, Washington and Toronto. John 
Scannell remembers the episode: 
Mick rang me up from, he usually used to do this, about two o’clock in the 
morning. ‘Yes Mick, what do you want?’ ‘I’ve got this great idea’ ‘Yeah, 
What is it?’ ‘I’m in NASDAQ in New York’ and he said ‘I’ve seen a ticker’. 
‘So what’s a ticker, what the hell is a ticker?’ ‘It s something that runs at the 
bottom of the screen, we’ve got to have one, we must have one’ So I said 
‘who the hell is going to be interesting in a bloody ticker?’ And he said, ‘well 
they’ve got it, everyone’s using it, we can have it on TOPIC, we can have a 
ticker page, we’ll run a ticker page’. Well, I said, that’s going to take months 
to get that installed. ‘No, what we’ll do, we’ll get a PC and we’ll have the 
output coming from EPIC into this PC and Ian will write a little programme on 
it to produce a ticker, then we’ll pump it into TOPIC, and we’ll have a ticker 
page’. So he probably rang Ian up and said ‘we need this software, how 
quickly can you do it?’ And Ian probably said six months. And Mick would 
say, ‘no I need it in two weeks’, and he did it in about two months and got 
this thing running in the end. [But] right from day one it was a success 
(Scannell interview). 
 
Visiting North America proved undeniably fruitful. ‘Mike [rang me] up 
again, another time. ‘I’ve got another idea’, he said’ (Scannell interview). The idea, 
conjured by Sheridan and Newman during a tour of Niagara Falls following a 
conference in Toronto, was aimed at making London’s traded options market ‘a bit 
more exciting’ by introducing index options (Sheridan interview). That, however, 
required ‘an index, a real-time index’ on which to trade. The existing FT30, dating to 
1935, was ‘hopeless because it [was] geometric. It was a very peculiar way of doing 
it’ (Newman interview). Sheridan and Newman created the new index, observing that  
the 500 or 750 [stocks] which the academics decided [ha ] a high correlation 
[with] the market [were what we] wanted as a proxy for the Exchange. [It] 
would actually be impossible to maintain that on a minute by minute basis, so 




The result was labelled the Stock Exchange Index, SE100, which was coded 
in two weeks and ran as an application on EPIC (McLelland, personal 
communication). The name became somewhat of a political controversy, as Sheridan 
recalled. 
The Chairman at the time, Sir Nicholas Goodison, called us into his office 
and said, ‘we’re not going to do this because we’d upset the [Financial 
Times]. And notwithstanding they had nothing whatsoever to do with it, he 
said we were going to call it the FT SE index and that’s what we did. 
After a trial period of some weeks during which theconstituents and weighing of the 
index were agreed (a process that as McLelland recalled involved several Stock 
Exchange/Financial Times committee meetings; McLelland, personal 
communication), the symbol of London as a global city, the ubiquitous number that 
is the FTSE 100, was born. 
 
Above all, however, the most tangible transformation of the Stock Exchange 
was the expansion of the technical teams and the networks they worked on. That is, 
the expansion of the material and organisational support of the marketplace. 
Reconstituting the market for Big Bang, and embracing the strategic centrality of 
information systems, led the Stock Exchange to amass a small army of technologists. 
Around the time of Big Bang, the Stock Exchange employed between 3300 and 3500 
people (Sheridan, Bennett interview). The original group of a few dozen 
technologists that developed TOPIC and EPIC in the 1970s had grown ‘to a couple of 
hundred, three hundred probably’ (Buck interview). While Peter Bennett along with 
a handful of technologists moved into a smaller unit, the Advanced Systems Group, 
George Hayter, head of Technical Services continued to oversee between 2,000 and 
2,200 employees whose responsibility was to ‘run the market and [make innovations] 
operational’ (Bennett interview). Programmers, develop rs, engineers, analysts, 
managers, marketing specialists and clerks overflowed the original tower of the 
Stock Exchange, requiring up to 14 buildings distributed across the City of London, 
housing everything from offices and restaurants to back-up systems in different 




The technological culture of the Stock Exchange wasnot immune to this 
expansion.  
As we were getting bigger you needed to split [functions] out to different 
people. And therefore you needed more formality in the design documents. 
It’s ok if you make some notes for yourself and make  sort of rough-and-
ready design document that you’re then going to code from, because you 
understand the assumptions that you’ve made and what this really means and 
what does this squiggle over there actually mean. But when you’ve got 
different people doing it, it needs to be more structured, more formal (Buck 
interview). 
The Stock Exchange became a tremendously large, and equally complex, developer 
of information technology. ‘We were constantly developing’, noted McLelland. 
It was literally while one release were being develop d, we got the 
programmers working on that as soon as we could, the designers would be 
looking at what are the next stages, and you either had like a major 
requirement coming or we had what we called change requests which would 
drive us. Then we said, ‘ok, what’s the next release going to look like’ and 
start designing that. And we could even have three releases on the go. You 
know, once we’d got a release into testing whereby we were supporting any 
fixes that had to be done, we’d probably have a team working on the next 
release and the designers working on the release after that, so it was kind of 
like a continuous cycle because this is what the Exchange and its membership 
demanded (McLelland interview).  
4.11 The international testing ground 
Although the Stock Exchange and its technologists were confident that SEAQ would 
serve its function as the Bailey bridge for Big Bang, success relied on the untested 
dealing method of dual-capacity. However, whereas dual-capacity was prohibited 
largely to members of the Stock Exchange prior to 1986, the practice thrived in the 
international market, unbound from the rules and regulations of the Exchange.  
 
As a financial capital, London held a long record of accomplishment in 
international dealings. Prior to the 1920s, the Stock Exchange had been a hub of 
international finance, dealing in the shares and bonds of foreign companies and 
governments. This changed, however, with the growth of e North American stock 
markets (which overtook London in both size and influence) and, more importantly, 
with the monetary restrictions imposed in Britain at the outset of the Second World 
War. In an attempt to disincentive the flight of capit l from Britain overseas in the 
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event of war, the government introduced a mechanism of exchange controls in 1939. 
By 1941, exchange controls extended beyond payments for he import and export of 
goods to the movement of gold, currency notes and securities. Exchange controls 
effectively prevented UK residents from buying non-sterling securities unless through 
an authorised depositary and, even then, only with the express permission of the 
Bank of England (Michie, 1999). The difficulty of engaging in international deals 
was furthered by the so-called dollar premium, introduced in October 1947, and 
which consisted of an additional fee paid to convert an American price into sterling 
at the official rate of exchange (Rix, 1950). Such restrictions increased the costs and 
complexities associated to dealing in foreign securities, restricting the desires and 
abilities of British investors to enter the international markets.  
 
This situation was not made any easier by either the culture or the rules and 
regulations of the Stock Exchange. Here, the emergence of the Eurobond market 
serves as an example. Eurobonds were first introduced as a method of raising capital 
in the early 1960s. Unlike the typical bond, however, they are issued in a foreign 
currency. Thus, a bond issued in London and denominated in dollars would 
constitute a Eurobond. For the City of London, Eurobonds became quite an attractive 
instrument. Insofar as they were not converted to sterling, they could be traded freely 
without the restrictions imposed by exchange controls. They hence became a 
depositary for the foreign capital that entered the City of London and which 
expanded quickly throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The London Stock Exchange was 
nevertheless a marginal player in the newborn market. Under the rules of the 
organisation, notes Michie (1999), commissions on Eurobond dealings had to be paid 
by both seller and buyer, and the transaction had to pass through a jobber who 
introduced a further differential between bid and ask. Non-members, particularly 
foreign investment firms with offices in the City of London that were not members 
of the Stock Exchange, had no such obligations and could guarantee a lower price 
per transaction. As a result, Michie (1999) estimates that by 1968 only one per cent 
of trading in Eurobonds passed through the Stock Exhange. The rulebook, along 
with an overall hostility to encourage arbitrage dealings and the complacent 
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insularity of the whole investment community left the Stock Exchange on the 
sidelines of a growing global financial system (Kynaston, 2002).  
 
The elimination of exchange controls 1979 became a fundamental moment of 
transformation for London as a financial centre. Comp unded with the demise of the 
Bretton-Woods agreement on fixed exchange rates in 1972, the abolition of exchange 
controls 
[made] it possible for far more attention to be paid to overseas markets by 
domestic investors. It forced member firms of the Stock Exchange to think 
more constructively about overseas markets than they ev r had before. It 
freed capital, and it really was not possible after 1979 for the Stock Exchange 
restrictions to remain in force if you think about it historically. Other markets 
abroad, other practitioners abroad, were going to operate under free rules, 
different rules. So change was inevitable from 1979 onwards (Sir Nicholas 
Goodison in Kandiah, 1999, p. 104). 
International markets were a vast frontier for exploration. And so, when it pondered 
the possible routes towards Big Bang, the Stock Exchange saw overseas securities as 
the ideal place to initiate experiments in dual-capacity.  
 
International markets were a frontier in more than one way: they constituted a 
domain populated by computing and telecommunications technologies and their 
pioneering applications. The end of fixed exchange rat s in 1972 had set the 
foundations of a market in which currencies could be bought, sold, hedged, 
arbitraged and mobilised across the globe. Seizing this opportunity, Reuters built the 
modern foreign exchange market. Reuters’ interest in the dissemination of prices 
originated as early as the 19th century, when it offered a communication service 
between London and Paris. When Reuters entered the realm of computing, it 
introduced Stockmaster, a quotation retrieval servic , into London. Quotes from the 
American markets travelled through ticker-tapes and were collected by a computer 
that transmitted data on demand across the Atlantic to Stockmaster terminals in Great 
Britain. This eliminated both the load on the expensive transatlantic communication 
channel as well as the need to ‘sort through a bundle of paper and prices before you 
found the price you wanted’ (Lawrenson & Barber, 1986, p. 129). More importantly, 
with the abolition of exchange controls, the network laid by Reuters became a 




The threat posed by Reuters to the international expansion of the Stock 
Exchange’s operations was clear. As Hayter noted in interview,  
Reuters sensed there was an opportunity for them to ove in and be the 
market in some major respect. In the same way that they had already become 
the trading mechanism for foreign exchange, they wanted to do the same 
thing for equities. And the first area that they started in was in was foreign 
equities that were not listed in London. [.. ]And so they set up pages that 
looked a bit like SEAQ, in black and white, on their Reuters monitor screens, 
company by company, and [in these] you could see all the market-makers 
quotations. [They] thought ‘Well, this is our opportunity to corner, to provide 
the electronic infrastructure for the foreign securities market in London’. 
The Stock Exchange reacted. With a newfound desire to b come a financial centre 
for dealings in international securities, it pursued an aggressive strategy. ‘I put Peter 
Cox in charge of competing with Reuters on this’, remembered Hayter, ‘and we 
succeeded in creating a primitive market that actually beat Reuters at their own 
game’ (Hayter interview).  
 
Peter Cox was closely involved in at least three of the Stock Exchange’s 
largest projects. An engineer by training, Cox joined the Stock Exchange seconded 
from IBM  in 1976, where he specialised in expert systems. The technical and 
organisational knowledge gained by Cox at IBM came to the fore when he was made 
responsible for outlining the design of the settlement system TALISMAN , which relied 
on the recently acquired IBM  370/145. For Cox, the development environment for 
TALISMAN  proved to be an interesting, perhaps even formative, experience. The 
Stock Exchange had  
brought in some new people. They had decided that we were going to do it in 
a different way. And there was sort of a clean broom that swept through the 
project. That was extremely exciting, because it had really good people on it. 
There was a determination to do the thing properly. It was a terrific project. 
For me, at the time, and for everybody working on it. (Cox interview). 
Launched in 1979, ‘two weeks later than the plan [because] we were going through 





The expertise Cox acquired in the development of TALISMAN  led him to 
participate in the joint project between the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange 
on the gilt-edged securities settlement system, BET/CGO. Towards 1984, and with Big 
Bang approaching, Cox was ‘brought back from the Central Gilts Office project and 
put into a loose team of planners’, reporting to the Deputy Chief Executive, John 
Young. There, Cox recalled,  
our job was to work out what needed to be done for Big Bang. We came up 
with a plan which was to create the SEAQ system, […] modelled on NASDAQ 
but […] based on an information system the Stock Exchange was already 
running called TOPIC [of which] Bennett was the architect. […] I was actually 
the only permanent member of this planning team. 
Planning for Big Bang required, in a sense, a deep understanding of the market. 
Working out the ‘functionality that would suit the market [was] not a foregone 
conclusion in those days’, said Cox. Indeed, for the members of the planning team 
(formed, among others, by Michael Newman, Peter Bennett, Peter Cox, and Daniel 
Sheridan) it was necessary to consider numerous possibilities for the future; at the 
time there weren’t any ‘models which [had] been proven in the market, when you 
design[ed] an electronic market’ (Cox interview).  
 
Among the several possibilities available to them, the planning team 
considered building a pilot market upon the trading platform used and licensed by 
Instinet. If the system demonstrated to be successful on a small scale, it could be 
introduced into the market at large in time for Big ang. The choice of Instinet’s 
platform had a concrete effect on the type of market selected for the trial.   
The idea was that, since we were running Instinet technology and all their 
expertise were in American securities and [that] there [was a] market in 
American securities in London, [we should] start a m rket in [these] running 
on the Instinet system and then, if successful, roll it ut into other markets[,] 
potentially into the UK equity market (Cox interview).  
 
The trial, however, did not achieve this form. When Cox and his colleagues 
conducted a preliminary round of market research into the feasibility of the new 
market, traders in American securities in London dismissed their plans. 
Hardly any of [them] were members of the Stock Exchange. They were 
almost all big [investment banks], Morgan Stanley, and Shearson Lehman, 
Merrill Lynch. […] We [told them] ‘We have this great idea. We want to 
 
121 
launch a European time zone market in American share . You guys are in the 
business, you’re doing it right now, it’ll be great. And just sign up being 
alongside us with this pilot’. And they said ‘Oh, ta ’s a stupid idea. You’re 
talking about putting a sophisticated system which runs in the most structured 
and regulated market in the world out here in Europe, where this American 
shares market runs with no regulation at all, and nobody has oversight of it. 
[London is] a bit of a Wild West market. And you want to put all this 
sophisticated transparent technology in there. Well that’s a daft idea, and 
we’re not going to do it’ (Cox interview).  
The unwillingness of foreign firms to set up shops in association to the Stock 
Exchange prompted the search of viable options. The one selected by Cox and his 
team was the ‘craziest plan B’ they could have conceived: if the prevailing view 
amongst foreign firms was that the market for American securities was ‘a bit of a 
wild west’, a possible solution was to create a regulated and structured market for 
these and similar securities within London.  
 
The proposal went several steps further from what tey did at the time, 
mentioned Cox. 
[Most] of [the foreign dealers] were saying, ‘Well, you know, an organised 
market is not such a bad idea’. So we said ‘Why don’t we organise a market 
in these shares. We don’t have to put all the sexy t chnology in place, but just 
try to organise a market for these players’ (Cox interview). 
The market introduced by the Stock Exchange depended ot so much on a radical 
technological innovation or on the adoption of an American trading platform as in a 
re-evaluation of the social and historical foundations of finance in London. It 
derived, in particular, from the construction of trust among market participants. 
Sitting in a large room near the Pall Mall in Londo, Peter Cox remembered that, 
[In designing the market,] we went right back to first principles. What are 
stock exchanges? Why are there stock exchanges? Stock exchanges started 
because these people were buying and selling shares in ooms like this 
centuries ago [and] suddenly there were rogues amongst them. And the good 
guys got together and said ‘Well we’ll form a club of good guys and we’ll 
sign up to a code of conduct that says we’re good guys and [when] somebody 
slips up and doesn’t meet the code of conduct, we’ll throw him out and that 
way we’ll gain confidence, you know, a market’. And that was exactly the 
situation we were in with these international dealing guys. They were doing 




The creation of an orderly market hinged on reaching agreements between the 
traders, on standardising and regulating their activities. As George Hayter later 
recalled, these standards were generated by the dealers in conjunction with the Stock 
Exchange. 
We allowed them to set the rules for how these quotations were to be 
interpreted. And things like what the standard sizewould be for the 
quotations, what currency they should be quoted in, what settlement house 
would be used for the clearing process. These were not universally accepted, 
they were not standardised, until we got these people t gether in a room 
(Hayter interview). 
The market in overseas securities required not only trust and regulation, though. The 
market lacked a ‘uniformity of presentation, [instead] working according to how 
each individual firm interpreted it’ (Cox interview). Uniformity was achieved 
through the introduction of a single electronic price bulletin board available to all the 
members of the newly constituted market. And as Cox’s team continued to structure 
and design the new international market in London, they ‘went from creating a sort 
of […] bulletin board to being a market department which regulated the market, 
wrote the rules, and also created a membership scheme for foreigners’ (Cox 
interview). 
 
The ultimate outcome of this process was SEAQ International, SEAQ-I, an 
electronic quote-driven trading service that cobbled together several existing systems 
and, perhaps more importantly, incorporated foreign firms into the operational realm 
of the Stock Exchange. Eventually, as SEAQ International’s market settled and 
congealed, it became the entry point for foreign firms into the membership of the 
Stock Exchange. ‘When you think about it’, said Peter Cox,  
it was a bit of a major step. But again, it was it was small scale stuff when it 
started. Nobody thought it was really important. The argument we made was 
‘let’s try to get these guys inside and collaborate with us and then we’ll 
gradually reel them in’ (Cox interview). 
In attracting foreigners, SEAQ International modified the manner in which the Stock 
Exchange operated, introducing dual-capacity dealings  overseas securities and 
establishing an undeniable break from the bi-centennial practices of the organisation. 
(As explored in chapter 6, this break with the past was manifold indeed; the 
establishment of a market in overseas shares throug SEAQ-I required the Stock 
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Exchange to merge with ISRO, the International Securities Regulatory Organisation, 
formed by foreign security houses based in London. The merger resulted in a ‘very 
expensive’ re-branding of the Stock Exchange [Bennett i terview], which became 
the International Stock Exchange in early 1986). The venture was a wise investment. 
SEAQ-I became an overwhelming success. As it expanded into a wider variety of 
overseas shares, it took over a larger segment of the European market. In the late 
1980s, SEAQ-I captured between 26% and 60% of the trading in share  of the 250 
corporations largest European companies by capitalisa ion. By 1990, trading in 
French shares on SEAQ-I represented as much as one forth of the volume of the same 
type of shares traded on the Paris Bourse (Jacquillat & Gresse, 1998). SEAQ-I ‘sucked 
liquidity from the continental market centres’, recalled Bennett (Bennett interview). 
London became, once again, a competitor in the interna ional arena.  
 
Nevertheless, the success of SEAQ-I was predicated not on its technological 
constitution, nor on the creation of an allegedly more efficient trading platform 
(international settlement remained extremely cumbersome and expensive). Although 
SEAQ-I was a confirmation of a widely held view that ‘in the future the business of 
buying and selling securities is going to be heavily computerised and based upon 
large scale networks’, as Cox wrote in 1985, it did not imply that the future 
‘therefore lies entirely in the hands of the technologists’ (Cox, 1985). SEAQ-I’s 
success lay in the careful weaving of the social fabric of an engineered marketplace, 
in constructing and making evident the trust and social ties that found market 
exchange. In effect, for Peter Cox, SEAQ-I demonstrated that in a world increasingly 
dominated by electronic systems ‘traditional’ stock exchanges still had a role to play. 
They exist to create ‘confidence in the market place, [allowing] for it to reach its full 
potential. The future’, wrote Cox before Big Bang, ‘lies in the successful blending of 
modern technologies with some of the more customary functions performed by stock 
exchanges today’ (Cox, 1985).  
4.12 The dress rehearsal and the ball 
The launch of SEAQ International in 1985 was a reflection of the technological 
prowess of the Stock Exchange when facing the challenges of an increasingly 
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digitalised financial world. And as Big Bang approached, the work of the Technical 
Services department increased its pace. To coordinate the different activities and 
projects, the Stock Exchange created a Projects Committee, chaired by Patrick 
Mitford-Slade. ‘Seven projects were being driven together all with that final 
deadline’ in mind, recalled Mitford-Slade.  
[We] started off by having weekly meetings[,] getting all the leaders of each 
project [together], the Peter Bennett’s, the George Hayter’s […] running it 
all. […] People from all sides of the market were developing their own 
systems, [and we got] them together once a week to make sure they were not 
conflicting with each other and were driving at theright sort of speed 
(Mitford-Slade interview). 
Frequent meetings soon gave way to a different approach, leaving much of the 
managerial decisions to the technologists. The preparation for Big Bang was not 
entirely constrained to Technical Services. Consultants were hired to audit the 
ongoing projects. As Peter Cox remembers  
there was some scepticism about the Exchange’s ability to bring on the plan, 
and so we said ‘Look, what we’ll have is a respected onsultancy firm who 
will have monitors’. They weren’t actually project managers, but they’ll have 
monitors sitting on the shoulders of the project managers. 
Project managers were, in most cases, the technologists that had brought real-time 
computing and communications to the Stock Exchange i  the mid to late 1970s. As 
Peter Buck recalled, ‘most of the people in that sor of little original SSG group […] 
stayed at the Stock Exchange and they were the core of this expanding empire. And 
so essentially we all sort of got promoted together, en masse’ (Buck interview). 
 
The version of SEAQ ultimately released for Big Bang was a compromise 
between the old and the new. On the one hand, the syst m relied on the tried and 
tested TOPIC and EPIC. While EPIC provided disk storage for the main SEAQ system, 
holding backup data and feeding start-of-day information into it, with its reliability 
record of 35 minutes downtime per month, TOPIC provided the information from 
SEAQ to the users in the market (Anonymous, 1986c). On the other hand, SEAQ 
introduced a different modality of trading in the Stock Exchange, providing a 
platform for dual-capacity dealing through the telephone. In a sense, SEAQ was but a 
real-time quote entry and visualisation system built upon established technologies, an 
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incremental technical innovation of sorts, predicated upon radical organisational 
change.  
 
Under SEAQ, competing market-makers (formerly jobbers) were rquired to 
keep continuous quotes for the securities in which they traded. Rather than being 
uttered on the floor, these quotes were entered into SEAQ terminals. Upon seeing a 
satisfactory quote on the screen, a broker would phone a jobber to close the deal 
(and, preserving the logic of Dictum Meum Pactum, market-makers could not modify 
their quotes once their phones rang). Such mode of operation entailed changes to the 
market and its infrastructure. As occurred with the introduction of EPIC in the late 
1970, shares were categorised into different groups (though unlike EPIC, the 
definitions were now much more explicit). The organis tion of the market was given 
not only by industrial groups but also by turnover, capitalization, and the number of 
market-makers in each share. In particular, the newly formed Quality of Markets 
Unit of the Stock Exchange had identified four categories, and to each corresponded 
a specific behaviour that market-makers were to foll w. Alpha shares, for instance, 
represented the most actively traded equities, accounting for an estimated 56% of the 
UK equity market. For a share to be considered alpha, ten or more market-makers had 
to deal in it, turnover had to be in excess of £195 million in the first half of 1986, and 
capitalization had to be above £740 million as of 30 June 1986 (Quality of Markets 
Unit, 1986b). For these shares, market makers were obliged to provide continuous, 
two-way prices during the mandatory trading hours between 8:30 and 16:30, and 
(initially) details of all trades were immediately published on SEAQ. Beta shares were 
somewhat less actively traded, and although market-makers in these were also 
required to display continuous, firm quotes, details of trades were published the 
following business day in the Stock Exchange Daily Official List. Gamma shares 
required market-makers to produce only indicative two-way prices, and due to their 
low turnover, delta equities only entailed displaying mid-prices.  
 
The new categorisation reformatted the market in ways that made it amenable 
to SEAQ. Importantly, it enabled a new mode of market visualisation that formed an 
integral part of the electronics-based competing market-maker system adopted by the 
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Stock Exchange. On SEAQ, each alpha and beta share received a page of its own, 
displaying the available quotes along with the sizes in which market-makers were 
willing to deal. Above the quotes displayed on the screen stood the yellow strip, 
highlighting the best bid and offer in the market (the ‘touch’ in jobbing parlance). 
And at the bottom of the screen was the New York-style ‘ icker’ pioneered by 
Newman, as seen in Figure 4.3. The yellow strip, in particular, effectively made it 
unnecessary to walk between pitches in pursuit of the best price. It was a symbolic 
reduction of space and time, presenting the market in a single line of characters. 
Hence, the screens produced by SEAQ and displayed through TOPIC made supply and 
demand evident, tangible, and equally accessible, to all participants in the market. 
They constituted scoping systems to the London equiti s market, namely, ‘a system 
of observation and projection that assembles on one surface dispersed and diverse 
activities, interpretations and representations which in turn orient and constrain the 
response of an audience’ (Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2007, p. 126).  
 
Novel categories were not restricted to shares. In the logic of SEAQ, the 
market was no longer composed of familiar faces with familiar names. Although the 
floor remained a trading venue in principle, dealing between offices was considered 
the norm of the future. Counterparties in SEAQ were firms, represented online by 
three or four characters next to their quotes. Making the transition even more 
complex, the larger firms operating after Big Bang were conglomerates bearing new 
names. The future, so to say, was partially anonymous.  
 
The complications related to the re-categorisation of the participants in the 
market were unveiled in the immediate weeks before Big Bang, when the Stock 
Exchange conducted a series of tests of both its technological platforms and the 
humans working with and behind them. The first such test occurred in the last 
Saturday of September 1986, when the Stock Exchange held a dress rehearsal for the 
gilt-edged securities market. Twenty-seven firms participated in the test, simulating 
normal trade during two hours, based on a make-belive portfolio engineered by the 
Bank of England. The success of the event provided a ‘huge sigh of relief’, showing 
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that under normal conditions both the settlement system and the dealing service 
could operate with ‘no major computer failure or problems’ (Anonymous, 1986a). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 This page (taken from Hamilton, 1986) shows the different bids and offers for share 
7210 of International Company Ltd (abbreviated as ICL). On the second line, the letter ‘A’ next 
to ICL denotes that an announcement has been made; ‘S 1000’ indicates the number of shares 
that comprise a lot; and ‘CLOSE 81’ is the price at the close of business on the previous trading 
day. The third line functions as a ticker: ‘CHG +3’ stands for the change in the mid-price since 
the previous night’s close; ‘VOL 156’ represents the volume of lots traded so far; LT stands for 
‘Last Trades’, and displays the prices of those trades: 82, 83, 89X (amount in excess of 25,000 
share), 82, 83 and 84. The fourth line shows the distribution of quotes among traders and thus 
the so-called ‘touch’ (the best bid and cheapest offer): 83, bid by CTY and 85, offered by WED. 
Lines 5 to 8 represent the specific quotes of the 11 market-makers in ICL. The numbers ‘83-7’ 
represent bid-offer pairs (that is, bid at 83, offer at 87). The quantities ‘1X2’ represent the sizes 
of those quotes: bid for 1000 and offer for 2000). In cases where a market is made in more than 
9000 shares, the letter L is uses, as in ‘2XL’. The final two lines were proposed as a NYSE-style 
ticker in other shares. 
 
The same cannot be said, however, of the largest drs rehearsal, organised 
by the Stock Exchange on 18 October 1986. The simulation was ‘designed to 
resemble a normal trading day as closely as possible’, noted Richard Lander of The 
Times. Institutional investors and brokers ‘will be in their offices to telephone their 
orders to market-makers, each of whom was given an equity “book” averaging £14 
million to begin with’ (Lander, 1986). The participating firms ‘were working to a 
script’ (Mitford-Slade interview). Reality, however, departed from the ideal. The 
SEAQ EXAMPLE                                                                   PAGE 7210 
INT COMP LTD            ICL   A      S  1000                              CLOSE 81 
 
CHG +3    VOL  156      LT   82   3   9X   2   3   4                               11:22 
                  AKD     LMB     CTY     83   5    WED     SMI     GRN 
AKD         83-7        1X2      GRV    81-6        2X1      SMI     82-5      2X1 
BUC          82-6        2XL     HGV    82-7        3X2      SKG    82-7      1X2 
CTY          83-6        3XL     LMB    83-7       1X3      WED   81-5      3X1 







GEC     GLXO     BP       BTOL     RCAL     SHEL     TSCO     MEPC 
212        965        491        243         244        643         191         *318# 
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brokers and market-makers had to learn to navigate through the system under their 
new identities. John Scannell recalled some of the difficulties faced on that day. 
[Some firms had] changed their name, and on the dress rehearsal day I had 
about 21 computer operators working for me and about 15 or 20 people on 
the helpdesk. [On that Saturday,] people were ringing up saying ‘I don’t 
know who I am’. So, you’d say, ‘Right, ok, that’s your problem’. [And they 
would answer] ‘Yeah, I don’t have any idea of who I am’. So I would say, 
‘Right, who were you, before?’ ‘Well, I was Wedd Durlacher but I don’t 
know who I am now, so do you know who I am now?’ Bizarre conversation! 
So I just sort of [asked around], ‘Does anyone know what Wedd Durlacher is 
called now?’ And so, ‘they’re called KAS or something like that’. ‘Right, 
you’re KAS now’. ‘No, I can’t be KAS’. ‘Why not?’ ‘Because he’s KAS.’ 
‘Who’s he?’ ‘The guy who’s [on the other side]’. And it was just so funny. 
I’ll never forget that. Absolute mayhem, it really was. 
The introduction of a new method of communication required working out a new 
conventionality of conversational exchanges in the form of a standardised telephone 
dialogue which ‘had to be concise and to the point […] i.e. ‘firm Name, take your 
bid/offer of volume at price’ and not ‘hello this i Joe, who’s that?’ (McLelland, 
personal communication). Indeed, the problems were not confined to people 
‘following their script’. Early on, some of the firms failed to get their computers to 
log-on to SEAQ; some traders claimed they could not contact counterparties over the 
telephone; and yet others said that, in a breach of t e Exchange’s rules, some were 
not even answering calls (Truell, 1986). The main complaint, however, was on the 
delay between the time market-makers entered prices and the quotes appearing on 
the screen, sometimes as much as 20 minutes. This, argued The Times, led dealers to 
refusing answering their telephones: trading on outdated prices could, in some 
instances, translate into losses (Clark & Thomson, 1986). Yet despite mishaps and 32 
problems reported by partaking brokers and dealers, mo t of the faults derived from 
compatibility issues between the systems of firms and those of the Stock Exchange, 
so argued the Exchange. ‘There were some problems, but nothing really serious’, 
said Mitford-Slade at a news conference following the rehearsal. ‘The system has 
performed exactly as expected’, he added.  
 
As the day of Big Bang approached, uncertainty remained in the air. 
Computer Weekly noted with caution that most of the firms would ‘go live with 
partial and patched systems’ (Anonymous, 1986d). Michael Newman, SEAQ’s 
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development director, was nevertheless confident the system would manage 80,000 
trades a day, well beyond the Exchange’s record. SEAQ, Newman said, was ‘rock 
solid’ (Anonymous, 1986b). In effect, in the week lading up to Big Bang, member 
firms were challenged to adopt, perhaps at great cost, the terminals developed by the 
Stock Exchange in order to reduce problems of compatibility and communication. 
But time was short and overheads were large. In preparation for the day, the two 
duplicated operations rooms of the Stock Exchange, on  in the Tower and one in an 
unmarked building on Christopher Street, were turned i to ‘emergency rooms should 
the City go berserk’ (Brown, 1986). And as the eyes of the City focused on SEAQ on 
the eve of Big Bang, Sir Nicholas Goodison confidently assured that one thing was 
certain, ‘screen-based dealing is here to stay’ (Goodis n, 1986a). 
 
Despite expectations, it was not SEAQ but TOPIC that crashed on the big day. 
Just as business was about to start on the morning of 27 October 1986, trading on 
SEAQ was suspended and did not resume for 50 minutes. While the system was down, 
dealers reverted to face-to-face trading on the floor and through the telephone. The 
event became the news of the day. ‘Instead of high tec nology taking over 
completely’, reported Nicholas Owen of ITN, ‘books and pencils were still required, 
the computer age having not arrived quite on schedule’ (ITN News, aired 27 October 
1986).  
 
The possibility of TOPIC’s failure, however, was not unexpected. Peter 
Bennett remembers raising the issue before Big Bang. ‘I’d written any number of 
memos on this and given them the actual calculations, a d I knew [it] was going to 
work out a problem on day one. They had about half t e capacity they needed’ 
(Bennett interview). In effect, many ‘weren’t conviced that [TOPIC’s MODCOMPs] 
were going to handle traffic, because we knew exactly what would happen’ (Buck 
interview). On the morning of Big Bang, TOPIC, initially tested to up to 4.5 million 
page requests, was overloaded with a ‘tidal wave’ from users. John Scannell, who 
was then standing in one of the operations rooms, recalled.  
Eight o’clock comes and the systems all come up. And we’re looking at the 
page response request and it goes up to 1.7 million a most immediately, 
which is a little bit bloody worrying. Then it crept up to sort of two million, 
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three million, and four million. What’s going on? This is quarter past eight. 
Then it got to five million, then everything is going berserk. Bells, and 
whistling, and ringing, and popping and banging. 
It took some clever on-site programming, a re-start of the system, and bringing the 
gilts-edged market offline to establish order in the general market. Dealers in the gilt-
edged market were not amused. ‘It’s the government’s market, you can’t take it off 
the system’, they said. ‘But we said ‘You’ve been dealing perfectly satisfactorily 
without the system for god knows how many years, you can continue without it for a 
little bit longer’ and of course they did, to satisfaction’ (Mitford-Slade interview). As 
the day came to a close, the Chairman of the Stock Ex hange reflected on Big Bang. 
‘The fact that the system worked at all this morning was a triumph’, said Sir 
Nicholas Goodison (Clark & Thomson, 1986). As the days followed, normality 
kicked in. Glitches continued to surface from time to time, but SEAQ remained the 
core of the market and did so for years to come. ‘So much for being a Bailey bridge. 
It was still there some years later’ (Buck interview). 
4.13 Disenchantment and exodus 
The first casualty of Big Bang was face-to-face dealing in bonds and equities on the 
floor of the Stock Exchange. The hexagonal pitches introduced with the 
redevelopment of the building in the late 1960s were abandoned three months after 
the beginning of the new regime. For some, particularly the technologists, this was 
an expected and ultimately desirable consequence of the introduction of SEAQ. Since 
real-time data on the supply and demand for most of the shares in the market would 
be readily available through TOPIC, there existed no reason, so said their argument, to 
remain on the floor. The demise would be imminent and swift. Others, such as 
Mitford-Slade, saw the floor as a temporary element tha  ‘might become obsolete, 
although many Market Makers would still want to make use of it at first, at least until 
information systems were bedded down’ (Mitford-Slade quoted in Kynaston, 2002, 
p. 646). Indeed, observing the vast expenditures on technology incurred by firms in 
preparation for Big Bang, George Hayter encouraged th m ‘to think in terms of a 
three-year life for trading equities and gilts’ on the floor (Hayter quoted in Kynaston, 
2002, p. 690). Yet for some of the users, the break in tradition was far too radical. 
The floor provided a mode of dealing thought to be incommensurable and superior to 
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the screen. Under pressure from jobbers, the Stock Ex hange invested heavily on the 
floor in the lead up to Big Bang (£2 million pounds, according to Mitford-Slade, who 
recalled that the floor had to be redesigned with ‘screens facing two ways so that 
everyone was being kept informed’). By September 1986, twenty-eight market 
makers had signed up for a pitch, with Smith New Court ‘making particularly 
trenchant noises about keeping at least four dozen dealers on the floor’ (Kynaston, 
2002). Within days of Big Bang, however,  
some [market-makers] had gone, and within three or four months even [those 
who pushed for it] had gone because they’d realised that business wasn’t on 
the floor […]And it moved very fast off the floor (Mitford-Slade interview). 
In March 1987, only traded options remained on floor f the Stock Exchange, with 
dealings in equities and gilt-edged securities conducted entirely over the telephone 
and through SEAQ. ‘In terms of physical markets’, said Luke Glass, spokesperson of 
the Stock Exchange to The New York Times, ‘it’s the end of an era in London’ (The 
New York Times, 1987). 
 
It would be all too easy to attribute the end of dealing on the floor solely to 
the introduction of SEAQ. In effect, as Mitford-Slade mentioned, ‘when all these 
prices were being shown to [the brokers on TOPIC] they could ring up the jobber 
making the best price and transact the business there and then’ (Mitford-Slade 
interview). The floor seemed to have been made irrelevant. Nevertheless, SEAQ was 
poor at capturing the levels of activity formerly perceived by brokers and jobbers on 
the floor. It did not reflect, for instance, experiential sensations of sound that 
provided market participants with a ‘feeling’ of the state of the market. Here, the 
solution came again from the technologists, in particular, from Michael Newman. As 
he explained in interview, 
I conceived […] a proxy view of the market on a screen. How do we do this? 
I came up with the idea that if we got the top 100 stocks [that formed FTSE] 
and jammed them on to one page, then that would be a proxy. If you’re not 
on the floor, and you can see what’s going on in the main stocks, that page 
would be a proxy for you. Now, how do you do that? A static view would not 
tell you the dynamics of the floor behaviour. So it’s no good just seeing the 
prices. What we came up with was a scheme we inherited from Teletext in 
which you could pulse signals, so that if a stock price had gone down, the 
price was shown on a red background, and it stayed lik  that for ten seconds 
and then went back to ‘steady’. So as it changed, it lit up in red or blue, a bit 
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like red and blue lights going on. And it stayed like this, so that if you kept 
seeing flashes, red or blue, you knew that the thing was damn active, and the 
more you saw changing, the more active it was. So if y u saw the whole 
wretched hundred in changing colour you knew that tere was mayhem, 
absolutely chaos. The other thing you could see by ye was that if you saw 
nearly everything red, you knew the floor was bombing out. If you saw 
everything blue, you knew it was all going up. [So] y u got this feeling of 
what it was like. I designed [this page and] called it the trigger page, because 
the idea was that it would trigger you to go and look [the shares] up in 
[TOPIC]. The trigger page […] became the most popular we’d ever had. 
In effect, the trigger page served as a higher representation of the system-as-a-whole, 
a ‘surprise trigger’ allowing ‘events of interest to swim into view’ (Knorr Cetina et 
al., 2007). As Newman added, the trigger page was instrumental in facilitating the 
end of the floor. 
I was told this by one of the dealers I knew quite well when I visited him on 
the floor in the first or second day post Big Bang. He said ‘Christ all mighty! 
By the time I wander round the floor and find out the prices, they all know it 
in the office. They are ahead of me!’ When he said to me ‘they are ahead of 
me in the office’, in living memory, this had never happened before. I knew 
that the days were up for the floor. 
Just as FTSE became the representation of the general state of the market, the trigger 
page became a handy representation of the floor.  
 
The type of anonymity conferred by the new dealing system proved a 
difficult creature to manage. In effect, the move to the screen did not entail a 
complete dissolution of the long-standing social ties that had characterised life on the 
floor of the Stock Exchange. Nowhere is this clearer than in the development of 
SAEF, the SEAQ Automated Execution Facility. SAEF followed considerably the logic 
set by the Technical Services department in planning IDN in the early 1980s. As Big 
Bang approached and IDN became unfeasible, plans for the future shifted to concrete 
short-term solutions. Among these, the Stock Exchange considered developing an 
automatic execution system, part of the successor of SEAQ code-named MANTIS for 
MArket aNd Trading Information System. MANTIS, expected to ‘perform the same 
functions as SEAQ and a number of others besides’, was based on the assumption that  
for slightly less active securities or the slightly larger trades in the active 
securities, a powerful tool would be the facility to bid or offer a line of stock 
from your own trading terminal to all other parties who may be interested, 
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and to give them the opportunity to accept your bid or offer on the computer 
(Hayter, 1984). 
Hayter envisioned a market where trades in small sizes could be fully automated 
through electronic order books while ‘direct face-to-face or telephone dealing 
[remained] the rule for the very large trades’ (Hayter, 1984). The technological lock-
in of SEAQ, however, made MANTIS an unattainable goal. (Firms had incurred in 
considerable investments on systems compatible with SEAQ and therefore considered 
departures from the system politically and financially unacceptable). SAEF emerged 
as a compromise, configured as an add-on to SEAQ.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Trigger page. Courtesy of John Scannell 
 
The development of SAEF, however, was plagued by delays – ‘their project 
disciplines and the timescales they needed to impleent it were far too long’ recalled 
Nic Stuchfield (Stuchfield interview). Initially planned for introduction in 1987, SAEF 
was eventually rolled out in early 1989, with market-makers BZW and Kleinwort 
Grieveson providing similar and highly competitive s rvices earlier in the game. 
SAEF, however, came with an interesting peculiarity. The service allowed brokers to 
route their orders to a preferred market-maker (McLelland interview). As Stuchfield, 
former jobber for BZW, recalled 
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once SEAQ was introduced, we knew immediately what the best price was 
because it was up there on the screen. And we may not make [it]. But there 
were an awful lot of retail brokers that would rather deal with Wedd 
Durlacher or BZW as it was now called, or Smith Brothers, or one or tw  other 
firms, rather than all these brand new 25 market making firms they had no 
relationship with whatsoever, and didn’t even now how to get a hold of them. 
The system, in a sense, automated established structures of trust. Although it keep to 
best-execution policies, SAEF allowed constraining business as much as possible to 
‘friends, [people and firms] they knew. And very often you could get a better price 
on the telephone than you saw on the yellow strip’ (Hayter interview).  
 
Indeed, the politics of asymmetric information were not confined to SAEF. 
The screen simply could not provide the same type of interpersonal visual cues once 
used on the floor. As Hayter mentioned, 
The crunch [of SEAQ] was that jobbers had to commit a price to the scren. 
And they didn’t like that, because they said ‘well, my price depends on who I 
am asked to deal with. If I deal with the spivvy, if I’m asked by the spivvy 
broker what the price is, I’ll give him a wider one than if I’m dealing with 
XYZ over here (Hayter interview). 
The years following Big Bang thus saw a dwindling of c nfidence in SEAQ. Market-
makers in particular considered the transparency ditated by SEAQ and the Stock 
Exchange’s regulations as forcing them to ‘deal in very unprofitable terms with 
rivals’ (Anonymous, 1989). Market-makers could not hide big trades from the rest of 
the market and were thus unable to unwind their position  as they had done so in the 
past. Such was the asymmetry introduced by SEAQ that BZW and Philips & Drew, two 
of the larges participants of the London equities markets, opted out of the system in 
1989. Brokers were not immune to the new order either. Encouraged by a widely 
held assumption that market-makers were unable to execute large transactions, 
institutional investors with access to the prices in SEAQ circumvented the market and 
dealt between themselves, leaving the brokers without their commissions. The age of 
electronic dealing emerged as a particularly hostile place for some of the old Stock 
Exchange’s broking firms.  
 
The cumbersome development of SAEF and the mounting criticisms to SEAQ 
were a sign of the changing landscape of finance in London and of impending 
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difficulties for the Stock Exchange. The technological build-up of member firms 
(discussed in chapter 5), along with increased domestic and international 
competition, led the Stock Exchange to a precarious sit ation in the late 1980s. The 
technologists, however, continued to pursue ever more s phisticated systems that 
provided faster, more efficient information flows. While Hayter developed SAEF, 
others advanced projects that resounded with the ambitions of IDN. Peter Giles, who 
originally worked on EPIC, was looking into a satellite-based replacement for he 
communications network of the Stock Exchange called SuperTicker (Buck interview; 
indeed, Bennett had previously sought a similar path when he devised a method for 
transmitting London prices through CNN’s satellite network. ‘Unfortunately’, said 
Hayter in interview, ‘Ted Turner didn’t see the commercial logic of it’). Peter 
Bennett, on the other hand, worked with Peter Harris on the development of a front 
office automation system, ORBIT, experimenting with local area networks, window-
based working environments, and personal computers (the system, incidentally, was 
later sold to IBM ; Harris interview, Bennett interview). Others worked on Artificial 
Intelligence applications to market surveillance. And on settlement, the Stock 
Exchange was venturing into the troubled waters of complete (certificate-based 
securities) dematerialisation through the development of TAURUS7. ‘The IT people’, 
recalled Bennett, ‘were effectively setting policy. And, like it or not, around Big 
Bang time it was working very well. It was a bull market, everyone was onwards and 
upwards, the old member firms were cashing out, new m mber firms were coming 
in’. For George Hayter, this route was necessary for guaranteeing the survival of the 
Stock Exchange. ‘I regarded the whole thing very early on as an information 
business. And if you wanted it to succeed, you had to grow it, and to do it 
commercially’ (Hayter interview). The technologist’s command was not merely one 
of designing systems and outlining business strategies: the analysts, programmers, 
systems engineers and other members of the technical services staff represented the 
                                               
7 TAURUS, which stands for Transfer and Automated Registraton of Uncertified Stock, was an 
ambitious settlement system set to replace TALISMAN. In design, TAURUS was supposed to eliminate 
the need paper-based certificates by introducing a completely electronic database of corporate 
ownership, allowing settlement to be carried out in a quicker and less expensive manner. The project, 
however, ran astray when conflicting interests among stakeholders pressured the Stock Exchange to 
follow risky technological and organisational routes. The episode, described in (Drummond, 1996), 
ended with the intervention of the Bank of England, which coordinated the development of an entirely 
new settlement system, CREST.  
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largest segment of the Stock Exchange’s employees, hovering above 2000 workers 
out of a total of 3000 (Bennett interview; Scannell, personal communication).  
 
 
Figure 4.5 Stock Exchange expenditure v.s income inthe years 
following Big Bang. Image courtesy of John Scannell. 
 
The Stock Exchange, however, was no longer the organisation they 
encountered in the 1970s. The membership, on the one ha d, had changed to include 
foreign firms who eventually obtained representation in the Council. For the 
newcomers, the business strategy of the Stock Exchange was not entirely clear, 
recalled Bennett. 
The Europeans were sort of ambivalent, really. But [opposition to systems 
development came] mainly [from] the Americans. ‘This is not the way to run 
an Exchange. We need to concentrate on other things, l ke designing a bigger 
and better market’ (Bennett interview).   
Indeed, there seems to have been a growing discontent on the way the Stock 
Exchange set plans for the future. Yet the position of Technical Services was 
somewhat secure: their systems continued to produce profits for the organisation, as 
they had since the days of MPDS. The crash of October 1987 and the ensuing 
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reorganisation of the securities industry, however, marked the beginning of the 
decline of their relative authority. While expenditure continued to increase 
monotonically from 1986 onwards, income started to fall slowly in 1987. And in late 
1989, the Stock Exchange incurred a loss (see Figure 4.5). 
 
The engineering culture of the Stock Exchange was not immune to the 
transformations of Big Bang. The Bailey bridge, recalled McLelland, became the 
cornerstone of future systems rather than the interim solution it had been intended as. 
‘New systems would not be developed, we would build on the existing limited 
capability due to time pressure (e.g. SAEF – ‘a must have because the US has [the 
Small Order Execution System])’ (McLelland, personal communication). The growth 
of the technical staff also presented problems: ‘Developers were now spending much 
more time in meetings, project office updating, reporting and all the bureaucracy of 
big organisations’ (McLelland, personal communication). And, in sum, the rapid 
development culture of the Stock Exchange was ‘lost’. ‘Developers were no longer 
allowed to develop without a long process of approval. For many, including myself, 
it was time to move on’ (McLelland, personal communication).  
 
A turning point in this story came, according to most f the original 
technologists, with the selection of Peter Rawlings to the recently created position of 
Chief Executive of the Stock Exchange. The developments that followed are murky 
and soaked in the politics of a rapidly changing and increasingly controversial 
organisation. The coup de grace, however, came in 1990. With mounting pressures 
from member firms, the spiralling cost of TAURUS, and the continuing influence of 
technologists on the Stock Exchange’s policies, Rawlings commenced a two-year 
process of outsourcing. ‘In a funny way’, reminisced Hayter in 2007 
the Big Bang which everybody said was going to rid us of the club mentality 
and make the whole thing more commercial ended up coming full circle to 
the point where the members were saying ‘We don’t want the Stock 
Exchange to do commercial things. We want it to just be the place that 
coordinates the regulation of the market, and not very much else’ (Hayter 
interview). 
The ranks of the Technical Services department wereslowly depleted. And in April 
1992, The Times reported that an agreement was reached between the Stock 
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Exchange and Arthur Andersen whereby Andersen would ‘r n the exchange’s 
market support systems’ and take on the ‘312 exchange staff’ (Anonymous, 1992). 
The exodus began, and soon enough the original members of the Special Systems 
Group had left.  
4.14 A technological epilogue 
The paths followed by the technologists after their d parture from the Stock 
Exchange varied greatly. Peter Buck, one of the first to leave after becoming ‘very 
concerned about the way things were going’ (Buck interview), joined a small 
consultancy firm in late 1989. George Hayter, perhaps the most prominent figure of 
the team to be ‘chopped’, left a year later, in December 1990 – ‘[If] you’re going to 
outsource to Arthur Andersen, you don’t need a director who’s responsible for 
internal IT services’, he recalled – going off to ‘develop stock exchanges in Eastern 
Europe’ (Hayter interview). Peter Bennett departed in 1990 too and, for a time, 
earned ‘his bread and butter’ by convincing ‘the top exchanges in Europe to agree 
that there was a need for a European price dissemination system’ (Bennett 
interview). (Alas, the system known as Euroquote fail d to materialise and was 
abandoned in mid-1991). Ian McLelland ‘moved away from the Exchange, merrily 
into [the London Traded Options Market] and then over to [London International 
Financial Futures Exchange]’ (McLelland interview). Michael Newman also joined 
the world of consultancy. John Scannell left in 1992, when Technical Services was 
outsourced to Arthur Andersen. And, in 1993, Peter Cox joined the London 
Securities and Derivatives Exchange, OMLX , set up in 1990 to trade options and 
futures in Swedish securities.  
 
But this was not the end of the story; it was merely a point in a longer 
trajectory. The years spent building the platforms for the market, negotiating 
arrangements with jobbers and brokers, analysing systems specifications, planning 
for the future, creating regulations, and dealing with the institutional structures of the 
Stock Exchange and the financial world at large were sources of particular forms of 
experience for the technologists of the Stock Exchange. Navigating through the 
organisational politics and technological requirements of the market necessitated, in 
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the words of sociologist John Law, practicing heterog neous engineering (Law, 
1987), arranging things both human and non-human in the marketplace. In effect, the 
technologists who built the platforms of the Stock Exchange, the George Hayter’s 
and Peter Bennett’s of the world, in the words of Patrick Mitford-Slade, possessed 
not only contributory technical expertise (that is, the ability to create new forms of 
technical knowledge and technical practices through the design of systems). In a 
much more fundamental manner, they also possessed a unique understanding of the 
market and an ability to communicate with those who comprised the marketplace. 
They had, paraphrasing sociologist Harry Collins and Robert Evans (2002), 
interactive market expertise, gained through years of living in and around the 
marketplace and tempered through the careful elaboration of the materialities that 
underpin it.   
 
In their diaspora, some of the technologists put into practice the knowledge 
produced during their tenure at the Stock Exchange. In 1993, after spending a couple 
of years as an independent consultant, Peter Bennett crea ed an order-driven 
electronic dealing system for international shares in collaboration with two former 
Stock Exchange colleagues, Michael Waller-Bridge and Stephen Wilson. This initial 
group expanded with the incorporation of some known individuals, Ian McLelland 
and John Scannell. The system, named Tradepoint, was a David for the Stock 
Exchange’s Goliath, the quote-driven SEAQ International. Confidence in the team and 
their strategy, however, was great enough to attract a number of important firms to 
the new system (Stuchfield recalled in interview ‘the Exchange had a long track 
record of having visionary heads of technology’). Founding supporters of Tradepoint 
included BZW, one of the largest firms in London, as well as Goldman Sachs and 
Scottish Widows. And by 1995, Cazenove, Panmure Gordon, NatWest Markets and 
Hoare Govett had signed up to Tradepoint as brokers. Tradepoint went online on 21 
September 1995, in what The Scotsman qualified as a quiet debut. ‘600,000 shares 
worth £2.3 million’ were traded on that day, wrote The Scotsman, ‘compared with 




The consequences of Tradepoint were not nearly as quiet as its debut. The 
first domestic competition of the Stock Exchange in 200 years (Economist, 1995) 
demonstrated that the stock exchanges of the future we  based on the provision of 
liquidity and best execution; they were, in a sense, facilitators of real-time 
information flows. The pressure was great on the London Stock Exchange. In a 
world in which marketplaces were freely interchangeabl  services, structures of 
membership and their associated dues were an uncompetitive anachronism. In 2000, 
in the context of a particularly intense period of mergers between exchanges within 
Continental Europe and across the Atlantic, the London Stock Exchange 
demutualised: membership was converted into shares, publicly traded in the market. 
The Stock Exchange was a business, no longer a club. A long road that started with 
mutualisation in 1947, and which led the Stock Exchange to develop its own 
systems, computerise the market, and hire an army of technologists, had come to an 
end. Through Tradepoint and other expressions of technological diaspora, the 
expertise so intrinsically associated to the creation of the materialities of the market 










5 Breaking Up the Family: a Social History of 
Technology and Disintermediation in the 
City of London 
‘The changes that have taken place in finance’, argued Sir Nicholas Goodison eight 
years after Big Bang, ‘have not undermined the need for a tremendous skill in 
handling business’. Speaking from his experience as both broker and Chairman of 
the London Stock Exchange, Goodison’s appraisal responded to a growing 
interpretation of global finance as a sphere of rapid change, a realm of technological 
depersonalisation, an area of institutional mechanisation. Unlike those who spelled 
the demise of geography and the triumph of information, Goodison saw continuities 
in his recent history. Indeed, for him, ‘all that’s happened after all is that there has 
been a technological improvement in the display of information, both before trade 
and after trade, and a huge improvement in the telephone network throughout the 
world. That’s all that’s happened. And the skills of the trader, the skills of the 
intermediary in doing the business are as necessary a  ever. They’re simply using 
different tools and better information’ (BL/NLSC/C408/09, 1995). For Goodison, 
finance was the same in 1994 as it had been in years past. It was a personal affair. It 
was inevitably intermediated.  
 
Across the Atlantic, these words were received as echo s of a distant past, 
clashing with the sociotechnical futures hailed by commentators and market 
participants alike. Within the growing cultural circuits of capital – a term coined by 
sociologist Nigel Thrift to describe the international system of production and 
distribution of business and managerial knowledge (Thrift, 2005) – ‘simple tools’ 
and ‘better information’ possessed a revolutionary tone. For consultants, software 
engineers, management professionals, economists and other specialists of finance, 
the ‘technological improvements’ that populated the securities industry in the 1980s 
were the foundation of a historical discontinuity. In the brave new world of digital 
technologies, large institutional investors could obtain the speed, mobility and 
opportunities for diversification that they desired; the could find, in the words of the 
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Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress, ‘more freedom from the 
clock than the traditional exchange trading hours and floor mechanisms can 
accommodate’ (U.S.Congress, 1990, p. 79). Finance was now free from the chains of 
time and space. And fundamentally, it was free from the paradigmatic intermediary 
of yore, the stock exchange. 
 
The imagined futures of finance of the late 1980s and early 1990s were as 
much a consequence of the desires of large institutional investors to reduce 
transaction costs as they were the reflection of a deeper change in our shared 
understanding of social, political and economic life. As mentioned previously, during 
the 1980s, we were told to think of modernity in terms of a new (technological) 
economy, to understand life as occurring in a world d iven by the production, control 
and dissemination of information (e.g. Bell, 1973; Bell, 1977; Castells, 2000c). 
 
The rise of the discourse of the information age was p rticularly noticeable in 
finance. Emphasis on the affordances of new technologies (Gibson, 1977; Norman, 
1999) and the apparent informatic reducibility of life resulted in three foundational 
myths, one of which maintained that markets could be ‘dematerialised’: if markets 
are driven solely by information and rational calculation, then data processing and 
telecommunication technologies were the natural stage for performing the economies 
of the future. By utilising these technologies, one could eliminate the clunky analog 
systems of exchange, communication and interaction of ld-style finance, reducing 
the vastness of the trading floor to the smallness of a computer and an (invisible) 
network of data feeds. Avoiding the awkward physicality of the material varieties of 
finance, dematerialised markets are constrained neither by place nor by time. They 
can operate from anywhere and at any time, executing orders automatically, cheaply 
and efficiently.  
 
But if markets are amenable to dematerialisation, they are also the subjects of 
disintermediation, a second myth of finance in the information age. Often presented 
as the outcome of the increased capacity of investors to utilise information 
technologies to bypass the middlemen in the marketplace, disintermediation is seen 
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positively, as a reduction in transaction costs. The online brokerages that ‘replace 
people and telephones with computers and codes’, for instance, are hailed as a 
‘consumer boon’ (Barber & Odean, 2001). Similarly, the advent of so called e-
finance is presented as furthering ‘the longstanding evolution of the financial 
services sector from one dominated by financial intermediaries to one dominated by 
capital markets and financial institutions that hold marketable securities assets’ 
(Allen et al., 2002, p. 10). Facilitated by electronic technologies, disintermediation 
has also been considered a means for raising capital in the stock market in a more 
efficient, less costly manner by directly accessing sophisticated individual and 
institutional investors (for a discussion, see Langevoort, 1998). In this sense, 
disintermediation has complemented the economic ideal of financial markets as 
efficient devices for the allocation of investments: through technology, they reduce 
transaction costs; and through novel regulatory and organisational arrangements, 
they render ‘traditional’ brokerage services arcane, granting individuals unmediated 
access to the marketplace.  
 
As the history of the London Stock Exchange demonstrates, however, the 
myth of dematerialisation conceals the underlying physicality of markets and, as 
importantly, sociologically relevant forms of knowledge and practice that develop 
around the materialities that structure modern finance. In a similar way, the myth of 
disintermediation assumes a one-dimensional interpretation of the cognitive fabric of 
finance, one in which efficient markets are driven by the (objective) information 
possessed by buyers and sellers, making intermediari s costly and ultimately 
unnecessary participants of exchange. As the previous chapters, the purpose of the 
following pages is to deconstruct a myth by showing the tacit, contingent, local, 
conventional and subjective elements that found information in modern markets. 
Information, in a sense, is proven embedded.  
 
In deconstructing the myth of disintermediation, this chapter performs three 
distinct tasks. First, it presents financial intermdiation as an ongoing reconstitution 
of the social connectivities (on the definition and relevance of connectivity sin 
finance, see MacKenzie 2004) that bound and structure the securities industry. 
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Focusing on the member firms of the London Stock Exchange, this chapter shows 
that intermediation acquired numerous manifestations throughout the twentieth 
century, each responding to the broader social and economic state of the United 
Kingdom and the financial world-at-large. Hence, the following pages delve into the 
social history of the intermediaries who made the market for bonds and equities in 
the City of London, roughly between 1900 and 1990. And in doing so, this chapter 
acquires a second purpose, namely, to present an admitte ly partial reconstruction of 
the dynamics that defined the practices and institutions of jobbers and brokers in the 
City of London’s financial marketplace.  
 
Second, by looking into the social history of interm diation in British finance, this 
chapter invariably touches upon the concept of gentlemanly capitalism, long used as 
an explanatory anchor for the social and economic history of the United Kingdom 
(Cain et al., 1986a; Cain et al., 1986b). In analysing the recollections of brokers and 
jobbers in London in the alleged years of transformation from a state of 
gentlemanliness to one of globalised Americanisation (c. 1960-1986), this chapter re-
evaluates gentlemanly capitalism not as the descriptor of the organisation of Britain’s 
financial and political elites but rather as a social imaginary that was re-invented 
during the constant re-negotiation between the remembered pasts, experienced 
presents and imagined futures of finance in the City of London. In this chapter, I 
adopt Charles Taylor’s definition of social imaginaries – that is, I understand social 
imaginaries to mean the referents used by individuals to imagine their social 
existence, their obligations towards others, their expectations of behaviour, and the 
normative notions and images underlying these expectations (Taylor, 2004). 
Importantly, given that they are shared by large social groups, social imaginaries 
make possible a wide sense of legitimacy. The pervasive acceptance of democracy as 
a form of legitimate political action – even though precise definitions of the meaning 
of democracy vary considerably across social groups – would be an example of the 
type of elements that constitute our modern social im ginaries. Secularism provides a 
similar example – while its meaning is negotiated in the details, it is widely 
acknowledged as an integral part of the modern state. Indeed, within the socio-
scientific literature, the concept of social imaginary is now utilised as a partial 
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substitute for ideology, in an attempt to explain broad historical changes associated 
to categories such as ‘democracy’ and ‘secularism’. Here, however, I approach social 
imaginaries at a ‘lower’ level, that is, as symbolic referents and normative 
expectations of behaviour that are shared by a relativ ly large community of practice, 
that link to broader imaginaries of social and political life, and that configure, in a 
way, senses of legitimacy. In doing so, this chapter str sses the fluid personhoods 
that framed financial practices and shows that theyar  irreducible to the conceptual 
shorthand of the gentlemanly capitalist.  
 
Third, this chapter goes beyond the critique of gentlemanly capitalism as 
culture and identity of British finance. Specifically, it presents the evolution of 
financial personhoods in Britain in terms of the socio-cognitive identities adopted by 
brokers and jobbers. Intermediation, it is shown, always possessed a social and 
cognitive character, with brokers and jobbers having to understand the operation of 
the market in a located, material and embodied manner. The personhoods that 
developed around intermediation, however, adapted to the cognitive, regulatory and 
material tools available to those working on the floor and in the office. As the 
informatic discourse rose in prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, and as computers 
were incorporated into the practices of some member firms of the Stock Exchange, 
the personhoods of some British financial intermediaries reconfigured around the 
ideal of information. This reconfiguration, however, did not imply renouncing to the 
subjectivities and situatedness of the past. British ntermediaries did not believe it 
was possible to delegate trust, decision and control to automated systems, 
considering finance an eminently subjective domain. F ance, for them, remained a 
human affair. 
5.1 The network and its bonds 
Prior to the advent of the automated trading system that populate the contemporary 
landscape of British finance, the securities industry in the City of London was 
defined and structured by the interpersonal practices of single capacity. Without any 
doubt, single capacity – whereby the functions of br king and matching orders are 
institutionally separated – was the cornerstone of the market’s organisation and the 
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basis for the forms of intermediation that existed in the City of London. Writing in 
the late nineteenth century, George Gibson saw single capacity as ‘one of the marked 
peculiarities of the Stock Exchange of London’ (Gibson, 1889, p. 33). Until the so-
called Big Bang in 1986, there existed at least two levels of intermediation within the 
market provided by the Stock Exchange. Those wishing to deal through its floor did 
so at a price, paying a commission to brokers and incurring in indirect costs through 
the spread between bids and asks (the ‘turn’) of jobbers. Firms seeking to raise funds 
in the capital market faced a similar double-layered access to the marketplace. Large 
underwritings required the interventions of merchant banks and brokers, and it 
occasionally proved necessary to conscript jobbers to advertise new issues on the 
floor.  
 
The congealment of single capacity as both custom and rule of the Stock 
Exchange in 1909 made the division of labour on and off the floor particularly stable. 
In effect, the crystallisation of the separation between brokers and jobbers along with 
the inability of banks to become members, allowed for the emergence of specific 
roles and practices across the marketplace, for the growth of a community of 
individuals with distinctive characters, occupations and routines. Jobbers, for 
instance, became increasingly specialised. ‘By making a speciality [sic] of a limited 
number of securities’, wrote Charles Duguid in 1913,  
the jobber is able to keep his finger on the pulse of the market, and to gauge 
accurately at any moment its supply and demand. He must do this in his own 
interest, for he must ever be ready to buy and sell at the demand of the broker 
whom the public sends to him (Duguid, 1913, p. 35). 
And due to their multiple undertakings and their constant interaction with companies 
and investors, brokers developed institutional formats of a particular kind. As 
Hamilton Whyte mentioned in his 1924 survey, a broke  with a ‘fair’ connection 
‘may be able to earn quite a handsome income with the assistance of a clerk, a typist 
and an office boy, in addition to an accredited clerk attending the Exchange. (Whyte, 
1924) (p. 39). 
 
A large number of small firms characterised the organisation of the securities 
industry, with jobbers outnumbering brokers two-to-one at the turn of the century 
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(Duguid, 1913; Whyte, 1924). The firms comprising the membership of the Stock 
Exchange were of two broad types: the first, as indiv dual entrepreneurs who had 
gained membership and were assisted by one or several cl rks and typists; the 
second, as relatively small partnerships, some of which could afford supporting 
specialised departments within the firm. This organis tion of the community of the 
Stock Exchange was the product of the relatively low restrictions on capital imposed 
on the membership. While it was estimated that membership to the New York Stock 
Exchange in the early 1920s cost about £14,000, and p rticipating of the Paris 
Bourse could entail up to £90,000 in collateral, a candidate for membership in 
London  
only requires to obtain three members of not less than four years' standing 
who will each undertake to pay five hundred pounds to the creditors of the 
candidate should the latter be declared a defaulter wi hin four years from the 
date of his admission (Whyte, 1924, p. 78-80). 
The system that thus emerged was a market organised i  t rms of the size and wealth 
of the membership, which correlated to the ability to make markets in the case of 
jobbers and to the repertoire of offered services in the case of brokers. Jobbing, notes 
historian Bernard Attard, ‘comprised a broad base of single and two-member firms 
and a narrow apex of market leaders who transacted the major business’ (Attard, 
2000, p. 14). And in broking, larger firms attracted he confidence of wealthier 
clients, with their size dictated ‘not only by an increase of ordinary business but also 
through its undertaking special lines of work’ (Whyte, 1924). The market of the 
Stock Exchange was hence heterogeneous. Variations in the size and composition of 
the firms created a certain complexity to the organisation of the marketplace, one that 
was recognised at the time. Large firms waned and disappeared. And small firms 
‘began their existence dependent on orders from friendly brokers (or even relatives) 
who may have encouraged them to start trading in the first place’(Attard, 2000, p. 
16).  
 
Despite its large and diverse membership and the relativ  ease of access to its 
floor, the marketplace of the Stock Exchange proved a stable structure, surviving 
both speculative bubbles and the economic hardships of the Great War. The 
resilience of the system originated neither from the dominance of technical expertise 
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over the market nor from aggressive marketing strategies on behalf of member firms. 
Broking and jobbing were far from being institutionalised professions. As Whyte 
(1924) noted,  
many persons are attracted into stockbroking whose claim to a partnership 
rests more on a large connection of wealthy clients than the possession of 
qualifications for such a post (p. 83).  
‘The average stockbroker’, he wrote, ‘has devoted li tle time to the study of 
economic problems at their source [with] Intuition rather than reason [determining 
their decisions]’ (Whyte, 1924, p. 8-9).  
 
Advertising, furthermore, provided no benefit when attempting to reach the 
pinnacle of the hierarchy or consolidate one’s position in the marketplace. Members 
of the Stock Exchange  
[showed] much repugnance even to their names appearing in the newspapers 
in any connection whatever, though it  may be quite apart from business, and 
some are even chary of announcing a mere change of partnership, or a 
removal of offices, lest it might be construed as an advertisement (Duguid, 
1913, p. 42).  
The stability of the market resided elsewhere: in its foundation upon the 
interpersonal connections that formed the social networks of the British economy of 
the early twentieth century. 
 
To view the stability of London’s markets as based on interpersonal 
connections is to recognise some of the key insight of recent scholarship in 
economic sociology. Advocating a departure from the canonical neoclassical model 
of anonymous, rational and instantaneous market exchange, economic sociology has 
revaluated the role of connectivities in the fabric of the marketplace. Within the 
growing literature in this field and its intersections with other disciplinary domains, a 
strong argument exists for understanding the economy as interactive exchange 
networks grounded on social relations between users, r gulators and market 
participants. Indeed, social relations within the marketplace are of fundamental 
importance for the operation of economic life particularly because of the role they 
occupy as a scaffold supporting the stabilisation of market exchange. Social relations 
and the connectivities they imply, for instance, are central to the production of trust 
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in economic networks of exchange (Granovetter, 1985); and trust, in a sense, 
provides a mechanism for evaluating risks and dealing with uncertainty: in dealing 
with the settlement of deals struck on the floor one needs to trust that one’s 
counterparties will deliver in due form and time; in dealing with a broker or 
intermediary, one needs to trust that he or she will obtain the best deal available in 
the market; and in dealing with an institution, one ne ds to trust that it is up-to-date 
with its regulatory commitments and that it will have the solvency and expertise to -
operate in the future. The erosion of trust and the expectations it entails can have 
disastrous consequences, as Robert K. Merton observed: they can lead to market-
failure, to the collapse of a bank, to a self-fulfilling prophecy fuelled by the 
evaporation of trust in an institution (Merton, 1948). But social networks and 
interpersonal relations are not only sources of stability. Through their persistence and 
reconstitution over time, these networks of social relationships also create an 
interface for signalling and learning amongst market participants (White, 2002). 
They generate small networks of transparency and pre ictability that allow aligning 
one’s positions, redirecting one’s actions according to what other participants say or 
do. They are, to an extent, a communication channel. Owing to their structuring 
character, social networks also establish specific modes and hierarchies of authority 
and legitimacy. Networks allow for the differentiation of economic activities not 
only in character but also in authority: some activities and groups within the market 
will acquire more repute, more trust, more importance; but acquisition of authority 
requires specific social and cultural investments that nurture trust and status within 
the communities of the network (Barnes, 1988; Podolny, 1993; Preda, 2005).  
 
The variety of intermediated finance that developed within the walls of the 
Stock Exchange at the turn of the twentieth century is a paradigmatic expression of 
the relational and networked character of economic life. This is particularly visible in 
three constitutive spheres of finance. The first and perhaps most prominent of all was 
the market itself. Within the diffuse boundaries of this sphere, forging personal 
contacts with clients, bankers, financiers, brokers and jobbers provided direct and 
indirect economic and social benefits. As mentioned i  preceding chapters, acquiring 
interpersonal knowledge of other market participants (ranging from their identities to 
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communal evaluations of the trustworthiness of firms and individuals) was quite 
necessary for navigating the at times busy and apparently intractable operations of 
the floor. However, this connectivity extended beyond the marketplace and into the 
broader set of social and economic relations that embedded the British securities 
industry.  
 
New issues – through which capital was raised in the market by means of the 
introduction of new securities – illustrated particularly well the role occupied by 
relations in business. Whyte (1924) remarked, 
[The] real claim of a broker to a privileged position is that he will be able to 
place the underwriting of a sound issue which the public are not expected to 
take up. Such a claim can be established only by a firm with a wide range of 
wealthy clients. It is natural therefore that an underwriting broker in 
distributing his lots should favour those brokers whose businesses show that 
they have such a connection (p. 44-45) 
The emergence of a distinct type of intermediary that worked on the margins of 
stockbroking – the so-called half-commission men – is also a revealing 
demonstration of the value of financial connectivity. Generally clerks ‘whose 
personal equipment is limited but whose financial connection is extensive’ (Whyte, 
1924, p. 83), these employees received no salary but were granted half-commission 
on the business they took into the firm.  
 
Wealth circulated across personal relationships. In effect, the maintenance of 
such connections implied specific forms of pro-social behaviour, some of which 
overflowed into attitudes towards newly adopted technologies. Upon their 
introduction, wrote Alan Jenkins, telephones were flt to be detrimental ‘in dignity 
and good manners. Principals either wrote letters or went to see each other. Walter de 
Zoete, who retired from Zoete & Gorton in 1909, never used the telephone at all, 
although the firm had one since 1895 […] and thought his clerk Pericles Freme […] 
a “somewhat pushing young particle” for wanting to extend its use’ (Jenkins, 1973, 
p. 122). 
 
Yet relationships with clients were not only advantageous for brokers who 
took commissions on every trade. Such networks also functioned as mechanisms for 
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communicating market information to a wider audience. The British investor, 
enmeshed in an economy in the process of colonial expansion, and predominantly 
represented by private wealthy individuals who felt ‘the dead weight of an ever 
increasing store of capital’ pressing upon them (Investor's Chronicle, quoted in Platt, 
1980, p. 8), often faced an opaque informatic landscape. In the market for overseas 
shares, the costs of telephones and telegraphs made acquiring data expensive. And in 
the domestic equities and new issues market, access to information was constrained 
by the absence of regulations on corporate reporting standards.  
 
Ties with ‘knowledgeable’ intermediaries were hence profitable. As William 
Reader mentions in his history of the broking firm of Foster & Braithwaite,  
published accounts […] of companies of the highest r pute did not need to 
reveal more than the barest minimum required to show shareholders, in the 
most general terms, how their capital was employed and how their profits 
were derived, and matters which the Directors found embarrassing or 
tactically sensitive could often, quite legally, be concealed (Reader, 1979, p. 
146). 
Bans on advertising amongst the membership of the Stock Exchange, which 
constituted part of a broader attitude of restraint towards the distribution of 
investment brochures and informative materials, transformed personal connections 
into two-way avenues of communication. As Michael Red argued, 
by tradition, stockbrokers tended to be rather passive in their attitudes to 
clients, responding to orders given by a client, and requesting advice when 
specifically requested, but tending overall to let the client take the lead. [The 
network of personal contacts] provided a means for a more direct expression 
of the stockbroker’s views (Reed, 1975, p. 160) 
The networked relationships of trust, however, alsoenabled the deployment of self-
policing schemes. By generating a certain level of transparency within the network, 
by controlling access to the membership, and by mediating the dissemination of 
information to the world-at-large, the connectivities of finance in London allowed 
establishing self-regulatory sanctioning mechanisms. The regulations of the London 
Stock Exchange, both on its membership as on the companies that wished to list 
shares therein, were predicated upon the possibility of maintaining order through a 
shared knowledge of the character of market participants that was not deemed 
accessible outside the walls of the organisation. Defaulters were seldom taken to 
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court. ‘[The] creditors in the Stock Exchange’ wrote Whyte (1924, p. 103), ‘never 
make [a defaulting firm] a bankrupt legally, preferring, of course, their own 
arrangements for dividing the estate’.  
 
The hierarchical relations that supported the market were not limited to the 
floor and the business relations weaved between intrmediaries, companies and 
investors. Structures of status and legitimacy spilled into a second sphere, the private 
organisation of member firms, and hence to the division of labour within the 
securities industry. As David Kynaston (2002) noted, firms, and in particular 
stockbrokers, ‘depended hugely on the quality and character of [their] senior partner’ 
(p. 165), their reputation in the market hinging on the individuals composing the 
higher echelons of the organisation.  
 
Within firms, partners constituted the upper strata, operating at a level 
separate from clerks and general staff, and dictating the general policies of the 
organisation. Their recruitment occurred mostly through networks of family and 
acquaintances. In the firm, they specialised in connectiveness, cultivating personal 
contacts with others in finance, from peers and private investors, to bankers and 
wealthy financiers; that was their specialisation within the division of social labour 
of finance. Although each partner catered for a specific group of clients acting as a 
relational node of business, the responsibility for maintaining the bureaucratic 
structures fell on the shoulders of the office manager, a member of staff that served 
as the coordinator between the clerks and their superiors. Clerks, in particular, 
performed most of the routine operations of the firm, with some keeping ‘in close 
touch with a client’s affairs, [speaking] direct with them on the phone or [meeting] 
them when they came to the office’ (Reed, 1975, p. 83) In effect, experienced clerks 
were a valued feature for firms: 
Harmonious cooperation between sections and a certain degree of all-round 
general knowledge is essential to efficient administration. This can be secured 
only by having experienced and competent men in each se tion. There is no 
business or industry where the adoption of the policy of what economists call 
‘the cheapness of high wages’ pays better than in stockbroking. In a good 
business with a wide and influential connection, the working expenses as a 
rule are very low relatively to profits, and a wise partner in such a firm will 
pay liberally for reliable clerks. Inefficiency, causing frequent mistakes, may 
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result in the loss of clients whose annual commissions exceed the cost of one 
or two first-rate office men. It never pays to risk a good connection by 
running the office cheaply (Whyte, 1924, p. 54). 
The mobility of skilled personnel, and thus of the expertise nurtured over time, was 
hampered by the conventions of the City. For instance, it proved quite 
counterproductive for a member of staff to request a pay rise to his superiors: ‘the 
prevailing culture of job immobility was such that [leaving a firm after a dispute over 
pay] was a black mark in the eyes of other potential employers’ (Kynaston, 2002, p. 
140). Yet however strict and rigid it may have been, the environment within the 
firms provided stability for both partners and staff. Junior and upcoming partners 
knew that with time, work and some degree of fortune they would eventually reap 
the benefits of seniority; and staff appreciated having a job assured for the future, 
insofar as the firm survived. Within the firms in the City of London there persisted 
an ordered systems of relationships (Reed, 1975, p. 85), dissociated from 
meritocratic structures, that generated ‘an intimate, family-like working environment, 
knit together by seemingly inalienable ties of mutual trust and loyalty’ (Kynaston, 
2002, p. 141).  
 
The connectivities of the market affected a third an final sphere, extending 
into the public life of the nation. In cementing the legitimacy of their institution and 
their trade (Preda, 2005), the membership of the Stock Exchange erected a 
thoroughly crafted public persona. The Stock Exchange was not merely a space for 
trading bonds and equities; it was not simply a serendipitous marketplace for wealthy 
investors. The Stock Exchange was construed, in a much ore fundamental sense, as 
a national institution that serviced the kingdom and the world through shared codes 
of honour, trust and respectability. For Whyte (1924), there were ‘few firms of 
outside brokers of the highest standing, possessing businesses superior in magnitude 
and status to those of the great majority of Stock Exchange firms’ (p. 43). In effect, 
the very structure of the Stock Exchange’s operations was praised as serving the 
welfare of the nation. Single capacity, along with the presence of an intermediating 
layer of brokerage services, was not rendered in terms of oligopolies and limited 
competition. Rather, these acted  
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as something of a check in the interest of the public unversed in the methods 
of the market. Were an outside buyer or seller to deal irect with a market 
professional, he would be entirely at his mercy, whereas by employing 
another market professional to deal for him he brings i to play the principle 
of diamond cut diamond. It is quite easy to bid on one's own behalf in an 
auction room, but it is usually found more profitable to pay a commission to 
someone who knows the ropes; and the intricacies of auction buying are not 
to be compared with those of transactions in stocks and shares (Duguid, 1913, 
p. 33). 
Intermediation and the connectivities it implied were seen as a necessity, not a 
hindrance.  
 
In the interest of maintaining an orderly and fair market, of allowing the 
‘right’ decisions to be made, the public was enrolled into endorsing the community 
of the Stock Exchange. But, indeed, why should theynot trust the membership, in its 
entirely male composition, to operate the engines of British capitalism? After all,  
members of the Exchange and the numerous clerks who spend their days in 
the market are a fraternity all by themselves. They are essentially of a 
sporting and good-natured temperament, patriotic in sentiment and generous 
in disposition [and whose] record of public service on public bodies rendered 
by members of this group compares favourably with any other class in the 
community (Whyte, 1924, p. 8). 
Through the private spheres of the firms to the fraternal spaces of the floor, the 
image of the Stock Exchange accessible to the public through investment brochures 
and the press presented the institution as none other than the rightful core of the 
market. But this shared public understanding rested not only on the putative networks 
of ‘old wealth’ and the mirage of ‘long traditions of caution and stability’ (Hirst, 
1932, p. 241). As fundamentally, it derived from the perceived constitution of its 
members and the trust onto them bestowed.  
5.2 A spectre in the City 
The connectivities of finance extended well beyond the walls of the Stock Exchange 
and the economic and social relations therein establi hed and reproduced. Indeed, it 
has been long argued that the social networks of broking and jobbing were but small 
manifestations of a larger systemic order intersecting society, polity and economy in 
the British Empire. In recent years, the nature of these networks of capitalist 
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enterprise has been the subject of multi-disciplinary debate, not the least because 
they bear upon what is often perceived as a critical tension in the economic history of 
the United Kingdom, that between the ‘visible’ productive industries and the 
‘invisible’ financial and services sector.  
 
Scholars from history and sociology have sought to trace the intricate 
associations between the financial elites of Britain, the spheres of high government, 
the evolution of politics in the colonial dominions and the development of the 
industrial economy at large. They have procured, in a sense, the ingredients for a 
‘total’ history, seeking to ‘reconstitute the overall form of civilisation, the principle – 
material or spiritual – of society, the significance common to all phenomena, the law 
that accounts for their cohesion’ (Foucault, 2002, p. 10). The law invoked, the 
principle created, was founded upon culture. There is, so argue a number of authors, 
a distinctive and readily identifiable cultural root t  British capitalism, one that is 
inseparable from the history of industry, finance, th  colonial endeavour and eventual 
decline.  
 
The origins of this cultural argument are difficult to elucidate, perhaps owing 
to the conflation of the literature on the British economy with other narratives and 
intellectual strands. By the late nineteenth century, however, commentators were 
visibly keen to highlight an alleged social and cultural uniqueness in the City of 
London, not only in reference to the character of finance as a capitalist activity but 
equally important, when accounting for its embedding materialities. Writing in 1889 
in his survey on international financial centres, George Gibson noted of the London 
Stock Exchange that 
[its] quarters are cramped, and it strikes an American that they ought to tear 
down the entire structure and erect one commensurate with the dignity and 
present requirements of the institution (p. 26). 
The building, as mentioned in chapter 3, was an architectural hodgepodge, built in 
1853 and expanded in following decades as the market g ew in instrument variety 
and membership. Yet, amusingly, Gibson offered his initial explanation of the 
material state of the Stock Exchange by recurring to culture as opposed to the ‘mere’ 
rational-economic institutional constraints of the organisation. An impediment to 
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reconstruction, argued Gibson, was ‘English preference for dinginess and the 
respectability of age, rather than spick-and-span architecture’ (Gibson, 1889, p. 26), 
only then annotated with the difficulties posed by the separation between ownership 
and membership of the Stock Exchange.  
 
An allegedly generalised and homogeneous culture in Britain, however, was 
deemed as extending beyond the seemingly pedestrian politics of building standards. 
Writing in the midst of the Great War, Thorstein Veblen was among the first 
influential social theorists to claim the existence of a social arrangement in Britain 
bonding a class-based culture, the political elite and control over the nation’s capital 
resources. In An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace, Veblen wrote that the 
establishments of the democratic order, as they are now organised and 
administered, do somewhat uniformly and pervasively operate with an 
effectual view to the advantage of a class, so far as may plausibly be done. 
They are controlled by and administered in behalf of th se elements of the 
population that, for the purpose in hand, make up asingle loose-knit class,—
the class that lives by income rather than by work. It may be called the class 
of the business interests, or of capital, or of gentlemen (Veblen, 1917, p. 93).  
Britain, in particular, had been since the nineteenth century a ‘government by 
gentlemen, for gentlemen, and of gentlemen’, providing stability, however positive 
or negative, for the nation and its commercial and political endeavours. In effect, the 
uncertainties of the war in the Continent were potentially revolutionary, argued 
Veblen, as they might have led to ‘a weakening of the hold of the gentlemanly 
classes on the control of affairs and weakening of the hold which the sacred rights of 
property, investment and privilege have long had over the imagination of the British 
people’ (Veblen, 1917). ‘The outcome’, he alleged,  
might, not inconceivably, be the virtual erasure of the Imperial dynasty, 
together with the pedigreed-class rule on which it res s and the apparatus of 
irresponsible coercion through which it works, in the Fatherland and in its 
subsidiaries and dependencies (p. 153). 
 
The dynasty continued, if not in Whitehall and the City of London, in the 
writings of social scientists for decades to come. Bankers, in particular, became a 
frequently dissected group through which scholars attempted to discern the 
mechanics of the purported culture-bound pedigreed-class rule in Britain. Although 
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by no means a flurry, the literature on the subject grew steadily over time and across 
disciplinary boundaries. In 1957, historian S.G. Checkland wrote of Britain’s 
‘financial aristocracy—the investment bankers and issuing houses headed by 
Rothschild and Baring’ (p. 262), as a group for which the ‘assessment of politics and 
power were more important than economic diagnosis […]; to understanding the laws 
governing the general working of the economy [they] made no claim’ (Checkland, 
1957, p. 264, 278). In 1959, bankers and their system  of kinship became indigenous 
to sociology through the analytical gaze of Tom Lupton and Shirley Wilson: in their 
study of the Parker Tribunal1, they revealed the ‘[shared] social origins and 
interconnections [of] the ‘top decision makers’ in British society’ (Lupton & Wilson, 
1959, p. 30). A shared (predominantly public school and Oxbridge-based) education, 
common club membership, and connections of kinship and affinity, argued Lupton 
and Wilson, accounted for the perceived informality and external intractability of the 
Bank of England’s decision-making process. The articulation of this specific 
narrative with broader conceptualisations of the economy continued well into the 
1970s. By 1973, D.C. Coleman had stretched the cultural argument into explanations 
on the relative decline of industrial production in Britain in the late nineteenth 
century. English business culture (the politically dominant form in Britain), argued 
Coleman, was grounded upon the only ‘really important division’ of the country’s 
pre-industrial social structure: between those who ere Gentlemen and those who 
were Players (p. 96). In effect, the decline of industry in Britain occurred, perhaps, 
‘because too many of the revolutionaries [were] too busy becoming gentlemen’ 
(Coleman, 1973, p. 97). Bankers, and by proxy, the ‘establishment’ of the City of 
London, were construed as gentlemen.  
 
The decisive conjuring of Britain’s gentlemanly volksgeist, however, only 
occured in the turbulent 1980s when the literature consolidated around a common 
story. In 1984, sociology once again fed the narrative of an ‘era of dynastic 
ownership and control’ (Lisle-Williams, 1984b, p. 334). A ‘gentlemanly’ ethos, 
reverence for tradition, mutual trust, and observance of unwritten conventions were, 
                                               
1 The Parker Tribunal was set up in 1957 when two non-executive directors of the Bank of England 




among others, the cultural traits of an identifiable group that had sustained the forms 
of ‘uncompetitive’ family capitalism in banking that survived well into the twentieth 
century (Lisle-Williams, 1984b; Lisle-Williams, 1984a). In effect, the stability of the 
City of London and its microcosmic aristocracy was predicated upon more than a 
shared culture. It resided, so contended some authors, on the ‘succession of 
marriages and intermarriages between a group of banking families and landed 
aristocracy’ from which a renewed elite emerged, ading ‘the financial power of the 
City to the prestige of the old aristocracy’ (Cassis, 1985).  The interests of the City 
were thus aligned to the interests of the political elites through blood and money, 
with familiar interests and their embedding culture of gentlemanly ideals exerted 
onto the industrial policies of the nation.  
 
Historiographic reconstitution followed suit, with t e publication of two 
articles that forged a new concept and congealed it into a species of orthodoxy. In 
1986, Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins introduce  ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ as 
a key explanatory anchor for modern British history (Cain et al., 1986a; Cain et al., 
1986b). Understanding the recent (and not so recent) pas  of Britain, they asserted, 
hinged on the recognition that the developments experienced between 1668 and 1914 
were 
bound up with the evolution of several separate but interacting forms of 
capitalist enterprise—agricultural, commercial, and fi ancial, as well as 
industrial. […] [Hence] discarding the assumption that non-industrial forms 
of capitalist wealth were either mere predecessors of the industrial revolution 
and were then subsumed by it, or were subservient by-products of one of its 
subsequent developmental stages (Cain et al., 1986a, p. 503).  
Gentlemanly capitalism, they wrote, originated in ‘the close of the seventeenth 
century [when] the landed magnates had ceased to be a feudal aristocracy and were 
ready to embrace a market philosophy’ (Cain et al., 1986a, p. 504). With the landed 
rentiers followed traditions from a pre-modern order, with an assumed primacy of 
relations based on personal loyalties and family connections; ‘contempt for the 
everyday world of wealth creation and of the profit motive as the chief goal of 
activity; and [..] stress laid on the link between heredity and leadership’ (p. 504). The 
gentlemanly enterprise ‘was strongly personal, and was sustained by a social network 
which, in turn, was held together by the leisure neded to cultivate it’ (p. 509). The 
 
161 
system was, thus, ‘a formidable mix of the venerable and the new’, becoming ‘the 
touchstone by which all other economic activities were judged’ (p. 504-505). 
Ingrained in the culture of gentlemanly capitalism, they continued, the City ‘began 
and remained, an extended network of personal contats b sed on mutual trust and 
concepts of honour which were closer to the culture of the country house circuit or 
the London club than they were to the more impersonal world inhabited by 
industrialists’(Cain et al., 1986a, p. 507). A spectr , so it seemed, lay behind the 
economic fate of industry in the nation, one that emanated from the cultural 
interstices of the networks of kinship of the City, aristocracy and the colonial 
administrators in their imperial dominions.  
 
Although by design the expiration date of gentlemanly capitalism was placed 
at the end of to the two-and-a-half century period between the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688 and the end of the Second World War in 1945, its explanatory presence 
lingered in the air well into the years of the Cold War and beyond. After the Second 
World War, argued its adherents, the ‘gentlemanly capitalists who had once provided 
the framework for Pax Britannica now survived to fight another day under the 
protection of Pax Americana’ (Cain et al., 1986b). The spectre and the system of 
homogeneous relations that it established were summoned into being as late as the 
twenty-first century as a persistent element of the cultural landscape of British 
finance in the years of putative revolution in the City of London. But therein resides 
the appeal of total histories, in their ability to be stretched beyond the limits of a 
single time and space, becoming themselves the touchstones by which all stories are 
judged. Indeed, several commentators were eager to r cur to gentlemanly capitalism 
as the cultural stick-figure on which to pin Britain’s economic malaise. William 
Hutton, an influential and widely cited political an lyst, noted in his 1996 The State 
We’re In that gentlemanly capitalism 
culturally locks in much of the ‘spot-market’, short term behaviour that 
generates low investment […] we can contrast ‘spot-market’ capitalism, with 
its facility to allow buyers and sellers the ever-present chance to break their 
existing commitments and do better in a new market deal […] with 
‘relationship capitalism’, where contractors are tokens of long-term 
relationships. […] Britain has over-emphasised the first at the expense of the 
second – and suffers thereby (Hutton, 1996, p. xix-x ). 
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And in his account of the seemingly disappointing transformation of the City of 
London in 1986, former stockbroker Philip Augar located the failure of British-
owned broking firms in their inability to cope with e environment ushered in by 
Big Bang, in their ‘lack of experience of institutional change’ (Augar, 2000, p. 50). 
The City’s institutions and values, wrote Augar, ‘reflected three pillars of 
conservative England: the public school, the gentleman’s club and the country house’ 
(Augar, 2000, p. 33)(p. 33). This deep-seated cultural regime collided with an 
external system of global capitalism, spearheaded by internationalised investment 
banks with offices in London.  
Management was not used to deal with technology, change or the need to 
work at inter-personal relationships in larger firms. No one in the old City 
was prepared for a world in which the computer replaced the handshake. […] 
The new [British] entrants to the City had a more pomising managerial skill 
set [but] were too handicapped by a value system which put time serving 
above merit and in which sound decisions could be marred by bureaucratic 
procedures (p. 39). 
Gentlemen were unfit for the hectic world of deterri o ialised, dematerialised and 
disintermediated finance.  
 
The tropes of ancient honour, familiar networks, and u professional 
technophobia within banking and finance of late twentieth-century Britain were not 
constrained to commentary. Social scientists willing y embraced the gentlemanly 
story as the description of a tangible sociological British past. The spectre emerged 
once again, but now as an invisible bowler-wearing character sitting in the 
background of the interviews that formed an ambitious project drawing together oral 
histories of change and continuity in the City of Lndon. Published under the title of 
City Lives, the accounts and recollections of some of the former inhabitants of the 
City’s many quarters soon brought to the fore the historical dualities and boundaries 
invoked by Cain and Hopkins ten years earlier. The achievement of London, wrote 
the compilers in their introduction, had demanded  
A radical transformation of [its] financial techniques and culture: a 
transformation from the old slow-moving system based on the mutual trust of 
a gentlemanly British elite, to an incessantly demanding struggle with the 
ruthless instabilities of today’s open global markets (Courtney & Thompson, 
1996, p. xi). 
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Sightings of the elusive gentlemen continued. For human geographers, the 
knowledge-base of the City was structured by the gentlemanly discourse that soaked 
social relations and evaluative frameworks with notions of ‘honour, integrity and 
courtesy, and manifested in ideas of how to act, ways of talk, suitable clothing and so 
on’ (Thrift & Leyshon, 1994, p. 316). In investment banking, so it was argued, the 
discursive gentlemen were emblematic of London’s financial landscape up until the 
mid 1980s, when American-style firms challenged the incumbents and came to set 
the agenda within the market (Hall, 2006; Hall, 2007). With these foreign 
competitors came ‘a new generation of lawyers and bankers […] less tied to the 
quasi-aristocratic ideals and disdain for marketing hat had characterised the 
‘gentlemanly’ stock exchanges and legal practices of an earlier era’ (McDowell, 
1997, p. 3). Anthropologists embraced, too, the legnd of a gentlemanly past. ‘From 
the mid-1980s’, wrote Caitlin Zaloom in her insightful study of an American firm’s 
operations in Britain, ‘London was no longer driven by English commerce and class 
ideals’ (Zaloom, 2006, p. 76). The City of London’s social changes were hence 
rendered as a succession of stereotypes, from the gentlemanly capitalists of a by-
gone era, passing through the uprooted working-class ‘Essex men’ traders of the late 
1980s and 1990s, to the university-trained professionals of today (Zaloom, 2006, p. 
73-92). Sociology continued the tradition, with authors utilising the narrative of a 
gentlemanly past to draw distinctions between capitals of finance in the derivatives 
markets. The gentlemen, so it seemed, became social fa ts, existing in their own 
right, independent of their individual manifestations (Durkheim, 1966).   
5.3 Castles in the air, people in the City 
The allure of gentlemanly capitalism and the system of relations it implies is 
understandable: as the pillar of a total history, the concept provides a generous 
stream of ready-made signposts that enable drawing boundaries between the City of 
London and elsewhere in the world. For economic historians, it divides modes of 
production and capitalist enterprise, internalising apparent inefficiencies into their 
narratives of stasis and change; for human geographe s, it provides the map of a 
place long-gone and the metrics by which its societal past were measured; for 
anthropologists, it stands as the placeholder for indigenous cultures of finance and 
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business in old London; and for sociology, it holds its meaning as the distinctive 
feature of the structures of social life in pre-globalised Britain.  
 
The mobilisation of gentlemanly capitalism within the recent literature on 
finance in Britain falls within a wider tradition of critical rapport between the social 
sciences and economics. Indeed, gentlemanly capitalism is often utilised as a 
convenient vehicle for attaching social flesh onto the perceived skeletal narratives 
offered by the economic model of rational-expectations as the vis viva of market 
action. The proof of the pudding is provided by Linda McDowell in her skilful 
account of the co-construction of gender and work in the investment banking sector 
of post-Big Bang London (McDowell, 1997). In the introductory chapters of Capital 
Culture, McDowell turns to debates within economic sociology in order to account 
for the relations between so-called ‘scripts’, different types of exchange, and 
behaviour within specific institutions (McDowell, 1997, p. 22). In particular, support 
for the causal connection between ‘scripts’ and ‘actions’ is obtained from Zukin & 
DiMaggio (1990), who state that 
Culture sets limits to economic rationality; it proscribes or limits exchange in 
sacred objects and relations […] or between ritually classified groups […] 
[Culture] in form of beliefs and ideologies, taken for granted assumptions, or 
formal rule systems also prescribes strategies of self-interested action […] 
and defines the actors who may legitimately engage in them. Culture provides 
scripts for applying different strategies to different classes of exchange 
(quoted in McDowell, 1997, p. 21) 
In her volume, McDowell used this and comparable arguments to successfully build 
a case for the role of a heteronormative masculine culture (somewhat 
indistinguishable from the ‘common’ variety of gentl manly capitalism presented by 
William Hutton) in the performance of gendered subjectivities in investment 
banking. Similar findings are presented by Zaloom (2006), who showed the gendered 
referents mobilised in the trading rooms of Perkins Silver, an anonymised American 
firm with operations in City of London.  
 
Critiques of the verisimilitude of gentlemanly capitalism are not limited to the 
commonplace observation that markets and society ar, indeed, infinitely more 
complex than previously represented. A number of specific counterarguments exist 
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within historical scholarship, particularly within studies of the British financial sector 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In his review of British Imperialism, 
the two-volume follow-up to Cain and Hopkins’ 1986 articles, historian Geoffrey 
Ingham (1995) criticised the tomes’ ‘particular mode of argumentation which is 
suggestive rather than explanatory – intuitive rather an expository’ (p. 345). There 
was, he continued, an ‘inherent ambiguity of the project’ produced, in part, by the 
multiple ‘rather glib generalisations’ (p. 346) populating the text. In addressing 
claims on the quasi-aristocratic history of merchant banking – a sphere that provided 
most of the sociological support for the thesis of gentlemanly capitalism – Stanley 
Chapman argued that the literature distorted the social diversity of the City of 
London. It did not mention, for instance, the role f foreigners and the business 
ideologies they professed within the British banking system (Chapman, 1986). The 
City of London, ‘was more diverse and complex. It was the final goal for 
entrepreneurs gravitating to the centre of the international financial scene’ 
(Chapman, 1988b). Claims of the survival of family and ‘dynastic’ control were also 
greatly exaggerated, argued Chapman, since the stori s of failure were often swept 
under the rug. And in his analysis of the stereotypes resented in Courtney and 
Thompson’s City Lives (Courtney et al., 1996), Ranald Michie concludes that e 
boundaries of finance in Britain were more permeabl than the thesis of gentlemanly 
capitalism suggests (Michie, 1998).  
 
The oddity of gentlemanly capitalism, however, resid  in its persistence as 
an almost melancholic recollection of a bygone era amongst market practitioners 
from the City of London. References to the ‘old’ style of finance as based on a close-
knit community, an exclusive members-only male club, are plentiful in both public 
and private spheres. Networks of kinship and friendships are often presented as the 
gates that gave previous generations access to the City of London’s inner sanctum. 
Public schools and Oxbridge are commonly deemed the cribs of the financial and 
banking elites. And the apparent contempt for management and professionalised 
expertise is frequently encountered in accounts of he past. Within the stories of the 
Stock Exchange, allegedly one of the strongholds of gentlemanly capitalism, these 
signposts are no less common than in other areas of mythical dynastic activity. A 
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fraternal atmosphere reminiscent of ‘jolly japes at boarding school, the officers’ mess 
or the junior combination room of an Oxbridge college’ (Augar, 2000, p. 35) is 
conjured in the memories of former brokers and jobbers. Donald Cobbett (1986), for 
instance, brought these images to the fore when writing of his experience in the 
1930s on the reactions of the floor’s inhabitants to the arrival of strangers, ‘our name 
for the too curious interloper who occasionally […] gate-crash the privacy of the 
sacred floor’ (p. 28-29): 
An intruder, particularly in those days of strict conformity to the commercial 
style of attire, would often cry out for attention variously by wearing the 
wrong clothes, perhaps smoking a pipe, or merely looking about him in 
bewilderment. The first Houseman to spot the stranger would immediately 
raise the cry ‘Fourteen hundred!’ […] [It] is said picturesquely to date from 
the latter part of the last century when for a long time the membership stuck 
at 1399, and consequently the presence of an outsider made up the round 
number. Nor was the stranger in those days allowed to slip away 
unacknowledged. A jostling crowd would at once form around him, impeding 
the efforts of the waiters, who by that time had arrived on the scene to escort 
the intruder off the premises. All this would  take place to a polite but 
insistent chorus to ‘Sit down!’: a quite impossible endeavour, anyway (p. 29).  
The technologists who built the infrastructures of the equities markets in London 
were also susceptible to the subject positions implied by the gentlemanly order. 
Some considered themselves as ‘largely invisible, background people who did all the 
clever stuff but fundamentally were sort of plebs’ (Buck interview). Others evoked 
the lunches of the Council of the Stock Exchange as relics from a strange past. ‘We 
had the best wine cellar in London’ recalled Peter Bennett, a director of technology 
at the Stock Exchange in the 1980s. ‘We had a butler who’d dispense this wonderful, 
wonderful wine, silver cutlery, the whole thing was silver, it was wonderful, it was a 
great gentleman’s club’ (Bennett interview). And yet others recalled the division of 
labour in the organisation as erected upon ‘a big social divide’ that fell with the 
arrival of the Americans in the mid 1980s (Scannell i terview). It is hence of no 
surprise to find publicists amidst the discursive mines of this mythical historical time, 
calling out the end of the golden ‘City era of pinstriped, cigar-chomping old boy’s 
network’ (JP Morgan, 2006). 
 
The root of this apparent inconsistency, of the survival of gentlemanly 
capitalism in the collective memory of both former and current dwellers of the City 
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of London, requires reinterpreting the term not as a descriptor of culture or the modes 
of societal organisation in Britain. Gentlemanly capit lism, rather, was but one of the 
competing and co-evolving social imaginaries mobilised within the communities of 
British finance. Forwarded by philosopher Charles Taylor (2004), the notion of a 
social imaginary proves useful: it places emphasis on the ‘way ordinary people 
‘imagine’ their social surroundings [through] images, stories, and legends [making 
possible] common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (p. 23). In 
effect, social imaginaries do not determine the manner in which actions are oriented 
or the way sense-making practices are structured. But they do serve as regimes of 
justification, as resources used for constructing legitimate boundaries, identities and 
historical rationalisations (cf. Boltanski & Thevenot, 1999).  
 
But to say that gentlemanly capitalism is a social im ginary does not imply 
that it is insubstantial or inconsequential. Words and metaphors have weight upon 
our lives (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). The shared images and stories that formed the 
ideals of a gentlemanly order were integral to the emergence of traditions and rituals 
of community that stabilised the connectivities of the market.  
 
The London Stock Exchange, again, provides a wealth of illuminating 
examples. Amongst the most telling are those related to the manner in which the 
community of brokers and jobbers represented their institution and its practices 
amongst themselves and to the public. The Stock Exchange Journal, a quarterly 
magazine published by the Stock Exchange between 1955 and 1975, is a particularly 
convenient proxy of these representations and theirunderlying imaginaries. It is no 
coincidence, for instance, that the first issue opened with a foreword by C. F. 
Cobbold, Governor of the Bank of England, arguably the institution that held the 
highest position of status and repute within the City of London at the time (Kynaston, 
2002). In addressing the readership, Cobbold welcomed the move of the Stock 
Exchange to make ‘its doings better known to the general public’ through the newly 
issued journal. ‘Legends die hard’, he wrote 
and there are still people who regard the City as amysterious centre on high 
finance and money-dealing divorced from real life. But these legends are 
dying and the public are increasingly coming to realis  how closely the City 
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is interwoven with everyday commercial and industrial life and what a vital 
part it plays (Cobbold, 1955, p. 3) 
Conveying a sense of ‘real life’ was certainly a comp nent of the Stock Exchange 
Journal, albeit entangled with the images of gentility commonly associated to the 
leisurely life of the old City of London. A section of the journal was devoted to news 
of the associations of members and staff, ranging from the Art and Orchestral 
societies to the Cricket Club and the Football Association. Covering several pages 
towards the end of each issue, these small news item portrayed the Stock Exchange 
as a sporty and cultivated group of individuals, worthy of managing the affairs of a 
national institution. At the antipode of this section, one entitled House Notes offered 
summaries of pragmatic matters for the membership: from the availability of new 
services and notices on construction work in the building, to the death of former 
members and the election of new Councilmen. Between th se two poles the Stock 
Exchange Journal engaged in business, with articles on the workings of overseas 
exchanges operating ‘in vastly different conditions f temperament and custom from 
our own’ (Anonymous, 1955a) to reports on the other House – the Houses of 
Parliament – in relation to governmental decisions that impinged on the economy.  
 
Interspersed throughout its pages, the Journal also included historical articles 
(e.g. on the City of London’s Roman origins or the days of the Coffee Houses on 
Exchange Alley) as well as recollections of the recent past, creating a sense of 
contrast with old styles of idealised (though patently anachronistic) finance. Poetic 
license was particularly useful in these cases. In a whimsical letter to the editors in 
which he described the changing reactions to intruders on the floor, R. H. Herford 
(Herford, 1956) wrote: 
The story is told that in days of old some Members  
were boist’rous and rough 
They guarded the door and the sacred Floor in  
manner decidedly tough. 
The Floor, then as now, was for Members alone and  
if anyone trespassed upon it, 
They’d hustle and bustle him, pull of his jacket, or  
batter him over the bonnet. 
BUT – 
Manners have changed with the passage of years, 




We never now tear his clothes apart, nor hammer him  
over the head. 
But lightly, sprightly, very politely, usher him out  
instead; 
Conduct him to the Gallerie, in manner extremely  
urbane: 
And when at the view of the Floor he gets eager,  
We take him to Pimms or perhaps to Bodega,  
And after a Haig, a Domecq or a Seager, 
We’ll press him to come back again! 
YES –  
Manners and methods and customs and usages  
change with the passing days – 
We nowadays act with the greatest of tact, 
 for we’ve proved that politeness pays!! 
 
The simultaneous construction of imaginaries of past and present was a 
constant throughout the life of the Journal – and arguably, of the community of the 
London Stock Exchange. Managing the borders between the old and the new, 
however, did not entail reviving the past in the prsent. Rather, it involved inventing 
traditions through which the community of the Stock Exchange established the 
membership of groups and the boundaries of the market, legitimated institutions and 
relations of authority, inculcated beliefs and conve tions of behaviour (Hobsbawm, 
2008; for an account of the invention of spatial trditions in the City, see Pryke, 
1991). These traditions constituted both the rituals of community and the face of the 
organisation to outsiders. They were the routines of the family, of the brokers and 
jobbers, clerks and staff, ‘who miss[ed] the same iaginary place’ (Bissell, 2008). 
 
One such invented tradition was the visitors’ gallery, a public space created 
within the otherwise private realm of the Stock Exchange. Built during the 
chairmanship of Sir John Braithwaite in 1953, the visitors’ gallery was deemed ‘the 
most striking’ innovation in the Stock Exchange’s public relations policies since 
1945 (Anonymous, 1958). Innovation in space, however, required subsequent 
innovations in labour. Initially, the gallery was unmanaged: for 6 pence, visitors 
would obtain a leaflet explaining the operation of the Stock Exchange and gain a 
glance of the trading floor. In due course, female guides were hired to tend to the 
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visitors in the gallery. As mentioned by the editor of the Stock Exchange Journal in 
1958,  
the appointment of three young women to act as guides to the Exchange is 
quite a revolutionary move, and one which may well induce many older 
Members feelings similar to those which their fathers, in their own age, had 
when ‘lady typewriters’ were first employed in offices. From the Public 
Relations viewpoint the innovation seems a good one, a d we look forward to 
hearing of its success. (Anonymous, 1958, p. 36). 
The guides and their gallery soon became a fixture. By 1960, their photographs were 
included in the Stock Exchange Journal s a means for displaying their carefully 
selected uniforms. In the winter of 1960, ‘the choie [was] for a clean-cut suit, its 
lines straight and simple, in warm cherry red frieze cloth and a half collar of black 
velvet’ (Anonymous, 1960a). Generally positioned in the initial pages of the Stock 
Exchange Journal, the photographs were a reminder that, however pleasurable, the 
gallery was business above all. As the Chairman of the Public Relations Committee 
wrote in 1962, 
There can be no doubt how greatly these attractive and intelligent girls have 
helped in welcoming our guests and creating a favourable image of the Stock 
Exchange and its activities. Even though matrimony has proved a major 
occupational risk, we have not lacked for replacements, and it is one of the 
consolations attaching to the office of Chairman of the P.R. Committee that 
he is a member of a small panel which interviews and selects candidates to 
fill the vacancies. (Althaus, 1962, p. 3). 
But, as the Stock Exchange moved away from its material past with the construction 
of a new building, the guides were traditionalised. The visitors’ gallery likewise 
became a space for reconstructed history, for a cert in archaeology of yesterday. 
During the 1962 Festival of the City of London, thefloor was open to the public and 
the gallery became an impromptu space of spectacle and exhibition. Recalling the 
event, the Stock Exchange Journal noted the crowds showing  
great interest […]on the display of the Council’s silver and the exhibition by 
the Exchange Telegraph of their Tape Machines past and present 
(Anonymous, 1962).  
Crafting these imagined pasts was indeed a constitutive ritual of the new tradition of 
the gallery and its guides. Entering the 1970s, and with the contents of the Journal 
shifting towards the more mundane luxuries and fetish s of modernity (swimming 
pools were once featured in the Journal), the images of guides and their uniform 
joined the obituaries, anniversary, club and society announcements. They joined, in a 
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sense, the legends of an Edwardian era of sportsmanship, familiarity and honour. 
While finance on the Stock Exchange moved towards the global, the position of the 
guides and their practices of representing a grand old past were made tangibly local.  
 
The legends of finance and their associated traditions constituted more than 
the public personhood of the London Stock Exchange; they mediated more than the 
visitors’ gallery and the leisurely clubs of the mebership and staff. Fundamentally, 
these legends were referents for the brokers, jobbers, clerks and staff who 
intermediated – directly or indirectly – the market. In bringing to mind a world of 
socio-economic gentility, of a grand old organisation, they colluded with practices on 
the floor and offices as much as with the relational networks of finance. They 
crafted, in a sense, specific market personas, a repertoire of stereotypes for the 
intermediaries of the City of London. Brokers and jobbers were not incidental 
middlemen in the long chains of financial transactions; but neither were they the 
natural inheritors of ancient financial blood. Interm diaries were, above all, providers 
of a service, embodying hubs of information for investors and companies, 
gatekeepers to the apparently opaque ebbs and flows of the market floor. Their 
personas were thus adaptive: as the landscape of British society changed, their 
behaviours and justifications followed suit, casting the legends of the past into new 
moulds for the future. And soon enough a distinctive mould emerged in the multitude 
with the rise of the computer as a central tool of the trade.  
5.4 Genteel info-mediation  
Seen as a cultural trait, gentlemanly capitalism is thu  unable to explain the changing 
patterns of behaviour in British finance. Specifically, it fails to offer a convincing 
account of the progressive computerisation of British banking and finance from circa 
1960s onwards (e.g. Batiz-Lazo & Wardley, 2007).  
 
What, then, were the causes and effects of the adoption of information and 
communication technologies in the City? As several authors have argued elsewhere, 
information and communication technologies offered British financial intermediaries 
a tool for competition: in a system of fixed commissions, computer-based research 
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was an added-value service for current and prospective clients. Additionally, and as 
explored below, these novel technologies allowed reconstituting the role of the 
intermediary around the concept of market information. The intermediary, in a sense, 
was a craftsperson, mining, tailoring, fixing and offering information on the market. 
This, however, did not imply the end of social connectivities. On the contrary, 
information in the City of London was communicated hrough interpersonal means, 
through the social networks that structured British f nance.  
 
In the late 1940s, the connectivities of finance faced an environment quite 
different to the one prevailing at the turn of the century. The instabilities experienced 
between 1914 and 1945 resulted in a profound transformation of the British 
economy. In the realm of finance, restrictive exchange controls implied that the City 
of London was no longer lender to the world. Merchant banks effectively moved 
‘away from acceptances and foreign loans towards inustrial finance and investment 
management’ (Lisle-Williams, 1984a, p. 260). Death duties and heavy taxation levels 
on higher incomes translated into a decline of private investors; as Michael Reed 
noted, after the war ‘there were fewer private individuals with the means to invest 
heavily through the Stock Exchange’  (Reed, 1975, p. 90). Institutional investors – 
including unit trusts, insurance and pension funds – were now increasingly dominant 
in the market (McRae & Cairncross, 1973). The character of investments also 
shifted, ‘with a greater proportion of [funds] being held in equities rather than 
debentures, preference shares, and Government securities’ (Reed, 1975, p. 90). 
 
This changed economic landscape had tangible effects on he organisation 
and operation of the securities industry in the City of London. The economic 
vicissitudes experienced in the aftermath of the Second World War made evident the 
strengths and weaknesses of both broking and jobbing firms. In the case of jobbers, 
the main issue was the undercapitalisation of firms vis-à-vis the requirements of 
institutional investors. As David Steen, a former jobber with Denny Brothers 
recalled, ‘the institutions were dealing in larger sizes and wanted bigger markets, and 
there wasn’t the capital there to handle it.’  
To take a simple situation, if you had a share with a reasonable turnover and 
the normal size of the market might be in 25,000 or 50,000 shares and some 
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[institutions wanted] a price in a quarter of a million [shares], if you had 
plenty of capital you could happily take the risk […]. The point is that one 
risk tended to offset another, so if you got a lot of capital you can trade in 
very large size and your actual overall net risk in relation to your resources is 
no greater than it would be if you’re a small firm where you’d normally made 
a price in 10,000, and hedge positions on that sort of basis. […] The thing 
about jobbing is really setting one risk as it were against another. […] If your 
jobbing firms have small capital then they’d be very unwise to trade beyond 
their means; but if the brokers want a bigger market th n clearly the jobbers 
need more capital. And that was where the problem really arose (Steen 
interview).  
Larger capital requirements provided an incentive for jobbers to incorporate (thus 
eliminating personal liability and reducing personal risk) and amalgamate (thus 
expanding the funds available to them). And so, from the heyday of the City of 
London in the early twentieth century to the turbulent 1980s, the number of jobbing 
firms reduced dramatically: by 1983, it is estimated that six jobbing firms alone 
accounted for 80% of the business conducted in the S ock Exchange (Augar, 2000; 
McRae et al., 1973).  
 
For brokers, the difficulties were similar. Writing in his detailed introduction 
to the profession, Dundas Hamilton recalled that while stockbroking had once been 
‘largely a matter of having the right connections ad using a certain amount of 
common sense […] today a far more scientific approach is made to investment’ 
(Hamilton, 1968, p. 8). Given their direct dependency on commissions and the 
overall levels of market activity, brokers were particularly susceptible to fluctuations 
in the economy: as the markets contracted, brokers m ged as a means of 
consolidating their client base and expertise and reducing the costs of clerical and 
research operations. The scars of economic crisis were visible amongst brokers: the 
number of firms almost halved from 294 in 1962 to 168 in 1973.  
 
This reorganisation of the securities industry was rooted on wider perceptions 
of finance. For many, the Stock Exchange was as an an chronistic and conservative 
institution, ‘politically out of favour and rather beleaguered and not looked on as a 
place of much excitement’ (George Nissen, quoted in Courtney et al., 1996). 
Enveloped by such image, brokers and jobbers faced important obstacles when 
recruiting new talents who could adapt to the rapidly changing economic 
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environment. Particularly grave was the lack of expertise in areas germane to the 
requirements of institutional investors. Due to their r latively superior levels of 
sophistication, tending for institutional investors needed ‘serious studies of the 
economic background, both at home and abroad’ and for the ‘evolution of new 
statistical measures of performance for the long-term appraisal of intrinsic value of 
investments in particular undertakings’ (Menzler, 1958, p. 8). Unfortunately, people 
with such kind of expertise were diverted elsewhere early in their careers. Writing in 
1958 in the Stock Exchange Journal, F.A.A. Menzler noted in a worrisome tone that 
those  
whose job it is to guide young people to occupations suited to their talents do 
not always place the Stock Exchange very high in the list of desirable 
employments.  This is especially the case for those abl  young people who 
have to make their way solely by their own efforts. The absence of formal 
standards of education and training must lend colour to the idea of the old 
Stock Exchange as a select club rather than a professi n, like other 
professions, success in which is dependent inter alia upon the attainment of 
high professional standards (Menzler, 1958). 
Coping with the prevailing view of finance as a lacklustre activity, some member 
firms adopted strategies that echoed practices fromthe legendary ‘dynastic’ past. 
Brokers, for instance, relied heavily on their immediate social networks (Michie, 
1998), recruiting ‘rich young men and selling them partnerships. When brokers lived 
off personal clients, rich young men with wealthy contacts were also useful for the 
new business they could attract’ (McRae et al., 1973, p. 116). Similarly, jobbers 
forged alliances with merchant banks in order to secur  preferential rates on loans 
and to facilitate issuing new shares (McRae et al., 1973).  
 
Indeed, the years following the Second World War wee dominated by a 
conservative withdrawal, accompanied by a growing atip thy towards outsiders. 
They formed, in a sense, a period during which the imaginaries of gentlemanly 
capitalism were reinvented in response to a loss of public confidence in finance and 
the City of London. Those entering the City and its institutions at the time were 
instructed into the newly minted traditions, adopting as their own the redefined 
boundaries between insiders and outsiders. As historian Ranald Michie noted, 
perceptions of the financial past as a period of social invariance and dynastic control 
were encountered more frequently amongst those whose careers begun in the 1940s 
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and 1950s, that is, among those whose first experience in finance was framed by the 
reconstruction of the Stock Exchange as a ‘noble’ natio al institution (Michie, 1998). 
Such generational shifts were not minor, proving significant in years to come as 
illustrated by Alan Jenkins’s observation on the admission of women to the Stock 
Exchange: it is perhaps not incidental that as late as 1971 the vote against including 
women members was led, so it was said, by younger members of the Stock Exchange 
(Jenkins, 1973, p. 186).  
 
Despite the rituals and discursive formations that bolstered the imaginaries of 
gentlemanly capitalism, financial practices in the City of London were not immune 
to the demands of the day. But brokers and jobbers did not change merely as a 
passive reaction to wider macroeconomic changes. Beneath the conservative veneer 
of the City of London, behind the marble pillars and beyond the wooden floor of the 
Stock Exchange, brokers and jobbers were gearing up for a new economic landscape, 
with much of the redirection in practices revolving around the provision of services. 
However, in the new system, services were no longer conceived in terms of ad hoc 
interpersonal connectivities or networks of wealth. Rather, they were perceived as 
relying on increasingly professionalised expertise. They were seen as inseparable 
from the control and manipulation of market information. 
5.5 Informatic revolutions 
The re-intermediation of finance in London around new methods of management and 
professionalised technical expertise reached public vis bility in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. This derived, in part, from a newfound abundance of economic and 
industrial data. Having survived a decade of adjustments after the Second World 
War, brokers and jobbers were now awash with market figures, from company 
reports to ever-expanding tables of share prices, earnings and dividends. The origins 
of such torrents, however, traced back several decades nd hinged as much on direct 
factors (i.e. the rise of institutional investment, developments in telecommunication 
technologies, and the consolidation of data providers such as Exchange Telegraph 
and Reuters) as on wider changes in the public conceptualisation of markets – from 
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the 1940s onwards, markets quickly grew to be considered indistinguishable from 
large-scale informatic processing and dissemination machines.  
 
Evidence of a transformation in the public discourse on financial markets 
exists in the form of governmental debates on the role of the Stock Exchange during 
the war, where the influence of prominent economic theorists in the construction of 
this new paradigmatic interpretation of economic life is clear. As a particularly 
telling illustration, a memorandum presented by John Maynard Keynes in June 1940 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Consultative Council – an advisory body to the 
Treasury on matters of economic policy – forwarded an informatic perspective of 
markets as a matter of national security. From the perspective of Keynes, the Stock 
Exchange and its price formation system could be rendered as sources of signals that 
might potentially reveal vital strategic information to the enemy. Wrote Lord 
Keynes:  
[It] is difficult to see how the Stock Exchange market in equities could 
continue to function in the event of significant war d mage. For details of 
War Damage are not to be published, so that those in the neighbourhood will 
be in the possession of information which shareholders and the market 
generally will not have. Indeed, it might be held that even the publication of 
Stock Exchange quotations might furnish useful information to the enemy. 
For if a particular aeroplane factory, or power station or a plant of Imperial 
Chemicals is heavily damaged, this will become apparent in the fall of the 
affected shares […] There may, therefore, be no way out except to suspend 
dealings in Home industrial Equities if and when the campaign from the air 
take on a really serious aspect (JMK/W/5/5). 
Other voices within economics mirrored this metaphor of markets as communication 
channels; as mechanisms for generating, transmitting and processing signals; as 
informatic entities. Friedrich von Hayek is an appropriate exemplar of this 
perspective, owing to his conceptualisation of market indices as entities ‘in which all 
relevant information is concentrated’ (Hayek, 1948). For Hayek, the price system 
played a central role in coordinating actions within the marketplace, functioning as 
[…] a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of 
telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch merely the 
movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few 
dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may never 
know more than is reflected in the price movement (Hayek, 1948). 
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Indeed, references to information as a fundamental aspect of market (and, for some 
authors, broader societal) phenomena surfaced frequently in post-war economic 
literature (e.g. Grossman, 1981; Fama, 1970; Arrow, 1959). As the historian of 
economic thought Philip Mirowski argued, this constitutes an emblematic pattern of 
‘orthodox’ contemporary economic literature, with authors steadily representing 
markets in cybernetic parlance, as entities based on inf rmation communication and 
computational processing (Mirowski, 2002).  
 
Rendering markets as informatic machines, however, was not limited to 
academic realms. It would be naïve to think that such a fundamental change in 
meaning was constrained to the (highly porous) ivory t wers of economics 
departments and the apparently inaccessible halls of government. In Britain, in 
particular, the rise of this perspective and the consolidation of market information as 
the putative blood of finance was the product of a confluence of changes in 
regulation, accounting traditions, public perceptions, broking and jobbing practices 
and the preferences of investors at large. With this transformation, the Stock 
Exchange and its floor became the central nodes of a national (and eventually, 
global) information network, operating as conduits for legitimate, veridical, 
instantaneous, and egalitarian data.  
 
Such was the underlying lesson of Daniel Cobbett’s comment in the Stock 
Exchange Journal of 1961. ‘Utmost care should be exercised that company 
information is released simultaneously in all quarters’ he wrote, ‘and that there is no 
long time-lag between decisions in the boardroom and elsewhere and their general 
dissemination’ (Cobbett, 1961, p. 11). Echoing von Hayek’s metaphor of the price 
system as a signalling mechanism, Cobbett continued: 
In the case of a free market such as the Stock Exchange, reflective of a world-
wide clientele with all its conflicting ideas and opinions, hopes and fears, 
discussion and rumour are necessarily inseparable from the other more 
factual influences which, at the end of each day’s trading, the final price 
changes emerge. […] Since company information once inadvertently let slip 
ahead of time will inevitably be taken advantage of, still greater security 
should be enforced at its source—that is, actually in the boardroom. This 
means speed in transmission from the inner sanctum, and the elimination of 
successive hands in the process (Cobbett, 1961).  
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As information acquired a greater role in the public discourse on markets, and as 
demand for industrial data from sophisticated investors increased, the personhood of 
brokers and jobbers was recast in the language of information processing. Their 
public respectability – once supported by pillars of re-invented gentlemanly ideals – 
was given an informatic dimension.  
 
The events leading to the information-centred practices and personhoods of 
the City of London of the late 1950s and early 1960s transcended the immediate area 
of influence of brokers and jobbers. Importantly, a transformed relationship between 
shareholders and the boards of companies nurtured the increased production, 
dissemination and use of market information: fuelled by debates on corporate 
disclosure and investor protection dating to the 1920s, the Companies Act 1947 
(consolidated in the form of the Companies Act 1948) imposed for the first time in 
British regulatory history information requirements on limited companies. As 
explored by Josephine Maltby (2000), through the int rvention and support of 
‘modernising’ organisations that sought to develop better provisions for investors 
and shareholders – organisations such as the Committee for General Purposes of the 
London Stock Exchange, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, and The Economist – regulation introduced professionalised accountancy to 
everyday finance. The objectivising judgement, mechanised practices and complex 
trust-based politics of accounting had reached the securities industry (Porter, 1995). 
 
The task of facilitating the dissemination of data to investors, brokers and 
jobbers quickly was internalised by the authorities of the Stock Exchange. Writing in 
the Stock Exchange Journal in 1957 on public relations in private industry, Gordon 
Cummings contrasted present standards with the austre annual reports required by 
previous versions of the Companies Act. ‘Examination of the average annual report’, 
he wrote, ‘took no more than a few minutes, and by its omissions, often left more 
doubt than enlightenment in the minds of its readers’ (Cummings, 1957, p. 48). 
Change, argued Cummings, came about through a number of ‘outstanding factors’. 
The 1948 Companies Act, ‘which laid down the minimum, and quite extensive, 
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information to be given in annual accounts’ (Cummings, 1957), was but one such 
factor. Others included  
[the] steady widening spread in the ownership of public companies, backed 
by growing investment by insurance companies, pension funds and other 
institutional investors […] Replacement of ‘family’ direction by professional 
management as the appreciation that stockholders, as proprietors of the 
company, are entitled to be given the fullest information about the progress 
and activities of their business […] Press and other criticisms aimed at 
bringing about a better informed stockholder-ship [And finally, a campaign 
by the Stock Exchange] for more informative company reports and, of equal 
importance, the issue of interim statements (Cummings, 1957) 
The imagined future embedded markets and reporting in a steady flow of 
information, of interim statements and quarterly reports. ‘The day may not be too far 
away’, concluded Cummings (1957), ‘when boards of directors who do not issue 
interim reports will be in such a minority that they will stand out in their isolation—
and risk the criticisms attendant on their lack of action’ (p. 49). 
 
The perspective of industry complemented the Stock Exchange’s drive 
towards ‘better informed’ shareholders. The directive bodies of some companies 
were not only aware of the role of accurate and timely information but, indeed, 
actively promoted disclosure and shareholder engagement. Sir Leon Bagrit, then the 
head of Elliott Automation, illustrated this point  his 1962 contribution to the Stock 
Exchange Journal, where he recalled the responsibility of industry towards ‘the 
Stock Exchange, and through it, the investing public’. 
Obviously the investor looks for a satisfactory and increasing return on his 
investment in the first place; but, in addition, to enable him to make the 
necessary judgements it is essential that, as far as possible, he should have 
adequate information […] Our attitude […] is based on the assumption that 
Stock Exchange firms, as well as banks and other financial institutions, owe 
the public a duty to study, on behalf of the large mass of investors, the 
information so made available [by companies] and to isseminate it to the 
investing public at large (Bagrit, 1962, p. 12). 
With the rise of the cult of the equity in the late 1940s2, investors and their broking 
agents ‘required much greater research effort […] long-established personal 
connections were insufficient to guarantee business, and, more and more, 
                                               
2 Whereby investors switched from lower yielding government securities to industrial equities due to 
high levels of inflation. 
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stockbrokers had to go out to seek business, and to retain it by offering a high level 
of service in a competitive environment’ (Reed, 1975, p. 91). The quality of 
information was thus of prime import: deficient data could hamper research efforts 
within broking and jobbing firms, potentially resulting in faulty advice to investors. 
The mutual responsibilities of companies and financi l services providers were clear, 
particularly for industrialists such as Bagrit: 
the future value of the Stock Exchange as the mobiliser of funds for the 
nation’s industrial development depends upon greate acceptance by 
companies of a responsibility to provide detailed information about 
themselves, and by financial institutions to make ev ry effort to absorb the 
information offered to them and to use it fully—a task, the complexity of 
which in a world of fast moving technological change cannot be overrated 
(Bagrit, 1962).  
5.6 Conduits and flows 
The reconstituted personhoods that developed around market information were not 
merely a corollary of the apparently objective forms of accountancy that 
accompanied novel accounting practices and regulations on corporate disclosure. 
Similarly, they were not entirely determined by thegrowing availability of 
telecommunication technologies and the increasing scope of the services offered by 
data providers such as Reuters and Exchange Telegraph. The proliferation of 
computers systems, telecommunication networks, and standardised modes of 
information disclosure were not, in a sense, living proof of the triumph of mechanical 
objectivity – the thought that, as Theodor Porter (1995, p. 3-5) indicates, objectivity 
can be attained through personal restraint, by carefully abiding to rules and making 
sure that it is impossible for personal biases to affect the outcome of a process or, in 
this case, the quality of market information. Indee, although ‘the days of the third-
hand ‘tip’, offered over a glass of sherry’ were ‘happily a long past’ (Daniel Cobbett, 
quoted in Kynaston, 1991), structures reminiscent of the ad hoc networks and 
hierarchical connectivies that characterised an earlier incarnation of finance in the 
Stock Exchange continued to play a critical role in British finance. The character of 
these connectivities, however, was quite different. Now more than ever in the past, 
they were active instruments for creating information, probes that allowed 
intermediaries to gauge their wider industrial and economic surroundings and with it 
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to assemble data for distribution to investors. TheCity, in a sense, had become a 
factory of information as much as a centre for exchange.  
 
At the time, information existed through a multiplicity of meanings and 
manifestations. The most prominent expression of mechanical objectivity was market 
information conceived as the product of impersonal a d techn(olog)ically mediated 
labour. In discourse, this perspective was quite similar to the formalised propositions 
of information theory, one of the prominent engineering paradigms of the Second 
World War. For this theory, information was contained in symbolic messages, 
rendering its semantic (and therefore interpretation l) aspects technically irrelevant. 
Messages and their meaning, after all, were standardised in language and routine 
usage, reducing analysis and system design to the optimisation of the communication 
channel (Shannon, 1948). Such definition of information as an entity ‘contained’ in 
messages percolated, in effect, the linguistic metaphors of numerous spheres (Lakoff 
et al., 2003). It was symptomatic, for instance, of the literature on economics and 
accountancy of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when firms, markets and financial 
statements came to be understood as the sources of stochastic signals amenable to an 
information-theoretic analysis. In the American accountancy tradition, a relevant 
example is found in the work of Lucy Lee and Norton Bedford (Lee & Bedford, 
1969), who identified accounting as an unambiguous cla sificatory mechanism that 
produced a communication channel for the state of the ‘financial life’ of firms. In 
economics, the work of Henri Theil is particularly evealing, not the least because of 
his application of information theory to financial markets (as exemplified by Theil & 
Leenders, 1965). Views of a similar vein were expressed in the UK by several authors 
– most of which held some connection to the burgeoning area of operational 
research, another cybernetic offspring of the Second World War. In the British case, 
however, discussions were often framed in terms of a lack of sufficient information 
and the methodologies for its quantification. As the prominent British statistician 
Maurice Kendall mentioned in the 1960 Stamp Memorial Lecture 
There remains, [for economic analysis] one type of pr blem in the realm of 
data organisation on which a major assault is still necessary. It concerns the 
setting up of systems of measurement for quantities which cannot be recorded 
on a measuring rod or a dial […] Unfortunately a great many of the standard 
terms of economics are of this kind (Kendall, 1960, p. 9).  
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Indeed, if the financial machine was to work efficiently, if statistics were to 
contribute as oil for the gears of the economy, a precise informatic accounting of 
economic life was necessary.  
 
Within the City of London, however, the dominant definition of information 
attenuated standardisation and mechanical objectivity with trust and interpersonal 
knowledge. This interpretation was particularly visible in investment analysis circles 
that, by the early 1960s, were advocating ‘a greate rel ase of information, together 
with standardisation of publication’ (Mosley, 1962). The investment analyst, so it 
was said, judged securities not only on the basis of published accounts but also by 
‘absorbing a climate of opinion from the flow of articles in the financial press’ 
(Morrell, 1962, p. 32). The negotiation of a definition that combined both 
standardisation and individual competencies is exemplified in a seminal article by D. 
Weaver and B.G. Fowler of the stockbroking firm Phillips & Drew on The 
Assessment of Industrial Ordinary Shares. Presenting a five-year dividend forecast 
model, Weaver and Fowler wrote that the  
greater part of the [investment analyst’s] work consists of a close examination 
of the company’s accounts and the chairman’s speeches for a number of 
years, the usual practice amongst investment analysts being to study the 
accounts since 1948, i.e. since the Companies Act, 1948, enforced the 
publication of consolidated accounts (Weaver & Fowler, 1960, p. 247) 
And although for them the ultimate objective of investment analysis was to ‘establish 
a method for reviewing all the factors bearing on the appraisal of an individual share 
so that an objective value can be reached’, Weaver nd Fowler were careful not to  
stress unduly the objective nature of the methods – the investment in equities 
is and must remain essentially subjective – and it will have been noticed that 
the subjective element is much in evidence at many stages in the analysis. 
The reactions to Weaver and Fowler’s paper were equally telling. In the ensuing 
discussion at the Institute of Actuaries, G.H.R Goobey noted that 
the more he read papers such as the one under discussion, the more he was 
convinced that the measurement of the quality of management played a most 
important part in the assessment of industrial ordinary shares. The trouble 
was the difficulty of measuring the management. […]He was convinced that 
nothing could replace personal knowledge of the management and judgment 
of their capacities or, if that was not possible, enquiry could be made of 




Information, regardless of its form, was invariably evaluated through interpersonal 
knowledge of the stock market and its participants. What existed in the City of 
London was a qualified form of mechanical objectivity.  
 
It is in the above sense that the social connectivities of the City of London 
were reconstituted as active instruments for creating market information. For 
instance, at Cazenove & Co., a prestigious firm engaged primarily in corporate 
broking, detailed research into companies was builtupon personal experience. As 
Patrick Mitford-Slade, a former partner at Cazenove’s, r called in interview, 
we knew the companies well. And we knew them from two angles. We knew 
them from the corporate finance side. One person would go to talk to the 
senior directors and the chairman about possible transactions they might wish 
to [make]. And another person from the research side would go in and talk to 
the treasurer or somebody on the factory floor and sort of get the feel of what 
the business was actually doing (Mitford-Slade interview). 
The disclosure regulations of the Companies Act 1948 and its subsequent reforms 
were insufficient for the practices of brokers and jobbers as well as the changing 
preferences of investors. The mechanisms for evaluating companies continued to rely 
greatly on the identities of evaluators and hence on their ability to inspire trust, on 
their ability to create and maintain networks of sociality.  
 
The interpersonal character of information was present even in firms 
equipped with sophisticated research and statistical departments. Such was the case 
of the Scottish stockbrokers Wood Mackenzie, which were among the handful of 
British pioneers in the provision of computerised analytical financial services (Eadie 
interview). Scott Dobbie, who joined the firm in 1970, recalled that  
a lot of the work we did would be trying to get attribution analysis by 
different segments of the company, the product and the geography. That 
wasn’t published as automatically as now. We would spend months working 
through subsidiary accounts trying to build up a picture of where the business 
earned its money, create your internal model of the earnings so you could 
apply changes to changes in mix, and we did all that from the outside. But 
[we] would then go and see the company and have these discussions with 
them, bounce things off them. […] They wouldn’t tell you the […] facts, but 
you would get much more help from them. The good analysts got much more 
help than the bad analysts. Now it’s all got to be the same (Dobbie interview).  
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Cultivating relationships was therefore a definitional issue of the personhoods of 
brokers and analysts; their value was gauged not only in terms of technical abilities 
or immediate familiar connectivities, but also in relation to their capacity to establish 
informatic connections with people in industry and the market.  
 
The continued role of social relationships was institutionalised in the 
bureaucratic organisation of firms. Dobbie recalled introducing ‘focal points’ 
(corresponding to an account director) to treat clients as ‘proper’ clients. 
Each client had a focal point in the firm, and he worried about the client, and 
he was responsible for the relationship. He got to know the client, and the 
same with the company. You’d got to know the company. I’d get to know 
their finance, certainly their finance director, if not the Chairman, of all the 
big companies we saw. I’d make sure I bloody well got to know them. We’d 
go around twice a year and see the finance director, then the ordinance 
director. […] We’d make a point of going and see thcompany there, we 
knew the chairman in first name terms, and so on. […] We actively worked 
on that. We’d have dinners with the chairman coming in to meet institutions. 
They hadn’t done that before. These were all things we did. And that was all 
[1970s though] its commonplace now.  
Similarly, in the institutional trading department of Phillips & Drew,  
Each man has an allocation of a small group of clients whom he claims to 
know personally. In the main it is telephone work, but frequent face-to-face 
contact is encouraged. [Brokers in this department s rve their clients] by 
continually putting forward investment propositions i  which we have 
confidence and which the client is likely to accept (Phillips & Drew, 1968) 
The social arrangements of the City of London gravitated around networks of known 
individuals. Yet these networks were not dynastic structures built on wealth and 
blood; they were informatic webs which – efficient or not – allowed for 
communication and the creation of knowledge across different spheres.  
5.7 Trust and silicon 
The introduction of computers to the securities industry of the City of London was 
therefore less revolutionary than what the mythology f the information society 
suggests (notably, Castells, 2000a; Cortada, 2005b). Importantly, computers did not 
lead to a fundamental transformation in the intermediating relations of banking and 
finance but were rather absorbed into the existing system of interpersonal 
connectivities and local expertise. As Roger Nightingale, Director of Economics and 
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Strategy for Hoare Govett Ltd, wrote with the benefit of hindsight in 1985, 
‘computers and advanced forms of communication were employed enthusiastically 
[…], but these new technologies left fundamental City relationships unchanged’ 
(Nightingale, 1985, p. 60). 
 
Data ordering and processing technologies in the form of tabulators and 
punched-card equipments entered stockbroking and jobbing firms as they did other 
areas of financial services: through the back office, as instruments designed to 
increase the efficiency and decrease the costs of clerical work. In the London Stock 
Exchange, for instance, such introduction occurred in the Settlement Room, where 
punched-card equipment was acquired during the late 1940s as an aid to the labour-
intensive activity of matching bargains (for a discu sion on this, see chapter 3). In 
1948, the Institute of Actuaries, which was closely r lated to the life assurance 
community, discussed these technologies as helpful in recordkeeping and at 
simplifying ‘the work of a life office valuation’ (Coe, Hedley, & Longley-Cook, 
1948, p. 260). Similarly, as early as 1945, building societies were using mechanical 
tabulators for individual account control (Batiz-Lazo et al., 2007).  
 
Stockbrokers followed similar lines. When digital computers became 
commercially available in the early 1960s, their use in broking firms was initially 
restricted to ‘investment administration and bookkeeping, or else comprised the 
production of lists of securities and current prices in sectors of the market where 
fairly simple analysis based on current prices would be useful’ (Grant, 1983, p. 84). 
Computers, in a sense, inhabited primarily the General Office departments, from 
Contract and Settlement, to Registration and Dividends (Hamilton, 1968). 
Contemporary discussions on the uses of electronic computers clearly reflected this 
position. In 1955, for instance, readers of the Stock Exchange Journal were advised 
on the potential of computing for their firms. As a review of The Scope for 
Electronic Computors in the Office [sic] published by the Office Management 
Association mentioned, ‘with £25,000 to spare, you can replace your clerks by an 
electronic engineer. ‘Automation’ is thought of as a thing of the future. From this 




Some firms, however, saw computers as an investment with relevance for 
other departments, including research and statistical offices that were becoming 
increasingly valuable for inter-firm competition. The developments at Phillips & 
Drew illustrate this co-evolution of value-added services and digital computing. As 
William Reader and David Kynaston noted in their history of the firm, Phillips & 
Drew was an early adopter of information technologies, having hired computer time 
as early as 1958 for calculating yields (Reader et al., 1998). Indeed, when 
International Business Machines launched their 1440 series in 1962, they caught the 
attention of Phillips & Drew. In an internal memo, senior partner Henry Cottrell 
presented the IBM  system as ‘specially designed for stockbrokers’ (Reader et al., 
1998, p. 136). The system, so argued Cottrell, could be used in established 
applications (preparing and printing, for instance, contract notes) but could easily be 
expanded to portfolio valuations, commission analysis and gilt price ratio statistics. 
As IBM  explained in their formal pitch to Phillips & Drew, the 1440 system was not 
only the ‘most efficient accounting system on the market [representing] cost savings 
which will increase with an expansion of [their] activities’. The system would also be 
a source of mechanised internal auditing, enabling the firm ‘to obtain detailed 
analyses of the sources of [their] income, and their relative profitability’ as well as to 
exploit their ‘Data Processing experience [to] develop statistical programmes on 
[their] own machines’ (Reader et al., 1998, p. 138). By 1966, Phillips & Drew’s IBM  
1440 was ‘running 80 hours a week’, and although it did not yet handle clients’ 
accounts or dividends, it conducted ‘an enormous range of work, some not even 
mentioned by IBM  (sold transfers) and some much more complex than we then knew 
[computer ranking of shares]’ (Reader et al., 1998, p. 140). 
 
The aura conferred on computers as cost-effective substitutes for labour soon 
dissipated. Writing in 1968, Dundas Hamilton noted that ‘none of the firms who have 
[moved from machine accounting to computers] has seen any savings in overheads, 
and many have been faced with higher costs’ (Hamilton, 1968, p. 134). A memo 
from Henry Cottrell of Phillips & Drew supported these views: ‘We shall never make 
a computer into a great success by savings in filing girls or contract clerks. The real 
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profit should come from the help it gives in getting business’ (Reader et al., 1998). 
Although the promise was left unfulfilled, the adopti n of computers had noticeable 
consequences in three aspects of the financial practices of the City of London. 
 
First, computers enabled new modes of market analysis. In the mid 1960s, for 
instance, Denis Weaver and Michael Hall of Phillips & Drew developed a computer-
based method for ranking shares whereby a multiple regression of past, present and 
forecast yield and earnings data was used to determin  the cheapness or dearness of 
equities. Calculations were carried out initially on a hired Elliott 803 and later moved 
to the firm’s IBM  1440 (Weaver & Hall, 1967). ‘Like the alchemist’, said L. Ginsburg 
in discussing Weaver and Hall’s paper at the Institute of Actuaries in 1967, 
the authors had tried to transmute lead into gold. They took an inert mass of 
financial statistics and sought to convert some part of it into a profitable 
financial operation (Weaver et al., 1967, p. 214).  
The ensuing discussion at the Institute of Actuaries showed that computer-based 
valuation techniques were far from uncontroversial. Professor Peter Moore from 
what would become the London Business School, for instance, questioned the 
independence of the selected variables and other discussants generally deemed that it 
was too early to judge the success of the method. Nevertheless, developments along 
these lines continued and were complemented by wider theoretical discussions on 
investment analysis. Thus, as price/earnings rations became an important analytical 
tool in Britain (Rutterford, 2004), they were incorp ated to the computational 
models of Phillips & Drew (Hobbs, 1974; Hobbs intervi w). In effect, by 1970, 
Phillips & Drew was marketing a commercial advisory service based on their 
computational ranking model which ran in tandem with established forms of 
‘subjective’ valuation (Reader et al., 1998). 
 
Second, the adoption of computers facilitated the em rgence of novel forms 
of market visualisation, as exemplified by the Scottish stockbrokers Wood 
Mackenzie. Along with Phillips & Drew, Wood Mackenize was among the first 
British firms to use computers for investment research. Indeed, much of the growth 
of Wood Mackenzie during the post-war period hinged on the firm’s ability to 
conduct sophisticated research as a complement to their stockbroking services 
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(Cheine interview). As Dugald Eadie, the first computer manager at Wood 
Mackenize recalled,  
There were three main branches of our analysis in that first two-year period 
[1968-1970]. One was analysis of price movements, which is what we called 
relative strength and it was focused on something that nowadays would seem 
naïve, which was just producing charts to show the movement of the price of 
a stock relative to the index. And don’t forget: the FTA All-Share Index 
which was used in the UK only started in 1966. So for us to produce charts of 
a price against the [index] and send them out to our clients was, actually, 
quite advanced. Then we had a service that was called the relative value and 
that was more about plotting things like P/E rations a d yields of stocks and 
showing how they moved over time against the market. [This] was actually 
quite significant because in [those] days that wasn’t information that was 
publicly available. And then the third service had to do with analysis of 
company accounts, what we called financial analysis, which would have to do 
much more with the fundamentals of the business of a stock you might invest 
in (Eadie interview).  
Computers therefore served as nodes for collecting data and creating representations 
of the state of the market or the relative position of a firm. The representations were 
effectively aids for both analysts and investors. A Scott Dobbie, a former 
stockbroker with Wood Mackenzie, recalled, 
In addition to plotting the [price, yield and earning s relative to the FTA All-
Share Index] for each security, one also superimposed the […] graphs on one 
page and hence identified anomalies between individual securities, or indeed 
industry sectors. This clearly assisted the search for value in portfolio 
construction. [We] were using computers in the early 1970s to carry out this 
work. It was initially done in the 60s by hand on about 300 companies. This 
involved meticulous calculation and graph construction (Dobbie, personal 
communication) 
The service offered by Wood Mackenzie ‘had the benefit that it covered the 
marketplace. It was a new product as far as the UK was concerned’ (Cheine 
interview). 
 
Third, the acquisition of computers for research impl ed establishing new 
relations with vendors (for instance, IBM), data service providers (including the 
London Stock Exchange, Exchange Telegraph and Reuters), users (such as fund 
managers and institutional investors) and workers within the firm (for example, 
securities analysts, computer programmers, economists and dealers). These relations, 
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in turn, came with specific sets of expertise, thems lves gauged in terms of 
professional competencies. Scott Dobbie recalled that at Wood Mackenzie 
we were all professionally qualified people. And […] at the same time, the 
clients were becoming professional. And all the peopl  we dealt with in the 
investment banks [that] were our contemporaries were all professional people 
and had come up through proper [routes, they] were all graduates. [Virtually] 
all of our analysts were graduates 
Similarly, Dugald Eadie mentioned that, in pursuing research, Wood Mackenzie 
developed ‘very large teams of programmers and systems analysts, and everything 
was done from first principles’ (Eadie interview). One can speculate that the 
emergence of these arenas of interaction between experts was at the centre of the 
consolidation of educational institutions such as the London Business School and 
professional associations such as the Society of Investment Analysts. Although these 
were somewhat inspired by similar developments in the United States, where 
management was deemed to hold a unique prestige and mystique (Earle, 1968), they 
responded to the needs of a constantly evolving City of London (Barnes, 1989). The 
importance of these trading zones and the use of computers for research effectively 
required different approaches to recruitment. At the level of staff, expertise in 
programming, economics, statistics, operations research and finance were now at a 
premium, making professional qualifications desirable. And at the level of partners, 
individuals with managerial expertise, a basic knowledge of computers and on the 
organisation of international finance were increasingly attractive. Blood and familiar 
connections were not, in a sense, the structuring element of finance in the City. 
 
Interpersonal connectivities, however, continued to play a fundamental role in 
finance. Computers were tied to some extent to the established system of personal 
relationships and the practices of the securities industry. The computerised share 
ranking system offered by Phillips & Drew’s, for instance, was doomed from the 
beginning. As Martin Gibbs, a senior partner, wrote ‘th  analyst found it far easier to 
speak with conviction about their own recommendations than those of the computer 
ranking’ (Reader et al., 1998, p. 150). The ranking was transformed into a weekly 
information sheet, showing actual and forecast yields and P/E ratios together with 
other data. The evaluation of cheapness or dearness, however, was left in the hands 
of analysts. In those days, recalled John Cheine, ‘you couldn’t bang on the door and 
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say ‘I’ve got a box of tricks I’d like to show you’. You had to be invited in’ (Cheine 
interview). Trust remained an affair between people. The personhoods of the 
inhabitants of the City, nevertheless, were not the same. Through their use in 
valuation and statistics, settlement and portfolio management, computers and 
telecommunications became part of the family’s mantelpiece.  
5.8 The family dispersed 
The incorporation of information technologies into br king and jobbing firms 
continued apace during the late 1970s. Writing in his 1979 review on the future of 
technology in British broking, Michael Josephs mentioned: 
A new trend has begun to show itself very recently. It used to be taken for 
granted that a computer system would be put in charge of its own special 
priesthood who would make sure that its perfect functio ing was not 
contaminated by the presence of the ungodly. The real problem was to teach 
the priesthood about Stockbroking, and some organisations never succeeded. 
Now the control is moving back into the hands of peopl  whose expertise lies 
in the Stockmarket and its workings […] The atmosphere has changed, and 
office staff who used to be afraid of the ‘electronic brains’ now take it for 
granted that they will operate keyboards and terminals as part of their work. 
The ‘punch girl’ who hammered holes into cards all d y long without 
knowing what they meant is a vanishing species (Josephs, 1979).  
Even the most conservative of stockbrokers, continued Josephs, had turned to 
computing services for automating back-office operations. Services such as those 
offered by NMW Computers Limited, a company created by the Northern and 
Midlands and Western Stock Exchanges in 1972, facilit ted the diffusion of 
computing in finance by providing electronic accounting facilities to firms otherwise 
unwilling to invest in standalone systems (Johnson, 1974). For most of the firms, 
however, computers were no substitute for personal rel tionships. Computers were 
explicitly rendered instruments of intermediation.  
 
The roots of the re-intermediated variety of finance that emerged in Britain in 
the 1980s were located within wider modifications of the institutional arrangements 
of the City of London. Just as the Companies Act 1948 facilitated the redefinition of 
financial practices around market-relevant information, the regulatory changes of the 
1980s allowed reconstituting the personhoods of firms and individuals around the 
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imaginaries of a global variety of finance. Fundamentally, they allowed for the 
existing social connectivities to be redrawn. As Nic Stuchfield, a former jobber with 
Wedd Durlacher, recalled 
I don’t think the technology has made the difference. There was a period 
when [the Stock Exchange] was a members club, and the floor was the 
clubhouse. That changes at the time of Big Bang. But, actually, there was 
still, and there still is, a lot of loyalty (Stuchfield interview). 
The biggest drivers of change, borrowing from Stuchfield’s recollections, were two 
modifications to the ownership structures of the financial intermediaries in the City 
of London: the first, a transformation of firms from partnerships to limited liability 
corporations; the second, the elimination of external ownership caps on member 
firms.  
 
Although ostensibly superficial, these two developments reformulated social 
relations between market participants and broader structural arrangements within 
British finance. ‘At the most simplistic level’, argued David Hobbs of Phillips & 
Drew, ‘you were no longer working for yourself as a partner. You were working for 
somebody else’ (Hobbs interview). A similar view was expressed by Scott Dobbie in 
interview:  
all firms were [operating] as an unlimited liability partnership. [That] was one 
of the big constraints on firms that kept people out before Big Bang. [You] 
tended to join [the partnership] without paying any money. You got the good 
will for nothing. And when you left, you got nothing. You just left. But when 
you joined the partnership at first, you did a phenomenal amount of work and 
did not get a particularly good share of it. When you’re at the end of your 
career, you get a phenomenal share and don’t do much work. So the guy pays 
through his goodwill and a lot of hard work when he’s young, and the older 
partner collects and doesn’t do so much work. Now that’s all changing, but 
that’s how it worked before.  
Under limited liability, the incentives for professionals within firms were different. 
Betting on long-term horizons was now economically inefficient, giving way to what 
Philip Augar (2000) termed the ‘cult of the individual’. Trained in an environment 
different from that of their predecessors, the newcomers recruited into the City’s 
ranks constituted, according to Barry Riley, former editor of the Financial Times, an  
influx of quite different meritocratic sort of people [into] firms [changed] the 
character of the Stock Exchange itself and, I suppose, contributed to the Big 
Bang process and the way it was accepted because tho  sort of people could 
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obviously see that there was a lot potential there which was being suppressed 
while the Stock Exchange remained a club (Riley interview). 
The imaginaries changed. The legends of British finance were no longer staged on 
the floorboards of the old Stock Exchange building. They were now set in the trading 
floors of a City of London reclaiming the legends of its global past. 
 
Change, however, came at a price. As brokers and jobbers were absorbed by 
investment banks eager to have direct, unmediated, ccess to the market, failed 
corporate marriages followed, populating the pages of the Financial Times in the 
aftermath of Big Bang. The causes of the widely dissected demise of British firms 
are difficult to identify. Yet one could find in the imaginaries of global finance a 
possible seed of conflict. As John Cheine recalled with hindsight, ‘we came to the 
apparently rather conceded conclusion that there was more to our game than we had 
imagined’ (Cheine interview). The vicissitudes of British finance, the death of the 
gentlemanly capitalist, and the reform of the City of London were thus, in part, the 
result of holding too narrow interpretations of theintricacies of finance. As Cheine 
recalled, 
I was reading something in the papers the other day. I do not believe in the 
argument that says, ‘Mr. Smith is a brilliant manager, and doesn’t matter 
whether he’s running the Post Office or a consumer products company in 
Latin America, he’ll make a success of it.’ To which my answer is balls. 
Now, there have been people who superficially have moved from one 
industry to another and been successful. And there are people who clearly 
have that sort of transferable skills in an infinite way. But as a generality, I 
think it’s a load of balls. And I think it’s that sort of feel that we’re talking 
about that says ‘just because you’re good at this doesn’t mean to say you’re 
good at that’. 
The history of finance, after all, is not written upon flows of information, through 
standardising practices and under the ubiquitous glow of trading screens. Finance is 
built upon social connectivities and the legends of weat and blood, of electrons and 
artifice, that bring them into being. 
5.9 Embedded information  
What, then, is the sociological lesson of this chapter? Contemporary descriptions of 
the development of the securities industry stress, quite unduly, systemic change as a 
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revolutionary process. Change, it is theorised, is often constrained to moments of 
overhaul, catalysed by the introduction of novel tools, organisational structures or 
practical techniques. In Britain, the latest transformative moment was arguably Big 
Bang in 1986. Represented by the introduction of double capacity, the opening up of 
the Stock Exchange’s membership, and the end of dealings on the trading floor, Big 
Bang is commonly deemed a watershed in a profound historical discontinuity, or to 
use Philip Aguar’s (2000) more colourful allegory, an incident marking the death of 
gentlemanly capitalism. 
 
In narratives of discontinuity, computers and telecommunications are often 
invoked as sources of change, not the least because accounts of the broad 
transformations of the twentieth century are frequently expressed in terms of the rise 
of an information, networked or postmodern age. Big Bang, for instance, is presented 
as a two-fold transformation: not only were there changes in the organisation of the 
Stock Exchange (i.e. its social structures) but, as importantly, there was an 
experiential modification of the market when dealing migrated from the trading floor 
onto the electronic platform of SEAQ (see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of this 
process; see also Hamilton, 1986). Big Bang not only symbolises a reconfiguration 
of social institutions in British finance; as importantly, it signalled the début of the 
information age in the City of London and, with it, the decline of social structures 
and their replacement by structures of flows (cf. Lash, 2002). Big Bang was a 
‘turning point’, representing a new ‘financial freedom [that] allowed capital from all 
sources to be mobilised from anywhere to be invested anywhere’ (Castells, 2000c, p. 
104). The actors, the networks, the non-humans, the in erface of humans and 
machines and, importantly, information were disembedded. Post-modernisation of 
finance meant the replacement of social structures by information and 
communication structures (Lash, 2002, p. 9, 28). 
 
The introduction of information technologies to thefinancial practices of the 
City of London, however, was a gradual and differentiated process. Not all firms 
ventured to ‘feed their business into the machine’, preferring instead to direct their 
investments to nurturing social connectivities – which, as mechanisms of social 
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brokerage, were in themselves profitable. Others, such as Wood MacKenzie and 
Philips & Drew, found in computers a tool for competition, an instrument for 
providing added-value services to their clients. Importantly, however, the 
information used in the conduct of finance was tempred by the interpersonal 
knowledge of market participants, independently of the systems adopted or the 
mechanisms set in place in the office. Observing with hindsight the changes of the 
decade since Big Bang, Sir Nicholas Goodison saw still the connectivities of yore, 
albeit inscribed in the new organisational arrangement of the City of London. The 
social camaraderie of the past 
has gone very much into the firms. As I said earlier some of them are now 
very big, and not difficult to keep that spirit of camaraderie on some of the 
firms’ own trading floors. I call them trading floors, they are actually trading 
rooms, and you have I am sure seen them, they are now banks and banks of 
desks with screens on them. But they have much of tat feel of the old trading 
floor, while not having the creaking floorboards and the stamp of the feet and 
the huge crowd. But I think a lot of that has gone into the trading rooms of 
the big firms. But don’t forget that people acting for clients get to know them 
pretty well too as a result of daily telephone contact, and would be meeting 
them outside for social purposes or indeed playing cricket against, when the 
two firms play cricket and so on. So it’s not all lost at all. The human being is 
a naturally social being, and it would take more than the abolition of the old 
Stock Exchange trading floor to undermine these social aspirations 
(BL/NLSC/C408/09, 1995). 
The social history of British finance was as much a story institutional and 
technological transformation as of the redefinition of market information and the 
social connectivities through which investment advice was generated and deployed. 
But despite the numerous occasions in which its meaning was re-negotiated, 

















6 Dictum Meum Pactum: Making the Market 
a Regulatory Object 
On 23 June 2009, the Treasury Committee of the House f Commons met to hear 
evidence on the state of banking and supervisory regulation in the United Kingdom. 
The parliamentary inquiry that gave rationale to the meeting manifested the sense of 
crisis that had imbued Westminster, Whitehall and the City of London for over two 
years. Although some asserted signs of recovery – the FTSE 100 stood above 4,200 
points, 700 more than the five-year low of 3,512 points reached two years earlier – a 
sense of uncertainty remained in the air.  
 
Crisis was not restricted to financial institutions. Importantly, the disarray 
extended to the formal regulatory systems that, since the 1980s, had been built 
around the banking, securities and insurance markets. In effect, on the day of the 
Treasury Committee’s first hearing, one of the topics for debate was the performance 
the Financial Services Authority, the statutory regulator of the banking and securities 
industry in Britain. For John McFall, Chair of the Committee, among the questions 
for the day was the culpability of the FSA in the development of, and response to, the 
financial crisis. Had the FSA, asked McFall, just closed the stable door after th  horse 
had bolted out? 
 
The Committee’s concern partly derived from theTurner Review, a policy 
document published by the FSA in March 2009 in response to the global financial 
crisis that initiated in the American mortgage market in 2007. For the authors of the 
Turner Review, the characteristics of the crisis challenged prevailing theories of 
financial economics, raising doubt on the validity of the ‘intellectual assumptions on 
which previous regulatory approaches have largely ben built’ (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009, p. 56). In the opinion of the FSA, future regulation required a 
systemic strategy, focused on the traditionally unexamined risks and 
interconnectivities of the financial system. The canonical approach of financial 
economics, however, proved insufficient. Thus, in refe encing theory, the authors of 
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the Review substituted the names of yore – Fischer Black, Eugene Fama, Merton 
Miller, Robert Merton and William Sharpe – by a peculiar cohort mixing new and 
old – from John Maynard Keynes and Benoit Mandelbrot to Hyman Minsky and 
Robert Shiller. For the FSA, rational investors were making way to irrational crowds 
in the regulatory paradigms of the future. 
 
The change in the theoretical approach of the FSA reached the corridors of 
Westminster through the Treasury Committee’s inquiry. For Andrew Lilico, a 
consultant from Europe Economics and witness before the Committee, the Turner 
Review was ‘a mistake’, 
We have a set of financial regulations which grew out of certain assumptions 
which were then interpreted through economic theory s  as to produce some 
recommendations, so [the FSA] decided that those recommendations did not 
produce the results [they] liked, and what the Turner Review then did was to 
ditch the economics (Lilico in House of Commons, 2009, p. Ev 1). 
In their attempt to plan for the future, argued Lilico, the FSA had thrown the baby out 
with the bathwater.  
 
Lord Turner of Ecchinswell, Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, 
disagreed and defended the regulatory stance of his Review. Future stability, argued 
Lord Turner, could not be guaranteed by greater transp rency, improved disclosure 
and more effective market discipline. For him, the evidence against the incumbent 
approach was clear: 
even though there was not perfect information in terms of individual bank 
accounts back in spring 2007, I think it was a reason ble thing to believe that 
the level of risk within the financial system was increasing—given the scale 
of the increase of a credit extension, given what we already knew about sub-
prime mortgages in the US, et cetera; and yet aggregate, on average, bank CDS 
spreads, rather than going up, continued to fall, to reach pretty much an all-
time low in about June 2007. Therefore, the thing which is meant to give us a 
forward indicator of risk failed almost entirely. I do think that we have a 
problem of the fundamental nature of financial markets. The concept of 
market discipline in response to transparent information depends crucially on 
the idea that market prices will reflect all of the available information rather 
than reflect herd and momentum effects. I think that o a significant extent 
they reflect herd and momentum effects. They serve as available information. 




The debate between Lord Turner and John McFall, between the FSA and 
Westminster, has a common denominator, a specific – and today, widely accepted – 
conceptualisation of financial life. Behind their dsagreement, Lord Turner and John 
McFall share the notion that markets are systems amen ble to the bureaucratic, 
technical and rationalising control of the state. In effect, for their conversation to 
have sense, they both presuppose that the market and its errors can be fixed through 
specific forms of representation and intervention.   
  
But how is it that we came to conceptualise the market as an entity that can 
be fixed through technical intervention? How is it that we rendered the market 
manageable? This chapter addresses these questions by analysing the rise of 
financial regulation in Britain throughout the twenti th century. In particular, this 
chapter presents a socio-historical examination of the ormation, stabilisation and 
transformation (pace Fligstein, 1996) of three broad regulatory epochs: an initial 
epoch, in which regulation occurred primarily through the symbolic and social 
actions of self-policing status groups; a second epoch, characterised by government-
sanctioned modes of bureaucratic self-regulation exemplified by the creation of the 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers; and the third epoch, defined by the proliferation of 
statutory instruments and the formation of an external supervisory agency, the 
Securities and Investments Board, predecessor of the FSA. Regulatory sense-making 
in each of these epochs, I argue, was coordinated by a specific model of finance, 
which allowed for individuals to direct their actions, establish conventionalities of 
meaning, and determine legitimate forms of behaviour and sanctioning. 
 
The argument here presented claims that the transitio  between epochs 
responded to a combination of three processes. First, it derived from a substantial 
change in the boundaries of legitimate regulatory action within the market, related to 
a re-constitution of the divisions within the City, and between the City and the state. 
Historically, changes in the boundaries resulted either from opportunities offered by 
crises of confidence within and outwith the financial sector (e.g. the crisis of 
legitimacy associated to the corporate scandals that led to the creation of the 
Takeover Panel), or moments of overall re-configuration (e.g. so-called Big Bang in 
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1986). Second, these transitions were associated to the emergence and consolidation 
of particular forms of expertise on the market within the juridical field (Bourdieu, 
1987). For instance, changes in the cultural circuits of capital that led to the 
consolidation of financial economics as a source of l gitimate knowledge on the 
securities industry allowed for the deployment of a discourse of regulation based on 
the metaphor of the market as an information processor. This, in turn, affected the 
instruments of regulation, defining the scope of observation and action of the 
regulatory agencies. Third, changes between epochs were related to the 
reconfiguration of the material supports of the market. As technological 
arrangements became central to the operation of the securities industry, they became 
ever more important as objects and instruments of regulation. In sum, authority, 
knowledge and technology colluded to create each regulatory epoch. 
6.1 Rules, regularities and order 
What do we understand by regulation? Within the specialised literature, regulation is 
often presented as a distinct form of legal-political action and authoritative 
intervention. In particular, the term regulation is invoked in reference to the 
extension of the state’s influence in social and economic affairs. Thus, for the 
Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, regulation constitutes the ‘employment of 
legal instruments for the implementation of social-economic policy objectives’ (den 
Hertog, 2000, p. 223), with legal instruments understood as state-sanctioned 
mechanisms that compel individuals and organisations t  behave in prescribed ways. 
In Stephen Croley’s analysis of regulatory theories and their relation to 
administrative bodies, regulation is concomitant to the rules and guidelines 
promulgated by government agencies ‘prescribing, proscribing and conditioning the 
behaviour of individuals, groups or firms’ (Croley, 1988, p. 3). And in Anthony 
Ogus’ Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, regulation comprises the law 
that implements a system where the state ‘seeks to direct or encourage behaviour 
which (it is assumed) would not occur without such intervention’ (Ogus, 2004, p. 1-
2). Regulation, then, is conceptualised as a legal-administrative object used to intrude 




As such, the most prevalent understanding of regulation is constructed around 
theoretical traditions and legal doctrines that describe the role of the state in 
organised capitalist societies. In a sense, regulation is only made observable and 
intelligible through such theories and doctrines by distinguishing it from other forms 
of authoritative intervention, be they constitutional, criminal or tort law, intra-
organisational rules and guidelines, or unenforceable ethical codes of behaviour 
observed by specific communities of practitioners. Regulation is thus apprehended in 
different manners, following the assumptions of the theory used to describe the 
regulatory process. For instance, with its foundations in neoclassical 
microeconomics, public choice theory represents regulatory decision-making as a 
market process (Croley, 1988). Legislation, regulation and other forms of state 
control, so goes the theory, are the outcome of the exchange of so-called ‘regulatory 
goods’ between political interest groups (e.g. citizens, firms, advocacy groups), 
following laws of supply and demand. Policies are formed at the points where 
equilibrium is reached between the providers of the goods and those that demand 
them. Regulations, furthermore, are understood in an overtly economic sense either 
as taxes imposed on particular activities or groups, entry controls in specific 
industries, restrictions on the ability to substitute or complement goods, or 
mechanisms of price-fixing in the marketplace (Stigler, 1971). In contrast, the 
literature on the sociology of risk adopts a broader vi w.  By engaging with the 
increased rhetoric and technical role of risk in modern organisations, this literature 
presents regulation as part of larger systems of governance and management that are 
involved in delineating, legalising and making accountable ‘uncertainties’ (Power, 
2007). Regulation, from this perspective, comes in a richer variety than in public 
choice theories, taking the shape of general principles, rule-like governmental 
legislations, audit and internal control protocols, and in general, devices of 
organisational accountability and uncertainty calcul bility that take numerous forms. 
  
The literature on financial regulation is no exception, being largely 
subordinated to broader theories of state control of industry and the promotion of 
competition. Given its character, it is also not surprising that analyses of financial 
regulation are strongly influenced by economic approaches – for instance, presenting 
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optimal regulatory systems as those in which the regulated can opt into competing 
frameworks in order to foster innovation (Macey & O'Hara, 1999). Financial 
regulation, furthermore, is often assumed to take the form of explicit rules, guidelines 
and surveillance mechanisms instituted by centralised governmental agencies that 
oversee the operation of the market (a paradigmatic example being the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of the United States). In doing so, the literature obscures the 
wider web of instruments, institutions and modes of intervention that organise the 
market: regulation, arguably, is also composed of elem nts of civil, contracts and 
corporate law; global standards and directives on accounting, clearing, settlement 
and data communication; internal guidelines of behaviour; professional boundaries; 
and tacit – yet socially sanctioned – forms of interaction. 
 
There remains, hence, much to say about the sociology f financial 
regulation. Specifically, a sociologically-informed approach must be able to re-
evaluate the somewhat mechanical models of agency used within the literature on 
law and economics, where regulation is essentially any form of ‘behavioural control 
[of the state] over the valued activities of a particular community’ (Ogus, 2004, p. 1). 
A sociology of financial regulation requires additional flesh on the skeleton of the 
canonical representation of economic actors as ‘ration l’ agents.   
 
A starting-point for this re-evaluation is provided by Michael Moran’s 
analysis of the regulatory framework of finance in the 1980s. In assessing the 
predominant definitions, Moran forwarded what he called a ‘narrower conception, 
picturing regulation as an activity in which the discretion of individuals is restricted 
by the imposition of rules’ (Moran, 1986, p. 185). For Moran, the so-called rule-
based conception makes the study of regulation manageable ‘by separating the 
activity from the exercise of other forms of power’ 
Above all, by focusing attention on rules it forces us to consider the central 
analytical problem of regulation: how to cast rules; how to constrain 
regulators and regulated within those rules; and how to reconcile the fact of 
change, and the necessity for adaptation, with the creation and maintenance 




Moran’s approach is anchored on the etymological roots f regulation. In 
every-day language, regulation is perceived as the instrument used in the act of 
regulating. To regulate, in turn, is to govern, direct or control by rule. Thus, 
regulations are synonymous to rules, and regulatory frameworks are rendered 
collections of rules, sets of explicit linguistic/administrative entities that have 
observable consequences on the behaviour of social units be it by wilful acceptance 
or authoritative coercion.   
 
To invoke rules as the constitutive matter of regulation is, however, a path 
that I will not follow. Rules have the problem of obscuring the sociological 
mechanisms through which order is formed and maintained within specific settings. 
Rules are too often presented as black-boxes of agency, giving normative systems a 
veneer of external objectivity and minimising the internal and contested political 
work that is carried out to maintain stable social and economic relations. Effectively, 
a sociology of financial regulation can benefit from a critical examination of rule-
following. In this sense, it can find theoretical inspiration in the sociology of 
knowledge and its correlate, the performative theory of social institutions as built by 
Barry Barnes, David Bloor and Martin Kusch (Barnes, 1983; Barnes, 1995; Bloor, 
1997; Kusch, 2002).  
 
For the performative theory of social institutions, issues of social order and 
collective coordination are wholly approachable by conceptualising knowledge, 
practice and meaning as systems of collective, conventional, self-referential, and 
normative processes. Here, the work of Barry Barnes is conspicuous for its ability to 
deal with the sociological characteristics of rules in institutional environments, 
providing a platform for the theoretical analysis of regulation. In his examination of 
Max Weber’s theories of bureaucratic organisation, Barnes observes that the rules 
through which control is purportedly maintained ‘lack power and cannot explain the 
practice with which they are associated’ (Barnes, 1995, p. 203). Bureaucracies, 
rather, are ‘genuine social formations involving the social relationships necessary to 
sustain shared understanding and practices’ (Barnes, 1995, p. 203). Following a 
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Weberian tradition, the status groups forming these bur aucracies can be seen as 
sustaining  
a distinctive lifestyle and an output of co-ordinated, instrumentally relevant 
collective action [achieving and maintaining] a shared sense of what is 
involved in following rules: they achieve an agreemnt in their practice. What 
a rule ‘in itself’ cannot produce – a compelling indication of what is to follow 
in the next instance – can be produced by references to the rule in the context 
of the ongoing practice of the status group (Barnes, 1995, p. 204). 
Bureaucracies and the rules that apparently structure their reproduction are hence 
maintained through conventionalities of meaning that are endorsed by authoritative 
status groups. The iron fist of the rule of law, one could say, is but a mirage of the 
soft social accords of a collective.  
 
Through the insights of the performative theory of s cial institutions, an 
argument can be made for a secondary and much neglect d tymological origin of 
regulation: to regulate is not only to govern by rules; it can also mean to make things 
regular or even. The point of regulation, in a sense, is neither to determine action nor 
to specify a mechanism of sanctioning. Written rules and the explicit elements of 
regulatory arrangements can be represented as rationalis ng instruments that allow 
agents to orient their actions according to particular conventionalities of practice. 
Rules and statutory arrangements do not determine in and of themselves behaviour. 
Rather, they are technologies of intervention, granting a veneer of objectivity to the 
actions of those who enforce the regulation and whoimplement punishment through 
the impersonal technicality of the rule and the juridical bureaucracies that support it. 
And as technologies of intervention, they are interpr tative. The regularity that 
follows regulation is therefore not a result of correct rule-following as much as it is a 
reflection of the stability of meaning within a determined collective. Hence, when 
regulation ‘works’ it is not due to the linguistic or mechanical effectiveness of the 
rules comprising the regulatory network; it is, instead, an expression of the stability 
of epistemic and coercive authority, of meaning, and of practice.  
  
Insofar as it entails stability, regulation necessitates some form of authority. 
For legal scholars, the nature of authority is given by wider legal doctrines to which 
the understanding of the rule of law and the role of the state are subordinated. For 
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them, the meaning and substance of authority is deduced almost self-evidently from 
the ‘internal dynamic’ of formalist jurisprudence (Bourdieu, 1987). For economic 
scholars, authority exists in the mechanics of the market where interest groups 
negotiate the shape of regulation through exchange. Hence, authority is closely 
associated to the capacity of actors to influence the outcomes of the political market 
for regulation. And for sociologists, authority is a force of coordination. In effect, as 
Michael Clarke argues, regulation is not merely a colle tion of rules and sanctioning 
mechanisms but is instead  
the constitution of a form of authority, whether internal or external, to 
achieve ordering in an area of life that has come to attention as showing 
tendencies to disorder, perversity or excess (Clarke, 2000, p. 3). 
 
Sociologically, authority can be comprehended as existing in both overt and 
covert configurations, operating through monopolistic and distributed mechanisms of 
sanctioning, coercion and conventionality. The ‘form of authority’ invoked by Clarke 
therefore takes numerous shapes, from centralised bodies that dominate the 
mechanisms of punishment, to distributed systems of an nymous control, to status 
groups that organise knowledge and create power relations (Foucault, 1977), to the 
everyday normativities of social interaction (Goffman, 1990). Regulation, in a sense, 
is the process of making things regular.   
 
In this chapter regulation is therefore interpreted in a broad sense. Regulation 
is not the mere establishment of rule-based systems. Rather, it is the mechanism 
through which the problem of authority is solved within collectives. Such problem, 
in particular, implies reaching agreement on the qustion of the legitimate arbiter for 
routine conflict, the establishment of deviations from the norm, the determination of 
the correctness of rule application, in sum, the regulation of activities, behaviours 
and relations. Regulation is hence both explicit rule-making and tacit regularisation, 
both normative coercion and conventional judgement.  
 
Bearing the above in mind, I can proceed to represent th  three epochs that 
framed regulatory action around the markets of the London Stock Exchange. As 
demonstrated in the following pages, regulation wasa perennial characteristic of 
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economic life in the City of London, merely modifying its forms and modes of 
actions across time. The problem of authority, in asense, was solved through 
different routes throughout the history of British finance, initially relying on the 
informal connectivities of the market (c. 1900) to eventually rely on statutory 
organisations built around both a carefully planned division of regulatory labour and 
the proliferation of technical instruments of interv ntion (c. 1986).  
6.2 First epoch: interpersonal regulation through status groups 
The first epoch of financial regulation in Britain corresponds to the period between 
the early nineteenth century and 1947, the year when t  London Stock Exchange 
consolidated its ownership and membership through mutualisation. During the later 
part of this period (c. 1880 – 1940), the regulatory landscape of British finance was 
largely a mixture of litigation, jurisprudence and the administrative traditions 
invented with the rise of the Victorian regulatory state (Moran, 2003). Aside from a 
handful of Parliamentary Acts – including the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, the 
Bankruptcy Acts 1830 and 1849 and the Companies Act 1862 – the City of London’s 
markets were, in Moran’s words, ‘a study in cooperative regulation’ (Moran, 2003, p. 
52).  
 
Organisationally, much of the routine regulatory work performed around the 
British securities market was the purview of the Lond n Stock Exchange. Composed 
by brokers and jobbers (market-makers) who, up to 1947, were represented by the 
Committee on General Purposes, the membership of the Stock Exchange had 
unmediated access to the floor of the Stock Exchange where most of the trading in 
governmental bonds and corporate securities took place. Within the market, 
interpersonal forms of knowledge were paramount for engaging in transactions. 
Effectively, notions of trust, integrity and honour were central to both the inward 
representation and outward projection of the membership of the Stock Exchange 
(Preda, 2009). Consequently, and as Moran (1986) noted, much of the British system 




Owing to what amounted to a monopolistic position, the prime form of 
financial regulation during this epoch was manifested as the barriers of entry to the 
membership of the Stock Exchange. Notably, the Rules and Regulations of the Stock 
Exchange constituted the foremost regulatory instrument in the City of London: they 
defined not only the patterns of conduct within the organisation but, perhaps more 
importantly, the mechanisms of access to the community of the Stock Exchange and, 
consequently, the market. Merchant banks, for instance, were not allowed to 
participate of the membership; similarly, to obtain  omination, individuals required 
the support of at least two existing members. Indeed, with the assent of the Treasury 
and the Bank of England, the Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange were 
generally considered a sound, almost legal, foundation for the constitution of a fair 
market.  
 
Although intended as a formal device for surveillance and control, the rules 
and regulations of the Stock Exchange were everything but a body of explicit 
behavioural instructions. Much tacit knowledge about the customs of dealing was 
needed in order to carry out business on the Stock Ex hange’s trading floor and to 
resolve disputes between members. In his comprehensive The Law and Practice of 
the Stock Exchange of 1897, Spence Brodhurst highlighted the somewhat tacit 
conventionalities under which legal accords were foged. ‘A contract made on the 
Stock Exchange’, he wrote,  
embraces all the usual characteristics of a legally enforceable agreement, with 
such additions and alterations as the rules and customs peculiar to the market 
may introduce into all contracts which are concluded there (Brodhurst, 1897, 
p. 88). 
While the ‘reasonableness of the printed rules cannot be called into question’, noted 
Brodhurst, the customs 
stand on a somewhat different footing. They are not expressly brought to the 
parties’ notice in the ordinary course of business, but a knowledge of them is 
presumed from the fact that the parties are dealing in the market in which 
they obtain. So long as they are fair and reasonable  non-member is bound 
by them, although he was not aware of their existence at the time when he 
entered into the contract (Brodhurst, 1897, p. 89)1. 
                                               





The customs of the Stock Exchange were thus an informal and collectively 
distributed form of sense-making that shaped expectations of the behaviour of market 
participants. Specifically, such customs were the prime mechanism used by both 
market participants and governmental bodies to solve the problem of authority: in 
routine cases of conflict, arbitration was delegated onto the conventionalities of the 
market. In effect, for the government, the suitability of these customs and their 
associated rules and regulations was demonstrated by a noticeable lack of efforts to 
legislate on the activities of the secondary securities markets in Britain. Even when 
the markets were objects of governmental scrutiny, heir operation was seldom 
condemned. In 1877, for instance, mounting politica pressure led to a public inquiry 
into the constitution, customs and usages of the Stock Exchange. Rather than 
criticising the Stock Exchange for its restrictive practices, the Royal Commission 
thus formed provided credence to the organisation’s exi tence. As Charles Duguid 
reported in 1913, few if any of the Commission’s recommendations were 
implemented, perhaps owing to the positive opinions held by the Commissioners on 
the conduct of finance. ‘In the main’, wrote Duguid of the Commission’s report, ‘the 
existence of [the Stock Exchange] and the coercive action of its rules on its members 
[were considered] salutary and to the interests of he public’ (Duguid, 1913, p. 126). 
For the Commission,  
the existing body of rules and regulations have been formed with much care, 
and are the result of long experience and the vigilant attention of a body of 
persons intimately acquainted with the needs and exigencies of the 
community for whom they have legislated. Any attempt to reduce these rules 
to the limits of the ordinary law of the land, or t abolish all checks and 
safeguards not to be found in that law, would in our opinion be detrimental to 
the honest and efficient conduct of business (Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Stock Exchange, quoted in Moran, 2003, p. 53). 
                                                                                                                          
When considerable numbers of men carry on one side of a particular business, they are apt to 
set up a custom which acts very much in favour of their side of the business. So long as they 
do not infringe some fundamental principle of right and wrong they may establish such a 
custom; but, if on dispute before a legal forum, it is found that they are endeavouring to 
enforce some rule of conduct which is so entirely in favour of their side that it is 
fundamentally unjust to the other side, the courts have always determined that such a custom, 
if sought to be enforced against a person in fact ignorant of it, is unreasonable, contrary to 
law, and void (in (Brodhurst, 1897)(p. 90)) 
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Rather than constituting an authoritative regulatory intervention into the apparently 
opaque mechanisms of the Stock Exchange, the report of the Royal Commission 
provided implicit governmental acquiescence of the customs, rules and regulations of 
the organisation. In a sense, it made the Stock Exchange a de facto, if not de jure, 
regulator of the equities market in London. 
 
If the Rules and Regulations of the Stock Exchange were accepted as a 
putative basis of control over the market, it was only because they reflected trust in 
the interpersonal connectivities of the finance2. Rather than operating as determinants 
of the behaviours of market participants, the Rules and Regulations served as both 
barriers to entry and apparatuses of justification for controlling the practices of those 
in the market. In a sense, they facilitated the outward projection of the Stock 
Exchange as a trustworthy community of intermediaries and the inward regulation of 
its members through informal control over trading ad other social actions (Segre, 
2008). New members were accepted only by nomination from existing ones. And 
existing members were required  
to have such personal knowledge of applicants whom they recommend, and 
of their past and present circumstances, as shall satisfy the committee as to 
their eligibility (Rule 25 as presented in Brodhurst, 1897). 
Trust was of the essence. The communities formed by and within the membership of 
the Stock Exchange were as much a mode of guaranteeing xternal validation as an 
internal device for controlling and surveying the conduct of deals. Finance was, in 
many ways, a strictly personal affair. And amongst the jobbers and brokers of the 
Stock Exchange, words were, quite literally, the stuff of legal, enforceable bonds.   
6.2.1 Dealing with speculation  
The Stock Exchange, however, was not granted unlimited authority over the market. 
During the course of time, the Stock Exchange redefined its legal instruments and 
internal mechanisms according to an ever-changing body of case law. Litigation 
amongst clients and members shaped the legal regulatory frameworks for finance, as 
illustrated by the changing treatment of speculation within the financial communities 
of the Stock Exchange. A form of dealing that has strong cultural connotations of 
                                               
2 On social connectivities and the stability of finance, see chapter 5. 
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futility and gambling, speculation was the subject of much discussion and debate, 
mostly in connection to the trading of commodities and options. In the United 
Kingdom, legislation was introduced in the eighteenh century to deal with several 
forms of speculation. The Barnard Act 1734 specifically attempted to limit the ability 
of jobbers to profit from opportunities derived from buying or selling with the intent 
of making a quick return. Yet as the N w York Times recalled in 1909, Barnard’s Act 
‘became a dead letter within a few months after its enactment [for] dealers carried on 
their business as before, depending, for the security of their mutual obligations, not 
upon the law but upon the very conditions on which they dealt’ (Johnson, 1908). 
 
For some scholars, the Stock Exchange’s treatment of speculation 
demonstrates the closed character of the organisation nd its overt detachment from 
state regulation. In his criminological analysis of speculation, for instance, 
Christopher Stanley presented the City of London as 
an internally closed self-referential culture representing the consensus of the 
post-war settlement in economic relations. It had generated a set of internally 
coherent laws and norms of practice and behaviour which operated without 
reference to external validating authorities. In part this was a successful 
strategy which operated to persuade and coerce partici nts within a 
primarily domestic and limited financial market to abide by particular 
standards (Stanley, 1994, p. 238).  
The literature on the Stock Exchange from the early 1900s would seem to confirm 
the predominance of an internalised approach to speculation. ‘Unbridled and 
misguided speculation is at once dangerous and destructive’, wrote F. E. Armstrong 
in The Book of the Stock Exchange in the 1930s, ‘and it is the practice of the Stock 
Exchange to discourage such development [In] this [e Stock Exchange] has a 
difficult task, as the ‘quality’ of speculation is subtle and hard to define’ (Armstrong, 
1934, p. 129).  
 
The impression that the Stock Exchange was a closed-worl  ‘operating 
without reference to external validating authorities’ as Stanley suggests is historically 
inaccurate, however. Although the Stock Exchange’s capacity to coordinate the 
market was not seriously questioned by state institutions as demonstrated by the 
Royal Commission, conflicts occasionally reached the courts when the arbitration 
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mechanisms of the Rules and Regulations failed to produce agreements. Notably, 
issues such as the definition of speculation and its ifferentiation from gambling 
were supported by a well-known body of case law that resulted from a series of 
conflicts in which parties to transactions sought to avoid entering into contracts. By 
invoking a specific deal as gambling, a party to a contract could attempt to abolish 
his or her obligations. In his analysis of the cases brought to the courts up to 1897, 
Brodhurst concluded that   
it appears that although, if proved, it will be a complete defence to an action 
in respect of Stock Exchange transactions to allege that such transactions 
were not bond fide purchases and sales, but were mer ly by way of gaming 
and wagering, yet such an allegation is exceedingly difficult to substantiate, 
and, in the words of Lord McLaren in Loioenfeld v. Hoicat, the defence of 
gaming and wagering ‘really does not offer to speculators in stock any 
available means of being released from their obligations’ (Brodhurst, 1897).  
Indeed, this legally supported tolerance to certain forms of speculation was not 
restricted to the community of the Stock Exchange. On the contrary, the dominant 
conceptualisation of speculation was constituted through the rhetoric repository of 
the juridical sphere, which classifies into case law new instances of market 
behaviour. The Stock Exchange, then, operated with reference to the exterior, 
constantly having to redraw the boundaries of finance, be it with the reinforcement of 
everyday rituals, the internal arbitration of conflicts or external litigation on the 
legality of contracts created on the trading floor. 
6.3 Second epoch: self-regulating finance 
The second epoch of financial regulation in Britain occurred between 1947 and 1986, 
years that marked profound changes in the governance structures of the securities 
industry. In particular, these years denoted the beginning and end of an era of 
government-sanctioned self-regulation within the City of London.  
 
In 1947, British finance faced two important events. The first was the 
mutualisation of the London Stock Exchange. Compelled by the threat of 
nationalisation – which had placed the Bank of Engla d under government control – 
the membership of the Stock Exchange took over the ownership of the organisation, 




The second event was the legislative transformation of the prevailing regime 
of corporate law and the concomitant invention of the moral imperative of ‘investor 
protection’. As other areas of British industrial policy, corporate governance was no 
stranger to the delicate balance between legislative change and informal regulation. 
Following trends from the previous century, in 1900 parliamentary action required 
shareholders to appoint auditors to oversee the company’s balance sheets; in 1908/9, 
the distinction between public and private companies was established; and in 1925, 
profit and loss accounts were enforced, although these had to be neither audited nor 
registered. By 1943, the Board of Trade – the key regulatory agency for companies – 
initiated inquiries into possible legislative reforms of the Companies Act 1929 then 
in force, appointing Justice Cohen to chair an inquiry on the state of corporate 
governance.  
 
The report of the Cohen Committee thus became the foundation of the 
Companies Act 1947, consolidated in the Companies Act 1948. Writing in The 
Accounting Review of 1946, Mary Murphy deemed that the Committee rightfully 
envisaged ‘the necessity of protecting the investor and enhancing his control over 
company managements without imposing unreasonable restraints upon ethical 
business’ (Murphy, 1946, p. 37). The relevance of the Committee’s findings lay not 
in proposing a mere technical update of the existing regulation but rather in the 
recognition of an 
increasing distribution of savings among persons totally unfamiliar with the 
responsibilities of investment [which] leads to acceptance of the premise that 
investors must receive both legal protection against fraud and adequate data 
concerning their companies’ financial positions andoperating results 
(Murphy, 1946, p. 38). 
In the imaginary forwarded by the Committee and shared widely across the City of 
London, finance was becoming popular, and with this popularity, provisions were 
needed to safeguard the uninformed and inexperienced i v stor. Replicating this 
imaginary in 1951, the Stock Exchange gave credence to its existence: there were 
very few people in Britain, it argued, who were not‘interested in and dependent 
upon the Stock Exchange either directly or indirectly and in one way or another’ 
(The Council of the Stock Exchange, 1951, p. 4). The state and City had thus a new 
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responsibility: to protect and guarantee the rights of investors in order to foster trust 
in the financial marketplace as the quickest, cheapest and fairest mechanism for 
providing new capital without which ‘our present standard of living could not be 
maintained’ (The Council of the Stock Exchange, 1951, p. 10). 
 
In this regulatory epoch, trust became a recognised instrument for mediating 
the relations of an increasingly bureaucratic organisation – the mutualised London 
Stock Exchange – and a changing public sphere. The solution to the problem of 
authority (and hence, the shape of regulatory action) hus boiled down to delegating 
authority onto the Stock Exchange and crafting an institutional persona based on 
vocabularies of trust, duty and investor protection3. Unlike the previous epoch where 
this delegation of authority was informal and occurred through the social networks of 
finance, in this second epoch the delegation was overt and centred on an emerging 
suite of formal institutional mechanisms within the City of London.  
 
As the moral imperative for regulation during this epoch, investor protection 
was construed as a substantial increase in accounting and audit requirements. 
Inspired by the recommendations of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales, the disclosure standards introduced by the Companies Act 1948 
provided a clearer framework for the presentation of company accounts (Edwards, 
1989). Overall, however, the listing and disclosure requirements of the Stock 
Exchange always exceeded those set by the Act. In effect, the new legislation 
provided weight to, and further articulated, the authority of the Stock Exchange. The 
report of the Cohen Committee considered affordances for 
                                               
3 As Josephine Matlby noted in her study of British corporate law, the Companies Act 1948 was not a 
legislative revolution in favour of greater corporate responsibility towards society at large but was 
instead a move to make regulations responsive to the needs of shareholders (Maltby, 2000). The Act, 
however, embodied an important discursive innovation: namely, the invention of investor protection 
as a moral imperative for governmental, industrial and financial circles. The conceptualisation of 
investor protection as the aim of informal regulation was more a product of the rhetoric of an 
expanding market rather than the reflection of changing patterns in the ownership of shares in the 
United Kingdom. In contrast to the dispersed modes of corporate ownership that developed in the 
United States between the 1930s and 1940s – that is, the emergence and materialisation of the Berle-
Means corporation –, British companies remained controlled predominantly by small groups that 
“retained a sizable percentage of the shares and plyed a prominent role in managerial decision-
making” (Cheffins, 2003, p. 12). Investor protection remained the protection of a handful of powerful 
shareholders rather than the protection of some widr – and unidentified – section of society. 
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a division of labour between legislative regulation of the Companies Act and 
administrative control through the London Stock Exchange Council and the 
Board of Trade (Anonymous, 1947, p. 1384). 
And with the enactment of the Companies Act 1948, the London Stock Exchange 
gained an additional role as a recognised listing authority for new securities 
(Wrenbury, 1949). 
 
While the reliability of the primary market was secured through the 
Companies Act 1948, the stability of the Stock Exchange’s social networks was also 
strengthened through government interference. In 1938, in particular, the government 
responded to increasing discontent with the practices of dealers who worked outside 
the membership of the Stock Exchange. Through a Departmental Committee, the 
Board of Trade looked into the practices of share pushing and share-hawking. And as 
demonstrated by their report, for the members of the committee the issue of 
deceptive practices was reduced to the trust created by professional demarcations in 
finance. ‘So long as anybody, however impecunious or inexperienced he may be, can 
call himself a ‘stockbroker’’, read the conclusions of the committee, ‘there will be 
grave and obvious risk of losses inflicted on the ignorant public’ (Report on Share 
Pushing, cited in Mannheim, 2001, p. 124). In the int rest of investor protection, the 
ensuing legislative process made dealing a licensed activity and to deal without a 
license a criminal offense.  
 
In spirit, the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939 thus introduced 
resembled an entirely modern instrument of government-led regulation; regulation, 
that is, understood as the extension of government co trol over the affairs of private 
business. As Hermann Mannheim observed in 1946, the act mpowered an agency of 
the state – the Board of Trade – to issue orders endorsed by penal action (Mannheim, 
2001, p. 124-125). The main contribution of the 1939 Act and its revised 1951 
version was nevertheless to reinforce the prevailing system of informal regulation 
and oversight. Specifically, although the Act required dealers in securities to register 
and obtain a license, it contemplated exemptions for recognised stock exchanges and 
associations of dealers in securities. Although the Act did not prima facie exempt 
members of the Stock Exchange from licensing (it considered revoking exemptions 
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by order of the Board of Trade), never was the authority and trustworthiness of the 
Stock Exchange seriously questioned. In practice, by defining administrative controls 
over the professional boundaries of securities dealing nd by granting exemption to 
the Stock Exchange, the Act gave legislative form to financial self-regulation.  
 
A new division of regulatory labour hence emerged: while the professional 
conventionalities of accountants and the administrat ve oversight of the Board of 
Trade would care for the disclosure of company information, the organisational 
barriers of the Stock Exchange’s rules would guarantee the quality of the market and 
of the entities therein traded. Investor protection derived from trust in the system of 
relations that gave credence to and stabilised the practices and institutions of finance 
in the City of London rather than from the apparatus of state control and surveillance. 
And here, through the division between brokers and jobbers, the Council of the Stock 
Exchange’s oversight coupled to the material characte  of the trading floor was the 
foremost technology of surveillance in British finance:  
[an advantage] of the an open outcry floor in those days was that one of the 
roles [the jobbers] did exceedingly effectively [was that] they had a very 
good ideas as to who was honest and who was dishonet, and they would tell 
you to mind your eye if they thought that there was anything unusual going 
on. So it was a self-policing mechanism […] It was an absolute eye opener to 
me when I first went on the council as to what some firms got up to. As the 
English proverb [says], birds of a feather flock together. In other words, there 
were half a dozen firms which if there were going to be problems the chances 
were they were there as it were. If there was going to be something 
approaching dishonesty that’s where you’d find it. (Ross-Russell interview) 
And so, when the Stock Exchange published the brochure My Word is My Bond in 
1951, in did not exaggerate by opening with the words ‘The Stock Exchange is a 
national institution’ (The Council of the Stock Exchange, 1951). They were, in all 
relevant ways, the recognised regulatory centre of British finance. 
6.3.1 Mergers & Acquisitions 
The choice of informal self-regulation as a solution t  the problem of authority was 
made evident by the handling of a drastic increase in corporate mergers in late 1960s 
Britain. Propelled by favourable post-war economic conditions and the enhanced 
financial disclosure requirements of the Companies Act 1948 (Roberts, 1992), hostile 
takeovers became a particularly acrimonious issue populating the pages of the British 
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financial press. These activities, however, were fomally unregulated, with 
provisions lacking both in the existing legislation as in the rules and regulations of 
the Stock Exchange. As Richard Spiegelberg noted in his critical assessment,  
all attempts so far to regulate the conduct of City institutions in take-over 
situations have to be seen as a compromise between, on the one hand, the 
desire for freedom and flexibility, and on the other, the need to ensure that the 
ethics and reputation of the City as a while are not seen to be question 
(Spiegelberg, 1973, p. 171). 
A series of highly publicised cases between 1966 and 1967 proved impossible to 
manage via the social connectivities of the City of L ndon, and in 1967 the Governor 
of the Bank of England, along with the Chairmen of the Issuing Houses Association 
and the London Stock Exchange, convened a Panel to supervise the operation of a 
Code on Amalgamations and Mergers. A crisis of public confidence had thus led to 
an overhaul in the regulatory system. Formed by Citinsiders, the resulting Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers was and remains the administrative agency behind the Code 
and its application.  
 
The Panel was a compromise between the incumbent system of informal 
regulation through social networks and market conventionalities and broader calls for 
statutory oversight. On one hand, the Panel on Takeovers was designed as a formal 
body invested with specific responsibilities over matters relating to mergers and 
acquisitions. On the other hand, the Panel continued a logic of laissez faire, 
delegating regulatory action on established self-regulatory institutions. As 
Spiegelberg noted in 1973 that  
the fundamental flaw in the new system consisted simply in that [the Panel] 
was itself virtually powerless […] The Panel’s censure was a dubious 
dishonour just as the freedom from an obscure American town in the mid-
west may be a dubious distinction (Spiegelberg, 1973, p. 177, 179). 
Indeed, after a difficult and highly criticised first year of operation, the Panel had to 
review the Code and its implementation. Rather thanestablishing an independent 
regulatory body, the Panel used the bureaucratic mechanisms and coercive authority 
of the Stock Exchange and the Board of Trade to intervene in conflicts: while the 
former had the ability to censure, suspend or expel companies from the official list, 




The Panel on Takeovers therefore represented three regulatory innovations. 
First, it demonstrated that indirect forms of coercion can be mobilised and exerted 
through social connectivities without the overt intervention of an independent 
statutory agency (see (see Johnston, 2007 for further details) for further details). 
Second, while it operated on the periphery of the juridical field, the Panel served as a 
forum for negotiating and reconstituting the meaning of self-regulation, the 
conventions of finance, and the acceptable modes of intervention in the market. And 
third, the Panel fostered the acquisition of regulatory expertise through the 
experience of discussing, evaluating and implementing the Code. In a finitist sense, 
the Panel was a place for training future regulators.  
6.4 Third epoch: the road to statutory regulation 
The third epoch of financial regulation corresponded to the period between 1986 and 
2000, marked by the introduction of the Securities and Investments Board and the 
broader consolidation of statutory oversight and technical intervention in the 
activities of the City of London. The seed of this epoch was a crisis of legitimacy 
planted in 1971 when merchant banks and institutional investors challenged the 
system of fixed commissions of the Stock Exchange. On that year, the Accepting 
Houses Committee – formed by merchant banks that were excluded from the Stock 
Exchange membership – announced the introduction of a c mputerised trading 
system that could bypass the trading floor of the Exchange. The system, known as 
the Automated Real-time Investments Exchange Limited or ARIEL, became the centre 
of an acrimonious debate between the Stock Exchange d the City at large. 
 
The debate surrounding ARIEL eventually resulted in a wider recognition that 
the ‘traditional’ boundaries between banking and fiancial services were being 
breached. In an attempt to preserve the self-regulatory environment of the City of 
London, the Stock Exchange and the Accepting Houses Committee sought to 
establish a body acknowledged and supported by all practitioners in the securities 
industry ‘which would bring the two sides closer together and which could also 
possibly fend off the unwanted attentions of Governme t’ (Hamilton, 1986, p. 7). 
The proposed organisation, the Securities Industry Supervisory BOard, SISBO, would 
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‘supervise the functions of the securities industry, the markets and their practitioners 
in the public interest [with its] authority [being] implicit in the general acceptance of 
its status’ (SISBO Objectives, quoted in Hamilton, 1986, p. 177, 179). 
 
The Bank of England and the Department of Trade and Industry (which 
succeeded the Board of Trade in 1970) reacted cautiously to SISBO. For them, the 
conflict between the Stock Exchange and its clients became an opportunity for 
government intervention. In October 1979, the Secretary of State for Trade 
announced a governmental review of the securities industry, hence overshadowing 
the creation of SISBO. Effectively, the practitioners’ body eventually formed – the 
Council for the Securities Industry – was constituted with limited authority 
(Hamilton, 1986, p. 9): following the template of the Panel on Takeovers, the CSI’s 
activities were restricted to issuing a Code of Conduct of Dealers in Securities and 
reviewing the practices of investment managers in 1979. The enforceability of the 
Code of Conduct was nevertheless questionable sincethe CSI was had no formal 
powers, no permanent staff (Black, 1997) and was eclipsed by larger governmental 
ambitions.  
 
Government pressure coalesced as early as 1974, when the Department of 
Trade and Industry, DTI, requested the Stock Exchange to register its Rules and 
Regulations, along with its Code of Dealing, with the Office of Fair Trading. The 
practices of the Stock Exchange, the customs once deemed a sound basis for finance, 
were on their way to the Restrictive Practices Court.  
 
Talk of reform remained in the air, and in 1981 the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry commissioned a review of the statutory protection required by 
private and business investors in securities and other property, the need for statutory 
control of dealers in securities, investment consultants and investment managers, and 
advice on the need for new regulation. Written by L.C.B Gower, the report published 
in 1984 as the Review of Investor Protection became the basis for the introduction of 




The Gower Report provided an account of the state of r gulation in the 
British securities industry of the early 1980s, offering suggestions on the possible 
content and reach of future legislation. Although it stands in public memory as the 
forerunner of the revolutionary Financial Services Act 1986, in its proposals, the 
Gower Report maintained a strong continuity with the past. Following the 
conventional vocabulary of British finance, the report considered regulation 
reducible to the implementation of a system ‘which would help the public to identify 
the sheep and which will effectively curve the activities of the goats’ (Gower, 1984, 
p. 5). Self-regulation was not an object of critique in the report. For Gower, the fault 
of the existing system ‘has not been that of self-regulation as such but of self-
regulation not subject to effective surveillance and [i  some cases] of the absence of 
any prudential regulation whether self or otherwise’ (Gower, 1984, p. 5). Indeed, the 
Gower report presented statutory regulation as a potential hindrance: in the interest 
of convenience, efficiency and economy, intervention in the market ‘should be 
reduced to the minimum necessary adequately to protect investors’ (Gower, 1984, p. 
5). 
 
Partly inspired by the Gower Report, the Financial Services Act 1986 
established government-sanctioned demarcations that were in line with the 
previously accepted boundaries of financial regulation in Britain (Coopers & 
Lybrand, 1988). The Act, in a sense, was not entirely discontinuous with past modes 
of self-regulation. On the contrary, the Act cemented existing relations in statutory 
law. Thus, rather than granting the Stock Exchange ad hoc privileges, the Act created 
two general legal entities, the Self-Regulatory Organisation and the Recognised 
Investment Exchange, that conformed to preceding usa es and customs.  
 
The Act, however, rationalised the division of regulatory labour in British 
finance. Thus, while as a recognised investment exchange the Stock Exchange would 
manage the day-to-day supervision of the market, th newly formed Securities 
Association would determine the specific content of regulations. Professional 
demarcations were likewise legalised with the invention of Recognised Professional 
Bodies. Control over the markets was delegated to a ‘designated Agency’, the 
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Securities and Investments Board, responsible for patrolling the integrity of the City 
on behalf of the DTI. Even the social connectivities of finance were rationalised: 
established when the Stock Exchange transformed individual into corporate 
membership, the Securities & Investment Institute served as a professional 
association that kept tabs on ‘people’s integrity and [made] sure that this was 
emphasised [in the future]’ (Ross-Russell interview). The Act and its correlates 
divided regulatory labour across a collection of increasingly bureaucratic and formal 
organisations (White, 1984).  
 
Contrary to the traditional account, then, British finance in the 1980s was 
oblivious to deregulation in a strict, etymological sense. Although it is often said that 
the events surrounding the Stock Exchange’s Big Bang exemplified a global trend 
towards deregulation (Plender, 1987), both in quantity and in quality, the rules, 
regulations, codes, guidelines and mechanisms of surveillance that populated the 
City of London grew around the constitution of the Financial Services Act 1986. 
‘Had a Socialist administration tried to introduce similar reforms’, wrote Michael 
Moran, ‘the response would have been uproar in the Conservative benches and 
apoplexy in the City’ (Moran, 1988, p. 20). Regulation became ‘a lawyer’s paradise’. 
The new system was  
extremely legalistic, and given the interests at stke it is likely to be tested in 
court on many occasions […] Substantial new sources of income are arising 
for the legal profession in fighting cases related to the FSA, in working for 
regulatory organisations, and in acting in the compliance field in financial 
institutions (Lomax, 1987, p. 201-202). 
As Harold Wilson wrote to Margaret Thatcher, almost everything the Stock 
Exchange did as a financial institution ‘has now got to be transacted under the eyes 
of solicitors and barristers’ (Wilson quoted in Kynaston, 2002, p. 618).  
 
Solicitors and legal experts were not the only ones to claim regulatory 
competencies. The technological reconfiguration and expansion of the market in the 
1970s and 1980s resulted in a vast machinery of command and control. It was not 
infrequent to read, for instance, that the quote and price dissemination technologies 
developed by the Stock Exchange in preparation for Big Bang were ‘a complete 
system of surveillance’ enabling suspicious circumstances or public complaints to be 
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fully investigated (Goodison, 1986b). The technologists behind these innovations 
were, indeed, regulators of sorts. Peter Cox, who spearheaded the creation of the 
successful international equities trading system, SEAQ-I, is an example. By 
coordinating diverse participants, he obtained agreement on the conventions of 
trading that would found exchange amongst foreign institutions that otherwise 
distrusted London (chapter 4). Others, such as Peter B nnett, architect of the Stock 
Exchange’s technological platforms, worked on the creation of technical and 
organisational standards for the establishment of Euroquote, a pan-European trading 
platform. By setting policy and participating in the construction of the supports of 
British finance, the technologists at the Stock Exchange regulated: they generated 
patterns of expected behaviour for market participants, protocols that users ‘had’ to 
follow for the ‘correct’ operation of the market.  
 
As an institution, the Stock Exchange was also increasingly technical in its 
self-assessment. Gauging the state of the market throug  the social connectivities of 
the trading floor was replaced by the formality of numbers and statistics. 
Increasingly, quantitative analyses became rightful instruments for accessing, 
representing and intervening in the market. Notably, from 1986 onwards, the Stock 
Exchange invested an increasing amount of organisational efforts in conducting 
statistical and economic studies of the market, from analyses of the number of 
market-makers in UK equities to detailed research into the costs of dealing and the 
factors affecting bid-ask spreads (Quality of Markets Unit, 1986a). Economics had 
reached market institutions, converted into a legitima e tool of analysis and 
intervention.  
 
Importantly, the proliferation of technical instruments did not imply the 
mechanisation of rule following. For the most part, regulatory action remained 
anchored to situated finitist judgements4. As in the past, rule application required 
                                               
4 Throughout this volume, I have sought to represent knowledge through the theoretical perspective of 
the Edinburgh school of the sociology of scientific knowledge. For the Edinburgh school, knowledge 
and concept application should not be read as governed by objective rule following. Rather, concept 
application moves from case to case, ‘mediated by a complex judgments of similarity and difference, 
and informed at all points by the local purposes of the concept users’ (Bloor, 1991, p. 164). Concept 
application – which includes determining whether some ne broke or not a rule – is therefore 
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contingent forms of knowledge and authority. Daniel Sheridan, who oversaw market 
regulation in the Stock Exchange in the years surrounding Big Bang, highlighted the 
nature of rules in the new environment:  
If there was a really big deal going on in London, the broker or the jobber or 
the […] merchant bank would come and see me and would talk about the 
nature of the deal they were going to undertake and would ask for an 
interpretation of the rules within the context of that type of deal. And I had an 
enormous amount of flexibility for, I wouldn’t say vary the rules, but to 
interpret the rules to accord with certain things. And I had enough experience 
to make sure that other firms didn’t lose out […] and I got a reputation for 
being able to do that. All the jobbers trusted me, th y knew that I wouldn’t 
disclose their business to anyone else. And all the brokers trusted me, 
including the small country brokers. The regulatory infrastructure that [was] 
set up was not one you’d find anywhere else in the world (Sheridan 
interview). 
Flexibility, however, was a right founded upon relations of trust established between 
market participants. The right to regulate required expertise of a certain type. 
Regulating thus transcended enforcement; rather, it called for a coherent 
understanding of individual contexts in which rules were created and deployed, an 
understanding, in a sense, of the particular configurations of communitarian 
authority5 (Kusch, 2002). ‘If you’re not responsible for creating [the rules], if you’re 
simply a regulator’, recalled Sheridan, ‘then everyone out there thinks their 
interpretation is as good as yours’ (Sheridan interview). Discretion remained, albeit 
veiled by a growing set of technical instruments.  
6.4.1 Markets made transparent 
An important change occurred, however, within the increasingly fragmented and 
rationalised institutions of British finance. The adoption of novel instruments for 
market analysis—including economics as a tool of intervention and digital 
technologies as platforms of exchange—facilitated representing the market as an 
informatic entity that could be managed and control through technical means. 
                                                                                                                          
underdetermined by explicit norms and relies on forms the experience of whoever it is that is applying 
the ‘rule’. In this sense, it is a ‘situated’ process, insofar as it is influenced by the situation and the 
locality of the moment in which the concept is applied.  
5 By communitarian authority, I refer to forms of power that are distributed throughout a particular 
group and that are only manifested collectively.  Thus, they are represented by the shared instruments 
of coercion and sanctioning and the collective norms that are associated to them. In this sense, 




Consequently, market design, surveillance and oversight could be rationalised 
according to the models, accounting techniques, and statistical comparisons that 
comprised the technical systems of the new epoch; the problem of regulatory 
authority was resolved, in a sense, by transferring control to instruments of market 
representation. 
 
This phenomenon was particularly noticeable in the regulatory approach of 
the Office of Fair Trading. Subordinated to the Department of Trade and Industry, 
the OFT neither dictated nor enforced regulations on the Stock Exchange and its 
member firms. Rather, its role was to ‘substantially change the playing field and the 
rules, perhaps forcing the unbundling of […] charges, particularly to non-member 
firms, and threatening [the Stock Exchange’s] primay market function’ (Lynch, 
1989b). As the foremost advisor to the state in matters of industrial regulation, the 
Office of Fair Trading had a direct bearing on the m aning, content and legal forms 
of public policy.  
 
Towards the late 1980s, the OFT established concrete relations with the 
growing communities of British economists interested in issues of markets, 
efficiency and competition. Notable among these communities was the London 
Business School, the Financial Markets Group of the London School of Economics 
(established in 1987), and the City University. Fuelled by the growth of global 
circuits of economic expertise, these research centres became focal point of 
economic knowledge in Britain (Thrift, 2005). From these points, the OFT derived a 
novel suite of theoretical instruments, a new vocabulary for approaching and 
regulating the market.  
 
The type of analytical instruments enrolled by the OFT is exemplified in the 
work of John Kay and John Vickers6. In a review written in 1988, Kay and Vickers 
provided an assessment of the so-called British ‘regulatory reform’ of the 1980s, 
arguing that the system instituted by the Financial Services Act was inappropriate for 
                                               
6 Incidentally, at the time the paper was produced, Kay worked at the London Business School while 
Vickers worked at Nuffield College, Oxford. Vickers, in particular, later served as Director General of 
the Office of Fair Trading between 2000 and 2005. 
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the operation of the market. For Kay and Vickers, the issue was not refining the 
relative balance between statutory and self-regulation. On the contrary, in their 
opinion regulatory work should focus on two endemic features of financial markets 
unattended by policy: asymmetric information and public confidence in the system in 
its entirety. ‘To the extent that asymmetric information is the problem’, they wrote, 
‘the first response must be to improve information fl ws. This implies the more 
extensive disclosure and the maximum transparency for market dealings’ (Kay & 
Vickers, 1988). Regulation, surmised a growing number of economists, was about 
the control and management of information rather than t e control of membership, 
the reinforcement of trust and the adjudication of rights.  
 
Apprehended by the OFT, this new vocabulary tested the Stock Exchange’s 
strategy. In April 1988, the Office of Fair Trading published a review of the rules 
that formed part of the Stock Exchange’s bid to the Securities and Investment Board 
in seeking recognition as an RIE under the Financial Services Act. For the Director 
General of the OFT, ‘the major anti-competitive features to which I objected in the 
old exchange’s rules’ had gone (Office of Fair Trading, 1988a, p. 2). There 
remained, however, several points of concern. The introduction of new trading 
platforms in the London Stock Exchange in 1986 – notably SEAQ, the bidirectional 
quote dissemination system; TOPIC, the general online information system; and CNS, 
the company announcements service – resulted in a visible centralisation of 
information provision. The Director General articulated a new regulatory 
preoccupation, namely, that the Stock Exchange had generated a monopoly of 
information by conflating its roles as regulator, dealing platform and information 
provider for the marketplace.  
 
In response to the April 1988 report, the OFT issued detailed advice on the 
Stock Exchange’s information services. For the OFT, the problem was reducible to 
‘the Stock Exchange’s decision that it should, in effect, be the sole source of 
domestic company news’ (Office of Fair Trading, 1988b, p. 2). For the Stock 
Exchange, the sole source approach was necessary to prevent the disorderly or 
improper release of information. But for the Director General of the OFT, the 
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mechanisms put in place by the Stock Exchange discriminated commercial 
information vendors, utilised restrictive policies on the re-use of information, cross-
subsidised regulatory and commercial roles, and alloc ted costs without reference to 
the benefits received. By doing so, the Stock Exchange ‘restricted, distorted and 
prevented competition in the market for company news’ (Office of Fair Trading, 
1988b, p. 4). 
 
The Stock Exchange was not oblivious of these problems, and prior to the 
OFT’s June 1988 report planned the introduction of twonew systems, the Regulatory 
News Service and the Commercial Company News Service. These would operate 
independently in order to avoid cross-subsidisation, providing equality of access to 
data feed of company news. The Stock Exchange, however, remained strongly 
committed to its role as a sole source of information. In a multi-source system, they 
argued, 
- There would be no validation of announcements, or elaborate rules would 
be required which would be difficult to enforce. 
- There would be a disorderly release of information, .e. there would be no 
control over the priority of release, and information would be likely to appear 
on different information services at different times (Office of Fair Trading, 
1988b, p. 23). 
While the securities markets remained concentrated in London, and while the Stock 
Exchange remained the country’s listing authority, the sole-source approach was 
deemed imperative for guaranteeing the value and authenticity of information. 
 
The OFT was unconvinced. Although it acknowledged the importance of the 
quality of information, it cited the provisions of the Financial Services Act relating to 
Recognised Investment Exchanges. As the OFT noted,  
where relevant, require issuers of investments dealt in on the exchange to 
comply with such obligations as will, so far as possible, afford to persons 
dealing in the investments proper information for determining their current 
value (Office of Fair Trading, 1988b, p. 14-15). 
For the OFT, the mechanisms established by the Stock Exchange f iled to provide the 
affordances envisioned in the legislation. Although the sole-source might provide 
some benefits to the users of the market, it was ‘not necessarily the best way to 
achieve fairness. It may control the flow of information and ensure that it reaches 
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those who can afford to subscribe to the Exchange’s service […] but it does not 
ensure that information reaches the wider audience of private shareholders’ (Office 
of Fair Trading, 1988b, p. 26).  
 
Through their assessments, the OFT exemplified a transformation of the 
regulatory imperatives of British finance. The economic vocabularies of information 
asymmetry and market transparency were becoming the tec nical manifestations and 
measures of previous notions of investor protection. As equal access to information 
became a right of the marketplace, transparency becam  its technical expression. 
Moral and interpersonally evaluated rights were made menable to the mechanics of 
mathematical formalism.  
 
Following a period of extreme competition amongst market makers, in 1989 
the Stock Exchange revised its rules on the publication of deals. After Big Bang in 
1986, trades in the most active stocks (also known as ‘alpha’ stocks) were reported 
within five minutes of execution and published immediately thereafter. Reporting in 
the less active ‘beta’ stocks was not required, thoug . The revised rules, however, 
extended immediate publication to beta stocks and introduced a 24 hour delay in the 
publication of large deals: £50,000 for beta stocks and £100,000 for alpha stocks. 
Based on a study commissioned to the London Business School, the Stock Exchange 
considered such delay would give market makers the opportunity to unwind their 
positions without generating ‘spurious’ volatility n the market (Lee, 2002, p. 181). It 
was, for them, the reasonable mechanism for guaranteeing an orderly market. 
 
In their subsequent assessment of the amended trading rules, the OFT 
presented a different interpretation, arguing that delays in publication created 
information asymmetries that restricted and distorted competition (Office of Fair 
Trading, 1990, p. 5). Crucially, the OFT’s opinion was based as much on the standard 
process of consultation with market participants as on economic research. In 
preparing their report, the OFT commissioned Professor Gordon Gemmill of the City 
University Business School to study the effects of different publication rules on large 
trades (Gemmill, 1996; Office of Fair Trading, 1990). As Gemmill recalled, the 
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‘official’ character of the study provided him with access to trade-by-trade data 
‘which would otherwise not have been available to me’ (Gemmill, personal 
communication). In effect, the OFT report not only created a new object of regulation 
– price transparency; it also materialised a regulatory turn towards economic 
evidence in quantifying and qualifying competition in the market.  
 
Issues of price transparency continued to figure heavily in the interactions 
between the OFT and the Stock Exchange. In 1991, the Stock Exchange changed its 
rules by dismantling the existing categorisation of shares and introducing the Normal 
Market Size7 as the new metric for stocks. In an attempt to provide a better proxy for 
liquidity, reporting standards were now framed through NMS rather than in terms of 
the previous categories alpha, beta, gamma and delta (L e, 2002). In their assessment 
of these changes, the OFT once again turned to the instruments of economics. The 
report published in November 1994 was notably technical. Transparency, it argued, 
had a clear economic justification: 
Prices are regarded as efficient if they reflect all available information. This is 
the basis for the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) which suggests that stock 
prices take account of certain kinds of information, essentially public 
information, efficiently, that is, in such a way tha  one cannot make 
exceptional profits by using the information. The implication of this is that 
pricing efficiency can be enhanced if relevant information is revealed to the 
market. Immediate last-trade publication can contribu e to pricing efficiency 
if details of past trades convey information to the market (Office of Fair 
Trading, 1994).  
In light of a growing literature, the OFT reaffirmed its previous findings, arguing that 
delayed publication restricted and distorted competition. Transparency had become a 
technical metaphor for regulation in the City of Lond n.   
 
In May 1997, after the protracted collapse of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, 
announced an overhaul of British banking, insurance and financial services. Barely 
ten years had passed since Big Bang when the responsibility to supervise the 
financial services sector was delegated to a new agency. From 2000 onwards, the 
                                               




Financial Services Authority, successor to the Securities and Investment Board, thus 
became the central, statutory regulator of British finance.  
 
Legislated through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the 
Financial Services Authority acquired statutory contr l over the market. The FSA thus 
became a governmental mechanism for guaranteeing market confidence, public 
awareness, consumer protection and lower levels of financial crime. In a sense, the 
FSA was but a result of trends initiated in the 1980s, when technicality rose to 
prominence as a legitimate form of regulatory intervention. Specifically, the 
authority of the FSA was partly anchored on the expert tools of economics:  within its 
remit, the regulator was given the authority to make rules ‘about the disclosure and 
use of information held by an authorised person’ (S. 147 HM Stationary Office, 
2000). The regulation of finance was thereby extended to the surveillance, control 
and regulation of information. 
6.5 Final remarks 
The regulatory landscape of British finance is once again undergoing a process of 
change. Catalysed by the recent financial crisis, the role, operation and 
instrumentalia of regulatory institutions is at centr  of the domestic and international 
political debate. Many questions remain on the shape that future regulation will take. 
What transformations, if any, will characterise thenext epoch of financial regulation? 
 
The debate between Lord Turner and the Treasury Committee in June 2009 
gestures, perchance subtly, at probable points of fracture in the current regulatory 
regime. Importantly, the incumbent economic paradigm is the target of intense 
critique. In reflecting on the crisis, for instance, Lord Turner noted in his speech to 
the CBI’s Annual Conference that 
too much confidence in the theory of efficient and rational markets, in the 
assumption that liquid financial markets will delivr appropriate price signals 
which give warning of risk, and that private incentives and market discipline 
will ensure that beneficial and adequately stable results follow from the 
pursuit of competitive self-interest […] Alan Greenspan believed that theory 
explicitly and strongly for over 40 years up until last year.  And then, on 23 
October last year, he informed the world that having observed the crisis and 
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thought a bit more about it, ‘I have found a flaw’ […] The flaws are indeed 
many and significant (Turner, 2009). 
The future of regulation according to Lord Turner rsides in a novel philosophy that 
focuses on ‘systemic approaches’ rather than technical risks measured at the level of 
the firm. The future, for Lord Turner, is in a conservative regulation of complexity. 
The techniques behind such approach, behind an emphasis on the system rather than 
the firm, have yet to acquire the concreteness of the regnant economic paradigm, 
however. Before financial economics reached the ears of the OFT, we must remember 
that it produced a canon (Jovanovic, 2008), it became  global source of authoritative 
expertise on the market.  
 
The coin is in the air, then, on the economic paradigm that will instrument 
future regulation. Notably, though, potential candidates are increasingly discernable. 
In a note provokingly titled ‘The Economist’s New Clothes’, Stephanie Flanders, the 
BBC’s chief economic editor, explored three approaches t at are competing for the 
attention of the regulators of the future. Neoclassical economics, as represented by 
Myron Scholes, seems ‘pretty unrepentant’, unlikely to change its customs and 
approach (The Economist, 2009). Keynesianism as heralded by Lord Robert 
Skydelsky attracts great interest, noting the irreducibility of the world to probabilistic 
relations. And behavioural economics, as construed by Richard Thaler, brings the 
promise of empirical insights – though, as Flanders notes, behavioural economics is 
more critique than competing theory (Flanders, 2009).  
 
Behind the debate, however, one thing is almost certain–or as certain as 
things can be in finance. The extant organisational trends that represent markets as 
manageable activity, as entities that can be fixed through intervention, are likely to 
continue. Crisis once again confirmed its role as amotor of reregulation. And whilst 
some regulators call for greater discretion and less r liance on technical instruments, 
the bureaucracies of market surveillance and control are likely to grow. Interestingly, 
though, as the dust of the last crisis settles, a new set of challenges is emerging in the 
horizon. Technological innovations in finance, specifically the proliferation of 
sophisticated computer systems that automate trades and conduct deals within 
milliseconds, are transforming the structure and behaviour of the markets. Perhaps 
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ironically, as markets overtly become domains of computational interaction, 
regulation is claiming to move away from technicality, attempting to recover a role 














7 The Fuzzy Ontology of Finance: Making 
Markets with Metaphors 
In the atrium of the London Stock Exchange building stands a 32 meter-tall artefact 
animated by the live data feeds of electronic trading. Inaugurated by Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth on 27 July 2004, the 729 Perspex orbs of The Source – a kinetic 
sculpture designed by greyworld – move up and down, activated by Python scripts 
that capture, interpret and represent the market’s ac ivity as it takes place. Like pixels 
on a screen, The Source makes physical the ephemeral nature of the stock mar et, 
providing the Stock Exchange with a unique digital substitute for its lost trading 
floor.  
 
The Source is an homage to both the electronic fluidity of the market and the 
human buzz of a time long gone. In its futuristic constitution, however, The Source 
annihilates nostalgia, creating a space – both economic and architectural– that leaves 
no room for the past. Aside from the Perspex – material of both The Source’s orbs 
and the whiteboards that once stood on the wooden floorboards near Threadneedle 
Street – nothing seems to remain from the days of analog finance. The pristine metal 
and concrete, marble and glass of the new Stock Exchange building surgically 
reconstruct our social imaginary of the market, reminding us that in today’s financial 
word there is only the cold reality of the corporate future.  
 
The Stock Exchange, nevertheless, shares a distinctive feature with its 
predecessor. Like the Starbucks across Paternoster Square, the newsstand at the 
entrance of Bank station, the art gallery in Soho, t e Tesco near Pall Mall, the Stock 
Exchange is a space of economic interaction, an arena for trade. The Stock 
Exchange, in particular, is a market, and despite the transformations and vicissitudes 
of time, has been so constantly for more than two hundred years. 
 
The market, we are told, is a cornerstone of modernity. Through it, goods and 
services are allocated, labour is directed towards p oductive ends, natural resources 
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are transformed into sophisticated products, and inovation is guaranteed by the 
spirit of capitalist enterprise. Whether through its invisible hand, its rationalising 
logic, or its evolutionary mechanics, the market shapes, organises and structures 
society.  
 
Despite this centrality, the market seems to escape all efforts of definition. 
Throughout the literature, the market emerges as a chameleonic character whose role 
adapts to the analytical gaze of the audience. The market is fluid circulation and 
static calculation, creation and destruction, mechanism and organism. The market is 
impersonal exchange; an aggregator of knowledge (Hayek, 1948); a Delphic oracle 
(Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004); the disentanglement of ownership relations (Thomas, 
1991); a system of commensuration (Carruthers et al., 1999); a calculative device 
(Muniesa & Callon, 2005); a frame for embedding anddisembedding (Callon, 1998); 
networks of social relationships between producers and consumers (Granovetter, 
1985); collectives differentiated through boundaries of legitimacy (Preda, 2009; 
Podolny, 1993); signalling systems (White, 2002); conversational exchanges (Knorr 
Cetina et al., 2002); a social arena of structured exchange (Fligstein, 2001); an 
evolving computational entity (Mirowski, 2007); a mechanism for the creation of 
value (Smith, 1989); a logic of worth (Stark, 2009); and a sociotechnical gencement 
(MacKenzie, 2009). The market is everything and nothi g; local and global; rational 
and emotional.  
 
For students of the economy, the claim that markets are multifaceted is hardly 
revolutionary (e.g. Lie, 1997). Confronting the timeless and asocial characterizations 
of neoclassical economic theory (Fligstein, 1996), recent literature has brought to the 
fore the shifting nature of the market, showing its h storical specificity (Mirowski, 
1988), underlying sociality (Granovetter, 1985; Podolny, 1993; White, 2002), 
cognitive fabric (Beunza & Stark, 2004; Knorr-Cetina & Preda, 2001), and overt 
materiality (Pinch et al., 2008). Even within economics, there is today an increasing 
recognition of the diversity of market forms and the importance of structural 
elements in economic behaviour (e.g. O'Hara, 1997). Markets are now designed. And 
calculation is the purview of computer algorithms as much as it is of rational agents. 
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The market, thence, is more chimera than chameleon, an animal formed by many 
animals, a material, embodied, ideological and symbolic mixture. 
 
This chapter seeks to contribute to the theoretical mélange of the sociology of 
markets by dealing with the forms of knowledge, practice, embodied action, and 
symbolic labour that lead to the constitution of a particular market form, finance. In 
particular, this chapter explores not what financial m rkets do but how they are 
made. This exploration is carried out in two parts. The first, captured, in section 1, 
introduces the theoretical instruments used to understand the mechanisms behind the 
creation of markets. Referred to as ‘market-making regimes’, these mechanisms 
constitute a taxonomy of the types of social actions deployed when creating specific 
manifestations of the market. In the second part of this chapter, I analyse the role of 
metaphors in market-making regimes. Section 2 presents a theoretical examination of 
the use of metaphors in market-making practices, focusing on the socio-cognitive 
and coordinative roles of metaphorical structures. This section also introduces a 
specific metaphor – the so-called informatic metaphor – as an example relevant to 
the history and sociology of modern finance. In seeking to understand its role in the 
making of markets, section 3 presents a brief genealogy of the informatic metaphor. 
Finally, section 4 provides a broad (perhaps tentative) sketch of the manner in which 
the informatic metaphor was deployed in American and British financial markets.  
7.1 The Constitution of the Market 
Let me start with the simple statement that the market is more than exchange. This 
recognition, which implies that the scope of the market overflows the transfer of 
goods and services between producers and consumers, is perhaps the single most 
important contribution of the recent sociological and anthropological literature on 
economic life. The market, in this sense, involves not only relationships of exchange 
– which may or may not be anonymous, and which may or may not be monetary – 
but also entails creating symbolic, material, and cognitive supports that enable 




The market, then, is not reducible to the bounded and objectivised account of 
the economy as posed by our modern social imaginary (Ta lor, 2004). Market 
interaction is embedded, whether in pre-existing social relations (Granovetter, 1985), 
inter-firm networks of  producers (White, 2002), or p litico-cultural relations 
between organisations (Fligstein, 2001). The market, however, is not merely the 
enactment of socialised forms of calculation in relation to a specific problem of 
exchange. The market is formed neither by collections f socialised Homo 
oeconomicus nor by a set of mechanised Homo sociologicus. Effectively, the market 
exists beyond a single evaluative framework, dependent on several competing logics 
of justification (Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006).  
 
The market is thus formed at the interface of several fo ms, fields, discourses 
and practices. While the market is embedded in broader forms of marketing – just as 
the economy is embedded in economics (Callon, 1998) –, it is also rooted, for 
instance, in the discourse and instrumentalia of civic and political rationality (e.g. the 
law, governance and  public policy). Although produced through specific forms of 
economic knowing and particular modes of economisation (Caliskan & Callon, 
2009), as a social institution, the market incorporates several – possibly 
incommensurable – conventionalities of value, contest and coordination. 
 
As Koray Caliskan noted in his study of the global m rket for cotton, the 
market is an ‘elusive thing’ (Caliskan, 2005). The hybrid elusiveness and 
pervasiveness of the market may indeed stem from the multiple roles it performs in 
society and the myriad types of labour that factor into its creation. Any attempt at 
definition, any attempt at fixing the fluidity of this chimerical cultural entity, would 
be thus futile.  
 
The futility of demarcation is not an impediment to analysis, however. Rather 
than trying to describe the market as a concrete object whose operation is driven by 
specified rules, sociological analysis can shift to the mechanisms through which 
social actors create, deploy and defend boundary objects (Leigh Star & Griesemer, 
1989) and boundary organizations (Guston, 2001) around the common theme of ‘the 
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market’. Thus, instead of attempting to access the market as empirical reality, the 
analysis of economic life can concentrate on the specific forms of work that take 
place in the putative constitution of a market.  
 
Here, I will refer to the forms of work that go into the creation of a market as 
regimes of market-making. By a regime of market-making, I mean the localised set 
of social actions that respond to the question: How is a market made? As recent 
discussions suggest – in particular, those at the confluence of science and technology 
studies and economic sociology – acts of market-making take a multiplicity of forms. 
To analyse the ways in which markets are constituted, this multiplicity is categorised 
into six distinct regimes: the material, embodied, affective, social, cognitive and 
symbolic.  
 
This focus on forms of market-making is meant to highlight two aspects of 
the market. First, the shifting manners in which social actors relate to this entity as an 
apparently abstract mechanism whereby supply and demand confront each other and 
adjust (Callon, 1998). Through concrete work, I argue, the allegedly abstract market 
is given actual manifestations. The market, in this sense, is constituted beyond the 
dichotomy between theoretical and practical activity, between economics and the 
economy. The market, for instance, is place: one ca be ‘in the market’ or ‘out of the 
market’. The market is also material and movement: the market goes ‘up’ and 
‘down’, is ‘hot’ and ‘cold’, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’. Furthermore, the market is artefact: it 
can ‘work’ or be ‘broken’. And it is also emotive and cognitive: at times, the market 
gets ‘angry’ with speculators, becomes ‘crazy’ or is, conversely, ‘kind’ and 
‘mellow’. Like the market, the forms of market-making work across various 
domains, creating a common interface to which all align their social actions.  
 
Second, the identification of regimes of market-making responds to the 
observation that there is no unique way of constituting a market. Market-making 
means different things in different social and historical contexts. For a jobber on the 
floor of the London Stock Exchange circa 1950, making a market meant creating the 
possibility of exchange by uttering a quote, assuring the conditions of felicity 
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(Austin, 1975) upon which a conversational exchange could become performative 
(Pardo-Guerra, 2010). For that actor in that space, making a market was concomitant 
to creating the possibility, rather than assuring the certainty, of exchange: the market 
was not in exchange but in the possibility thereof.   
7.1.1 The material regime 
Uttering quotes on a trading floor is not the only way one can make a market. The 
most straightforward type of market-making involves the use and modification of the 
material world with the aim of creating supports for calculation and exchange. 
Marie-France Garcia-Parpet’s now classical study of the construction of the 
strawberry auction market in Fontaines-en-Solonge (Garcia-Parpet, 2007) provides a 
clear illustration of this, the material regime of market-making. To achieve the 
practical realization of the pure model of competition, argues Garcia-Parpet, the 
auction venue was construed to differentiate between buyers, sellers and the 
auctioneer. The market was ‘made’, in a very materil sense.  
 
Like the jobber on the floor of the Stock Exchange, a programmer working 
on an electronic communication network is also making a market, creating the 
platform on which exchange may be possible. So is the architect, designing the floor 
plans for a new trading room, or the computer engineer, installing faster connections 
between servers to minimize latency. Although their activities might seem 
intrinsically technological, they are also overtly oriented toward the making of a 
market.  
 
The fact that markets are material – or have concrete material manifestations 
– now seems a commonplace, as demonstrated by the growin  literature in the social 
studies of finance (MacKenzie, 2009; Pinch et al., 2008). The recognition that 
material labour goes into the creation of market nevertheless continues to be a source 
of valuable insights into the dynamics and evolution of economic life. As chapters 3 
and 4 showed, the history of the Stock Exchange was inextricable from the history of 
the market’s materialities. Due to its concrete materi lisations, the market provided 
by the Stock Exchange was prone to the sticky dynamics of the physical world. For 
the Stock Exchange, the adoption of technologies entail d new types of work—for 
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instance, routine maintenance. In providing market information services, the Stock 
Exchange hired computer and telecommunication enginers that guaranteed the 
reliable operation of its systems (perhaps recognizing that the implementation and 
use of technologies requires local, tacit forms of knowledge Fleck, 2003). And as 
demand for the systems grew, and with it the pressu for increased reliability, the 
number of technologists climbed. Decisions to update systems only accelerated the 
process, leading the Stock Exchange to increase the size of the Technical Services 
department and expand the expertise of the organization, hiring analysts, 
programmers, managers, developers and support staff. The work associated to the 
market information services – the material regime of market-making – transformed 
the Stock Exchange into a centre of technological innovation and the market into an 
explicitly technological entity.  
7.1.2  The embodied regime 
Markets, however, are not only made by materialities and their associated forms of 
labour. The market is also constituted through particular forms of embodied action 
(e.g. Abolafia, 1996; MacKenzie, 2006). Whether in the apparently ruthless trading 
pits of Chicago (Zaloom, 2006) or the civilised environment of an auction room 
(Heath & Luff, 2007), making a market, entering into a contract, participating of 
exchange, entails specific conventionalities on the us  and articulation of the body.  
 
The introduction of radio-communication technologies into the floor of the 
Stock Exchange provides here a relevant example of the bodily constitution of 
markets. When these technologies were adopted by member firms to facilitate the 
communication between brokers on the floor and their offices, they inadvertently 
revealed some of the types of embodied labour that wen into forging contracts. 
Through the use of portable bidirectional radio devic s, in particular, brokers could 
request instructions and information from their offices without leaving the floor. For 
jobbers, the use of such systems entailed new informatic asymmetries that were 
impossible to minimise with their knowledge of the floor. As David Steen, recalled 
in interview, the introduction of these devices 
was a frightful sort of hoo-ha […]. You weren’t allowed to use your walkie-
talkie set actually on the jobbers pitch, so the jobber was standing here [with 
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his price board next to him] and the broker came up [and] would ask for a 
price. Then he’d go off [there], [a couple of meters] over here, and he’d 
report to his office. Now, the jobber could change th  price while [the broker 
was on the walkie-talkie with his office]. But he wasn’t allowed to do it while 
he was standing on the pitch. You wouldn’t have got much good will with the 
broker if you did, but there circumstances were it had occurred. (Steen 
interview). 
The agreement to buy or sell shares was formed not only on the back of conventions 
on dealing as a conversational exchange (Pardo-Guerra, 2010) but, importantly, 
through specific embodied performances from those on the floor of the Stock 
Exchange.  
7.1.3  The affective regime 
The embodied dimension of market-making has the corollary of rendering the market 
into an affective object. In their interactions, social actors involved in the making of 
markets adopt emotional languages to describe their routine activities and the 
constitutive relations they establish with the market-at-large. As several authors have 
argued elsewhere, market processes are bound to emoions. As recent scholarship 
suggests, emotions seem to perform several roles in the stabilisation of the market, 
operating as either heuristics for rational action, contributors to the creation of trust 
(Banelj, 2009), or as factors that contribute to the s aping of expectations (Pixley, 
2002).   
 
An example of the prevalence of affectivity as a market-making practice is 
provided in the work of Karin Knorr-Cetina and Urs Bruegger. In their study of the 
postsocial relationships constructed between traders and their screens, (Knorr-Cetina 
& Bruegger, 2002) identified, amongst other things, emotional vocabularies through 
which the (mainly electronic) market is represented. Traders, they note, say they 
‘feel’ and ‘sense’ the market. And although reference to a ‘feeling’ might seem, more 
than anything else, an expression of tacit forms of kn wledge developed around the 
interpretation of market information, this ambiguity is also associated to the affective 
modes with which individuals relate to, and the affective characteristics they ascribe 
to, the market. The market, for instance, is often represented as a sexualised entity, 
‘shafting’, ‘bending over’, ‘blowing up’, ‘raping’ and ‘hammering’ those who dare 




These and similar affective tropes are often compleented by stories of game 
and theatrical performance. In his recollections of the City of London, Michael 
Verey (1912 - 2000), a former banker with Helbert, Wagg, noted that business was ‘a 
means to an end. We wanted to have fun and crack some jokes’ (quoted in Courtney 
et al., 1996, p. 9). For brokers and jobbers, dealers nd investors, the market was 
play, a bounded space for ludic interaction. Recalling his days on the floor, David 
Steen stressed the ‘enormous fun’ he had as a jobber (Steen interview). And as 
broker for Philips & Drew, Paul Bazalgette warned those tempted to feed their 
business into a computer, ‘dealing done that way will never be fun. Dealing certainly 
ought to be, and I think that between humans it usually is’ (Kynaston, 2002, p. 422).  
7.1.4  The social regime 
The view that markets are the ultimate product of social action is a long and 
illustrious claim (e.g. (Weber, 2000) [1924]). Indee , a considerable part of the 
theoretical and empirical efforts of economic sociology over the past thirty years 
have gone into demonstrating either that socio-politic  nstitutions are necessary for 
the existence of an economy or the manner in which t e market is embedded in a 
larger social domain. While some authors sought to explicate economic life in terms 
of culture-bound scripts that frame economic action (Zukin et al., 1990), others 
identified the calculative agency in social networks that allow actors to reduce 
uncertainty and engage in exchange (Granovetter, 1985; Callon, 1998).  
 
These approaches, however, tend to focus on the fabric of calculative 
agencies, that is, on the sociology of the calculative devices (Muniesa et al., 2005) 
that bring market interaction into being. The other forms of social labour that go into 
the creation of a market are thus rendered peripheral to the analytical gaze. These 
types include manifestations of social action that are not explicitly calculative but 
that, nevertheless, constitute varieties of market-making insofar as they create 
boundaries and structures between the market and its putative exterior. A clear 
example is provided by forms of interaction oriented at creating trust between parties 
around the act of exchange, that is, types of social a tion oriented at providing 




Entertaining a client, attending a trade conference, visiting a company 
director, holding a conversation with an investor, or engaging in a long lunch with 
colleagues all contribute to making the market. These acts, in a sense, provide 
members of the community of market practitioners foms of knowledge that, due to 
their interpersonal qualities and located nature, can be difficult to obtain by other 
means. As the previous chapter argued, the regulatory control of the London Stock 
Exchange’s market – which is tantamount to defining the limits of the market as 
sphere of legitimate action – was closely associated to the interpersonal forms of 
knowledge developed brokers and jobbers. For this, structures, and almost ritualistic, 
activities such as the legendary ‘long lunches’ of the City of London allowed people 
‘to know each other better, and to understand each other. I think that actually helped 
the flow of business’ (Steen interview). In the words of George Nissen, former 
broker with Pember & Boyle, the lunch-room in his firm was  
an immensely important part of the business and got to know our clients 
extremely well inviting them to lunch […] [The Stock Exchange itself was] a 
sort of lunch club […] It all adds to your understanding of what people you’re 
working with and your general information about what’s going on in the City 
(quoted in Courtney et al., 1996, p. 197-198). 
Arguably, part of the work performed by the cultural circuits of capital (Thrift, 2005) 
is precisely to create and circulate specific forms of interpersonal and systemic 
knowledge that can only be accessed through social interactions within the market’s 
communities. To keep the market alive beyond the relationship of exchange requires, 
in a sense, the incessant activity of forging, modifying and qualifying social 
connectivities.  
7.1.5 The symbolic regime  
The social investments in market-making are frequently – though not necessarily – 
related to the creation of readily transportable signposts. The representation of the 
Stock Exchange as a national institution, for instace, involved creating a particular 
imaginary of honour and respectability, which achieved expressions in the concept of 
gentlemanly capitalism as well as in the regulatory attitudes towards finance in 
Britain. Effectively, the market is populated by symbols that allow actors to orient 
their behaviours towards a common strategy. Symbols and symbolic structures 
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enable, for example, the formation of coalitions, articulating critique, and exploring 
futuristic possibilities. As a case in point, the imagery of the market as a mechanism 
driven by the invisible hand of collective rational action has long been a rhetoric 
instrument for political mobilisation. As signposts, symbols provide the possibility of 
defining the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the market, allowing for social actors to refer to 
the internal constitution of the marketplace and its outward projection. In effect, the 
diffuse edges of the market are supported by second order symbolic systems, by sets 
of mythologies (Barthes, 1993) that are the discursive resources upon which 
boundary work is performed.  
 
Symbolic work, however, also takes local and precise forms. The prices on an 
electronic trading screen, the FTSE index, the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the 
London InterBank Offered Rate all required efforts to become entities that are widely 
acknowledged to trigger market action. To feed intocalculative agencies, 
furthermore, these symbols have to be made conventional: they need to acquire 
meaning within a particular community. Prices, for instance, do not emerge 
‘naturally’ out of market interaction. Rather, they are carefully produced in relation 
to the conventionalities of meaning and practice of investors and intermediaries 
(Muniesa, 2007; Pardo-Guerra, 2010).  
7.1.6  The cognitive regime 
Finally, making markets is also a cognitive process. Here, well-known analyses of 
the processes of classification, standardisation, cmmensuration, accounting, 
economisation, qualification and calculation that lead to exchange provide plentiful 
examples (see (Caliskan et al., 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Stark, 2009; Podolny, 1993; 
Callon, 1998; Carruthers et al., 1999)). Yet as thee studies demonstrate, the 
cognitive work behind market-making is not reducible to internalised machine-like 
mental calculations. On the contrary, the cognitive efforts that make market 
exchange possible are distributed. They are, in a sense, coextensive to assemblages 
of human and non-human entities (MacKenzie et al., 2007). Hence, the models and 
theories utilised to conceptualise the market as an ide tifiable object – e.g. financial 
economics – are as much an element of cognition as the act of processing a stimuli 
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and producing a response – e.g. deciding how to react to a change of price on a 
trading screen.  
7.2 Market and Metaphor 
As an analytical tool, the regimes of market-making presented above should not be 
confused with closed domains of action defined in terms of the organisation of 
embodied or epistemic labour in the marketplace. Similarly, they should not be 
deemed an injective mapping from a set of logics of w rth (Boltanski et al., 2006; 
Stark, 2009) onto a set of concrete forms of social action. The market-making 
activities of particular actors can exist simultaneously in several regimes. 
Consequently, specific manifestations of market-making – for instance, creating a 
limit order book, or designing the display of data on a trading screen – involve 
performing work across two or more regimes. Thus, the material regime is not 
limited to the technologist who builds an automated execution system. As well as 
making a market in a physical sense, the technologist also engages in symbolic work 
(defining, for instance, forms of market visualisaton), and a reasonable degree of 
social work (she has to sell the product to her company and the users, creating 
networks of producers, developers, and consumers). A trader, similarly, is not 
constrained to cognitive work. A trader does not merely construct the market as a 
cognitive entity but, on the contrary, renders the market into an affective object, 
becomes a weaver of social connectivities around the relationships of exchange, and 
lives the market as an embodied experience.   
 
Making markets is therefore an activity that can take numerous forms. But 
precisely due to this multiplicity, precisely due to the fact that it is made across 
several regimes, in different locations, and at varying times, the market cannot be 
apprehended in its entirety. The market is concrete and abstract, contained and 
ubiquitous, here and everywhere. We experience the market for cotton by walking 
into a clothing store, observing prices and products, and choosing to buy a particular 
t-shirt. But we also experience the market in other angible ways, for instance, by 
growing, transporting, or trading the cotton and its derivatives. The market, 
nevertheless, is not reducible to any of its specific manifestations: the market is an 
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abstract conceptualisation, a larger assemblage of institutions, boundaries, 
individuals, things, techniques, models, languages, images and feelings (Caliskan, 
2005). We can relate to equations, models and theories; we can relate to political 
ideologies and machinations of perfect societies; we can relate to calculative 
practices and specific systems of worth; we can relate to specific suppliers and 
providers, but we cannot relate to the market as a whole.  
 
The impossibility of wholesale access to the market explains the use and 
prominence of higher order representations as the basis for collective coordination 
(Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2001). As a policy instrument, the theoretical instumentalia 
of economics offers a particular mode of concrete apprehension that provides some 
types of market-makers (e.g. an International Monetary Fund analyst or a 
government minister) a common set of referents: in all its complexity, the market is 
reduced to equations and numbers, to tractable relations between discrete entities. A 
graph, too, serves as concrete mode of apprehension, representing ‘the market’ as a 
bounded visual unit: supply and demand, producers and consumers are transformed 
into two lines on a bi-dimensional plane. In the Lond n Stock Exchange, the trigger 
screen introduced by Michael Newman on SEAQ provides yet another example, 
allowing traders to leave the floor and move onto the dealing desk by ‘capturing’ the 
market through colour and movement (chapter 4). Finally, market prices – like the 
practice of marking a price – are also construed as concrete manifestations of a larger 
system, as readily transportable entities that allow s cial actors to refer to ‘the 
market’ in a specific thing, be it cotton, company shares, or index derivatives.  
 
The unfeasibility of total apprehension also explains the pervasiveness of 
metaphorical vocabularies as means for describing the market. For the cognitive 
linguist George Lakoff, metaphors are the main mechanisms through which we 
comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract re soning (Lakoff, 1992). Whilst 
we cannot capture the market in its entirety, we can apprehend metaphors of its 
nature and operation. Thus, the metaphor of markets as vertical movement (e.g. 
‘prices went up’ or ‘the market went down’) has conrete manifestations in setting up 
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the repertoire we use to represent the market. The market slides, slumps, falls and 
tumbles, and it rises, bounces and breaks the ceiling.   
 
Yet metaphors are not merely figurative. On the contrary, metaphors are 
conceptual, embodied elements of cognition that result from our concrete experience 
with the physical world (Lakoff et al., 2003). The metaphor that ‘more is up’, argues 
(Lakoff, 1992), is grounded in the common experiences of everyday life: pouring 
fluid into a container and seeing the level go up, or adding more things to a pile and 
seeing it get higher. In these experiences, we develop a correspondence between 
different conceptual domains. In the case of ‘more is up’, we establish a 
correspondence between the domain of quantity and that of verticality: ‘more’ 
becomes ‘up’ whilst ‘less’ becomes ‘down’. In most metaphors, however, the 
correspondence in real experience is unnecessary: a metaphor is often intelligible 
because it has a regular correspondence with many other cases, some of which are 
bound to experiential grounds. We need not be told,f r instance, that a market 
‘bounce’ is ‘more’ whilst a market ‘slide’ is ‘less’.  
 
Metaphors, then, create systematic mappings between domains, for instance, 
between verticality and quantity, between emotions a d colour. And precisely due to 
their incidence across domains, metaphors are instruments that intervene in our 
relation with the world-at-large. Like models in science (Morgan & Morrison, 1999), 
metaphors mediate our every-day interactions, creating conceptual linkages and 
structuring our actions around a common experiential rel tion: metaphors of market 
as movement, market as substance, market as colour, and market as animal become 
coordinated and, more importantly, serve as a common echanism for organising 
and orienting behaviour. Metaphors go to the very core of our interaction with ‘the 
market’, shaping our expectations as to what the future has in store. In their 
insightful study, (Morris, Sheldon, Ames, & Young, 2007) show that the use of 
agentic metaphorical commentary (e.g. ‘the NASDAQ climbed higher’) prompted the 
audience to expect the continuation of trends, whereas the use of object metaphors 
(e.g. ‘the NASDAQ was pushed higher’) did not. In this instance, via specific 
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metaphors, certain expectations on the nature and future of the market were created, 
possibly shaping the decisions taken by the audience. 
 
But metaphors are not constrained to the domain of i dividual cognition. 
Metaphors, rather, are elements of the coordinative rep rtoires of social actors. As 
Barry Barnes as John Dupre note,  
without the models and metaphors current in our shaed everyday culture, 
social coordination quite generally would not be possible, and social life in 
the sense that human beings know it could not exist. The deployment of 
models and metaphors relevant to our present concern is just the redescription 
of things and goings-on in one context in terms of familiar shared patterns 
established in other contexts. If blinkered vision is sometimes encouraged by 
shared models and metaphors, it is the price that has o be paid for the 
coordination they allow (Barnes & Dupre, 2008, p. 61)1. 
Metaphors are mechanisms for coordinating action by means of the conventionalities 
of experience as much as they are devices for apprehending environmental surprises 
by making situational knowledge about novelty transportable.  
 
How, then, can we account for changes in our relation with, and 
understanding of, financial markets? The observation that our concrete market-
making practices hinge on broader systems of metaphor offers a possible answer: the 
historical evolution of financial markets can be narrated as much in terms of shifting 
institutions, materialities and practices as through the changing metaphors used by 
market-makers in creating, bounding and reformatting economic life. The history of 
the market is, in a sense, mirrored by the history of the metaphors used to describe it. 
 
Economics provides a useful example of the role of metaphors in our market-
making practices. For the sake of argument, let us con ider economics a form of 
cognitive market-making. In the end, economics is an intellectual tool that attempts 
to represent economic exchange through a concrete set of practices (e.g. 
mathematical abstraction, the creation of models and theories, the use of statistical 
techniques) and that, increasingly, seeks to be a source of insight for economic (and 
non-economic) policies. In a sense, let us follow the logic of Michel Callon’s 
                                               
1 I owe this point to Donald MacKenzie. 
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performativity programme (Callon, 1998), accepting economics as an agent that 
bears upon the configuration of the economy. If we allow for this possibility, if we 
embrace economics as a form of market making, then much of the literature on the 
history of economic thought is rendered a history of metaphors. The work of Philip 
Mirowski is salient in this respect, tracing the sinuous path of economics, from the 
natural metaphors entangled with the language of biology, evolution and physiology 
(Mirowski, 1988), to the mechanical metaphors of physics (Mirowski, 1999b), to the 
cybernetic dreams of the twentieth-century (Mirowski, 2002). Economics is a 
domain rife with metaphorical language (McCloskey, 1995). Metaphors here are not 
merely allegorical or pedagogic (Klamer & Leonard, 1994); they are, in all ways, 
structural to discourse (McCloskey, 1983).  
  
However, economics is just one form of market making. My point here is 
rather more general. Here, I posit that the use of metaphors is endemic to virtually all 
regimes of market-making as it is to all of our linguistic and concept-making 
practices. It is no coincidence, for instance, thate vocabulary of economic life on 
the floor of the London Stock Exchange was once governed by metaphors of ‘market 
as space’, ‘market as physical effort’ and ‘market as animal’. As former broker 
Dundas Hamilton explained in his account of the practices of the Stock Exchange 
(Hamilton, 1968), brokers on the floor had ‘positions’ that were ‘carried over’ 
accounting periods; prices were either ‘above’ or ‘below the market’; shares 
‘floated’; investors were ‘long’ and ‘short’; brokers could do ‘put-throughs’ by 
matching shares without recurring to a jobber; the market had a ‘touch’; profits were 
‘turns’; and some valiant brokers were ‘stags’. The market, then, was constituted at 
the interface of concrete instances of work, social connectivity, and the experiential 
metaphors of embodied space and time. It is indeed not surprising that for much of 
the twentieth century the dominant metaphor of the market, the regnant interpretation 
of finance, was that of the ‘club’. The club was not a descriptor of reality, as much as 
it was a metaphor of the sociality of exchange. After all, finance was a matter of 
embodied action and social connectivity: trade was conducted on the floor of the 
Stock Exchange, requiring physical presence and distinct conversational conventions 
(see chapter 3), and identities were bound to the social imaginaries of gentlemanly 
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capitalism (as discussed in chapter 5). Associated to the imagery of the gentlemanly 
capitalist, the metaphor of the club was not merely a linguistic affordance, however: 
critically, it allowed actors to establish limits, create boundaries, negotiate access and 
rally authority and legitimacy. This metaphor, certainly, was critical to the day-to-
day operation of British of finance. 
 
But experience is also technologically mediated, an rguably one of the 
most important metaphors of contemporary market-making practices bears the sign 
of the machine. The metaphor in question, referred to by some as the informatic 
metaphor, presents the world as reducible to the mining, distribution, coding, and 
decoding of information. The world, for this metaphor, is an information processor. 
And in its associated ontology, all there is at the end of the day is information and its 
flows.  
7.3 Informatic archaeologies 
In 1970, Eugene Fama published what is perhaps one of th  most significant articles 
of late twentieth century economics (Han Kim, Morse, & Zingales, 2006). Reviewing 
the extant literature on the behaviour of stock prices, Fama approached theory and 
evidence by introducing a novel yet subtle conceptualisation of the market. For 
Fama, the reigning debate on the randomness of stock prices could do with some 
reorganisation. Specifically, economic analysis should focus on determining whether 
markets were or not ‘efficient’, that is, whether scurities prices at any given time 
‘fully reflect’ all available information (Fama, 1970). 
 
Within the history of economics, Fama’s article marked the début of the 
efficient market hypothesis, the consolidation of a dominant theoretical canon on the 
structure and behaviour of financial markets (Jovanic, 2008). Predicated upon 
established traditions of economic thought (Samuelson, 1964), the efficient market 
hypothesis was, and continues to be, an object of intense empirical inquiry (for early 
debates, see Jensen, 1978; Shiller, 1981; Summers, 1986). The significance of 
Fama’s hypothesis, however, extended beyond technical debates. Importantly, the 
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criticality of the efficient market hypothesis resided in its metaphorical scaffold, in 
the fact that it represented financial markets in informatic terms.  
 
The informatic metaphor used by Fama – and that becam  commonplace in 
the modern vocabulary on finance – formed part of a broader discursive movement. 
From the Second World War onwards, emphases on informatic issues and their 
associated metaphors spread across the disciplinary andscapes of Europe and North 
America. The work of Fama and his peers manifested uch expansion within 
financial economics. In the larger realm of the economics profession, the 
transformation of information into a variable was, in the words of Kenneth Arrow, 
‘the greatest development of the century’ (Arrow, 2001, p. 300). Yet the use of 
information as a representational instrument was rife elsewhere: in accounting, 
information provided an objectivised veneer to the analysis of corporate statements 
(e.g. Lee et al., 1969; Beaver, 1968; Butterworth, 1972); in management, information 
was the basis for a general approach to the regulation of organisations (e.g. Boulding, 
1956); in psychology, information allowed rendering the mind into a manageable 
machine (Attneave, 1959; Edwards, 1996); in biology, informatic metaphors were 
central to the development of the control and communication models of genomics 
and molecular biology (Barnes et al., 2008; Fox-Keller, 2002; Kay, 1995); and, via 
statistical thermodynamics, information emerged as a standard concept in the 
analysis of astrophysical phenomena (e.g. Bekenstein, 1973; Bekenstein, 1975; 
Hawking, 2005).  
 
The history of the informatic metaphor has been gleaned by several well-cited 
studies. Notably, the works of Philip Mirowski (2002), and Lily E. Kay (1995) and 
Evelyn Fox-Keller (2002) highlight the careers of the informatic metaphor in 
economics and biology respectively. Similarly, in The Closed World, Paul Edwards 
(1996) provides a thorough and insightful account of the genesis of computing 
metaphors within the military circles of the Second World War and their subsequent 




The work of these authors highlights three processes that were constitutive of 
the informatic metaphor. The first was the consolidation of ‘formal’ approaches to 
puzzles in computing, communications and strategy. These included the 
formalisation of computing theory (e.g. Turing, 1936), the emergence of information 
theory (e.g. Shannon, 1937; Shannon, 1948), and the ev lopment of game theory 
(e.g. von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Founded on efi itions of information as 
a statistical function over a finite set of signs, these approaches transformed some of 
the technological problems confronted by Anglo-American military forces during the 
Second World War (including issues of encryption, securing communication 
channels and optimising field tactics) into a manageable body of abstract 
mathematical relations. As a common denominator to these puzzles, information 
provided a conceptual foundation upon which authors c uld construct a theoretical 
idealisation for apprehending the increasingly electronic environment of the 
twentieth century.  
 
Associated to these theoretical developments, the informatic metaphor was 
strengthened by the work performed in cybernetics. As Norbert Weiner, one of the 
founders of the field wrote, cybernetics offered a ‘unified’ approach to a set of 
problems in ‘communication, control, and statistical mechanics, whether in the 
machine of the living tissue’ (Weiner, 1948, p. 11). Through the collusion of 
biological and mechanical metaphors, cybernetics acquired the guise of a ‘grand 
theory of information and control’ (Edwards, 1996, p. 1), eroding a long-standing 
ontological divide between ‘humans and machines, the living and the dead, the active 
and the inert, meaning and symbol, intention and teleology’ (Mirowski, 2002, p. 13). 
Such ontic reconfiguration proved fruitful: through a cybernetic transformation, 
researchers tackled issues as diverse (and militarily relevant) as human-machine 
interaction, learning, cognition and organisational design. Here, the optimisation of 
anti-aircraft gun control served as an exemplar (Galison, 1994; Hacking, 1998; 
Edwards, 1996; Mirowski, 2002). The accuracy and effici ncy of the mechanism 
could only be improved, argued cyberneticians, by understanding the human operator 
and the machine as a single unit forming a ‘self-steering device guided by an 
information feedback loop’ (Bousquet, 2009, p. 108). The operator’s mind was thus 
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another computer in the loop, and systemic regulation was produced by processing 
the information received from the environment and reacting accordingly.  
 
The birth of operations research was the third contributor to the expansion of 
the informatic metaphor. Similar in form to cybernetics, operations research emerged 
during the Second World War as a result of the involvement of scientists (primarily 
physicists and statisticians) in the Anglo-American military efforts (Fortun & 
Schweber, 1993). Partly inspired by the theoretical approach of information theory 
and optimisation techniques (see Ackoff, 1956; Krulee, 1954), operations research 
was generally concerned with the application of statistics to predicting and 
comparing the costs of alternative courses of action involving human-machine 
systems (Mirowski, 1999a). As such, operations research offered a formal approach 
to problems of organisational decision-making, a fact that was exploited by the 
community of operational researchers when they built the professional boundaries of 
the field at the end of the war. Indeed, operations research survived the war 
successfully by becoming a practical instrument for improving ‘the everyday 
operation of administrative organisations’ (Simon & Newell, 1958). With the 
ensuing diffusion of operations research in civilian circles (Kirby, 2000), the 
metaphor of organisations as informatic entities reach d the halls of industry and 
government.  
 
Weaved in the organisational and technological looms f the war, the 
informatic metaphor was thus created. From an early stage, information ceased to be 
a technical shorthand for an abstract relation betwe n signs (Shannon, 1948), 
becoming a wholesale physical concept. Like mass, energy, time and space before, 
information acquired ontologically stable qualities (Mirowski, 2002). Importantly, 
information was understood through the so-called conduit metaphor. First articulated 
by Michael Reddy (1979), the conduit metaphor presents ideas as stable entities that 
travel through a channel between senders and receivers, mirroring the basic 
communications model of information theory (Day, 2000). According to Reddy, in 
our language about language, speakers convert ideas into objects, put objects into 
words, and send words along conduits to hearers who take the ideas/objects out of 
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their words/containers (Lakoff et al., 2003). The conduit metaphor hence renders 
information into a thing that can be ‘obtained’, ‘accessed’, ‘diffused’, ‘channelled’, 
‘extracted’, ‘flowing’, ‘spilling’ and ‘travelling’ through our technologies of 
communication (Boal & Lakoff, 1995). Through technology and discourse we 
became, pace Hacking, realists about information as an entity (Hacking, 1983). 
7.4 Making markets informatic in America and Britain  
7.4.1 America 
In finance, the metaphorical affordances of information and communication 
technologies became particularly relevant to market-making practices in 1960s and 
1970s America. Notably, the ascent of the informatic metaphor as a central mediator 
between economic actors and the market was exemplified in numerous episodes of 
the financial history of the United States, where in a matter of years markets became 
widely conceptualised in terms of technologically supported information flows.  
 
Arguably, the ultimate success of the informatic metaphor in America 
responded to a peculiar collusion between geography nd politics: from a historical 
perspective, the American financial system had grown in a fragmented manner, with 
different trading venues competing to capture a larger share of the market. Although 
prominent, the New York Stock Exchange by no means monopolised the national 
market, sharing space with regional exchanges – from San Francisco and 
Philadelphia to Chicago and Boston – and national venues – including the American 
Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the all-
electronic Instinet.  
 
Decisively, however, the American market was united by the centralising 
agency of the Securities and Exchange Commission which since the 1930s had 
overseen financial regulation in the United States. Through its political clout, the SEC 
proved fundamental in catalysing the automation of American finance. Authorised by 
Congress in 1961, the SEC created a special group responsible for studying and 
investigating the ‘adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules of national 
securities exchanges and national securities associations’ (House Commerce 
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Committee, 1961). Published in 1963, the Report of the Special Study group stressed 
the advantages of automation and electronic quote diss mination in ‘vastly 
increasing the flow of market information and […] insuring better executions for the 
public’  (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1963, p. 657). Surveying the future, 
the Special Study prepared the grounds for digital fin nce. From their consultation 
with specialists in electronic technologies – including the Univac Division of Sperry 
Rand Corp –, the Special Study group noted 
the potentiality of a system which would select the best bids and offers, 
execute orders, and clear transactions. Transmitting and receiving units would 
be installed in the offices of all subscribing broker-dealers. Wholesale dealers 
and other broker-dealer subscribers could enter quotations (and size of 
market) into a central computer for indexing under th  appropriate security 
and could interrogate the computer to determine the highest bid and lowest 
offer, selected by the computer, together with the number of shares bid and 
offered at such prices (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1963, p. 657). 
The fragmented marketplace, the ‘lack of central locati n’, could thus be ‘overcome 
by the use of a single, central computer’ from which information about trading would 
flow to both the professional dealer and the public. 
 
Soon enough, information technologies became recognisable instruments of 
regulation. By the mid 1970s, the US Congress and the SEC sought to extend 
regulatory control over the securities industry through the transformation of the 
material infrastructures of American finance. Amendments to the Securities 
Exchange Act in 1975, in particular, mandated the development of a National Market 
System (NMS), giving oversight and control over its establishment to the SEC. The 
objectives of the NMS resounded both with the ideals of economic theory and the 
regulatory imperatives of the SEC. The novel arrangement was to enhance the 
economic efficiency of transactions, ensure fair competition, provide broad 
availability of information, and – subjected to best xecution policies – guarantee the 
possibility of automating trades. Towards the end of the 1970s, a suite of 
technological systems gave shape to the NMS: while the Consolidated Tape unified 
the reporting of trades, the Consolidated Quotation System created streams of market 




In a substantial way, the fifteen years between the publication of the Report 
of the Special Study group in 1963 and the introduction of the Consolidated 
Quotation System in 1978 marked a profound change of the experiential character of 
finance in America. Markets were increasingly mediated by digital technologies and, 
following a tradition possibly inaugurated by the ticker tape (Preda, 2008), 
‘information flows’ became the blood of the marketplace. Concretely, the diffusion 
of information and communication technologies allowed cyborg metaphors to enter 
finance at the level of the embodied and material regimes of market-making: both the 
experience of being ‘in’ the market and the construction of novel market platforms, 
supports and architectures was mediated by the metaphor of economic and 
organisational life as informatic performance.  
 
Changes in the modes of apprehending and representing markets were also 
experienced elsewhere. For economists and business scholars of the 1960s, in 
particular, cybernetic metaphors allowed re-inventing heir professions around novel 
conceptualisations of knowledge, calculation and economic exchange. Interaction 
and coordination could now be modelled as a chain of i f rmation processors, a 
communication channel between companies and investors, between the world and 
the market. The economy, like society at large, became a subject of communication, 
command, control and intelligence – C3I, the paradigmatic pillar of cybernetic 
warfare (Mirowski, 2002). Financial economists took the metaphor to the extreme. 
Eugene Fama, for instance, presented decision-making in the market as amenable to 
information theory, referring his readers to Fred Attneave’s Applications of 
Information Theory to Psychology (Attneave, 1959). In effect, later 
conceptualisations of efficiency as based on the market’s processing of financial 
information (e.g. Fama, 1970) were rooted on the earlier application of information 
theory to the behaviour of stock prices (Fama, 1965; Theil et al., 1965). For Fischer 
Black, a forbearer of modern portfolio theory, finance could similarly be 
computational. A stock exchange, he wrote, 
can be embodied in a network of computers, and the costs of trading can be 
sharply reduced, without introducing any additional i stability in stock prices, 
and without being unfair either to small investors  to investors at large 
(Black, 1971, p. 87). 
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And as the Consolidated Tape entered in operation in 1974, economists 
Kenneth Garbade and William Silber provided empirical support to the connections 
between technology and the quality of markets. In their study of the telegraph, 
telephone and electronic tape in American and British markets, Garbade and Silber 
(1978) observed enhanced integration, reduced information delays, and a significant 
narrowing of inter-market price differences after tchnological adoption. For 
financial economists and regulators alike, technology was a handmaiden of the 
market, the visible skeleton of a global, invisible hand.  
7.4.2 Britain 
Informatic metaphors, however, were by no means as mobile and transportable as the 
physical circuitry of the computer. The cyborg vocabul ry that emerged in America 
was the result of the intense and localised efforts f scientists, economists, 
technologists, government officials and military organisations. Cyborgs, in sum, 
were the offspring of the American institutions of the Cold War (Edwards, 1996; 
Mirowski, 2002). Big science, nuclear warfare, global telecommunications networks, 
theories of human-machine interaction, and deconstructions of management-as-
information control all gave cyborg metaphors their s emingly universal credence. 
Yet the metaphors of the cyborgs were bounded to ide logy and experience, 
contained by the limits of a closed-world discourse. And as an instance of the cyborg 
worldview, the informatic metaphor was also constrained, originally to the domain of 
military engineering, subsequently to the managerial language and technological 
practices of post-war America.  
 
In Britain, the informatic metaphor followed an altogether different route. 
Unlike the United States, British cybernetic vocabul ries seemed to fade away soon 
after the Second World War, only to be rediscovered in the so-called information 
age. In the United Kingdom, metaphors derived from co puters, automation, and the 
manipulation of information were limited both in practical scope and political 
possibilities. Despite having been home to numerous proto-cyborgs – including Alan 
Turing, the computer scientist, Patrick Blackett, the physicist, and Maurice Kendall, 
the statistician – the obvious proponents of a cybernetic worldview in Britain seemed 
not to have fared particularly well to the messy politics of the post-war. Notably, 
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during the crucial period between the 1940s and 1960, British operations research – 
one of the platforms for the expansion of cyborg metaphors in America (Mirowski, 
2002) – was largely sidelined. For the British military, operations research was a 
tactical matter rather than an issue of the higher strategic conduct of war; and as of 
its founders, they were either denounced as academic imperialists that attempted to 
usurp the roles of civil servants or labelled communist sympathisers (Kirby, 2000). 
In his history of the field, Maurice Kirby notes that the diffusion of operations 
research in Britain occurred only after 1960, when operations researchers could 
present themselves as credible and legitimate gatekeep rs to computer technologies 
(Kirby, 2000; Hannah, 1983). 
 
From the early 1960s until the late 1970s, the metaphor of markets as 
information flows was largely confined to a marginal set of forms of market-making 
within British finance. Undoubtedly the most prominent of all was the material work 
performed by technologists around the infrastructures of the market. For these 
technologists, the informatic metaphor was a conceptual inheritance of their 
experience in other areas of practice/expertise, including the design of military 
aircraft control systems (e.g. George Hayter) and the development of real-time 
computing and telecommunications networks (e.g. Peter Bennett).  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the informatic metaphor was central to the 
worldviews of the leading technologists at the Lond Stock Exchange. For George 
Hayter, Director of Technical Services at the Londo Stock Exchange, the market is  
a series of feedback loops going on [with] different people in the chain […] 
using feedback from the end of the chain and even from earlier stages to drive 
their reactions. [With prices, you’ve] got a series of feedback loops that end 
up with this wiggly line at the end. It doesn’t seem to me like an equilibrium 
situation at all.  It’s jerky; it’s a whole series of people reacting in a time-
series-way to feedback which is also jerky. It’s jut not that elegant and clean 
(Hayter interview). 
And in the opinion of Peter Bennett, the misbehaviour of markets derives from 
people failing to ‘understand the whole picture’ and broader system constraints that 
generate certain types of feedback (Bennett interview). ‘Whenever you have positive 
feedback’, said Bennett, ‘you have instabilities’.  
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That’s a basic in engineering. A lot of people don’t understand instability, 
positive feedback, dynamic systems. A lot of [financi l and economic 
models] out there [are] actually very static, basiclly data mining, [creating] 
statistical pictures, as opposed to dynamic modelling (Bennett interview).  
By embracing the informatic metaphor and its conceptual corollaries, the 
technologists posited the market as a system that could be managed through 
technical-rational solutions. And by making markets apprehensible in technological 
terms, the informatic metaphor provided epistemic and organisational authority to the 
armies of technologists that would populate the institutions of finance of the late 
twentieth century. 
 
As computers and telecommunications expanded througout the 1970s, the 
informatic metaphor remained subordinated to worldviews that expressed the market 
as social, embodied or affective action. Finance was commonly represented in terms 
of the metaphorical vocabulary of the ‘club’. And although market participants 
understood the potential of information technologies for the securities industry – as 
exemplified by the attitude and reactions of the Stock Exchange to the introduction 
of ARIEL in 1974 – market action was largely gauged in terms of the physical 
encounter of brokers and jobbers, the production of paper tickets, meetings with 
industrialists and long lunches over port and wine. Arguably, the fact that finance 
was experienced as social and embodied action outweighed the symbolic power of 
information flows. The gentlemen were computerised but, despite their new 
technological appendages, they remained gentlemen. The practices and identities of 
the communities of finance of the London Stock Exchange continued to be mediated 
by imaginaries of honour and integrity. More importantly, however, interpersonal 
knowledge prevailed over mechanised forms of market information. As 
demonstrated by the history of the adoption of computers in Phillips & Drew and 
Wood MacKenzie (chapter 5), market participants valued and qualified market 
information through forms of knowledge produced at the interstices of social 
connectivities.  
 
The 1980s provided a shift in the market. In 1986 came a putative 
transformation of the City of London and the Stock Exchange within. With Big 
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Bang, finance moved onto the screen, partnerships made way to dual-capacity 
corporations, senior market participants retired, new divisions of labour were created, 
technologists acquired organisational power, and competition became a global affair. 
Yet one should not exaggerate the scale of change. The new market was a strictly 
social affair and, as in the past, connectivities and social forms of market-making 
remained central to the sense-making practices of financial intermediaries. The 
recollections of former jobber Michael Johnstone ar particularly illustrative. 
According to Johnstone, early on after Big Bang prices were unnecessarily realistic. 
Soon enough, however, they became ‘cumbersome, innoce t, inefficient’. As in the 
old market, people discovered that they did not have to show the prices they would 
ultimately deal in. The poker game continued, and rather than transmitting onto the 
market, prices on the screen became a means for adve tising the wares, for showing 
‘how competitive you could be’. Said Johnstone,  
You can actually deal  at a better price than the scr en price, anyway, so if 
you had your relationship [with a market-maker] you could come, [get a 
better price] and that was your reward for dealing with them (Johnstone 
interview). 
Despite the new medium of the screen, finance remained tied to the evaluative 
frameworks of the past, where prices were gauged in terms of interpersonal 
knowledge on the connectivities of the market (chapter 3, 4 and Pardo-Guerra, 2010).   
 
How, then, was the informatic metaphor adopted in Lo don? As explored in 
the previous chapters, the emergence and consolidati n of this metaphor in British 
finance occurred at the confluence of three distinct processes intersecting several 
regimes of market marking, adding to an ever-changing repertoire of financial 
representation.  
 
The first process related to the historically grounded re-materialisation of the 
marketplace, as examined in chapters 3 and 4. Towards the 1990s, and catalysed by 
the growth of market information services within the Stock Exchange, the leadership 
of the Technical Services department had amassed trust and repute within the social 
and organisational circles of British finance. Consequently, their vocabularies 
propagated throughout the higher echelons of the institutions of the market. In early 
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1989, for instance, technical teams were heavily involved in planning the future 
strategy of the Stock Exchange. For technologists, the challenges of finance were 
clear: ‘major investors are increasingly aware of the advantages of a world-wide 
spread of investments, and require suitable mechanisms of achieving this goal’ 
(Langlands, 1989). To survive in the turbulent environment of the early 1990s, the 
Stock Exchange thus required ‘competitor and market analysis, technology research 
and development, appropriate procurement strategy, having the right mix of and 
profile of technical and business staff, and considerable cooperation between them’ 
(Newlands, 1989). In sum, the prerequisite of survival was populating the established 
ethos of the organisation with ‘tried and tested management and scientific 
techniques’ (Lynch, 1989a). Effectively, technologists and their vocabulary had 
gained credence in the organisation and, increasingly, the market was understood by 
the membership of the Stock Exchange in technological terms. 
 
Technologists, however, were not limited to the Stock Exchange. Elsewhere 
in finance, systems development also re-mediated th relation between market 
participants and exchange. For Nic Stuchfield of the investment bank BZW, for 
instance, technology was clearly a competitive factor, and people throughout the City 
recognised that important parts of the market could be automated. Ventures into 
automation took numerous forms and occurred in several occasions, including the 
development of TRADE, BZW’s small order execution service in 1987 (chapter 5). The 
exodus of technologists from the Stock Exchange in 1992 and the subsequent 
development of alternative trading platforms (e.g. Tradepoint) further demonstrated 
that the landscape of finance in the City of London was technological. Engaging with 
the market now necessitated technological vocabularies nd their associated 
metaphors. Changes in the organisation of finance, coupled to the proliferation of 
networks, platforms, and technological competencies, had altered the experiential 
character of the markets in London. 
 
A second process involved the reconfiguration of some f the cognitive tools 
used by intermediaries in creating the market. Specifically, British varieties of 
market-making during the 1990s quickly became inscrbed in broader cultural 
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circuits (Thrift, 2005) that included, among other things, informatic metaphors of 
economic exchange. Economic expertise, for instance, acquired an authoritative 
presence within financial institutions, prompting the creation of networks and 
alignments with academic and research institutions that had adopted the canonical 
version of financial economics (Jovanovic, 2008) as a paradigmatic explanation of 
the behaviour of stock markets (Dimson interview). The informatic metaphor also 
arrived as a theoretical convergence between British economists and their American 
peers.  
 
The third and final process comprised the redefinitio  of the boundaries of 
authority between the state, the markets and the public which took the form of the re-
regulation of British finance. As examined in chapter 6, the introduction of the 
Financial Services Act 1986 and of statutory regulation in the 1990s allowed for the 
stock market to be conceptualised as a rule-governed mechanism amenable to expert 
control and intervention. Metaphors of transparency from earlier discourses of self-
regulation were redefined in technical terms under th  statutory system. Economic 
expertise, in particular, became a source of authoritative claims on the behaviour of 
the market and, consequently, transparency and market quality were interpreted in an 
informatic vocabulary. With governmental acquiescence, the market became an 
informatic machine.  
 
To interpret the rise of the informatic metaphor in British finance as a tale of 
the discovery of information would therefore misrepresent the nuances of the history 
presented here and in previous chapters. Indeed, if London grew to see markets as 
information flows it was not because this metaphor describes their true nature, the 
essence of economic exchange. Rather, the metaphor matu ed by coordinating action 
across domains of market-making, by creating boundaries of economic exchange. 
Markets in London were made informatic by the adoption of technological 
metaphors of processing, control, transparency and efficiency. But for these 
metaphors to be intelligible, for these modes of apprehension to mediate market-
making activities, material foundations had to be laid, work had to be done, and 
institutions had to be built. The history of the Lond n Stock Exchange was 
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necessarily the tale of the creation of these foundations, forms of work and 
institutions. It is not, however, a saga of efficiency, a legend of the discovery, 











8 Conclusions  
The chapters in this volume provide a multifaceted approach to the historic 
transformations surrounding the Big Bang of 27 October 1986. By exploring the 
twists and turns that ushered these transformations, this volume also provides a 
critique of the information age in finance and, in particular, of three foundational 
myths that are often used to explicate the evolution (and, occasionally, to predict the 
destiny) of global markets – namely, that the information age leads to 
dematerialisation, disintermediation, and deregulation. 
 
Let the first lesson of this study be that markets are material. Much of the 
exploration of this volume is in line with a growing body of literature that stresses 
the critical role of material entities in performing finance (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 
2009). The history of the Stock Exchange, then, can be represented as a history of 
technological innovation, a perspective that is lacking in the extant literature on 
finance. For better or for worse, analyses of the evolution of finance so far have been 
predominantly the purview of economic and business hi tory, areas that are notably 
able to black-box technologies in terms of inherent fu ctions, cost/benefit 
comparisons and technical potentialities. As the literature in science and technology 
studies has shown for several decades now (MacKenzie t al., 2003; Williams et al., 
1996), however, neither the genesis nor the uses of technologies are given by such 
imperatives. The technological trajectories of the Stock Exchange are only 
intelligible by understanding the role of a core group of technologists in designing, 
implementing, and projecting technologies in the marketplace. As such, chapters 3 
and 4 complement traditional accounts of the history of British finance by 
demonstrating the paths taken in constructing the (oft n ignored) material platforms 
of the market.  
 
The second lesson is that, as much as they are material, markets hinge on 
social connectivities. This claim is in line with a strong tradition of economic 
sociology that has argued for the social embeddednes, or social connectedness, of 
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economic action. Yet in engaging with this literatue, the exploration here presented 
on the history of the Stock Exchange encountered a pervasive notion that the 
fundamental cultural transition of 1980s British finance was given by the move from 
a market culture of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ to one of ‘global finance’. It might 
seem, for some, that the death of gentlemanly capitalism signalled the rise of the 
information age in British finance. While it may bepossible to speak of market 
cultures, this study has opted for adopting the langu ge of social imaginaries. And as 
shown in chapter 5, the history of the London Stock Exchange’s markets is better 
framed in terms of an ongoing reconstruction of a social imaginary of honour and 
familiarity than through the thick cultures of the g ntlemanly capitalist. Indeed, in 
showing this ongoing reconstitution, chapter 5 demonstrates that the evolution of 
London’s markets cannot be dissociated from the history of the social connectivities 
between jobbers, brokers, investors, regulators and members of staff, which were 
established by and through the practices of intermediation in British finance, and that 
required the creation of specific imaginaries that served as mechanisms for mediating 
actions in the marketplace.  
 
The third lesson is similar, in a sense, in so far as it challenges the view of 
regulatory change as a discontinuous process resulting from a reconfiguration of 
economic incentives as perceived by the state. On the contrary, regulation is to be 
understood as part of a constant process of negotiating the boundaries of legitimate 
action within the social connectivities of finance, a matter that required only 
relatively lately the overt intervention of the state. The myth of regulation is thus 
erred, in as much as it fails to capture changes in the conceptualisation of the market, 
the proliferation of formal rules, and in the adopti n and abandoning of specific 
technical vocabularies within market institutions. The deregulations of the 1980s 
seem to have entailed more than anything else the creation of novel boundaries 
within the market, rather than the elimination of cntrols across the board (Vogel, 
1996). 
 
Finally, this volume offers a modest, yet insightful, analytical framework for 
markets by introducing the notion of a market-making regime. In presenting markets 
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as entities that cannot be apprehended in their entirety, this volume shows the 
importance of focusing on specific instances of market-making work. There, chapter 
7 highlights the role of metaphors in representing hrough experience and 
coordinating action. The case of specific metaphor is analysed, offering some 
provisional arguments on the changing vocabularies and modes of apprehension of 
finance. Indeed, while the myths of the information age may have flattened a rich 
story of social and technological in the City of London, the metaphorical repertoire 
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Appendix A. Interviews  
Name Date Location 
Peter Bennett 16 July 2007 London 
Simon Peter Buck 24 September 2007 Dartford 
John Cheine 8 April 2008 London 
Peter Cox 28 September 2007 London 
Elroy Dimson 28 February 2008 London 
Scott Dobbie 26 February 2008 London 
Dugald Eadie 10 April 2008 London 
Ian McLelland  22 October 2007 York 
Pete Harris  5 September 2007 New York  
(via telephone) 
George Hayter 25 October 2007 Gloucester 
David Hobbs 22 November 2007 London 
Michael Johnstone 27 February 2008 London 
Patrick Mitford-Slade  20 November 2007 Hampshire 
Michael Newman 22 November 2007 London 
Barry Riley 20 April 2007 Edinburgh 
Graham Ross Russell 10 April 2008 London 
John Scannell 21 November 2007 London 
Daniel Sheridan 26 May 2007 Kent 
David Steen 24 May 2007 Kent 
Nic Stuchfield 26 September 2007 London 
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